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ABSTRACT	  
	  
Toward	  Understanding	  the	  Role	  of	  Leadership	  in	  Alleviating	  State	  Fragility	  
By	  
Ajay	  Tejasvi	  Narasimhan	  
Claremont	  Graduate	  University:	  2012	  
	  
Approximately	  sixty	  countries	  have	  been	  designated	  ‘Fragile	  States’	  by	  
international	  development	  agencies.	  Home	  to	  two	  billion	  of	  the	  world’s	  poorest	  
people,	  these	  fragile	  states	  are	  characterized	  by	  violence,	  weak	  institutions	  and	  
shattered	  economies.	  Not	  only	  do	  they	  pose	  a	  challenge	  to	  regional	  security,	  they	  
often	  become	  the	  breeding	  grounds	  for	  terrorism.	  	  
Donor	  agencies	  pour	  billions	  of	  dollars	  annually	  into	  these	  countries	  –	  
through	  policy	  advice	  and	  conditional	  loans	  –	  to	  alleviate	  fragility	  and	  promote	  
development.	  Development,	  however	  it	  is	  defined,	  involves	  economic,	  social	  and	  
political	  transformation.	  	  Such	  a	  transformation	  is	  shaped	  by	  ideas,	  engages	  
multiple	  interests,	  and	  proceeds	  within	  rules	  and	  norms	  set	  by	  political	  
institutions.	  Since	  the	  structure	  of	  political	  institutions	  is	  influenced	  by	  human	  
agency,	  leadership	  becomes	  important	  to	  study.	  Leadership	  is	  crucial	  particularly	  
in	  fragile	  states,	  where	  institutions	  are	  weak	  or	  have	  been	  destroyed	  by	  conflict;	  
however,	  a	  systematic	  effort	  to	  examine	  the	  role	  of	  leaders	  and	  coalitions	  in	  fragile	  
states	  is	  lacking.	  	  
This	  dissertation	  seeks	  to	  create	  a	  methodology	  to	  improve	  understanding	  
of	  the	  role	  of	  different	  leadership	  strategies	  in	  bringing	  about	  transitions	  in	  and	  
out	  of	  fragility.	  To	  make	  the	  scope	  manageable,	  the	  study	  focuses	  on:	  (i)	  leadership	  
at	  the	  national	  level;	  and	  (ii)	  fragile	  states	  in	  Africa.	  It	  does	  so	  by	  examining:	  (i)	  
evidence	  from	  country	  level	  panel	  data	  on	  leadership	  (regime)	  change	  and	  
fragility;	  and	  (ii)	  in-­‐depth	  analytical	  case	  studies	  of	  transitions	  in	  and	  out	  of	  
fragility	  in	  four	  countries:	  Zimbabwe,	  Uganda,	  Rwanda,	  and	  South	  Africa.	  	  
The	  analysis	  looks	  at	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  change	  agent’s	  
leadership	  strategy	  (the	  independent	  variable:	  political	  participation	  and	  inclusion,	  
economic	  growth	  and	  inclusion,	  and	  security	  and	  justice)	  and	  fragility	  outcomes	  
(dependent	  variable:	  conflict	  and	  security	  indicators,	  economic	  indicators,	  and	  the	  
approach	  to	  political	  inclusion).	  	  
The	  results	  of	  the	  regression	  analysis	  exhibit	  a	  robust	  association	  between	  
leadership	  change	  and	  fragility.	  Furthermore,	  the	  country	  cases	  show	  how	  
different	  types	  of	  leadership	  strategies	  lead	  to	  varying	  trajectories	  of	  fragile	  states’	  
post-­‐transition.	  The	  case	  studies	  reveal	  different	  approaches	  to	  sequencing	  of	  
political	  inclusion	  and	  the	  role	  of	  leadership	  exit	  in	  transitions	  from	  fragility.	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1. The	  Challenge	  of	  Fragile	  States	  
Why	  the	  Global	  Focus	  on	  Fragile	  States	  
Approximately	  two	  billion	  people	  live	  in	  countries	  affected	  by	  fragility	  and	  
conflict.1	  Poverty	  rates	  in	  fragile	  states	  average	  54	  percent	  compared	  with	  22	  
percent	  for	  low-­‐income	  countries	  as	  a	  whole.2	  These	  “fragile	  states”	  represent	  a	  
major	  challenge	  for	  global	  poverty	  reduction,	  achievement	  of	  the	  Millennium	  
Development	  Goals,	  for	  peace	  and	  stability	  and	  for	  global	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  war	  on	  
terror.3	  	  The	  African	  continent	  contains	  the	  majority	  of	  fragile	  states	  with	  most	  
Africans	  living	  on	  less	  than	  two	  dollars	  a	  day.	  The	  average	  lifespan	  in	  these	  
countries	  is	  under	  50.	  Drought	  and	  famine	  persist.4	  	  
Fragile	  states	  are	  characterized	  by	  violence,	  a	  legacy	  of	  conflict,	  weak	  
governance	  and	  limited	  administrative	  capacity.	  	  Underlying	  fragility	  is	  a	  history	  of	  
divided	  identity,	  political	  fragmentation,	  and	  weak	  institutions.	  	  Transitioning	  out	  
of	  fragility	  is	  a	  complex	  and	  arduous	  task.	  The	  effort	  requires	  a	  multipronged	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Ashraf	  Ghani	  &	  Clare	  Lockhart,	  Fixing	  Failing	  States:	  A	  Framework	  for	  Rebuilding	  a	  Fractured	  World,	  (Oxford,	  UK:	  Oxford	  
University	  Press,	  2008),	  6-­‐9.	  	  
2	  The	  World	  Bank,	  Global	  Monitoring	  Report	  2007:	  Confronting	  the	  Challenges	  of	  Gender	  Equality,	  (Washington	  DC:	  The	  
World	  Bank	  Group,	  2007),	  10-­‐12.	  
3	  The	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals	  are	  eight	  international	  development	  goals	  that	  all	  192	  United	  Nations	  member	  states	  
and	  at	  least	  23	  international	  organizations	  have	  agreed	  to	  achieve	  by	  the	  year	  2015.	  They	  include	  eradicating	  extreme	  
poverty,	  reducing	  child	  mortality	  rates,	  fighting	  disease	  epidemics,	  such	  as	  AIDS,	  and	  developing	  a	  global	  partnership	  for	  
development.	  
4	  See	  “Africa	  Rising”	  in	  The	  Economist,	  (December	  3,	  2011).	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approach	  to	  secure	  peace,	  rebuild	  institutions,	  and	  accelerate	  growth	  and	  poverty	  
reduction.5	  	  	  
The	  focus	  of	  the	  international	  community	  has	  been	  on	  providing	  financial	  
and	  technical	  assistance	  and	  on	  external	  intervention,	  especially	  since	  problems	  of	  
fragility	  can,	  in	  some	  instances,	  be	  transnational.	  	  Nonetheless	  insufficient	  
emphasis	  has	  been	  placed	  on	  understanding	  the	  role	  that	  domestic	  leadership	  
processes	  play	  in	  lifting	  countries	  out	  of	  fragility	  or	  causing	  or	  keeping	  countries	  in	  
fragility.	  	  
The	  Purpose	  and	  Focus	  of	  this	  Dissertation	  
This	  dissertation	  examines	  the	  role	  of	  leadership	  in	  transitions	  in	  and	  out	  of	  
fragility.	  To	  make	  the	  scope	  manageable,	  the	  thesis	  focuses	  on:	  (i)	  leadership	  at	  the	  
national	  level;	  (ii)	  fragile	  states	  in	  Africa;	  and	  (iii)	  the	  aspects	  of	  fragility	  related	  to	  
political	  participation	  and	  inclusion,	  economic	  growth	  and	  inclusion,	  and	  security	  
and	  justice.	  	  It	  does	  so	  by	  examining:	  (i)	  evidence	  from	  global	  cross-­‐country	  time-­‐
series	  data	  on	  leadership	  (regime)	  change	  and	  fragility;	  and	  (ii)	  in-­‐depth	  insights	  
from	  four	  analytical	  case	  studies	  of	  successful,	  unsuccessful,	  and	  ongoing	  
transitions	  out	  of	  fragility.	  	  
Whither	  the	  Winds	  of	  Change?	  
Though	  the	  proliferation	  of	  technology	  and	  improved	  communication	  have	  
enabled	  citizens	  to	  demand	  better	  services	  from	  their	  governments,	  these	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  The	  World	  Bank,	  World	  Development	  Report	  2011:	  Conflict,	  Security,	  and	  Development,	  (Washington,	  DC:	  The	  World	  Bank	  
Group,	  2011),	  145.	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advancements	  are	  only	  just	  beginning	  to	  reach	  the	  people	  who	  live	  in	  fragile	  and	  
post-­‐conflict	  states.	  Achieving	  the	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals	  (MDGs)	  
remains	  a	  distant	  hope	  for	  many	  of	  these	  fragile	  states.6	  
Figure	  1-­‐1	  below	  shows	  the	  total	  global	  MDG	  deficit	  (excluding	  Brazil,	  
Russia,	  India,	  and	  China).	  Figures	  in	  red	  and	  yellow	  show	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  
MDG	  deficit	  related	  to	  people	  living	  in	  countries	  affected	  by	  or	  recovering	  from	  
violence.	  
	  
Figure	  1-­‐1:	  Conflict,	  Fragility	  and	  MDG	  Achievement7	  
The	  2011	  World	  Development	  Report	  (WDR):	  Conflict,	  Security	  and	  
Development	  notes	  that	  progress	  in	  MDG	  achievement	  has	  been	  slowest	  in	  fragile	  
and	  conflict-­‐affected	  states.	  Besieged	  by	  conflict	  and	  violence,	  and	  hampered	  by	  
weak	  institutional	  capacity,	  these	  states	  face	  particular	  challenges	  in	  meeting	  the	  
MDGs.	  Some	  startling	  statistics	  include:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The	  World	  Bank,	  Global	  Monitoring	  Report	  2007:	  Confronting	  the	  Challenges	  of	  Gender	  Equality,	  (Washington	  DC:	  The	  
World	  Bank	  Group,	  2007).	  
7	  This	  table	  was	  developed	  using	  World	  Development	  Indicators	  Data	  and	  analysis	  by	  World	  Bank	  staff	  and	  World	  
Development	  Report	  2011	  collaborating	  authors.	  For	  more	  details,	  please	  see	  The	  World	  Bank,	  World	  Development	  Report	  
2011:	  Conflict,	  Security,	  and	  Development,	  (Washington,	  DC:	  The	  World	  Bank	  Group,	  2011).	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• Fragile	  states	  account	  for	  close	  to	  a	  fifth	  of	  the	  population	  of	  low-­‐income	  
countries,	  but	  more	  than	  a	  third	  of	  their	  poor.	  	  
• No	  fragile	  or	  conflict-­‐affected	  country	  has	  achieved	  a	  single	  Millennium	  
Development	  Goal	  as	  of	  December	  2011.	  	  
• These	  countries	  account	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  MDG	  deficit	  (see	  Figure	  1-­‐1),	  
and	  generally	  lag	  40	  to	  60	  percent	  behind	  other	  low	  and	  middle-­‐income	  
countries	  in	  MDG	  achievement.	  
• Fragile	  states	  are	  home	  to	  33	  percent	  of	  the	  population	  that	  survive	  on	  less	  than	  
$1.25	  per	  day,	  50	  percent	  of	  the	  world’s	  children	  who	  die	  before	  the	  age	  of	  five,	  
and	  where	  33	  percent	  of	  all	  maternal	  deaths	  occur.8	  	  
Not	  only	  are	  these	  fragile	  states	  falling	  behind,	  but	  also	  the	  gap	  with	  other	  
developing	  countries	  has	  been	  widening	  since	  the	  1970s.	  In	  2006,	  per	  capita	  GDP	  
grew	  only	  at	  two	  percent	  in	  fragile	  states,	  whereas	  it	  reached	  six	  percent	  in	  other	  
low-­‐income	  countries.	  The	  World	  Bank	  projects	  that	  fragile	  states	  will	  constitute	  
an	  even	  larger	  share	  of	  low-­‐income	  countries	  in	  the	  future,	  given	  that	  many	  better	  
performing	  low-­‐income	  countries	  will	  graduate	  to	  middle-­‐income	  status.	  	  
The	  increasing	  proportion	  of	  fragile	  states	  will,	  without	  a	  renewed	  approach	  for	  
dealing	  with	  them,	  make	  international	  engagement	  and	  development	  assistance	  
less	  effective.9	  Accelerating	  progress	  in	  these	  fragile	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  countries	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  The	  World	  Bank,	  World	  Development	  Report	  2011:	  Conflict,	  Security,	  and	  Development,	  (Washington,	  DC:	  The	  World	  Bank	  
Group,	  2011),	  59-­‐60.	  
9	  The	  World	  Bank,	  The	  Growth	  Report:	  Strategies	  for	  Sustained	  Growth	  and	  Inclusive	  Development,	  (Washington	  DC:	  The	  
World	  Bank	  Group,	  2009),	  7.	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toward	  achieving	  the	  MDGs	  will	  require	  a	  fundamental	  and	  systemic	  shift	  in	  
orientation,	  both	  by	  their	  governments	  and	  the	  international	  financial	  institutions	  
working	  to	  assist	  them.	  
The	  Global	  Impact	  of	  Fragile	  States	  	  
While	  most	  fragile	  states	  were	  treated	  as	  a	  backwater	  of	  international	  
politics	  up	  until	  the	  1990s,	  they	  have	  increasingly	  attracted	  attention	  since	  the	  end	  
of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  The	  terrorist	  attacks	  on	  September	  11,	  2001	  in	  New	  York	  and	  
Washington,	  D.C.	  prompted	  a	  decisive	  shift	  in	  the	  world	  community’s	  attitude	  
towards	  fragile	  states.	  	  
Previously	  neglected,	  fragile	  states	  are	  now	  seen	  as	  a	  core	  development	  
issue	  and	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	  global	  security.	  The	  promotion	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  good	  
governance	  in	  these	  states	  is	  aimed	  at	  arresting	  the	  downward	  slide	  and	  
ameliorating	  the	  threat.	  The	  typical	  crisis	  of	  the	  fragile	  state	  constitutes	  a	  threat	  to	  
the	  international	  system	  because	  of	  the	  social	  conditions	  and	  conflicts	  that	  it	  
generates.	  	  
Over	  the	  past	  few	  years,	  the	  development	  challenges	  faced	  by	  fragile	  states	  
have	  moved	  to	  the	  top	  of	  the	  international	  development	  agenda.	  The	  emphasis	  on	  
weak	  and	  failing	  states	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  peace	  and	  security	  has	  become	  conventional	  
wisdom.	  Research	  shows	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  state	  fragility	  and	  spillover	  
exists,	  but	  it	  varies.10	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  See	  Stewart	  Patrick,	  “Weak	  States	  and	  Global	  Threats:	  Assessing	  Evidence	  of	  Spillovers,”	  Working	  Paper	  no.	  73,	  
(Washington,	  DC:	  Center	  for	  Global	  Development,	  2006).	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Fragile	  states	  have	  often	  provided	  transnational	  terrorist	  organizations	  with	  
benefits	  such	  as	  training	  camps	  and	  access	  through	  their	  borders.	  Fragile	  and	  post-­‐
conflict	  states	  play	  a	  critical	  role	  in	  proliferation	  of	  small	  arms	  as	  well	  as	  weapons	  
of	  mass	  destruction.	  The	  easy	  availability	  of	  weapons	  tends	  to	  weaken	  State	  
capacity	  further,	  fuelling	  wars	  and	  fostering	  crime	  and	  violence.	  Transnational	  
organized	  criminal	  networks	  are	  drawn	  to	  environments	  where	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  is	  
absent,	  such	  as	  those	  provided	  by	  fragile	  states.	  Money	  laundering,	  financial	  fraud	  
and	  cyber	  crime	  also	  find	  a	  home	  in	  fragile	  states.	  	  
Violent	  conflict	  and	  complex	  emergencies	  often	  spill	  over	  porous	  borders	  
with	  potentially	  destabilizing	  effects.	  The	  economic	  cost	  of	  State	  failure	  is	  borne	  by	  
neighboring	  countries.	  Weak	  and	  failing	  states	  may	  serve	  as	  important	  breeding	  
grounds	  for	  new	  pandemics.	  Although	  there	  are	  no	  conclusive	  data	  on	  the	  
relationship	  between	  state	  capacity	  and	  epidemics,	  the	  global	  infectious	  disease	  
burden	  falls	  on	  low	  and	  middle-­‐income	  countries.	  
Fragile	  states	  not	  only	  face	  issues	  of	  abject	  poverty,	  but	  also	  contend	  with	  
cycles	  of	  repeated	  violence	  with	  a	  mix	  of	  political	  and	  criminal	  motives.	  As	  the	  2011	  
World	  Development	  Report:	  Conflict,	  Security,	  and	  Development	  notes,	  the	  violence	  
can	  be	  spurred	  by	  a	  range	  of	  domestic	  and	  international	  stresses,	  such	  as	  
trafficking	  networks,	  youth	  unemployment,	  and	  tensions	  among	  social	  groups.11	  
The	  probability	  of	  violence	  is	  much	  higher	  when	  one	  combines	  these	  internal	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  The	  World	  Bank,	  World	  Development	  Report	  2011:	  Conflict,	  Security,	  and	  Development,	  (Washington,	  DC:	  The	  World	  Bank	  
Group,	  2011),	  1-­‐3.	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external	  stresses	  with	  weak	  and	  incapable	  institutions.	  The	  report	  also	  notes	  that	  
the	  threat	  of	  violence	  increases	  when	  countries	  do	  not	  provide	  their	  citizens	  with	  
security,	  access	  to	  justice,	  and	  open	  markets	  that	  generate	  employment.	  Violent	  
groups	  are	  able	  take	  advantage	  of	  such	  circumstances	  and	  make	  the	  situation	  
worse.	  Studies	  show	  that	  the	  conflicts	  in	  fragile	  states	  are	  not	  one-­‐off	  events,	  but	  
are	  ongoing	  and	  repeated.	  Data	  show	  that	  90	  percent	  of	  the	  last	  decade’s	  civil	  wars	  
occurred	  in	  countries	  that	  already	  had	  had	  a	  civil	  war	  in	  the	  last	  30	  years.12	  	  
It	  is	  obvious	  that	  these	  cycles	  of	  violence	  and	  conflict	  threaten	  
development,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  lack	  of	  progress	  towards	  the	  millennium	  
development	  goals.	  Another	  troubling	  feature	  is	  that	  different	  forms	  of	  violence	  –	  
political,	  criminal,	  religious	  –	  link	  to	  one	  another.	  Criminal	  gangs	  can	  support	  
political	  violence	  during	  electoral	  periods,	  as	  in	  Haiti,	  Jamaica,	  and	  Kenya.	  
Ideological	  extremist	  movements	  like	  Al-­‐Qaeda	  and	  Lashkar-­‐e-­‐Taiba,	  influence	  
violence	  in	  Afghanistan,	  Iraq,	  and	  Pakistan.	  	  
Violence	  and	  conflict	  often	  spill	  over	  into	  regional	  and	  sometimes	  global	  
arenas.	  The	  wars	  in	  Afghanistan	  and	  Iraq	  clearly	  have	  global	  repercussions.	  The	  
violence	  in	  Tanzania’s	  neighbors	  causes	  the	  country	  to	  lose	  an	  estimated	  0.7	  
percent	  of	  GDP	  growth	  per	  neighbor	  in	  conflict.13	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  See	  Joseph	  Hewitt,	  Jonathan	  Wilkenfeld,	  and	  Ted	  Gurr,	  Peace	  and	  Conflict	  2010,	  (College	  Park,	  MD:	  Center	  for	  
International	  Development	  and	  Conflict	  Management,	  2010),	  1-­‐2.	  	  
13	  See	  the	  effects	  of	  conflict	  on	  trade	  by	  Reuven	  Glick	  and	  Alan	  Taylor,	  “Collateral	  Damage:	  Trade	  Disruption	  and	  the	  
Economic	  Impact	  of	  War”	  CEPR	  Discussion	  Paper	  No.	  5209,	  2005.	  Available	  at	  SSRN:	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=822767	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Refugees	  and	  internally	  displaced	  persons	  have	  increased	  threefold	  in	  the	  
last	  three	  decades.	  The	  World	  Development	  Report	  also	  notes	  that	  nearly	  75	  
percent	  of	  the	  world’s	  refugees	  are	  hosted	  by	  neighboring	  countries.	  Thus,	  fragility	  
clearly	  has	  consequences	  that	  reach	  beyond	  a	  country’s	  borders.	  	  
In	  addition,	  violence	  and	  conflict	  exact	  a	  heavy	  toll	  on	  society.	  Many	  
families	  experience	  the	  death	  of	  a	  child	  before	  their	  time.	  It	  is	  unsafe	  for	  women	  
and	  children	  to	  walk	  on	  the	  streets.	  Even	  everyday	  events	  like	  going	  to	  school	  or	  
the	  grocery	  store,	  become	  a	  challenge.	  	  
Violence	  impacts	  economic	  activity	  and	  reduces	  investments	  in	  the	  country.	  
In	  Guatemala	  for	  instance,	  violence	  in	  the	  country	  cost	  it	  more	  than	  seven	  percent	  
of	  GDP	  in	  2005.14	  The	  World	  Development	  Report	  notes	  that	  the	  direct	  impact	  of	  
violence	  primarily	  falls	  on	  young	  males,	  who	  form	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  fighting	  
force.	  Male	  children	  who	  witness	  violent	  abuses	  have	  higher	  tendencies	  to	  
perpetuate	  violence	  later	  in	  life,	  as	  well.	  	  
The	  next	  section	  examines	  the	  meaning	  of	  fragility	  and	  its	  structural	  causes.	  	  
Definitions	  of	  “Fragile	  States”	  	  
The	  Oxford	  English	  Dictionary	  defines	  the	  word	  “fragile”	  as	  meaning	  “liable	  
to	  break	  or	  be	  broken;	  easily	  snapped	  or	  shattered;	  in	  a	  looser	  sense,	  weak,	  
perishable,	  easily	  destroyed.”	  In	  the	  context	  of	  independent	  political	  states	  or	  
countries,	  the	  term	  “fragile”	  implies	  the	  existence	  of	  states	  whose	  very	  existence	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  The	  World	  Bank,	  World	  Development	  Report	  2011:	  Conflict,	  Security,	  and	  Development,	  (Washington,	  DC:	  The	  World	  Bank	  
Group,	  2011),	  56-­‐58.	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under	  threat.	  In	  the	  extreme	  case,	  where	  states	  do	  cease	  to	  exist	  or	  function	  to	  any	  
normal	  degree,	  they	  can	  even	  be	  termed	  “failed	  states”.	  
A	  number	  of	  definitions	  and	  measurements	  of	  fragile	  states	  are	  currently	  in	  
use.	  Many	  of	  these	  have	  been	  developed	  by	  international	  development	  agencies	  
and	  reflect	  the	  concern	  that	  these	  countries	  may	  be	  too	  weak	  to	  use	  aid	  effectively.	  
One	  of	  the	  better-­‐known	  definitions	  is	  that	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom’s	  Department	  
for	  International	  Development	  (DFID),	  which	  defines	  a	  fragile	  state	  as	  one	  where	  
“the	  Government	  cannot	  or	  will	  not	  deliver	  core	  functions	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  
people,	  including	  the	  poor.”15	  Core	  functions	  refer	  to	  the	  provision	  of	  basic	  services	  
such	  as	  education,	  health,	  infrastructure,	  and	  security,	  which	  are	  often	  the	  focus	  of	  
donor	  aid	  programs.	  	  
The	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  OECD	  classify	  states	  as	  fragile	  based	  on	  their	  score	  
in	  the	  Country	  Policy	  and	  Institutional	  Assessment	  (CPIA)	  ratings.16	  A	  low-­‐income	  
country	  with	  a	  CPIA	  score	  of	  3.0	  or	  less	  is	  seen	  as	  fragile.	  These	  countries	  were	  
termed	  “low-­‐income	  countries	  under	  stress”	  (LICUS)	  and	  have	  been	  described	  as	  
“difficult	  partnership	  countries.”	  This	  denotes	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  underlying	  concern	  
of	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  OECD	  is	  that	  countries	  may	  be	  too	  fragile	  to	  use	  aid	  
effectively.	  The	  term,	  “fragile	  states”	  generally	  describes	  countries	  facing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  See	  UK	  Department	  for	  International	  Development,	  Aid	  Effectiveness	  in	  Fragile	  States,	  
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.dfid.gov.uk/mdg/aid-­‐effectiveness/fragile-­‐states.asp	  (accessed	  
December	  25,	  2011).	  
16	  The	  Country	  Policy	  and	  Institutional	  Assessment	  (CPIA)	  rates	  countries	  against	  a	  set	  of	  16	  criteria	  grouped	  in	  four	  
clusters:	  (a)	  economic	  management;	  (b)	  structural	  policies;	  (c)	  policies	  for	  social	  inclusion	  and	  equity;	  and	  (d)	  public	  sector	  
management	  and	  institutions.	  See	  	  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ENVIRONMENT/EXTDATASTA/0,,contentMDK:21115900~menuP
K:2935553~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:2875751,00.html	  (accessed	  April	  18,	  2011).	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particularly	  severe	  development	  challenges,	  such	  as	  weak	  governance,	  limited	  
administrative	  capacity,	  violence,	  or	  the	  legacy	  of	  conflict.	  	  
Other	  terms	  used	  to	  describe	  fragile	  states	  include:	  collapsed	  states,	  failed	  
states,	  failing	  states,	  fragile	  states,	  low-­‐income	  countries	  under	  stress,	  and	  weak	  
states.	  	  
Despite	  methodological	  variations,	  however,	  development	  partners	  have	  
been	  converging	  around	  a	  definition	  developed	  at	  the	  OECD,	  which	  recognizes	  
some	  common	  characteristics.	  	  These	  include	  weak	  governance	  and	  vulnerability	  
to	  conflict,	  together	  with	  differentiated	  constraints	  and	  opportunities	  in	  fragile	  
situations	  of	  (1)	  prolonged	  crisis	  or	  impasse,	  (2)	  post-­‐conflict	  or	  political	  transition,	  
(3)	  gradual	  improvement,	  and	  (4)	  deteriorating	  governance.17	  	  
In	  the	  literature,	  there	  is	  no	  uniform	  agreement	  over	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
countries	  are	  classified	  as	  fragile.	  Many	  researchers	  and	  practitioners	  take	  issue	  
with	  the	  choice	  of	  a	  rigid	  CPIA	  score	  of	  3.0	  as	  the	  cut-­‐off	  point	  for	  deciding	  
whether	  or	  not	  a	  country	  is	  too	  “fragile”	  to	  use	  aid	  effectively.	  	  	  
Another	  operational	  definition	  of	  fragile	  states	  comes	  from	  the	  Canadian	  
International	  Development	  Agency’s	  “Country	  Indicators	  for	  Foreign	  Policy	  
(CIFP)”	  project.	  David	  Carment,	  Yiagadeesen	  Samy,	  and	  Stewart	  Prest	  provided	  a	  
critical	  review	  of	  the	  CIFP	  Fragility	  Index	  for	  a	  United	  Nations	  research	  project.	  
These	  researchers	  found	  that	  the	  fundamental	  causes	  of	  state	  fragility	  are	  broader	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17	  See	  The	  World	  Bank,	  Global	  Monitoring	  Report	  2007:	  Confronting	  the	  Challenges	  of	  Gender	  Equality,	  (Washington	  DC:	  The	  
World	  Bank	  Group,	  2007).	  
	   11	  
than	  just	  violent	  conflict.18	  In	  the	  index,	  state	  fragility	  is	  measured	  across	  three	  
factors:	  threats	  to	  the	  authority	  (A),	  legitimacy	  (L)	  and	  capacity	  (C)	  of	  the	  state.	  
Performance	  is	  measured	  for	  these	  three	  factors	  across	  different	  dimensions,	  
which	  include	  economic,	  governance,	  security	  and	  crime,	  human	  development,	  
demographic	  and	  environmental.	  According	  to	  the	  CIFP	  Index,	  70	  percent	  of	  the	  
40	  most	  fragile	  states	  are	  in	  sub-­‐Saharan	  Africa.19	  	  
What	  Causes	  State	  Fragility?	  
Understanding	  the	  Causes	  of	  State	  Fragility	  	  
In	  the	  literature	  on	  Africa,	  considerable	  attention	  has	  been	  devoted	  to	  the	  
role	  of	  colonial	  history.	  Africa	  represents	  an	  appropriate	  setting	  for	  analyzing	  the	  
impact	  of	  colonial	  rule.	  Historically,	  nowhere	  else	  was	  colonization	  as	  far-­‐reaching	  
as	  it	  was	  in	  the	  African	  experience	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  19th	  century.	  There	  is	  a	  shared	  
perception	  that	  state	  fragility	  –	  as	  well	  as	  other	  dysfunctions,	  such	  as	  corruption	  
and	  ethnic	  conflict	  –	  might	  find	  its	  roots	  in	  the	  legacy	  of	  colonization	  and	  the	  way	  
these	  states	  were	  formed.	  	  
The	  leading	  theories	  on	  state	  formation	  include	  those	  by	  political	  scientists	  
such	  as	  Charles	  Tilly,	  Hendrick	  Spruyt	  and	  Jeffrey	  Herbst,	  who	  contend	  that	  state	  
formation	  is	  a	  non-­‐linear	  process.	  They	  trace	  the	  formation	  of	  nation	  states	  to	  their	  
medieval	  European	  roots	  as	  feudal	  states,	  city-­‐states,	  or	  city	  leagues.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18	  See	  Yiagadeesan	  Samy,	  David	  Carment,	  and	  Steward	  Prest,	  “Security,	  Development,	  and	  the	  Fragile	  State:	  Bridging	  the	  
Gap	  Between	  Theory	  and	  Policy”,	  (London,	  UK:	  Routledge,	  2009).	  	  
19	  See	  the	  2007	  Country	  Indicators	  for	  Foreign	  Policy	  Country	  Ranking	  Table.	  
http://www.carleton.ca/cifp/app/ffs_ranking.php	  (accessed	  April	  18,	  2011)	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Tilly	  asserts	  that	  any	  account	  of	  state	  formation	  must	  deal	  with	  the	  nature	  
of	  institutional	  variation	  that	  existed	  in	  medieval	  Europe	  and	  the	  subsequent	  
consolidation	  of	  the	  state.20	  	  
Hendrick	  Spruyt	  argues	  that	  where	  Tilly	  explains	  the	  variation	  between	  
types	  of	  organizations	  by	  differential	  responses	  to	  the	  functional	  demand	  of	  
waging	  war,	  his	  account	  is	  based	  upon	  the	  impact	  of	  economic	  change	  and	  
subsequent	  politics	  of	  coalition	  bargaining.	  Spruyt	  sees	  the	  economic	  
transformation	  of	  medieval	  Europe	  as	  the	  primary	  independent	  variable	  that	  made	  
new	  political	  coalitions	  possible.21	  	  
Jeffrey	  Herbst	  looks	  at	  problems	  of	  state	  consolidation	  and	  development	  of	  
state	  institutions	  in	  Africa	  as	  compared	  to	  the	  European	  state	  consolidation,	  where	  
‘war’	  had	  a	  significant	  impact.	  Herbst	  suggests	  that	  these	  can	  be	  illustrated	  in	  
terms	  of	  the	  state’s	  administrative	  capacity	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  national	  identity.22	  
The	  State’s	  Administrative	  Capacity:	  The	  state’s	  ability	  to	  extract	  resources	  through	  
taxes	  is	  a	  classic	  example	  of	  how	  weak	  state	  capacity	  causes	  the	  government	  to	  
institute	  desperate	  and	  self-­‐defeating	  economic	  policies.	  	  
Sub-­‐Saharan	  African	  states	  are	  desperately	  short	  of	  revenue	  even	  to	  fund	  
minimal	  state	  services	  that	  their	  populations	  have	  long	  been	  promised.	  These	  
countries	  need	  more	  extensive	  and	  more	  efficient	  tax	  systems.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  
remember	  that	  the	  process	  of	  development	  requires	  large	  expenditures	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  See	  Charles	  Tilly,	  Coercion,	  Capital,	  and	  the	  European	  States,	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Blackwell	  Publishers,	  1990).	  	  
21	  Hendrick	  Spruyt,	  The	  Sovereign	  State	  and	  Its	  Competitors,	  (Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press,	  1994).	  	  
22	  Jeffrey	  Herbst,	  “War	  and	  the	  State	  in	  Africa,”	  International	  Security,	  Vol.	  14,	  No.	  4,	  (Spring	  1990),	  117-­‐139.	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infrastructure	  to	  promote	  economic	  activity	  and	  to	  sustain	  the	  large	  expenses	  
typically	  incurred	  by	  urbanizing	  countries.	  	  
Many	  African	  governments	  rely	  largely	  on	  taxation	  of	  foreign	  trade	  and,	  as	  a	  
consequence,	  there	  is	  damage	  to	  the	  national	  economy	  because	  leaders	  are	  
compelled	  to	  erect	  ever-­‐greater	  administrative	  controls	  on	  imports	  to	  extract	  
finances	  for	  the	  government	  to	  work.	  Some	  side-­‐effects	  of	  these	  high	  tariffs	  include	  
corruption,	  smuggling	  and	  most	  importantly,	  over-­‐valued	  exchange	  rates	  due	  to	  
the	  government’s	  reliance	  on	  administrative	  controls,	  rather	  than	  the	  market,	  to	  
regulate	  imports.	  	  
Over-­‐valued	  exchange	  rates	  lead	  to	  widespread	  damage	  within	  those	  
countries,	  as	  exporters	  are	  put	  at	  a	  disadvantage	  in	  the	  global	  economy.	  The	  
population	  is	  encouraged	  to	  depend	  upon	  imported	  food,	  and	  black	  markets	  
quickly	  develop	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  distorted	  prices.	  This	  phenomenon	  can	  be	  
observed	  in	  Zimbabwe	  over	  the	  past	  15	  years.	  
The	  Degree	  of	  National	  Identity:	  Herbst	  and	  other	  scholars	  have	  observed	  that	  the	  
degree	  of	  nationalism	  in	  fragile	  countries,	  and	  to	  a	  large	  extent	  in	  countries	  South	  
of	  the	  Sahara,	  is	  largely	  absent.23	  This	  aggravates	  the	  State’s	  clumsy	  efforts	  to	  
extract	  resources	  and	  is	  also	  exacerbated	  by	  insecure	  and	  often	  authoritarian	  
leadership.	  	  
Herbst	  notes	  that	  the	  central	  difficulty	  of	  ‘nation-­‐building’	  in	  much	  of	  
Africa	  and	  Asia	  –	  and	  indeed	  in	  most	  Fragile	  States	  –	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  any	  shared	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  See	  Jeffrey	  Herbst,	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historical	  mythology	  and	  memory	  on	  which	  state	  elites	  can	  set	  about	  ‘building’	  the	  
nation.24	  The	  lack	  of	  nationalism	  may	  reflect	  the	  fact	  that	  many	  fragile	  countries	  
are	  artificial	  groupings	  of	  disparate	  people	  and,	  therefore,	  are	  not	  really	  nation-­‐
states.	  This	  has	  left	  these	  countries	  not	  only	  unable	  to	  continue	  their	  evolution	  
into	  more	  mature	  entities	  like	  other	  nation	  states,	  but	  has	  also	  left	  them	  without	  a	  
strong,	  inclusive	  institutional	  framework	  necessary	  to	  govern	  newly-­‐established	  
countries.	  	  
The	  Impact	  of	  Path	  Dependence	  
In	  the	  process	  of	  colonization,	  colonial	  powers	  discarded	  local	  institutions,	  
norms,	  and	  systems	  of	  governance	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  more	  westernized	  concept	  of	  the	  
state.	  This	  Western	  concept	  of	  the	  state	  was	  superimposed	  on	  a	  variety	  of	  
preexisting	  forms	  of	  government	  and	  social	  organization	  that	  had	  evolved	  over	  
centuries	  and	  through	  adaptation	  to	  local	  conditions.	  In	  some	  cases,	  the	  state	  was	  
even	  superimposed	  where	  order	  had	  traditionally	  been	  maintained	  without	  any	  
central	  institutions,	  such	  as	  in	  Somalia.	  The	  results	  have	  been	  devastating	  for	  the	  
vast	  majority	  of	  these	  colonial	  states.	  	  
The	  new	  pattern	  established	  when	  the	  colonial	  powers	  first	  arrived	  and	  
built	  their	  administrations	  on	  top	  of	  and	  disconnected	  from	  local	  societies	  was	  
essentially	  perpetuated	  in	  most	  countries	  at	  the	  time	  of	  their	  independence.	  As	  a	  
consequence,	  these	  governments	  are	  still	  largely	  divorced	  from	  and	  autonomous	  of	  
the	  societies	  they	  are	  supposed	  to	  serve.	  The	  State	  in	  most	  fragile	  states	  is	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  Jeffrey	  Herbst,	  “War	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essentially	  an	  artificial	  one,	  ‘suspended	  above’	  a	  society	  that	  would	  never	  have	  
produced	  it	  naturally	  and	  did	  not	  demand	  it.25	  	  
This	  mismatch	  between	  state	  and	  society	  is	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  problem	  
faced	  by	  fragile	  states.	  Typically	  in	  such	  situations,	  there	  is	  an	  enormous	  power	  
and	  wealth	  gap	  between	  a	  small	  elite	  group	  that	  manipulates	  or	  controls	  the	  state,	  
and	  therefore	  favors	  its	  perpetuation,	  and	  the	  general	  public,	  who	  are	  generally	  
ambivalent	  at	  best	  toward	  their	  own	  government.	  Thus,	  the	  State	  has	  become	  the	  
estate	  of	  the	  new	  nobility	  in	  Fragile	  States.	  	  
The	  post-­‐colonial	  order,	  whereby	  European	  powers	  have	  sought	  to	  help	  
their	  former	  subjects	  by	  providing	  aid	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  assistance,	  has	  in	  many	  
ways	  only	  prolonged	  the	  agony.	  It	  has	  done	  so	  by	  preventing	  any	  reorganization	  of	  
the	  state	  so	  as	  to	  make	  it	  better	  suited	  to	  local	  conditions	  and	  more	  connected	  to	  
its	  surrounding	  society.	  Western	  policy	  toward	  fragile	  states	  may,	  in	  fact,	  be	  
regarded	  as	  a	  form	  of	  neocolonialism,	  as	  it	  tends	  to	  extend	  those	  states’	  
dependence	  on	  their	  former	  colonial	  masters.	  	  
The	  weakness	  of	  the	  policies	  of	  international	  financial	  institutions	  is	  
particularly	  acute	  in	  countries	  where	  the	  State	  has	  failed	  to	  strike	  deep	  roots	  post-­‐
independence.	  The	  political	  disconnect	  between	  State	  and	  society	  was	  exacerbated	  
by	  the	  economic	  disconnect	  that	  arose	  from	  the	  growing	  availability	  of	  external	  
financial	  support.	  As	  the	  State	  became	  dependent	  on	  foreign	  resources	  for	  its	  
survival,	  it	  also	  grew	  increasingly	  autonomous	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  its	  own	  society	  and	  local	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  Seth	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  Development,	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resources,	  and	  lost	  interest	  in	  that	  resource	  base	  as	  anything	  other	  than	  an	  object	  
of	  plunder.26	  	  
Abundant	  natural	  resources	  such	  as	  oil,	  when	  controlled	  by	  a	  narrow	  ruling	  
elite	  can	  yield	  a	  similar	  result	  or	  exacerbate	  dysfunction	  in	  a	  society,	  a	  situation	  
commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “resource	  curse.”	  To	  further	  complicate	  things,	  most	  
fragile	  states	  were	  kept	  on	  artificial	  life-­‐support,	  by	  the	  West	  or	  the	  Soviet	  Union,	  
during	  the	  Cold	  War.	  These	  countries	  were	  shaped	  by	  the	  classical	  questions	  of	  
international	  relations	  –	  those	  of	  power,	  order	  and	  security	  –	  before	  they	  became	  
part	  of	  the	  international	  system.	  Since	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War,	  the	  powerful	  states	  
were	  much	  less	  willing	  and	  able	  to	  support	  these	  weaker	  states,	  making	  them	  more	  
prone	  to	  violence	  and	  conflict.	  	  
Political	  Fragmentation	  and	  Weak	  Institutions	  
Thus,	  from	  the	  literature,	  it	  becomes	  clear	  that	  two	  structurally	  important	  
issues	  plague	  fragile	  states:	  political	  identity	  fragmentation	  and	  weak	  national	  
institutions.	  These	  factors,	  when	  combined,	  preclude	  the	  formation	  of	  any	  robust	  
system	  of	  governance.	  This	  deadly	  combination	  severely	  undermines	  the	  
legitimacy	  of	  the	  state	  and	  leads	  to	  regimes	  that	  are	  highly	  unstable	  and	  difficult	  to	  
reform.	  	  
State	  legitimacy	  lies	  at	  the	  base	  of	  any	  political	  order	  and	  is	  an	  essential	  
ingredient	  influencing	  any	  country’s	  capacity	  to	  foster	  economic,	  political,	  or	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social	  progress.	  Legitimacy	  is	  a	  powerful	  predictor	  of	  economic	  growth	  and	  the	  
quality	  of	  governance.	  David	  Easton	  notes	  that	  the	  most	  secure	  political	  order	  will	  	  
“derive	  from	  the	  conviction	  on	  the	  part	  of	  citizens	  that	  it	  is	  
right	  and	  proper	  for	  him	  to	  accept	  and	  obey	  the	  authorities	  and	  to	  
abide	  by	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  regime.	  It	  reflects	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  
some	  way,	  the	  individual	  sees	  the	  state	  and	  its	  institutions	  as	  
conforming	  to	  one’s	  own	  moral	  principles.”27	  	  
	  
The	  American	  political	  sociologist	  Seymour	  Martin	  Lipset	  noted	  that	  
legitimacy	  also	  “involves	  the	  capacity	  of	  a	  political	  system	  to	  engender	  and	  maintain	  
the	  belief	  that	  existing	  political	  institutions	  are	  the	  most	  appropriate	  and	  proper	  
ones	  for	  the	  society.”28	  	  
This	  legitimacy	  can	  be	  derived	  from	  the	  citizens	  seeing	  the	  State	  as	  a	  result	  
of	  a	  socially	  and	  culturally	  appropriate	  historical	  evolution	  that	  has	  yielded	  a	  just	  
order	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  nation	  states.	  Legitimacy	  can	  also	  stem	  from	  citizens	  
accepting	  the	  State	  because	  it	  has	  been	  established	  by	  or	  is	  governed	  by	  a	  leader	  
seen	  as	  legitimate	  –	  such	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Lee	  Kuan	  Yew,	  in	  Singapore	  and	  Mustafa	  
Kemal	  Atatürk,	  in	  Turkey.	  	  
Even	  non-­‐democratic	  regimes	  need	  to	  achieve	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  legitimacy	  
to	  survive	  over	  a	  period	  of	  time.	  The	  Suharto	  Regime,	  in	  Indonesia	  (1967	  to	  1998)	  
was	  able	  to	  achieve	  legitimacy	  during	  its	  early	  years,	  despite	  its	  military	  
background	  and	  authoritarian	  character.	  It	  was	  able	  to	  do	  so	  through	  the	  delivery	  
of	  basic	  public	  services	  like	  education	  and	  health,	  and	  attention	  to	  infrastructure	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and	  rural	  development.	  When	  President	  Suharto’s	  advisors	  and	  family	  members	  
started	  to	  pay	  more	  attention	  to	  personal	  enrichment,	  instead	  of	  national	  
development,	  the	  Suharto	  regime	  began	  to	  lose	  legitimacy	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  
people.	  The	  regime	  was	  subsequently	  ousted	  from	  power.	  A	  system	  of	  governance	  
that	  has	  become	  deeply	  rooted	  in	  and	  widely	  accepted	  by	  society	  is	  by	  far	  the	  
strongest	  and	  longest-­‐lasting	  form	  of	  legitimacy.	  This	  is	  a	  solid	  foundation	  upon	  
which	  to	  promote	  development.29	  	  
The	  role	  of	  identity	  is	  very	  important	  to	  the	  creation	  of	  legitimacy,	  because	  
a	  legitimate	  political	  order	  is	  generally	  built	  around	  a	  cohesive	  social	  group	  and	  
relies	  on	  institutions	  that	  reflect	  that	  group’s	  historical	  evolution.	  As	  Michael	  
Hudson	  explained	  in	  his	  classic	  study	  of	  the	  “legitimacy	  shortage”	  in	  Arab	  politics,	  	  
“a	  legitimate	  political	  order…	  has	  to	  be	  based	  on	  some	  
consensus	  about	  national	  identity,	  some	  agreement	  about	  the	  
boundaries	  of	  the	  political	  community,	  and	  some	  collective	  
understanding	  of	  national	  priorities.	  If	  the	  population	  within	  given	  
political	  boundaries	  is	  so	  deeply	  divided	  within	  itself	  or	  ethnic	  or	  class	  
lines,	  or	  if	  the	  demands	  of	  a	  larger	  supranational	  community	  are	  
compelling	  to	  some	  portion	  of	  it,	  then	  it	  is	  extremely	  difficult	  to	  
develop	  a	  legitimate	  order.”30	  	  
	  
Without	  political	  structures	  endowed	  with	  legitimacy	  and	  sufficient	  
administrative	  capacity,	  civic	  life	  tends	  to	  be	  violent	  and	  unpredictable.	  Political	  
fragmentation	  and	  weak	  governance	  systems	  feed	  upon	  each	  other	  further	  
undermining	  state	  legitimacy.	  As	  William	  Easterly	  explains,	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  See	  Seth	  Kaplan,	  Fixing	  Fragile	  States:	  A	  New	  Paradigm	  for	  Development,	  (Westport,	  CT:	  Praeger	  Security	  International,	  
2008),	  37-­‐40.	  
30	  Michael	  C.	  Hudson,	  Arab	  Politics:	  The	  Search	  for	  Legitimacy,	  (New	  Haven,	  CT:	  Yale	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  389-­‐390.	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“Ethnic	  diversity	  has	  a	  more	  adverse	  effect	  on	  economic	  policy	  
and	  growth	  when	  institutions	  are	  poor.	  To	  put	  it	  another	  way,	  poor	  
institutions	  have	  an	  even	  more	  adverse	  effect	  on	  growth	  and	  policy	  
when	  ethnic	  diversity	  is	  high.	  Conversely,	  in	  countries	  with	  sufficiently	  
good	  institutions,	  ethnic	  diversity	  does	  not	  lower	  growth	  or	  worsen	  
economic	  policies.”31	  	  
	  
Formal	  institutions	  substitute	  for	  the	  “social	  glue”	  (informal	  institutions)	  
that	  is	  in	  shorter	  supply	  when	  there	  are	  ethno-­‐linguistic	  divisions	  and	  other	  social	  
cleavages.	  When	  State	  legitimacy	  is	  undermined,	  society	  experiences	  low	  levels	  of	  
trust	  among	  the	  citizens,	  as	  well	  as	  between	  the	  citizens	  and	  the	  government.	  The	  
low	  levels	  of	  trust	  result	  in	  higher	  transaction	  costs	  in	  political,	  economic,	  and	  
social	  interactions.32	  	  
In	  an	  environment	  where	  there	  are	  low	  levels	  of	  trust,	  social	  capital	  is	  hard	  
to	  come	  by.	  Stephen	  Knack	  and	  Phillip	  Keefer	  have	  shown	  that	  “social	  capital”	  is	  
important	  for	  improved	  economic	  performance.33	  They	  use	  indicators	  of	  trust	  and	  
civic	  norms	  from	  the	  World	  Values	  Surveys	  for	  a	  sample	  of	  29	  market	  economies.	  
They	  find	  that	  trust	  and	  civic	  norms	  are	  stronger	  in	  nations	  with	  higher	  and	  more	  
equal	  incomes,	  with	  institutions	  that	  restrain	  predatory	  actions	  of	  chief	  executives,	  
and	  with	  better-­‐educated	  populations.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31	  William	  Easterly,	  Jozef	  Ritzan,	  and	  Michael	  Woolcock,	  “Social	  Cohesion,	  Institutions,	  and	  Growth,”	  Working	  Paper	  No.	  
94,	  (Washington,	  DC:	  Center	  for	  Global	  Development,	  2006),	  14.	  	  
32	  There	  is	  consensus	  among	  practitioners	  and	  researchers	  about	  importance	  of	  social	  capital	  in	  promoting	  economic	  
development.	  Trust,	  as	  a	  major	  component	  of	  social	  capital	  is	  often	  believed	  to	  be	  a	  catalyst	  for	  transaction.	  Many	  literatures	  
hold	  that	  trust	  can	  reduce	  the	  transaction	  costs	  including	  information	  searching,	  negotiating,	  monitoring	  and	  enforcing	  a	  
transaction	  or	  agreement.	  	  
33	  See	  Stephen	  Knack	  and	  Philip	  Keefer,	  “Does	  Social	  Capital	  Have	  an	  Economic	  Payoff?	  A	  Cross-­‐Country	  Investigation,”	  The	  
Quarterly	  Journal	  of	  Economics,	  (1997).	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According	  to	  Robert	  Putnam,	  social	  capital	  is	  “the	  collective	  value	  of	  all	  
'social	  networks'	  and	  the	  inclinations	  that	  arise	  from	  these	  networks	  to	  do	  things	  for	  
each	  other.”34	  Putnam	  contends	  that	  social	  capital	  is	  a	  key	  component	  to	  building	  
and	  maintaining	  democracy.	  As	  social	  capital	  declines	  in	  a	  country,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  
in	  lower	  levels	  of	  trust	  in	  Government	  and	  lower	  levels	  of	  civic	  participation.	  
Putnam	  believes	  that	  social	  capital	  can	  be	  measured	  by	  the	  amount	  of	  trust	  and	  
reciprocity	  in	  a	  community	  or	  between	  individuals.	  
In	  “Social	  Capital	  and	  Development:	  The	  Coming	  Agenda,”	  Francis	  
Fukuyama	  notes	  that	  though	  there	  isn't	  an	  agreed	  definition	  of	  social	  capital,	  it	  can	  
be	  understood	  as	  “shared	  norms	  or	  values	  that	  promote	  social	  cooperation,	  
instantiated	  in	  actual	  social	  relationships.”35	  He	  argues	  that	  social	  capital	  is	  a	  
necessary	  precondition	  for	  successful	  development,	  but	  a	  strong	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  
basic	  political	  institutions	  are	  necessary	  to	  build	  social	  capital.	  Fukuyama	  also	  
believes	  that	  strong	  social	  capital	  is	  necessary	  for	  a	  strong	  democracy	  and	  strong	  
economic	  growth.	  	  
Fukuyama	  believes	  that	  bridging	  social	  capital	  is	  essential	  for	  strong	  social	  
capital	  because	  a	  broader	  radius	  of	  trust	  will	  enable	  connections	  across	  borders	  of	  
all	  sorts	  and	  serve	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  institutions.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  political	  
fragmentation	  directly	  impacts	  the	  ability	  of	  countries	  to	  foster	  the	  positive	  
institutional	  environment	  necessary	  to	  encourage	  the	  development	  of	  social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34	  Robert	  Putnam,	  Bowling	  Alone:	  The	  Collapse	  and	  Revival	  of	  American	  Community,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Simon	  and	  Schuster,	  
2000).	  	  
35	  Francis	  Fukuyama,	  “Social	  Capital	  and	  Development:	  The	  Coming	  Agenda”,	  SAIS	  Review	  vol.	  XXII	  No.	  1,	  School	  of	  
Advanced	  International	  Studies,	  (Washington	  DC:	  Johns	  Hopkins	  University,	  2002),	  27.	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capital	  –	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  societal	  cleavages	  get	  exacerbated.	  This	  results	  in	  further	  
violence	  and	  conflict.	  Fragile	  states,	  thus,	  are	  stuck	  in	  a	  vicious	  cycle	  of	  violence	  
and	  deteriorating	  institutions.	  	  
How	  to	  Assist	  Fragile	  States?	  
The	  issue	  of	  how	  to	  promote	  governance	  of	  weak	  states,	  improve	  their	  
democratic	  legitimacy,	  and	  strengthen	  self-­‐sustaining	  institutions	  has	  become	  
central	  to	  today’s	  development	  challenge.	  Francis	  Fukuyama	  notes	  that	  
international	  financial	  institutions	  arrive	  at	  such	  a	  conclusion	  either	  as	  a	  result	  of	  a	  
desire	  to	  rebuild	  war-­‐torn	  nations,	  or	  out	  of	  a	  desire	  to	  eliminate	  spawning	  
grounds	  for	  terrorism,	  or	  out	  of	  a	  hope	  that	  poor	  countries	  will	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  
develop	  and	  prosper.	  Any	  solution	  to	  state	  building	  should	  serve	  all	  of	  these	  goals	  
simultaneously.	  Fukuyama	  also	  points	  out	  that	  if	  we	  really	  want	  to	  increase	  the	  
institutional	  capacity	  of	  a	  developing	  country,	  we	  need	  to	  change	  the	  metaphor	  
that	  describes	  what	  we	  hope	  to	  do.	  	  
“We	  are	  not	  arriving	  in	  the	  country	  with	  girders,	  bricks,	  cranes,	  
and	  construction	  blueprints,	  ready	  to	  hire	  natives	  to	  help	  build	  the	  
factory	  that	  we	  have	  designed.	  Instead,	  we	  should	  be	  arriving	  with	  
resources	  to	  motivate	  the	  natives	  to	  design	  their	  own	  factory	  and	  to	  
help	  them	  figure	  out	  how	  to	  build	  and	  operate	  it	  themselves.	  Every	  bit	  
of	  technical	  assistance	  that	  displaces	  a	  comparable	  capability	  on	  the	  
part	  of	  the	  local	  society	  should	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  two-­‐edged	  sword	  and	  
treated	  with	  great	  caution.	  Above	  all,	  the	  outsiders	  need	  to	  avoid	  the	  
temptation	  to	  speed	  up	  the	  process	  by	  running	  the	  factory	  
themselves.”	  36	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36	  See	  chapter	  on	  Weak	  States	  and	  the	  Black	  Hole	  of	  Public	  Administration,	  in	  Francis	  Fukuyama,	  State-­‐Building:	  
Governance	  and	  World	  Order	  in	  the	  21st	  Century,	  (Cornell,	  NY:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2004).	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The	  traditional	  approach	  to	  assist	  fragile	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  states	  has	  been	  
international	  intervention	  to	  help	  countries	  establish	  state	  institutions	  and	  
infrastructure	  for	  development	  using	  an	  image	  of	  Europe	  in	  the	  1950s.	  	  
International	  financial	  institutions,	  like	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  International	  
Monetary	  Fund	  have	  been	  involved	  in	  trying	  to	  strengthen	  state	  institutions	  
through	  structural	  adjustment	  and	  conditional	  lending.	  In	  such	  an	  approach,	  there	  
is	  strong	  emphasis	  on	  the	  role	  of	  state	  institutions	  and	  international	  intervention.37	  	  
The	  2011	  World	  Development	  Report	  points	  out	  that	  the	  problem	  with	  this	  
approach	  is	  that	  it	  is	  too	  reliant	  on	  the	  “supply-­‐side”	  actions	  in	  countries	  with	  
weak	  institutions.	  The	  report	  also	  notes	  that	  outsiders	  cannot	  restore	  confidence	  
and	  transform	  institutions	  for	  countries—these	  processes	  have	  to	  be	  nationally	  
led.	  	  
International	  actors,	  however,	  can	  provide	  effective	  external	  support	  in	  the	  
form	  of	  finance,	  technical	  advice,	  and	  supplementary	  capacity.	  The	  report	  also	  
emphasizes	  that	  international	  actors	  can	  also	  diminish	  external	  stresses	  on	  fragile	  
states,	  by	  containing	  the	  adverse	  impact	  of	  illegal	  trafficking,	  resource	  
competition,	  international	  corruption	  and	  money	  laundering,	  and	  by	  protecting	  
them	  from	  economic	  shocks.	  The	  report	  notes,	  however,	  that	  the	  current	  
international	  architecture	  for	  assistance	  is	  not	  well	  adapted	  to	  provide	  fast	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37	  Paul	  Collier,	  The	  Bottom	  Billion:	  Why	  the	  Poorest	  Countries	  are	  Failing	  and	  What	  Can	  Be	  Done	  About	  It,	  (Oxford,	  UK:	  
Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007).	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flexible	  assistance	  to	  restore	  confidence,	  or	  patient	  enough	  to	  help	  transform	  
institutions.	  
As	  noted	  in	  the	  sections	  above,	  most	  international	  interventions	  meet	  with	  
limited	  success	  because	  donors	  try	  to	  impose	  a	  Western-­‐style	  blueprint	  that	  is	  not	  
suitable	  for	  local	  conditions.	  Most	  often,	  these	  reform	  efforts	  are	  not	  in	  sync	  with	  
the	  local	  historical,	  political,	  economic,	  and	  cultural	  realities	  –	  and,	  hence,	  meet	  
with	  failure.	  The	  international	  community	  is	  increasingly	  recognizing	  that	  
development	  is	  fundamentally	  a	  political	  process,	  and	  that	  economic	  growth,	  
governance,	  and	  politics	  are	  interdependent.38	  	  
The	  2011	  World	  Development	  Report’s	  analysis	  suggests	  that	  good	  
governance	  and	  strong	  institutions	  are	  necessary	  for	  establishing	  peace,	  security,	  
and	  development.39	  The	  report	  also	  notes	  that	  is	  it	  important	  to	  restore	  confidence	  
at	  the	  local	  level	  through	  inclusion,	  and	  early,	  visible	  results	  before	  undertaking	  
wider	  institutional	  reforms	  in	  fragile	  states.	  It	  is	  clear,	  however,	  that	  attempts	  to	  
establish	  institutional	  models	  from	  European	  states	  have	  not	  taken	  hold	  in	  a	  
majority	  of	  fragile	  states.	  Interestingly,	  even	  ‘country-­‐led’	  Poverty	  Reduction	  
Strategies	  (PRSs)	  have	  not	  shown	  the	  desired	  results.	  40	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38	  See	  Adrian	  Leftwich	  and	  Steve	  Hogg,	  “The	  Politics	  of	  Institutional	  Indigenization.”	  (West	  Perth:	  The	  Developmental	  
Leadership	  Program,	  2008).	  
39	  See	  World	  Bank,	  World	  Development	  Report	  2011:	  Conflict,	  Security,	  and	  Development,	  (Washington	  DC:	  The	  World	  Bank	  
Group,	  2011).	  	  
40	  Poverty	  Reduction	  Strategy	  Papers	  (PRSPs)	  were	  introduced	  in	  1999	  by	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  IMF	  as	  a	  new	  framework	  
to	  enhance	  domestic	  accountability	  for	  poverty	  reduction	  reform	  efforts.	  	  A	  PRSP	  defines	  a	  country’s	  macroeconomic,	  
structural,	  and	  social	  policies	  and	  programs	  to	  promote	  growth	  and	  reduce	  poverty,	  as	  well	  as	  associated	  external	  financing	  
needs.	  See	  http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm	  (Accessed	  January	  2012).	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This	  could	  be	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  donor	  processes	  to	  establish	  country	  
ownership	  and	  leadership	  in	  the	  poverty	  reduction	  strategy	  are	  often	  shallow	  and	  
do	  not	  take	  historical	  socio-­‐political	  realities	  into	  consideration.	  Such	  experiences	  
suggest	  that	  State	  building	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  technical	  design	  and	  
establishment	  of	  state	  infrastructure	  and	  institutions.	  It	  is	  a	  complex	  cultural	  and	  
socio-­‐economic-­‐political	  process	  involving	  individual	  change	  agents	  and	  their	  
coalitions	  at	  various	  levels	  of	  society.	  	  
The	  interaction	  of	  these	  change	  agents	  within	  society	  leads	  to	  the	  development	  
of	  institutions	  –	  that	  could	  either	  be	  legitimate	  or	  illegitimate,	  effective	  or	  
ineffective.	  These	  institutions	  then	  define	  the	  rules	  of	  engagement,	  which	  
influence	  stability,	  security,	  and	  economic	  growth.	  In	  the	  literature	  and	  in	  the	  
approach	  to	  development	  assistance,	  however,	  little	  attention	  has	  been	  paid	  to	  the	  
role	  of	  these	  change	  agents	  or	  the	  role	  of	  domestic	  leadership	  in	  the	  process	  of	  
development.	  This	  dissertation	  undertakes	  a	  systematic	  analysis	  of	  the	  role	  of	  
agency	  in	  influencing	  development	  outcomes,	  along	  with	  other	  structural	  and	  
historical	  factors.	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2. Understanding	  Leadership	  
Does	  Leadership	  Really	  Matter?	  
As	  touched	  upon	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  the	  ‘structure-­‐agency’	  debate	  is	  an	  old	  one	  in	  
social	  science.41	  Indeed,	  the	  very	  debate	  is	  probably	  the	  most	  significant	  marker	  of	  
the	  difference	  between	  the	  natural	  and	  social	  (or	  human)	  sciences.	  In	  brief,	  the	  
structure-­‐agency	  problem	  concerns	  the	  key	  issue	  about	  how	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  
political	  behavior	  are	  explained.	  	  
Within	  this	  debate,	  the	  literature	  ranges	  from	  absolutist	  stances	  to	  more	  
moderate,	  inclusive	  ones.	  On	  one	  end,	  Leo	  Tolstoy’s	  historical	  theory	  is	  perhaps	  
the	  most	  dismissive	  of	  the	  impact	  of	  leaders,	  seeing	  so-­‐called	  heroic	  and	  historical	  
leaders	  as	  mere	  ex-­‐post	  justifications	  for	  events	  wholly	  beyond	  any	  individual’s	  
influence.42	  	  
Karl	  Marx	  allows	  some	  scope	  for	  agency	  but	  argues	  that	  leaders	  must	  
choose	  from	  a	  historically	  determined	  set	  of	  choices,	  meaning	  that	  they	  have	  much	  
less	  freedom	  to	  act	  than	  they	  think	  they	  do.43	  In	  general,	  Marx’s	  theory	  continues	  
to	  inspire	  many	  thinkers	  who	  see	  the	  contest	  of	  social	  or	  economic	  forces	  
trumping	  the	  roles	  of	  individuals.	  These	  traditions	  often	  see	  leaders	  as	  merely	  
symbolic:	  “labels”	  to	  describe	  particular	  expressions	  of	  underlying	  social	  
phenomena.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
41	  Anthony	  Giddens,	  “Central	  Problems	  in	  Social	  Theory”	  in	  ed.	  Colin	  Hay,	  Political	  Analysis,	  A	  Critical	  introduction,	  
(London,	  UK:	  Macmillan,	  1979).	  
42	  See	  Isaiah	  Berlin,	  Russian	  Thinkers,	  (London,	  UK:	  Hogart	  Press,	  1978).	  
43	  See	  Karl	  Marx,	  “The	  Eighteenth	  Brumaire	  of	  Louis	  Napoleon”,	  Die	  Revolution,	  (New	  York,	  1852).	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To	  Tolstoy,	  Marx,	  and	  others,	  leaders	  generally	  claim	  immodest	  powers,	  
although	  they	  are	  in	  fact	  of	  little	  consequence.	  Meanwhile,	  the	  population	  at	  large	  
–	  and	  historians	  in	  later	  analysis	  –	  may	  accept	  this	  pretense	  as	  part	  of	  a	  long	  
tradition,	  ingrained	  through	  religious	  faith,	  of	  believing	  in	  a	  higher	  power.44	  	  
A	  modern	  view	  of	  leadership	  in	  the	  psychology	  literature	  considers	  the	  very	  
idea	  of	  powerful	  leaders	  a	  social	  myth,	  embraced	  to	  satisfy	  individuals’	  
psychological	  needs.45	  Some	  more	  recent	  theoretical	  developments	  in	  
organizational	  research	  argue	  that	  the	  realm	  in	  which	  single	  individuals	  can	  
impact	  organizational	  performance	  is	  so	  limited	  that	  there	  is	  essentially	  no	  reason	  
to	  worry	  about	  whether	  there	  are	  any	  behaviors	  or	  attributes	  that	  are	  unique	  to	  
leadership.	  	  
Pfeffer	  and	  Salancik	  argue	  that	  most	  organizational	  action	  can	  be	  
understood	  not	  as	  an	  exercise	  of	  individual	  agency	  but	  as	  an	  organizational	  
response	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  external	  actors	  upon	  which	  organizations	  depend	  for	  
resources	  and	  support.46	  Some	  organizational	  theorists	  also	  argue	  that	  the	  concept	  
of	  leadership,	  itself,	  is	  too	  loosely	  defined	  and	  is	  ultimately	  an	  amalgam	  of	  
behaviors	  and	  attributes	  that	  can	  be	  more	  tractably	  defined	  and	  linked	  to	  
performance	  when	  they	  are	  analytically	  decoupled.	  	  
In	  contrast,	  there	  is	  the	  other	  extreme	  viewpoint	  in	  which	  individuals	  are	  
seen	  as	  the	  decisive	  influences	  in	  history:	  the	  so-­‐called	  “Great	  Man”	  view.	  From	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44	  See	  Leo	  Tolstoy,	  War	  and	  Peace,	  (Moscow:	  Goslitizdat,	  1869).	  
45	  Gary	  Gemmill	  and	  Judith	  Oakley,	  "Leadership:	  An	  Alienating	  Social	  Myth?",	  Human	  Relations,	  XLV,	  (1992).	  113-­‐129.	  
46	  See	  Jeffrey	  Pfeffer	  and	  Gerald	  Salancik,	  The	  external	  control	  of	  organizations:	  A	  resource	  dependence	  perspective,	  (New	  
York:	  Harper	  and	  Row,	  1978).	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this	  viewpoint,	  the	  evolution	  of	  history	  is	  largely	  determined	  by	  the	  idiosyncratic,	  
causative	  influences	  of	  certain	  individuals.	  Thomas	  Carlyle	  articulated	  this	  type	  of	  
historical	  theory	  clearly	  in	  his	  study	  of	  the	  French	  Revolution	  and	  later	  works.47	  
This	  view	  persists	  today	  especially	  among	  military	  historians,	  who	  tend	  to	  see	  the	  
individual	  leader	  as	  the	  key	  to	  military	  outcomes.	  For	  instance,	  the	  British	  
historian,	  John	  Keegan,	  noted	  that	  the	  political	  history	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century	  
can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  biographies	  of	  six	  men:	  Lenin,	  Stalin,	  Hitler,	  Mao,	  Roosevelt,	  
and	  Churchill.48	  
These	  opposing	  viewpoints	  tend	  to	  obfuscate	  a	  possible	  broader	  middle	  
ground.	  In	  the	  debate	  over	  historical	  determinism,	  Isaiah	  Berlin	  distinguishes	  
between	  the	  singular	  approach	  of	  the	  “hedgehogs”	  and	  the	  flexibility	  of	  the	  
“foxes”.49	  In	  Berlin’s	  perspective,	  Marx	  and	  Carlyle	  are	  hedgehogs.	  Weber,	  whose	  
sociological	  theories	  act	  as	  a	  counterpoint	  to	  Marx	  on	  many	  dimensions,	  is	  a	  fox.	  
Weber	  sees	  a	  role	  for	  “charismatic”	  leadership	  in	  certain	  circumstances.50	  He	  
allows	  for	  possibly	  substantial	  individual	  roles,	  but	  only	  in	  those	  cases	  where	  the	  
national	  bureaucracy,	  or	  possibly	  traditional	  social	  norms,	  do	  not	  stand	  in	  the	  way	  
of	  the	  individual.	  For	  Weber,	  individuals,	  historical	  forces,	  and	  institutions	  are	  all	  
important,	  and	  they	  interact	  in	  an	  important	  way.	  Other	  scholars,	  like	  Drucker,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47	  See	  Thomas	  Carlyle,	  The	  French	  Revolution:	  A	  History,	  (London:	  Chapman	  and	  Hall,	  1837)	  and	  Thomas	  Carlyle,	  On	  
Heroes,	  Hero	  Worship	  and	  the	  Heroic	  in	  History,	  (New	  York:	  Wiley	  and	  Halsted,	  1859).	  
48	  See	  John	  Keegan,	  "Winston	  Churchill,"	  Time.	  Available	  at	  
http://www.time.com/time/time100/leaders/profile/churchill.html	  (accessed	  May	  04,	  2011)	  	  
49	  See	  Isaiah	  Berlin,	  Russian	  Thinkers,	  (London,	  UK:	  Hogart	  Press,	  1978).	  
50	  See	  Max	  Weber,	  The	  Theory	  of	  Social	  and	  Economic	  Organization,	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1947),	  358.	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Bennis,	  and	  Kotter	  have	  emphasized	  that	  leadership	  is	  a	  vital	  force	  in	  institutional	  
life.51	  	  	  
In	  political	  science,	  there	  has	  been	  little	  systematic	  exploration	  of	  the	  role	  
that	  leadership	  plays	  in	  development	  outcomes.	  Nonetheless,	  a	  positive	  
development	  is	  that	  recent	  research	  on	  growth	  and	  development	  outcomes	  has	  
built	  on	  Douglass	  North’s	  Institutions,	  Institutional	  Change	  and	  Economic	  
Performance.	  The	  research	  has	  moved	  beyond	  conceptions	  of	  convergence	  based	  
on	  purely	  economic	  factors	  to	  consider	  the	  role	  of	  institutions	  and	  social	  context	  
in	  shaping	  economic	  outcomes.52	  Among	  other	  results,	  the	  research	  has	  found	  
relationships	  between	  some	  measures	  of	  political	  institutions	  and	  macroeconomic	  
outcomes.53	  Convincingly	  identifying	  the	  causal	  effects	  of	  institutions,	  however,	  is	  
a	  difficult	  proposition	  as	  Glaeser	  argued.54	  	  
Yet,	  if	  institutions	  have	  explanatory	  power,	  it	  is	  then	  perhaps	  a	  natural	  next	  
step	  to	  ask	  whether	  national	  leaders,	  who	  may	  partly	  control	  or	  substitute	  for	  
formal	  institutions	  in	  fragile	  and	  post	  conflict	  countries,	  exert	  personal	  influences	  
on	  development	  outcomes.	  The	  work	  of	  Adrian	  Leftwich	  emphasizes	  the	  centrality	  
of	  politics	  to	  development	  outcomes.	  They	  argue	  that	  economic	  growth	  and	  its	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51	  See	  Peter	  Drucker,	  “Managing	  Oneself,”	  in	  Harvard	  Business	  Review,	  (1999).	  
http://academy.clevelandclinic.org/Portals/40/managingoneself.pdf	  (accessed	  December	  25,	  2011),	  Warren	  Bennis,	  “The	  
Leadership	  Advantage,”	  Leader	  to	  Leader,	  No.	  12,	  (Spring	  1999)	  http://www.hr-­‐newcorp.com/articles/bennis_Leaders.pdf	  
(accessed	  December	  25,	  2011),	  and	  John	  P.	  Kotter,	  The	  Leadership	  Factor,	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  January	  11,	  1988)	  	  
52	  See	  Douglass	  North,	  Institutions,	  Institutional	  Change,	  and	  Economic	  Performance,	  (Cambridge,	  UK:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1990).	  	  
53	  Acemoglu,	  Daron,	  Simon	  Johnson,	  and	  James	  Robinson.	  "The	  Colonial	  Origins	  of	  Comparative	  Development:	  An	  
Empirical	  Investigation."	  American	  Economic	  Review,	  XCI	  (2001),	  1369-­‐1401.	  
54	  Glaeser,	  Edward	  L.,	  Rafael	  La	  Porta,	  Florencio	  Lopez-­‐De-­‐Silanes,	  and	  Andrei	  Shleifer.	  "Do	  Institutions	  Cause	  Growth?"	  
Journal	  of	  Economic	  Growth,	  IX	  (2004),	  271-­‐303.	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benefits	  are	  not	  simply	  technical	  matters	  that	  can	  be	  achieved	  by	  the	  mere	  design	  
of	  institutions	  and	  policies.	  	  
Development	  is	  driven	  or	  held	  back	  by	  political	  processes	  in	  society.	  The	  
challenges	  involve	  making	  decisions	  on	  using	  the	  resources	  in	  various	  ways.	  The	  
decisions	  are	  determined	  by	  different	  interests	  with	  different	  forms	  and	  degrees	  of	  
power,	  fuelled	  by	  distinctive	  ideas	  and	  ideologies.55	  In	  these	  contexts,	  human	  
agency,	  in	  the	  form	  of	  leaders	  and	  their	  coalitions,	  plays	  a	  central	  role	  in	  
determining	  development	  outcomes.	  This	  work	  recognizes	  that	  agency	  is	  
important,	  but	  that	  it	  is	  a	  combination	  of	  leaders	  and	  coalitions	  that	  constitute	  
drivers	  of	  change.	  
Then,	  what	  is	  the	  balance	  between	  structure	  and	  agency	  in	  explaining	  
outcomes	  in	  any	  given	  situation?	  This	  question	  is	  central	  to	  understanding	  the	  
politics	  of	  development	  and,	  in	  particular,	  how	  domestic	  leadership	  influences	  the	  
manner	  in	  which	  locally	  legitimate	  and	  appropriate	  institutions	  develop,	  change,	  
or	  decay.	  This	  is	  also	  important	  in	  enhancing	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  formation	  
of	  stable	  institutional	  rules	  of	  the	  game,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  establishment	  of	  the	  
political	  and	  economic	  institutions,	  and	  their	  leadership	  strategies	  to	  see	  the	  
explicit	  effect	  these	  have	  on	  development	  outcomes	  in	  fragile	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  
countries.	  In	  order	  to	  proceed	  on	  this	  path,	  it	  becomes	  necessary	  to	  understand	  
what	  are	  the	  different	  approaches	  to	  understanding	  what	  leadership	  means	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55	  See	  Adrian	  Leftwich,	  “Bringing	  Agency	  Back	  In:	  Politics	  and	  Human	  Agency	  in	  Building	  Institutions	  and	  States,”	  (2009).	  
http://www.dlprog.org/ftp/download/Public%20Folder/1%20Research%20Papers/Bringing%20Agency%20Back%20In.pdf	  
(accessed	  December	  25,	  2011).	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literature.	  I	  seek	  to	  better	  understand	  leadership	  through	  a	  literature	  survey	  of	  the	  
different	  concepts	  of	  leadership.	  	  
What	  is	  the	  Meaning	  of	  Leadership?	  	  
	   In	  The	  Bass	  Handbook	  of	  Leadership,	  Bernard	  Bass	  acknowledges	  that	  a	  
tension	  exists	  between	  theory	  and	  problem	  orientation	  in	  the	  leadership	  
literature.56	  	  Theorists	  seek	  to	  identify	  different	  types	  of	  leadership	  and	  relate	  them	  
with	  the	  functional	  demands	  in	  society.	  They	  also	  try	  to	  account	  for	  the	  emergence	  
of	  leadership	  by	  studying	  the	  qualities	  of	  the	  leader	  or	  elements	  of	  the	  situation	  
and	  the	  interactions	  between	  the	  individual	  and	  situational	  variables.	  From	  1945	  to	  
1960,	  the	  leadership	  literature	  was	  focused	  on	  empirical	  research	  and	  as	  a	  
consequence,	  ignored	  many	  aspects	  of	  theory,	  which	  previously	  had	  been	  
considered	  as	  important.	  But	  the	  research	  on	  leadership	  became	  theory	  driven	  
again	  from	  the	  1970s,	  with	  empirical	  research	  testing	  theoretically-­‐derived	  
hypotheses.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  2-­‐1:	  The	  Universality	  of	  Leadership	  57	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  See	  Bernard	  Bass,	  The	  Bass	  Handbook	  of	  Leadership:	  Theory,	  Research,	  and	  Managerial	  Applications	  4th	  Edition,	  (New	  
York,	  NY:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  2008),	  15-­‐23.	  	  
57	  See	  Bernard	  Bass,	  The	  Bass	  Handbook	  of	  Leadership:	  Theory,	  Research,	  and	  Managerial	  Applications	  4th	  Edition,	  (New	  
York,	  NY:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  2008),	  14.	  
The	  literature	  notes	  that	  leadership	  is	  a	  universal	  phenomenon	  in	  human	  societies	  and	  
can	  also	  be	  observed	  in	  animals,	  like	  gorillas,	  chimpanzees,	  and	  elephants.	  Social	  
scientists	  and	  anthropologists	  have	  argued	  that	  all	  animals	  living	  in	  groups	  exhibit	  social	  
organization	  and	  leadership.	  For	  instance,	  experimentation	  and	  observation	  in	  of	  
primates	  in	  their	  natural	  settings	  suggest	  that	  these	  groups	  develop	  strongly	  
diﬀerentiated	  status	  hierarchies,	  which	  their	  members	  adhere	  to	  and	  leaders	  obtain	  
privileges	  that	  furthers	  their	  dominance.	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   Bernard	  Bass	  notes	  that	  the	  many	  dimensions	  into	  which	  leadership	  was	  
cast	  and	  the	  overlapping	  meanings	  have	  added	  to	  the	  confusion.	  In	  the	  early	  20th	  
century,	  leadership	  was	  seen	  as	  impressing	  the	  will	  of	  a	  single	  individual	  on	  
followers,	  and	  inducing	  obedience,	  loyalty,	  respect,	  and	  cooperation.	  In	  the	  1930s,	  
leadership	  was	  considered	  as	  a	  process	  by	  which	  the	  leader	  organized	  followers	  to	  
move	  in	  a	  particular	  direction.	  In	  the	  1940s,	  leadership	  was	  understood	  as	  the	  
ability	  to	  persuade	  and	  direct	  beyond	  the	  confines	  of	  authority	  and	  power.	  	  
	   In	  the	  1950s,	  leadership	  was	  associated	  with	  what	  leaders	  did	  in	  groups	  and	  
the	  authority	  that	  the	  group	  accorded	  them.	  In	  the	  1960s,	  leadership	  meant	  
influence	  to	  move	  others	  in	  a	  shared	  direction.	  In	  the	  1970s,	  the	  leader’s	  influence	  
was	  considered	  discretionary	  and	  as	  varying	  from	  one	  person	  to	  another.	  In	  the	  
1980s,	  leadership	  was	  seen	  as	  inspiring	  others	  towards	  achieving	  purposeful	  
actions.	  In	  the	  90s,	  leadership	  was	  seen	  as	  the	  influence	  both	  of	  a	  leader	  and	  the	  
followers	  who	  sought	  to	  bring	  about	  change	  that	  reflected	  their	  common	  vision.	  In	  
the	  21st	  century,	  the	  leader	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  person	  who	  is	  most	  responsible	  and	  
accountable	  for	  the	  actions	  of	  his	  or	  her	  institution.58	  	  
Defining	  Leadership	  
“A	  definition	  is	  a	  sack	  of	  flour	  compressed	  into	  a	  thimble.”	  
-­‐	  Remy	  De	  Gourmont	  (1858	  –	  1915)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58	  See	  Bernard	  Bass,	  The	  Bass	  Handbook	  of	  Leadership:	  Theory,	  Research,	  and	  Managerial	  Applications	  4th	  Edition,	  (New	  
York,	  NY:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  2008),	  15.	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   In	  today’s	  context,	  the	  term	  ‘leadership’	  signifies	  a	  very	  complex	  concept.	  
Consequently,	  the	  literature	  on	  leadership	  is	  spread	  across	  multiple	  disciplines,	  
with	  different	  definitions,	  concepts	  and	  purposes.	  	  
Definitional	  Evolution	  and	  Classification	  
	  
Figure	  2-­‐2:	  Summary	  of	  Major	  Leadership	  Concepts	  in	  the	  Literature	  59	  
	   The	  concept	  of	  leadership	  has	  been	  explored	  by	  many	  scholars,	  who	  have	  
all	  attempted	  to	  define	  it	  in	  ways	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  a	  given	  content	  or	  purpose.	  
There	  is	  no	  grand	  theory	  or	  definition	  of	  leadership,	  however.	  	  One	  of	  the	  defining	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59	  Adapted	  from	  Bernard	  Bass,	  The	  Bass	  Handbook	  of	  Leadership:	  Theory,	  Research,	  and	  Managerial	  Applications	  4th	  
Edition,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  2008).	  
Definitions	  and	  Concepts	  of	  Leadership	  in	  the	  Literature	  
	  
• ‘Leadercentric’	  definitions	  of	  Leaders	  and	  Leadership	  
• The	  Leader	  as	  a	  Personality	  
• Leadership	  as	  an	  Attribution	  
• Leaders	  as	  the	  Foci	  of	  Group	  Processes	  
• The	  Leader	  as	  a	  Symbol	  
• Leadership	  as	  the	  Making	  of	  Meaning	  
• Leadership	  of	  Thought	  
• Leadership	  as	  Purposive	  Behavior	  
• Leadership	  as	  Persuasive	  Behavior	  
• Leadership	  as	  the	  Initiation	  of	  Structure	  
• Leadership	  as	  the	  Exercise	  of	  Influence	  
• Leadership	  as	  Discretionary	  Influence	  
• Leadership	  as	  the	  Art	  of	  Inducting	  Compliance	  
• Leadership	  as	  an	  Effect	  
• Leadership	  in	  Terms	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  Leader	  and	  the	  Led	  
• Leadership	  as	  a	  Power	  Relationship	  
• Leadership	  as	  a	  Differentiated	  Role	  
• Recognition	  of	  the	  Leader	  by	  the	  Led	  
• Identification	  with	  the	  Leader	  
• Leadership	  as	  a	  Combination	  of	  Elements	  
• Transformational	  Leadership	  
• Connective	  Leadership	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themes	  in	  the	  literature	  is	  a	  lack	  of	  clarity	  and	  agreement	  on	  the	  definition	  of	  
leadership.	  Bass	  acknowledges	  this	  reality	  in	  his	  compendium	  on	  leadership	  and	  
identifies	  twenty-­‐one	  types	  of	  definitions	  from	  different	  disciplines	  and	  viewpoints	  
into	  a	  rough	  scheme	  of	  classification	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2-­‐2.	  The	  following	  section	  
explains	  each	  of	  the	  above	  classifications	  from	  the	  Bass	  Handbook	  of	  Leadership	  in	  
added	  detail.	  
• Leader-­‐centric	  definitions	  of	  Leaders	  and	  Leadership:	  These	  are	  about	  one-­‐way	  
effects	  due	  to	  the	  leader	  as	  a	  person.	  The	  leader	  has	  the	  combination	  of	  traits	  
necessary	  to	  induce	  others	  to	  accomplish	  a	  task.	  	  
• The	  Leader	  as	  a	  Personality:	  The	  concept	  of	  personality	  appealed	  to	  several	  
early	  theorists,	  who	  sought	  to	  explain	  why	  some	  persons	  are	  better	  able	  than	  
others	  to	  exercise	  leadership.	  This	  approach	  equates	  the	  strength	  of	  personality	  
and	  the	  character	  of	  the	  leader,	  and	  sees	  leadership	  as	  a	  one-­‐way	  effect	  of	  the	  
leader	  upon	  the	  followers.	  The	  popularity	  of	  this	  school	  of	  thought	  has	  led	  to	  a	  
focus	  on	  the	  characteristics	  and	  traits	  of	  leaders	  and	  leadership.	  This	  approach	  
is	  not	  without	  weaknesses.	  Bass	  notes	  that	  scholars	  like	  A.	  O.	  Bowden	  stated,	  
“The	  amount	  of	  personality	  attributed	  to	  an	  individual	  may	  not	  be	  unfairly	  
estimated	  by	  the	  degree	  of	  influence	  he	  can	  exert	  upon	  others.”60	  
• Leadership	  as	  an	  Attribution:	  Leadership	  may	  be	  conceived	  solely	  as	  a	  romantic	  
figment	  of	  one’s	  imagination	  used	  to	  explain	  why	  a	  group,	  organization,	  or	  
nation	  has	  been	  successful.	  Or	  leadership	  can	  be	  conceived	  solely	  as	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  See	  A.O.	  Bowden,	  “A	  study	  of	  the	  personality	  of	  student	  leaders	  in	  the	  United	  States,”	  Journal	  of	  Abnormal	  and	  Social	  
Psychology,	  21,	  (1926),	  149-­‐160.	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observable	  reason	  for	  outcomes	  that	  have	  occurred.	  Bass	  notes	  that	  the	  truth	  
lies	  somewhere	  in	  between.	  
• Leaders	  as	  the	  Foci	  of	  Group	  Processes:	  Early	  theorists	  viewed	  leaders	  as	  the	  
focus	  of	  group	  change,	  activity,	  and	  process.	  Cooley	  noted	  that	  the	  leadership	  is	  
always	  the	  nucleus	  of	  a	  tendency,	  and	  if	  one	  were	  to	  examine	  a	  social	  
movement,	  s/he	  would	  find	  such	  a	  nucleus.61	  Mumford	  noted,	  “Leadership	  is	  
the	  preeminence	  of	  one	  or	  a	  few	  individuals	  in	  a	  group	  in	  the	  process	  of	  control	  of	  
societal	  phenomena.”62	  
• The	  Leader	  as	  a	  Symbol:	  Leaders	  serve	  a	  symbolic	  function	  and	  serve	  as	  
representatives	  of	  their	  group	  to	  outsiders.	  Katz	  and	  Kahn	  argue	  that	  leaders	  
provide	  a	  way	  to	  simplify	  and	  find	  meaning	  in	  the	  group’s	  external	  
environment.63	  	  
• Leadership	  as	  the	  Making	  of	  Meaning:	  Leaders	  provide	  understanding	  and	  
meaning	  for	  situations	  that	  followers	  find	  confusing,	  ambiguous,	  unclear,	  
vague,	  indistinct,	  or	  uncertain.	  Gronn	  argues	  that	  leaders	  are	  able	  to	  define	  
reality	  for	  followers	  and	  are	  able	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  the	  situation	  for	  them.	  
Leaders	  talk	  about	  values	  that	  are	  acceptable	  to	  the	  followers	  and	  that	  can	  
guide	  their	  subsequent	  action.64	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  See	  Charles	  Cooley,	  Human	  Nature	  and	  the	  social	  order,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Scribners	  Publishing,	  1902).	  	  
62	  See	  Eben	  Mumford,	  “Origins	  of	  Leadership,”	  American	  Journal	  of	  Sociology,	  12,	  (1906),	  216-­‐240.	  
63	  See	  Daniel	  Katz	  and	  Robert	  Kahn,	  The	  social	  psychology	  of	  organizations,	  (New	  York:	  Wiley,	  1978).	  
64	  Peter	  Gronn,	  From	  transactions	  to	  transformation:	  A	  new	  world	  order	  in	  the	  study	  of	  leadership?	  Lecture,	  Educational	  and	  
Administration	  Society,	  Balliol	  College,	  Oxford	  University,	  Oxford,	  UK,	  (1995)	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• Leadership	  of	  Thought:	  This	  leadership	  is	  exerted	  through	  lectures,	  writing,	  or	  
discovery	  by	  prominent	  thinkers	  like	  Plato,	  Chanakya,	  Galileo,	  Shakespeare	  
and	  other	  luminaries.	  Howard	  Gardner’s	  theory	  of	  multiple	  intelligences	  is	  also	  
related	  to	  this	  school	  of	  thought.	  This	  theory	  emerged	  from	  cognitive	  research	  
and	  “documents	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  students	  possess	  different	  kinds	  of	  minds	  
and	  therefore	  learn,	  remember,	  perform,	  and	  understand	  in	  different	  ways,”	  
according	  to	  Gardner.	  	  
	   According	  to	  this	  theory,	  individuals	  are	  able	  to	  know	  the	  world	  through	  
language,	  logical-­‐mathematical	  analysis,	  spatial	  representation,	  musical	  
thinking,	  the	  use	  of	  the	  body	  to	  solve	  problems	  or	  to	  make	  things,	  an	  
understanding	  of	  other	  individuals,	  and	  an	  understanding	  of	  ourselves.	  Where	  
individuals	  differ	  is	  in	  the	  strength	  of	  these	  different	  intelligences	  -­‐	  the	  so-­‐
called	  profile	  of	  intelligences	  -­‐and	  in	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  such	  intelligences	  are	  
invoked	  and	  combined	  to	  carry	  out	  different	  tasks,	  solve	  diverse	  problems,	  and	  
progress	  in	  various	  domains.65	  	  
• Leadership	  as	  Purposive	  Behavior:	  This	  school	  of	  thought	  preferred	  to	  define	  
leadership	  in	  terms	  of	  activities	  or	  behaviors.	  These	  are	  the	  particular	  activities	  
that	  the	  leader	  engages	  in	  the	  course	  of	  directing	  and	  coordinating	  the	  work	  of	  
group	  members.	  They	  may	  include	  actions	  to	  structure	  work	  relations,	  praising	  
or	  criticizing	  group	  members,	  and	  showing	  consideration	  for	  feelings	  and	  
welfare	  of	  individuals.	  Heifetz	  looks	  at	  leadership	  as	  adaptive	  work,	  the	  activity	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  Howard	  Gardner,	  Intelligence	  Reframed:	  Multiple	  Intelligences	  for	  the	  21st	  Century,	  (New	  York:	  Basic	  Books,	  1999).	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of	  mobilizing	  a	  social	  system	  to	  face	  challenges,	  clarify	  aspirations,	  and	  adapt	  
to	  challenges	  faced.66	  	  
• Leadership	  as	  Persuasive	  Behavior:	  	  This	  school	  of	  thought	  assumes	  a	  normative	  
approach	  and	  sees	  leadership	  as	  a	  ‘good,’	  achievable	  only	  by	  persuasion.	  In	  the	  
1920s,	  Schenk	  defined	  leadership	  as	  “the	  management	  of	  men	  by	  persuasion	  
and	  inspiration,	  rather	  than	  by	  the	  direct	  or	  implied	  threat	  of	  coercion.”67	  It	  
was	  the	  preferred	  definition	  of	  leadership	  for	  students	  of	  history	  and	  politics	  in	  
opposition	  to	  the	  definition	  of	  leadership	  as	  the	  art	  of	  inducing	  compliance,	  
which	  was	  seen	  as	  legitimizing	  authoritarianism.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Burns	  sees	  leadership	  as	  a	  benevolent	  and	  paternal	  act	  through	  which	  the	  
leader	  directs	  the	  behavior	  of	  followers	  in	  order	  to	  satisfy	  common	  
requirements.	  Burns	  made	  a	  distinction	  between	  leadership	  and	  power.	  Power	  
seeks	  to	  alter	  the	  behavior	  of	  others	  to	  satisfy	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	  leader,	  
and	  not	  necessarily	  that	  of	  the	  followers.	  There	  need	  not	  be	  any	  common	  
ground	  in	  this	  case.68	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  normative	  conception	  of	  leadership	  as	  persuasive	  and	  inspirational,	  
as	  opposed	  to	  coercive,	  is	  highly	  limiting	  and	  reduces	  its	  relevance	  for	  studies	  
of	  political	  leadership.	  Bass	  notes	  that	  it	  might	  be	  more	  useful	  to	  see	  
“persuasion”	  as	  one	  form	  of	  leadership,	  but	  that	  it	  does	  not	  really	  serve	  our	  
purpose	  well	  as	  a	  definition.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66	  Ronald	  A.	  Heifetz,	  Leadership	  without	  easy	  answers,	  (Cambridge,	  MA:	  Harvard	  University	  Press,	  1994).	  
67	  See	  Caiper	  Schenk,	  “Leadership,”	  Infantry	  Journal,	  33,	  (1928),	  111-­‐122.	  
68	  James	  M.	  Burns,	  Leadership,	  (San	  Francisco,	  CA:	  Harper	  and	  Row,	  1978),	  13.	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• Leadership	  as	  the	  Initiation	  of	  Structure:	  This	  approach	  looks	  at	  leadership	  as	  
more	  than	  the	  role	  and	  position,	  and	  focuses	  on	  the	  process	  of	  creating	  and	  
maintaining	  a	  structure	  of	  roles	  for	  leaders	  and	  followers,	  and	  the	  
interconnected	  relationships.	  Hemphill	  and	  Stogdill	  defined	  leadership	  in	  
terms	  of	  the	  variables	  that	  give	  rise	  to	  the	  differentiation	  and	  maintenance	  of	  
role	  structures	  in	  groups.	  The	  focus	  was	  more	  on	  the	  processes	  involved	  in	  the	  
emergence	  of	  leaders	  and	  leadership.	  Bass	  notes	  that	  this	  conception	  of	  
leadership	  makes	  a	  distinction	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  persons,	  resources,	  and	  
tasks	  within	  differentiated	  roles	  within	  the	  group.69	  	  
• Leadership	  as	  the	  Exercise	  of	  Influence:	  This	  school	  of	  thought	  presents	  a	  more	  
abstract,	  less	  authoritarian	  picture	  of	  the	  leader’s	  impact	  on	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  
followers.	  This	  approach	  looks	  at	  the	  actual	  achievement	  of	  change	  in	  behavior	  
of	  others,	  and	  allows	  for	  much	  more	  goal-­‐ownership	  on	  the	  part	  of	  followers.	  
There	  is	  scope	  for	  more	  interaction	  between	  leaders	  and	  followers	  through	  a	  
process	  of	  bargaining.	  Thus,	  leadership	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  effort	  to	  change	  the	  
behavior	  of	  others,	  and	  success	  is	  achieved	  when	  behavioral	  change	  is	  
observed.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  This	  approach	  reflects	  an	  acceptance	  that	  individuals	  can	  affect	  the	  group	  
in	  different	  ways.	  Hence,	  it	  allows	  for	  the	  importance	  of	  group	  dynamics	  and	  
the	  fluidity	  of	  leadership	  elite.	  There	  is	  no	  single	  leader	  who	  influences	  all	  in	  
the	  group	  equally	  –	  and	  leaders	  are	  subject	  to	  feedback	  from	  followers.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69	  J.K.	  Hemphill,	  A	  proposed	  theory	  of	  leadership	  in	  small	  groups,	  (Columbus:	  Ohio	  State	  Leadership	  Studies,	  1954)	  and	  R.M.	  
Stogdill,	  Individual	  behavior	  and	  group	  achievement,	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1959).	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Hollander	  and	  Julian	  suggested	  that	  leadership	  in	  the	  broadest	  sense	  implies	  
the	  presence	  of	  a	  particular	  influence	  relationship	  between	  two	  or	  more	  
persons.70	  	  
• Leadership	  as	  a	  Discretionary	  Influence:	  Many	  theorists,	  like	  Katz,	  Kahn,	  and	  
Miller,	  have	  wanted	  to	  limit	  leadership	  to	  influence	  that	  is	  not	  mandated	  by	  the	  
individual’s	  role.71	  Osborn,	  Hunt,	  and	  Jauch	  suggested	  that	  discretionary	  
leadership	  is	  influence	  over	  and	  above	  what	  is	  typically	  required	  of	  a	  position.	  
Thus	  individuals	  are	  leaders	  only	  when	  they	  take	  the	  opportunity	  to	  exert	  
influence	  over	  activities	  beyond	  what	  has	  been	  prescribed	  as	  a	  requirement	  of	  
their	  role.72	  	  
• Leadership	  as	  the	  Art	  of	  Inducing	  Compliance:	  This	  approach	  looks	  at	  leadership	  
as	  a	  one-­‐way	  effect,	  but	  adds	  that	  it	  is	  the	  art	  of	  persuasion	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  
induce	  loyalty,	  rather	  than	  purely	  a	  matter	  of	  possessing	  the	  right	  personality	  
qualities.	  This	  approach	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  legitimizing	  authoritarianism.	  For	  
example,	  B.	  V.	  Moore	  stated	  that	  leadership	  might	  be	  defined	  as	  the	  “ability	  to	  
impress	  the	  will	  of	  the	  leader	  on	  those	  led	  and	  induce	  obedience,	  respect,	  loyalty,	  
and	  cooperation.”73	  
• Leadership	  as	  an	  Effect:	  This	  school	  of	  thought	  approaches	  leadership	  as	  an	  
effect	  of	  group	  interaction.	  Leadership	  is	  seen	  as	  something	  that	  can	  only	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70	  E.P.	  Hollander	  and	  J.W.	  Julian,	  “Contemporary	  trends	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  leadership	  processes,”	  Psychological	  Bulletin,	  71,	  
(1969),	  387-­‐397.	  
71	  J.A.	  Miller,	  Structuring/destructuring:	  Leadership	  in	  open	  systems,	  (Rochester,	  NY:	  University	  of	  Rochester,	  Management	  
Research	  Center,	  1973),	  and	  Daniel	  Katz	  and	  Robert	  Kahn,	  The	  social	  psychology	  of	  organizations,	  (New	  York:	  Wiley,	  1978).	  
72	  R.N.	  Osborn,	  J.G.	  Hunt,	  and	  L.R.	  Jauch,	  Organization	  theory:	  An	  integrated	  approach,	  (New	  York:	  Wiley,	  1980).	  	  
73	  B.V.	  Moore,	  The	  May	  conference	  on	  leadership,	  Personnel	  Journal,	  6,	  (1927),	  47-­‐63.	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conferred	  by	  members	  of	  the	  group	  onto	  individuals.	  Hence,	  leaders	  can	  only	  
emerge	  passively,	  by	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  role	  that	  has	  been	  assigned	  to	  
them	  by	  the	  group.	  This	  approach	  accords	  more	  weight	  to	  the	  idea	  that,	  rather	  
than	  traits	  and	  qualities,	  what	  makes	  a	  leader	  is	  specific	  and	  contingent	  upon	  
the	  group	  and	  its	  requirements.	  Borgardus	  stated	  that,	  “as	  a	  social	  process,	  
leadership	  is	  that	  social	  inter-­‐stimulation	  which	  causes	  a	  number	  of	  people	  to	  set	  
out	  toward	  an	  old	  goal	  with	  a	  new	  zest	  or	  a	  new	  goal	  with	  hopeful	  courage	  –	  with	  
different	  persons	  keeping	  different	  places.”74	  	  
• Leadership	  in	  Terms	  of	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  Leader	  and	  the	  Led:	  The	  
definition	  of	  leadership	  as	  a	  process	  is	  becoming	  increasingly	  popular	  in	  the	  
field	  today.	  This	  approach	  concerns	  the	  cognitions,	  interpersonal	  behaviors,	  
and	  attributions	  of	  both	  the	  leaders	  and	  the	  following	  as	  they	  impact	  each	  
other’s	  pursuit	  of	  their	  mutual	  goals.	  Leadership	  is	  not	  a	  one-­‐way	  process,	  but	  
rather,	  an	  interactive	  two-­‐way	  process	  between	  the	  leader	  and	  the	  follower.	  
Peter	  Northouse	  sees	  leadership	  as	  a	  process	  though	  which	  an	  individual	  
influences	  a	  group	  of	  individuals	  to	  attain	  a	  common	  goal.75	  	  
• Leadership	  as	  a	  Power	  Relationship:	  This	  school	  approaches	  leadership	  from	  the	  
lens	  of	  political	  realism	  and	  hence,	  is	  most	  commonly	  used	  by	  the	  political	  
theorists.	  This	  approach	  is	  Machiavellian	  in	  the	  way	  it	  explores	  the	  importance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74	  E.S.	  Bogardus,	  Leadership	  and	  attitudes,	  Sociology	  and	  Social	  Research,	  13,	  (1929),	  377-­‐387.	  
75	  Peter	  G.	  Northouse,	  Leadership:	  Theory	  and	  Practice,	  (London:	  Sage	  Publications,	  Inc,	  2009).	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of	  power	  in	  leadership	  and	  Weberian	  in	  the	  way	  it	  looks	  at	  the	  relationship	  
between	  leadership	  and	  authority.76	  	  
	   	  	  An	  examination	  of	  Weber’s	  approach	  reveals	  the	  basis	  of	  his	  distinction	  
between	  power	  and	  authority	  –	  two	  concepts	  important	  to	  understand	  
leadership.	  Power	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  impose	  one's	  will	  on	  another,	  regardless	  of	  
the	  other's	  wishes,	  and	  despite	  any	  resistance	  s/he	  may	  offer.	  Power	  is,	  
therefore,	  relational;	  it	  requires	  one	  person	  to	  dominate,	  and	  the	  other	  to	  
submit.	  This	  assumes	  that	  one	  person	  will	  acquiesce,	  co-­‐operate	  with,	  or	  
consent	  to	  domination	  by	  the	  other,	  and	  this	  cannot	  be	  true	  of	  all	  
relationships.	  The	  act	  of	  issuing	  a	  command	  does	  not	  presuppose	  obedience.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Weber	  argues	  that	  an	  individual	  can	  exercise	  power	  in	  three	  ways:	  
through	  direct	  physical	  power,	  by	  reward	  and	  punishment	  and	  by	  the	  influence	  
of	  opinion.	  The	  exercise	  of	  power	  is	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  indirect	  and	  coercive:	  a	  
combination	  of	  rewarding	  and	  punishing	  through	  the	  use	  of	  argument,	  debate,	  
and	  rhetoric.77	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Authority,	  by	  comparison,	  is	  a	  quality	  that	  enhances	  power,	  rather	  than	  
being	  itself	  a	  form	  of	  power.	  The	  word	  “authority”	  comes	  from	  the	  verb	  “to	  
authorize.”	  Therefore,	  an	  individual's	  power	  must	  be	  authorized	  by	  the	  group	  
in	  order	  for	  it	  to	  be	  legitimate.	  An	  individual	  is	  considered	  an	  authority	  because	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
76	  See	  Niccolò	  Machiavelli,	  The	  Prince,	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1985),	  and	  See	  Max	  Weber,	  The	  Theory	  of	  
Social	  and	  Economic	  Organization,	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1947),	  358-­‐360.	  
77	  P.	  M.	  Blau,	  "Critical	  remarks	  on	  Weber’s	  theory	  of	  authority,"	  The	  American	  Political	  Science	  Review,	  57	  (2),	  (1963),	  305-­‐
316.	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of	  his/her	  technical	  expertise,	  combined	  with	  his/her	  ability	  to	  communicate	  
effectively	  with	  the	  group.	  The	  individual	  in	  authority	  is	  the	  one	  who	  is	  primary	  
in	  the	  group,	  controlling	  certain	  aspects	  of	  what	  the	  other	  group	  members	  do	  
and	  say,	  and	  perhaps	  even	  what	  and	  how	  they	  think.	  This	  school	  of	  thought	  
views	  leadership	  through	  the	  perspective	  of	  how	  one’s	  power	  and	  authority	  are	  
granted.	  The	  power	  relation,	  in	  this	  sense,	  can	  be	  overt,	  covert,	  or	  
unrecognized,	  but	  it	  is	  always	  there.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Bass	  argues	  that	  most	  political	  theorists	  see	  power	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  political	  
leadership.78	  When	  power	  is	  combined	  with	  the	  personal	  tendencies	  of	  leaders,	  
it	  may	  lead	  to	  the	  transformation	  of	  a	  leadership	  opportunity	  into	  an	  overt	  
power	  relation.	  This	  has	  often	  had	  a	  negative	  impact	  on	  society.	  This	  
perspective	  has	  proved	  a	  powerful	  argument	  against	  authoritarianism	  and	  for	  
the	  need	  of	  restraint	  upon	  leadership.	  There	  is,	  however,	  a	  real	  dearth	  of	  
research	  on	  this	  approach	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  political	  science,	  which	  has	  
mostly	  been	  occupied	  with	  the	  exploration	  of	  power.	  This	  lack	  of	  research	  has	  
proven	  to	  be	  a	  detriment	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  role	  of	  leadership	  for	  
development.	  	  
• Leadership	  as	  a	  Differentiated	  Role:	  	  This	  school	  of	  thought	  is	  based	  on	  ‘role	  
theory,’	  which	  looks	  at	  how	  different	  members	  of	  a	  group	  occupy	  different	  
positions,	  both	  within	  the	  group,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  larger	  institutional	  context	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78	  See	  Bernard	  Bass,	  The	  Bass	  Handbook	  of	  Leadership:	  Theory,	  Research,	  and	  Managerial	  Applications	  4th	  Edition,	  (New	  
York,	  NY:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  2008),	  21.	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that	  they	  inhabit.79	  In	  this	  approach	  the	  roles	  of	  leaders	  and	  followers	  are	  well	  
defined.	  Scholars	  refer	  to	  traditionally	  hierarchical	  societies	  like	  those	  of	  
Melanesia,	  Micronesia,	  and	  Polynesia,	  where	  the	  societal	  structure	  dictated	  
whether	  leadership	  was	  a	  differentiated	  role	  or	  not.80	  Marshall	  Sahlins	  refers	  to	  
the	  dichotomy	  between	  ‘ascribed’	  and	  ‘achieved’	  leadership.81	  82	  In	  Polynesia,	  
leadership	  is	  ascribed	  by	  the	  system	  of	  rank,	  chiefdom,	  and	  hierarchy.	  In	  
Melanesia,	  the	  leader	  is	  usually	  a	  ‘Big-­‐Man,’	  who	  has	  achieved	  that	  status	  
through	  the	  acquisition	  of	  wealth	  and	  power.	  Thus	  leadership	  might	  be	  an	  
inherited	  differentiated	  role	  in	  some	  cultures,	  societies,	  and	  contexts,	  but	  it	  can	  
also	  be	  very	  fluid	  and	  dependent	  upon	  results	  and	  achievements	  in	  others.83	  	  	  	  
• Recognition	  of	  the	  Leader	  by	  the	  Led:	  This	  leadership	  perspective	  requires	  
matching	  of	  the	  leadership	  prototype	  of	  traits	  and	  behaviors	  with	  the	  face-­‐to-­‐
face	  contact	  required	  for	  a	  more	  controlled	  cognitive	  process.	  In	  this	  case,	  
followers	  must	  recognize	  the	  ‘greatness’	  of	  leaders	  and	  choose	  to	  follow	  them.	  
Lord	  and	  Maher	  contend	  that	  this	  process	  of	  matching	  is	  based	  on	  socially	  
communicated	  processes.84	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  See	  Neal	  Gross,	  W.E.	  Martin,	  and	  A.W.	  McEachem,	  Explorations	  in	  role	  analysis,	  (New	  York:	  Wiley,	  1958).	  	  
80	  G.D.	  Paige,	  The	  scientific	  study	  of	  political	  leadership,	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1977),	  6.	  
81	  Marshall	  D.	  Sahlins,	  “Poor	  Man,	  Rich	  Man,	  Big-­‐Man,	  Chief:	  Political	  Types	  in	  Melanesia	  and	  Polynesia,”	  Comparative	  
Studies	  in	  Society	  and	  History,	  Vol.	  5,	  No.	  3,	  (April	  1963),	  285-­‐303.	  
82	  The	  distinction	  between	  ascribed	  and	  achieved	  leadership	  was	  first	  made	  by	  Talcott	  Parsons.	  See	  Talcott	  Parsons,	  The	  
structure	  of	  social	  action,	  (New	  York:	  Free	  Press,	  1937).	  
83	  See	  W.S.	  Douglas,	  "An	  evaluation	  of	  experimental	  procedures	  for	  the	  systematic	  training	  of	  group	  leaders,"	  Dissertation	  
Abstracts	  International,	  (1979),	  36.	  
84	  R.G.	  Lord	  and	  K.J.	  Maher,	  “Alternative	  information	  processing	  models	  and	  their	  implications	  for	  theory,	  research,	  and	  
practice,”	  Academy	  of	  Management	  Review,	  15,	  (1990),	  9-­‐28.	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• Identification	  with	  the	  Leader:	  In	  this	  perspective,	  there	  is	  an	  emotional	  
connection	  between	  the	  leader	  and	  the	  led,	  based	  on	  a	  sense	  of	  similarity.	  The	  
leader	  provides	  an	  example	  to	  be	  imitated	  by	  the	  followers.	  Shamir	  notes	  that	  
the	  aspirations	  of	  the	  leader	  become	  the	  followers’	  own	  aspiration.85	  	  	  
• Leadership	  as	  a	  Combination	  of	  Elements:	  Bass	  notes	  that	  some	  scholars	  have	  
combined	  several	  definitions	  of	  leadership	  to	  cover	  a	  larger	  set	  of	  meanings.86	  
Bogardus	  defined	  leadership	  in	  terms	  of	  personality	  in	  action	  under	  group	  
conditions.	  He	  also	  noted	  that	  it	  was	  not	  only	  about	  personality	  or	  a	  group	  
phenomenon,	  but	  that	  it	  was	  also	  a	  social	  process	  involving	  a	  group.87	  
According	  to	  Jago,	  leadership	  was	  the	  exercise	  of	  non-­‐coercive	  influence	  to	  
coordinate	  the	  members	  of	  an	  organized	  group	  in	  accomplishing	  the	  group’s	  
objectives.88	  
• Transformational	  Leadership:	  Transformational	  leadership	  gives	  more	  attention	  
to	  the	  charismatic	  and	  affective	  elements	  of	  leadership.	  Downton	  first	  coined	  
the	  term	  “transformational	  leadership”	  in	  1973.89	  Bass	  and	  Riggio	  suggested	  that	  
its	  popularity	  might	  be	  due	  to	  its	  emphasis	  on	  intrinsic	  motivation	  and	  follower	  
development.	  The	  emergence	  of	  transformational	  leadership	  as	  an	  important	  
approach	  to	  leadership	  began	  with	  a	  classic	  work	  by	  political	  sociologist	  James	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85	  Boas	  Shamir,	  “The	  charismatic	  relationship:	  Alternative	  explanations	  and	  predictions,”	  The	  Leadership	  Quarterly	  2,	  (1991),	  
81-­‐104.	  
86	  See	  Bernard	  Bass,	  The	  Bass	  Handbook	  of	  Leadership:	  Theory,	  Research,	  and	  Managerial	  Applications	  4th	  Edition,	  (New	  
York,	  NY:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  2008),	  22-­‐23.	  
87	  E.S.	  Bogardus,	  Leaders	  and	  leadership,	  (New	  York:	  Appleton-­‐Century,	  1934).	  
88	  A.G.	  Jago,	  “Leadership:	  Perspectives	  in	  theory	  and	  research,”	  Management	  Science,	  28,	  (1982),	  315-­‐336.	  
89	  See	  Bernard	  Bass,	  The	  Bass	  Handbook	  of	  Leadership:	  Theory,	  Research,	  and	  Managerial	  Applications	  4th	  Edition,	  (New	  
York,	  NY:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  2008).	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MacGregor	  Burns,	  entitled	  Leadership	  in	  1978.90	  Burns	  attempted	  to	  link	  the	  
roles	  of	  leadership	  and	  followership.	  He	  wrote	  of	  leaders	  as	  people	  who	  tap	  the	  
motives	  of	  followers	  in	  order	  to	  reach	  more	  effectively,	  the	  goals	  of	  leaders	  and	  
followers.	  For	  Burns,	  leadership	  is	  quite	  different	  from	  power	  because	  it	  is	  
inseparable	  from	  followers’	  needs.	  	  
	   Burns	  distinguished	  two	  types	  of	  leadership	  –	  transactional	  and	  
transformational.	  Transactional	  leadership	  refers	  to	  the	  bulk	  of	  leadership	  
models,	  which	  focus	  on	  the	  exchanges	  that	  occur	  between	  leaders	  and	  their	  
followers.	  	  
	   Transformational	  leadership	  is	  the	  process	  whereby	  a	  leader	  engages	  with	  
others	  and	  creates	  a	  connection	  that	  raises	  the	  levels	  of	  motivation	  and	  
morality	  in	  both	  the	  leader	  and	  the	  follower.	  This	  type	  of	  leader	  is	  attentive	  to	  
the	  needs	  and	  motives	  of	  followers	  and	  tries	  to	  help	  followers	  reach	  their	  fullest	  
potential.	  	  
	   Burns	  also	  made	  the	  distinction	  between	  pseudo	  and	  authentic	  
transformational	  leadership.	  	  Pseudo-­‐transformational	  leadership	  describes	  
leaders	  like	  Stalin	  and	  Hitler,	  who	  were	  self-­‐consumed,	  exploitive,	  and	  power-­‐
oriented,	  with	  warped	  moral	  values,	  but,	  were	  nonetheless,	  able	  to	  lead	  
nations.91	  Authentic-­‐transformational	  leadership	  is	  socially	  responsible	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90	  James	  M.	  Burns,	  Leadership,	  (San	  Francisco,	  CA:	  Harper	  and	  Row,	  1978).	  
91	  See	  Bernard	  Bass	  and	  Ronald	  Riggio,	  Transformational	  Leadership,	  Second	  Edition,	  (Mahwah,	  NJ:	  Lawrence	  Erlbaum	  
Associates,	  2006).	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leadership,	  which	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  collective	  good.	  These	  leaders	  
transcend	  their	  own	  interests	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  others.92	  
	   Bass	  argues	  that	  transformational	  leadership	  motivates	  followers	  to	  do	  
more	  than	  expected	  by	  raising	  followers’	  levels	  of	  consciousness	  about	  the	  
importance	  and	  value	  of	  specified	  and	  idealized	  goals.	  This	  approach	  prompts	  
followers	  to	  transcend	  their	  own	  self-­‐interest	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  team	  or	  
organization	  and	  moves	  followers	  to	  address	  highest	  level	  needs.	  	  
• Connective	  leadership,	  as	  explained	  by	  Jean	  Lipman-­‐Blumen,	  is	  an	  approach	  to	  
leadership	  that	  is	  politically	  savvy	  and	  instrumental,	  yet	  ethical,	  authentic,	  
accountable,	  and	  ennobling.	  This	  approach	  stands	  in	  stark	  contrast	  to	  other	  
traditional	  approaches	  to	  leadership,	  which	  are	  either	  power	  driven	  or	  
manipulative.	  Connective	  leaders	  use	  political	  strategies	  and	  skills,	  as	  well	  as	  
the	  interconnections	  among	  people,	  institutions,	  and	  processes,	  in	  an	  ethical	  
manner.	  Some	  characteristics	  of	  connective	  leaders93	  include:	  	  
 Connecting	  their	  vision	  with	  the	  dreams	  of	  others	  –	  combining	  and	  
bringing	  together,	  rather	  than	  dividing	  and	  conquering	  
 Striving	  to	  overcome	  mutual	  differences	  and	  problems,	  instead	  of	  merely	  
uniting	  followers	  against	  a	  common	  enemy	  
 Creating	  a	  sense	  of	  community	  between	  diverse	  groups	  of	  stakeholders	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92	  See	  Jane	  Howell	  and	  Bruce	  Avolio,	  "Transformational	  leadership,	  transactional	  leadership,	  locus	  of	  control,	  and	  support	  
for	  innovation:	  key	  predictors	  of	  consolidated-­‐business-­‐unit	  performance",	  Journal	  of	  Applied	  Psychology,	  (1993),	  891-­‐902.	  
93	  For	  a	  detailed	  discussion	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  connective	  leaders,	  please	  see	  Jean	  Lipman-­‐Blumen,	  Connective	  
leadership:	  Managing	  in	  a	  changing	  world,	  (New	  York	  :	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000),	  16-­‐20.	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 Bringing	  together	  committed	  leaders	  and	  stakeholders	  for	  common	  
purposes	  and	  inspiring	  active	  constituents	  to	  assume	  ownership	  and	  
responsibility,	  rather	  than	  manipulating	  passive	  followers	  
 Joining	  with	  other	  leaders,	  even	  former	  adversaries,	  not	  as	  competitors,	  but	  
as	  colleagues	  
 Renewing	  and	  building	  broad-­‐based	  democratic	  institutions,	  instead	  of	  
creating	  authoritarian	  regimes	  
 Nurturing	  potential	  leaders,	  including	  possible	  successors	  
 Demonstrating	  integrity	  and	  commitment	  to	  the	  cause	  and	  holding	  
themselves	  to	  the	  high	  standards	  that	  they	  expect	  from	  their	  peers	  and	  
followers	  	  
	  
Figure	  2-­‐3:	  The	  Connective	  Leadership	  Model94	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94	  See	  Connective	  Leadership	  and	  Achieving	  Styles	  http://achievingstyles.com/asi/connective_leadership.asp	  (Accessed	  
February	  24,	  2012)	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The	  Connective	  Leadership	  Model	  (See	  Figure	  2-­‐3)	  describes	  three	  
general	  categories	  or	  sets	  of	  behaviors	  used	  by	  individuals	  for	  achieving	  
their	  objectives.	  The	  model	  consists	  of	  three	  major	  sets	  of	  behavioral	  styles:	  
direct,	  relational,	  and	  instrumental.	  	  
Leaders	  who	  prefer	  the	  direct	  set	  prefer	  to	  handle	  their	  own	  tasks	  
individually	  and	  directly	  –	  emphasizing	  mastery,	  competition,	  and	  power.	  
People	  who	  prefer	  to	  work	  on	  group	  tasks	  or	  help	  others	  to	  attain	  their	  
goals	  emphasize	  the	  relational	  set.	  The	  relational	  set	  addresses	  the	  issues	  
inherent	  in	  the	  many	  forms	  of	  interdependence	  –	  collaboration,	  
contribution,	  and	  vicariousness	  (supporting	  or	  facilitating	  others’	  
accomplishments).	  People	  who	  emphasize	  the	  instrumental	  set	  tend	  to	  use	  
themselves	  and	  others	  as	  instruments	  towards	  community	  goals.	  The	  
instrumental	  set	  involves	  three	  styles	  –	  personal,	  social,	  and	  entrusting.	  
People	  who	  use	  the	  instrumental	  achieving	  style	  treat	  everything	  –
themselves,	  their	  relationships,	  situations,	  and	  resources	  as	  instruments	  
towards	  their	  goals.	  	  	  
Leaders	  have	  traditionally	  adopted	  the	  direct	  achieving	  styles.	  In	  
these	  styles,	  the	  leader	  masters	  his/her	  own	  tasks	  while	  achieving	  progress	  
towards	  the	  goal.	  In	  the	  relational	  styles,	  the	  leader	  achieves	  progress	  by	  
contributing	  actively	  or	  passively	  to	  team-­‐members’	  tasks.	  The	  instrumental	  
styles	  emphasize	  using	  one's	  personal	  strengths	  to	  attract	  supporters,	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creating	  and	  working	  through	  social	  networks	  and	  alliances,	  and	  entrusting	  
various	  aspects	  of	  one's	  vision	  to	  others.	  	  
Connective	  leaders	  understand	  that	  complex	  issues	  require	  one	  to	  be	  
able	  to	  utilize	  all	  the	  different	  behavioral	  styles	  in	  order	  to	  succeed.	  
Lipman-­‐Blumen	  notes	  that	  their	  conception	  of	  leadership	  reaches	  beyond	  
the	  direct	  styles	  favored	  by	  traditional	  leaders,	  including	  competition	  and	  
power.	  It	  involves	  the	  ability	  and	  willingness	  of	  these	  leaders	  to	  call	  upon	  
ethical	  relational	  and	  instrumental	  action.	  	  
	   An	  important	  takeaway	  from	  the	  leadership	  literature,	  particularly	  from	  
Burns’	  and	  Lipman-­‐Blumen’s	  work,	  is	  that	  as	  a	  process	  and	  a	  relationship	  of	  
engagement,	  the	  key	  elements	  of	  leadership	  are	  the	  “motives	  and	  resources	  of	  the	  
power	  holder,	  the	  motives	  and	  resources	  of	  the	  power	  recipients,	  and	  the	  
relationship	  among	  all	  these.”95	  Burns	  combines	  the	  elements	  of	  leadership	  as	  
personality,	  leadership	  as	  a	  power	  relation,	  leadership	  as	  the	  exercise	  of	  influence	  
and	  leadership	  as	  the	  focus	  of	  group	  processes.96	  Lipman-­‐Blumen	  points	  out	  that	  
Connective	  leaders	  create	  short-­‐term	  coalitions	  to	  work	  on	  different	  problems	  
unique	  to	  those	  groups.	  They	  also	  know	  how	  to	  integrate	  the	  contradictory	  
tensions	  of	  interdependence	  and	  diversity.97	  These	  elements	  become	  helpful	  in	  
approaching	  leadership	  as	  a	  factor	  in	  influencing	  development	  outcomes.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95	  James	  M.	  Burns,	  Leadership,	  (San	  Francisco:	  Harper	  and	  Row,	  1978),	  13.	  	  
96	  See	  Heather	  Lyne	  de	  Ver,	  “Leadership,	  Politics	  and	  Development:	  A	  Literature	  Survey,”	  (Canberra:	  AUSAID,	  2008).	  
97	  See	  Jean	  Lipman-­‐Blumen,	  Connective	  leadership:	  Managing	  in	  a	  changing	  world,	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  
2000),	  226-­‐231,	  and	  Jean	  Lipman-­‐Blumen,	  The	  Connective	  Edge:	  Leading	  in	  an	  interdependent	  World,	  (San	  Francisco:	  Jossey-­‐
Bass,	  1996).	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   Through	  leadership	  and	  engagement	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  followers,	  
there	  is	  potential	  for	  the	  leader	  to	  transform	  their	  needs	  into	  something	  that	  is	  
higher,	  and	  establish	  a	  common	  vision	  for	  progress.	  Heather	  Lyne	  de	  Ver	  notes	  
that	  it	  is	  this	  perspective	  on	  leadership	  that	  helps	  form	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  useful	  
exploration	  of	  leadership’s	  importance	  for	  development	  and	  for	  politics	  in	  general	  
–	  as	  the	  basis	  of	  planned,	  organized,	  or	  coordinated	  change.	  	  
	   The	  above	  section	  provides	  an	  overview	  the	  different	  approaches	  and	  ways	  
to	  define	  leadership.	  Bass	  aptly	  notes,	  “There	  are	  almost	  as	  many	  different	  
definitions	  of	  leadership	  as	  there	  are	  persons	  who	  have	  attempted	  to	  define	  the	  
concept.”98	  The	  way	  to	  define	  leadership	  can	  evince	  passionate	  debates	  and	  long	  
deliberations	  that	  have	  preoccupied	  theorists	  and	  practitioners	  for	  centuries	  now.	  
Until	  there	  is	  a	  centrally	  recognized	  authority	  on	  leadership,	  Bass	  notes	  that	  we	  
have	  to	  live	  with	  both	  broad	  and	  narrow	  definitions	  of	  the	  subject,	  ensuring	  that	  
the	  definitions	  are	  being	  applied	  according	  to	  context	  and	  the	  purpose	  being	  
served.	  	  	  
“Leadership	  is	  an	  interaction	  between	  two	  or	  more	  members	  of	  
a	  group	  that	  often	  involves	  a	  structuring	  or	  restructuring	  of	  the	  
situation	  and	  of	  the	  perceptions	  and	  expectations	  of	  the	  members.	  
Leaders	  are	  agents	  of	  change,	  whose	  acts	  affect	  other	  people	  more	  
than	  other	  people’s	  acts	  affect	  them.	  Leadership	  occurs	  when	  one	  
group	  member	  modifies	  the	  motivation	  or	  competencies	  of	  others	  in	  
the	  group.	  Leadership	  can	  be	  conceived	  of	  as	  directing	  the	  attention	  of	  
other	  members	  to	  goals	  and	  the	  paths	  to	  achieve	  them.	  It	  should	  be	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
98	  See	  Bernard	  Bass,	  The	  Bass	  Handbook	  of	  Leadership:	  Theory,	  Research,	  and	  Managerial	  Applications	  4th	  Edition,	  (New	  
York,	  NY:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  2008),	  25.	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clear	  with	  this	  broad	  definition,	  any	  member	  of	  the	  group	  can	  exhibit	  
some	  degree	  of	  leadership,	  and	  the	  members	  will	  vary	  in	  this	  regard.”99	  	  
Limitations	  in	  the	  Literature	  
	   There	  are	  some	  limitations	  in	  the	  literature	  that	  one	  needs	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  
as	  well.	  It	  is	  evident	  that	  the	  majority	  of	  definitions	  of	  leadership	  discussed	  in	  the	  
previous	  section	  need	  to	  be	  considered	  as	  definitions	  of	  particular	  types	  of	  
leadership,	  or	  leadership	  in	  particular	  contexts.	  
	   Most	  of	  the	  definitions	  of	  leadership	  are	  not	  universal	  in	  their	  applicability,	  
and	  it	  becomes	  important	  to	  understand	  the	  scholars’	  conceptions	  of	  leadership,	  
and	  the	  context	  within	  which	  they	  are	  trying	  to	  define	  leadership.	  There	  is	  no	  
single	  definition	  of	  leadership	  that	  is	  accepted	  across	  different	  disciplines,	  like	  
history,	  anthropology,	  political	  science,	  psychology,	  and	  management	  and	  
organizational	  behavior.	  	  
	   The	  literature	  also	  tends	  to	  focus	  primarily	  on	  Western	  corporate	  and	  
organizational	  leadership.	  The	  studies	  often	  make	  assumptions	  based	  on	  a	  
controlled,	  established	  institutional	  context,	  which	  is	  not	  the	  case	  in	  most	  
developing	  country	  leadership	  scenarios.	  Also,	  there	  is	  a	  bias	  towards	  Western	  
sensibilities	  and	  ethical	  standards	  –	  with	  little	  attention	  being	  given	  to	  local	  
historic	  and	  cultural	  norms.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99	  See	  Bernard	  Bass,	  The	  Bass	  Handbook	  of	  Leadership:	  Theory,	  Research,	  and	  Managerial	  Applications	  4th	  Edition,	  (New	  
York,	  NY:	  The	  Free	  Press,	  2008),	  25.	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Focus	  of	  this	  Study	  
As	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  the	  literature	  review	  above,	  the	  literature	  on	  leadership	  
is	  massive	  and	  diffused	  across	  multiple	  disciplines	  and	  contexts.	  The	  concepts	  and	  
definitions	  of	  leadership	  vary	  according	  to	  the	  context	  for	  which	  they	  were	  
developed.	  Some	  definitions	  focus	  on	  the	  traits	  and	  attributes	  of	  an	  individual	  (the	  
leader	  as	  “personality,”	  “symbol,”	  or	  “attribution”).	  Some	  focus	  on	  the	  interaction	  
and	  relationship	  between	  a	  leader	  and	  followers	  (“leadership	  as	  the	  foci	  of	  group	  
processes,”	  “power	  relationship,”	  or	  “transformational	  leadership”).	  Still	  others	  
emphasize	  the	  results	  or	  outcomes	  of	  leadership	  (leadership	  as	  “effect”).	  For	  the	  
purpose	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  the	  definition	  of	  leadership	  that	  best	  suits	  the	  
development	  context	  would	  be:	  Leadership	  is	  the	  process	  by	  which	  change	  
agent(s)	  mobilize	  ideas,	  people,	  and	  resources	  to	  make	  progress	  in	  attaining	  
complex	  shared	  objectives.	  	  
Given	  the	  explicit	  focus	  of	  this	  dissertation	  on	  the	  challenges	  of	  fragility,	  I	  am	  
interested	  in	  learning	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  leadership	  that	  can	  help	  with	  a	  durable	  
exit	  from	  fragility.	  In	  order	  for	  such	  an	  exit	  to	  occur,	  leadership	  would	  need	  to	  
address	  the	  underlying	  issues	  of	  political	  fragmentation,	  citizen	  security,	  weak	  
institutions,	  and	  economic	  growth.	  The	  following	  chapters	  attempt	  to	  do	  this	  
through	  quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  methods.	  Chapter	  3	  looks	  at	  the	  relationship	  
between	  leadership	  and	  fragility	  through	  a	  cross-­‐country	  time-­‐series	  analysis.	  
Chapter	  4	  then	  looks	  at	  specific	  cases	  of	  leadership	  in	  countries	  that	  have	  
experienced	  different	  trajectories	  of	  post-­‐conflict	  development.	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3. Leadership	  and	  Fragility:	  A	  Cross-­‐Country	  Analysis	  
Analytical	  Framework	  
Assumptions	  
	   As	  seen	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  literature	  review	  suggests	  that	  leadership	  is	  a	  
process	  through	  which	  a	  change	  agent	  interacts	  with	  coalitions	  to	  create	  and	  
implement	  strategies	  that	  help	  make	  progress	  towards	  achieving	  collective	  goals.	  
One	  insight	  is	  that	  leadership	  is	  thus	  as	  much	  about	  agency,	  as	  it	  is	  about	  how	  and	  
what	  was	  achieved.	  The	  challenge,	  then,	  is	  to	  see	  how	  this	  process-­‐oriented	  
definition	  of	  leadership	  can	  be	  applied	  in	  the	  context	  of	  state	  fragility.100	  	  
	   This	  dissertation	  examines	  the	  role	  of	  leadership	  strategies	  in	  transits	  in	  
and	  out	  of	  fragility.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  dissertation,	  a	  leadership	  change	  is	  
explained	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  regime	  change.	  I	  have	  found	  through	  my	  research	  that	  a	  
regime	  change	  generally	  brings	  along	  with	  it	  a	  new	  leader,	  who	  has	  a	  new	  
leadership	  strategy	  and	  approach	  to	  governance.	  	  
	   There	  are	  no	  data	  available,	  however,	  for	  fragile	  states	  related	  to	  leadership	  
changes.	  I	  have,	  hence,	  approximated	  regime	  change	  to	  represent	  leadership	  
change.	  A	  regime	  change	  is	  indicated	  primarily	  by	  a	  change	  in	  (or	  abandonment	  
of)	  the	  principles	  and	  norms	  governing	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  regime	  i.e.,	  establishment	  
of	  new	  principles	  and	  norms.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
100	  The	  World	  Bank	  Institute	  defines	  leadership	  as	  the	  process	  by	  which	  a	  change	  agent	  mobilizes	  meaning,	  people,	  and	  
resources	  toward	  making	  progress	  to	  achieve	  collective	  goals.	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   Assuming	  {Leadership	  Change}	  =	  {Regime	  Change},	  we	  can	  express	  the	  
relationship	  as,	  𝐹𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑓 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑝  𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 	  
The	  first	  step	  in	  establishing	  whether	  a	  robust	  relationship	  exists	  between	  
leadership	  and	  fragility	  is	  to	  examine	  the	  available	  empirical	  data.	  After	  
considerable	  research	  on	  databases	  of	  fragility	  and	  leadership,	  I	  selected	  the	  Polity	  
IV	  database	  to	  identify	  leadership	  change	  (represented	  by	  regime	  change)	  and	  the	  
International	  Country	  Risk	  Guide	  (ICRG)	  database	  to	  identify	  the	  level	  of	  fragility	  
in	  a	  country,	  and	  the	  World	  Bank’s	  World	  Development	  Indicators	  to	  create	  a	  
vector	  of	  control	  variables	  that	  include	  political,	  economic	  and	  social	  indicators	  
that	  represent	  the	  level	  of	  fragility	  in	  a	  country.	  	  
This	  approach	  is	  limited	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  existing	  data	  can	  be	  utilized	  to	  
the	  extent	  of	  being	  able	  to	  show	  that	  there	  is	  a	  robust	  relationship	  between	  
leadership	  change	  and	  fragility,	  but	  I	  am	  aware	  that	  this	  does	  not	  prove	  causality.	  
In	  order	  to	  understand	  what	  causes	  movement	  in	  or	  out	  of	  fragility,	  I	  then	  conduct	  
in-­‐depth	  case	  studies	  to	  analyze	  the	  role	  of	  leadership	  strategy.	  	  
Measuring	  Fragility	  (Dependent	  Variable	  of	  Interest)	  
As	  previously	  noted	  in	  Chapter	  1,	  the	  term,	  “fragile	  states”	  generally	  
describes	  countries	  facing	  particularly	  severe	  development	  challenges	  such	  as	  weak	  
governance,	  limited	  administrative	  capacity,	  violence,	  or	  the	  legacy	  of	  conflict.	  
Development	  partners	  have	  been	  converging	  around	  a	  definition	  of	  fragility	  
developed	  at	  the	  Organization	  for	  Economic	  Cooperation	  and	  Development	  
(OECD).	  This	  definition	  recognizes	  common	  characteristics	  of	  weak	  governance	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and	  vulnerability	  to	  conflict,	  together	  with	  differentiated	  constraints	  and	  
opportunities	  in	  situations	  of	  (1)	  prolonged	  crisis	  or	  deadlock,	  (2)	  post-­‐conflict	  or	  
political	  transition,	  (3)	  gradual	  improvement,	  and	  (4)	  deteriorating	  governance.	  
Based	  on	  this	  definition	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  fragility,	  the	  variable	  I	  employ	  is	  an	  
additive	  measure.	  It	  consists	  of	  indicators	  representing	  Internal	  Conflict,	  External	  
Conflict,	  GDP	  growth	  rate,	  Government	  Stability,	  and	  Bureaucratic	  Quality.	  I	  have	  
adapted	  these	  indicators	  from	  the	  International	  Country	  Risk	  Guide	  (ICRG)	  
Methodology	  in	  order	  to	  measure	  the	  level	  of	  fragility	  in	  a	  country.101	  	  
The	  Internal	  Conflict	  indicator	  in	  the	  ICRG	  ratings	  is	  an	  assessment	  of	  political	  
violence	  in	  the	  country	  and	  its	  actual	  or	  potential	  impact	  on	  governance.	  The	  
highest	  rating	  is	  giving	  to	  those	  countries	  where	  there	  is	  no	  armed	  or	  civil	  
opposition	  to	  the	  government	  and	  the	  government	  does	  not	  indulge	  in	  arbitrary	  
violence	  –	  direct	  or	  indirect	  –	  against	  its	  own	  people.	  The	  lowest	  rating	  is	  given	  to	  
a	  country	  embroiled	  in	  an	  on-­‐going	  civil	  war.	  The	  risk	  rating	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  three	  
subcomponents,	  each	  with	  a	  maximum	  score	  of	  four	  points	  and	  a	  minimum	  score	  
of	  zero	  points.	  A	  score	  of	  four	  points	  equates	  to	  Very	  Low	  Risk,	  and	  a	  score	  of	  zero	  
points	  equates	  to	  Very	  High	  Risk.	  The	  subcomponents	  of	  this	  indicator	  are:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101	  The	  International	  Country	  Risk	  Guide	  (ICRG)	  rating	  comprises	  22	  variables	  in	  three	  subcategories	  of	  risk:	  political,	  
financial,	  and	  economic.	  A	  separate	  index	  is	  created	  for	  each	  of	  the	  subcategories.	  The	  Political	  Risk	  index	  is	  based	  on	  100	  
points,	  Financial	  Risk	  on	  50	  points,	  and	  Economic	  Risk	  on	  50	  points.	  The	  total	  points	  from	  the	  three	  indices	  are	  divided	  by	  
two	  to	  produce	  the	  weights	  for	  inclusion	  in	  the	  composite	  country	  risk	  score.	  The	  composite	  scores,	  ranging	  from	  zero	  to	  
100,	  are	  then	  broken	  into	  categories	  from	  Very	  Low	  Risk	  (80	  to	  100	  points)	  to	  Very	  High	  Risk	  (zero	  to	  49.9	  points).	  The	  
Political	  Risk	  Rating	  includes	  12	  weighted	  variables	  covering	  both	  political	  and	  social	  attributes.	  ICRG	  advises	  users	  on	  
means	  of	  adapting	  both	  the	  data	  and	  the	  weights	  in	  order	  to	  focus	  the	  rating	  on	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  particular	  investing	  firm.	  
For	  more	  details	  about	  the	  International	  Country	  Risk	  Guide	  Methodology,	  please	  see	  
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx	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• Civil	  War/Coup	  Threat	  
• Terrorism/Political	  Violence	  
• Civil	  Disorder	  
The	  External	  Conflict	  indicator	  is	  an	  assessment	  both	  of	  the	  risk	  to	  the	  
incumbent	  government	  from	  foreign	  action,	  ranging	  from	  non-­‐violent	  external	  
pressure	  (diplomatic	  pressures,	  withholding	  of	  aid,	  trade	  restrictions,	  territorial	  
disputes,	  sanctions,	  etc.)	  to	  violent	  external	  pressure	  (cross-­‐border	  conflicts	  to	  all-­‐
out	  war).	  	  
External	  conflicts	  can	  adversely	  affect	  foreign	  business	  in	  many	  ways.	  These	  
range	  from	  restrictions	  on	  operations	  to	  trade	  and	  investment	  sanctions,	  to	  
distortions	  in	  the	  allocation	  of	  economic	  resources,	  to	  violent	  change	  in	  the	  
structure	  of	  society.	  The	  risk	  rating	  assigned	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  three	  subcomponents,	  
each	  with	  a	  maximum	  score	  of	  four	  points	  and	  a	  minimum	  score	  of	  zero	  points.	  A	  
score	  of	  four	  points	  equates	  to	  Very	  Low	  Risk,	  and	  a	  score	  of	  zero	  points	  equates	  to	  
Very	  High	  Risk.	  The	  subcomponents	  are:	  
• War	  
• Cross-­‐Border	  Conflict	  
• Foreign	  Pressures	  
The	  Government	  Stability	  indicator	  is	  an	  assessment	  both	  of	  the	  government’s	  
ability	  to	  carry	  out	  its	  declared	  program(s),	  and	  its	  ability	  to	  stay	  in	  office.	  The	  risk	  
rating	  assigned	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  three	  subcomponents,	  each	  with	  a	  maximum	  score	  of	  
four	  points	  and	  a	  minimum	  score	  of	  zero	  points.	  A	  score	  of	  four	  points	  equates	  to	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Very	  Low	  Risk,	  and	  a	  score	  of	  zero	  points	  equates	  to	  Very	  High	  Risk.	  The	  
subcomponents	  are:	  
• Government	  Unity	  
• Legislative	  Strength	  
• Popular	  Support	  
The	  Bureaucratic	  Quality	  measure	  deals	  with	  the	  institutional	  strength	  and	  
quality	  of	  the	  bureaucracy,	  another	  shock	  absorber	  that	  tends	  to	  minimize	  
revisions	  of	  policy	  when	  governments	  change.	  Thus,	  high	  points	  are	  given	  to	  
countries	  where	  the	  bureaucracy	  has	  the	  strength	  and	  expertise	  to	  govern	  without	  
drastic	  changes	  in	  policy	  or	  interruptions	  in	  government	  services.	  In	  these	  low-­‐risk	  
countries,	  the	  bureaucracy	  tends	  to	  be	  somewhat	  autonomous	  from	  political	  
pressure	  and	  to	  have	  an	  established	  mechanism	  for	  recruitment	  and	  training.	  
Countries	  that	  lack	  the	  cushioning	  effect	  of	  a	  strong	  bureaucracy	  receive	  low	  
points	  because	  a	  change	  in	  government	  tends	  to	  be	  traumatic	  in	  terms	  of	  policy	  
formulation	  and	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  administrative	  functions.	  
The	  GDP	  Growth	  Rate	  is	  the	  annual	  percentage	  growth	  rate	  of	  GDP	  at	  market	  
prices	  based	  on	  constant	  local	  currency.	  Aggregates	  are	  based	  on	  constant	  2000	  
U.S.	  dollars.	  
Measuring	  Leadership	  Change	  (Independent	  Variable	  of	  Interest)	  
As	  noted	  in	  the	  assumptions	  section	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  Chapter	  3,	  regime	  
change	  is	  most	  often	  associated	  with	  leadership	  change	  in	  fragile	  states.	  Because	  of	  
the	  lack	  of	  data	  regarding	  leadership	  changes	  in	  fragile	  states,	  I	  have	  sought	  to	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approximate	  regime	  change	  to	  represent	  leadership	  change.	  I	  understand	  that	  this	  
may	  be	  an	  imperfect	  (noisy)	  measure,	  but	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  regime	  change	  associated	  
with	  the	  change	  of	  at	  least	  some	  number	  of	  policy-­‐makers	  at	  the	  highest	  levels	  of	  
government.	  I	  have	  employed	  regime	  transition	  data	  available	  from	  the	  Polity	  IV	  
Database	  for	  Political	  Regime	  Characteristics	  and	  Transitions,	  1800-­‐2010,	  for	  this	  
purpose.102	  
The	  Regime	  Transition	  (REGTRANS)	  variable	  in	  the	  Polity	  IV	  Database	  is	  
relevant	  to	  this	  dissertation	  as	  it	  indicates	  the	  change	  in	  the	  type	  of	  leadership	  at	  
the	  level	  of	  national	  government.103	  It	  is	  also	  relevant	  because	  this	  dissertation	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102	  The	  Polity	  IV	  dataset	  covers	  all	  major,	  independent	  states	  in	  the	  global	  system	  (i.e.,	  states	  with	  total	  population	  of	  
500,000	  or	  more	  in	  the	  most	  recent	  year;	  currently	  164	  countries)	  over	  the	  period	  1800-­‐2010.	  The	  Polity	  IV	  Project	  constantly	  
monitors	  regime	  changes	  in	  all	  major	  countries	  and	  provides	  annual	  assessments	  of	  regime	  authority	  characteristics	  and	  
regime	  changes	  and	  data	  updates.	  It	  is	  also	  the	  most	  closely	  scrutinized	  data	  series	  on	  political	  issues	  as	  analysts	  and	  experts	  
in	  academia,	  policy,	  and	  the	  intelligence	  community	  regularly	  examine	  and	  often	  challenge	  Polity	  codings.	  See	  
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm	  for	  more	  information.	  	  
103	  For	  more	  details	  on	  the	  REGTRANS	  Variable,	  please	  see	  Pg.	  35,	  Polity	  IV	  Project:	  Dataset	  Users	  Manual	  available	  at	  
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm	  The	  REGTRANS	  variable	  indicates	  that	  the	  Polity	  has	  undergone	  a	  
substantive	  regime	  transition,	  defined	  as	  a	  “regime	  change.”	  A	  “regime	  change”	  is	  defined	  simply	  as	  a	  three-­‐point	  change	  in	  
either	  the	  polity’s	  DEMOC	  or	  AUTOC	  score	  (variables	  in	  the	  Polity	  IV	  Dataset)	  and	  may	  be	  either	  a	  negative	  value	  change	  
(i.e.,	  “negative	  regime	  change”	  or	  “adverse	  regime	  transition”)	  or	  a	  positive	  value	  change	  (i.e.,	  “positive	  regime	  change,	  
“minor	  democratic	  transition,”	  or	  “major	  democratic	  transition”).	  An	  “adverse	  regime	  transition”	  is	  defined	  as	  a	  six-­‐point	  
decrease	  in	  the	  polity’s	  POLITY	  score	  or	  by	  an	  interregnal	  period	  (-­‐77)	  that	  denotes	  a	  collapse	  of	  central	  authority	  or	  a	  
revolutionary	  transformation	  in	  the	  mode	  of	  governance.	  A	  “democratic	  transition”	  is	  defined	  as	  at	  least	  a	  three-­‐point	  
POLITY	  value	  change	  in	  three	  years	  or	  less	  from	  autocracy	  (i.e.,	  a	  negative	  or	  zero	  POLITY	  score)	  to	  a	  partial	  democracy	  
(POLITY	  values	  +1	  to	  +6)	  or	  full	  democracy	  (POLITY	  values	  +7	  to	  +10).	  The	  REGTRANS	  value	  is	  coded	  according	  to	  the	  
CHANGE	  value	  assigned	  for	  a	  continuous	  regime	  transition;	  REGTRANS	  records	  the	  same	  value	  for	  each	  year	  in	  a	  multi-­‐year	  
regime	  transition	  (i.e.,	  from	  the	  last	  recoded	  POLITY	  prior	  to	  transition	  to	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  new	  Polity).	  Each	  year	  of	  a	  
regime	  transition	  has	  a	  recorded	  value	  from	  3	  to	  -­‐3;	  this	  method	  is	  used	  to	  facilitate	  the	  isolation	  of	  regime	  transition	  
(leadership	  change)	  data.	  
Value	  	   Description	  
+3	   Major	  Democratic	  Transition	  –	  six	  points	  or	  greater	  increase	  in	  POLITY	  score	  over	  a	  period	  of	  three	  years	  or	  less	  
including	  a	  shift	  from	  an	  autocratic	  POLITY	  value	  (!10	  to	  0)	  to	  a	  partial	  democratic	  POLITY	  value	  (+1	  to	  +6)	  or	  full	  
democratic	  POLITY	  value	  (+7	  to	  +10)	  or	  a	  shift	  from	  a	  partial	  democratic	  value	  to	  a	  full	  democratic	  value.	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seeks	  to	  study	  the	  nature	  of	  leadership	  at	  the	  level	  of	  national	  government	  that	  
leads	  to	  different	  outcomes.104	  
What	  is	  a	  Regime?	  
Calvert	  says	  that,	  “a	  regime	  is	  the	  name	  usually	  given	  to	  a	  government	  or	  
sequence	  of	  governments	  in	  which	  power	  remains	  essentially	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  
same	  social	  group.”105	  Christian	  Anglade	  and	  Carlos	  Fortin	  say,	  “On	  the	  one	  hand,	  
the	  state	  expresses	  the	  domination	  of	  a	  given	  combination	  of	  classes	  and	  fractions	  of	  
classes	  on	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  society.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  state	  is	  a	  set	  of	  institutions	  
and	  personnel	  through	  which	  class	  domination	  is	  expressed.”	  The	  state	  in	  its	  
institutional	  sense	  is	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘regime’,	  thereby	  emphasizing	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
+2	  	   Minor	  Democratic	  Transition	  –	  three	  to	  five	  point	  increase	  in	  POLITY	  score	  over	  a	  period	  of	  three	  years	  or	  less	  
including	  a	  shift	  from	  autocratic	  to	  partial	  democratic	  or	  from	  partial	  to	  full	  democratic	  value	  (see	  definitions	  above).	  
+1	  	   Positive	  Regime	  Change	  –	  three	  or	  more	  point	  increase	  in	  POLITY	  score	  without	  a	  shift	  in	  regime	  type	  as	  defined	  
above.	  
	  	  0	  	   Little	  or	  No	  Change	  in	  POLITY	  score.	  
-­‐	  1	   Negative	  Regime	  Change	  –	  three	  to	  five	  point	  decrease	  in	  POLITY	  score.	  
-­‐	  2	  	   Adverse	  Regime	  Transition	  –	  six	  or	  more	  point	  decrease	  in	  POLITY	  score	  or	  an	  interregnal	  period	  	  
-­‐	  3	  	   This	  value	  has	  been	  designated	  for	  codes	  -­‐77	  State	  Failure	  –	  complete	  collapse	  of	  central	  political	  authority,	  -­‐	  66	  
Interruption,	  96	  State	  Disintegration	  and	  98	  State	  Demise	  
104	  The	  Polity	  IV	  conceptual	  scheme	  is	  unique	  in	  that	  it	  examines	  concomitant	  qualities	  of	  democratic	  and	  autocratic	  
authority	  in	  governing	  institutions,	  rather	  than	  discrete	  and	  mutually	  exclusive	  forms	  of	  governance.	  This	  perspective	  
envisions	  a	  spectrum	  of	  governing	  authority	  that	  spans	  from	  fully	  institutionalized	  autocracies	  through	  mixed,	  or	  
incoherent,	  authority	  regimes	  (termed	  "autocracies")	  to	  fully	  institutionalized	  democracies.	  The	  "Polity	  Score"	  captures	  this	  
regime	  authority	  spectrum	  on	  a	  21-­‐point	  scale	  ranging	  from	  -­‐10	  (hereditary	  monarchy)	  to	  +10	  (consolidated	  democracy).	  The	  
Polity	  scheme	  consists	  of	  six	  component	  measures	  that	  record	  key	  qualities	  of	  executive	  recruitment,	  constraints	  on	  
executive	  authority,	  and	  political	  competition.	  It	  also	  records	  changes	  in	  the	  institutionalized	  qualities	  of	  governing	  
authority.	  The	  Polity	  data	  include	  information	  only	  on	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  central	  government	  and	  on	  political	  groups	  
acting,	  or	  reacting,	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  that	  authority.	  It	  does	  not	  include	  consideration	  of	  groups	  and	  territories	  that	  are	  
actively	  removed	  from	  that	  authority	  (i.e.,	  separatists	  or	  "fragments";	  these	  are	  considered	  separate,	  though	  not	  
independent,	  polities)	  or	  segments	  of	  the	  population	  that	  are	  not	  yet	  effectively	  politicized	  in	  relation	  to	  central	  state	  
politics.	  
105	  See	  Peter	  Calvert,	  The	  Process	  of	  Political	  Succession,	  (New	  York:	  Macmillan,	  1987).	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formal	  structures	  of	  political	  authority—parliament,	  executive,	  judiciary—but	  
including	  also	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  mediation	  between	  those	  structures	  and	  the	  
citizens,	  notably	  the	  party	  system.106	  
Chazan	  et	  al.	  contend	  that	  a	  regime	  may	  be	  characterized	  as	  the	  part	  of	  the	  
political	  system	  that	  determines	  how	  and	  under	  what	  conditions	  and	  limitations	  
the	  power	  of	  the	  state	  is	  exercised.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  concept	  of	  regime	  is	  
concerned	  with	  the	  form	  of	  rule.107	  
What	  is	  a	  Regime	  Change?	  
Stephen	  Krasner	  suggests	  that	  changes	  in	  rules	  and	  decision-­‐making	  
procedures	  are	  changes	  within	  regimes,	  provided	  that	  principles	  and	  norms	  are	  
unaltered.	  Thus,	  a	  case	  of	  regime	  change,	  in	  this	  perspective,	  is	  indicated	  primarily	  
by	  a	  change	  in	  (or	  abandonment	  of)	  the	  principles	  and	  norms	  governing	  the	  
nature	  of	  the	  regime	  (i.e.,	  establishment	  of	  new	  principles	  and	  norms).108	  The	  
transition	  phase	  begins	  before	  the	  formal	  or	  de	  facto	  collapse	  of	  a	  regime.	  At	  the	  
same	  time,	  new	  forces	  or	  parties	  mobilize.	  The	  endpoint	  of	  a	  transition	  is	  more	  
difficult	  to	  determine.	  According	  to	  Schmitter	  and	  Karl,	  the	  endpoint	  occurs	  when	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106	  See	  Christian	  Anglade	  and	  Carlos	  Fortin,	  The	  State	  and	  Capital	  Accumulation	  in	  Latin	  America:	  Argentina,	  Bolivia,	  
Colombia,	  Ecuador,	  Peru,	  Uruguay,	  Venezuela,	  (Pittsburgh:University	  of	  Pittsburgh	  Press,	  1990).	  	  
107	  See	  Naomi	  Chazan,	  N.	  Mortimer,	  D.	  Rothchild,	  Politics	  and	  Society	  in	  Contemporary	  Africa,	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  Lynne	  
Rienner,	  1988).	  	  
108	  Stephan	  Krasner,	  “State	  Power	  and	  the	  structure	  of	  International	  Trade,”	  World	  Politics	  28,	  (1976),	  317-­‐347.	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the	  transition	  regimes	  become	  “seedlings”	  (i.e.	  when	  they	  are	  rooted,	  reasonably	  
stable	  but	  not	  immune	  from	  the	  vagaries	  of	  nature	  or	  politics).109	  	  
Ronald	  Francisco	  emphasizes	  that	  regime	  change	  is	  a	  political	  event.110	  
Thus,	  the	  changes	  can	  center	  on	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  issues.	  The	  most	  
important	  aspect	  of	  a	  regime	  transition	  is	  that	  a	  new	  constellation	  of	  rules,	  
institutions,	  and	  authority	  develops.	  Thus,	  a	  positive	  regime	  change	  or	  leadership	  
change	  refers	  to	  a	  transition	  toward	  the	  establishment	  of	  more	  inclusive,	  
democratic	  institutions.	  A	  negative	  regime	  change	  refers	  to	  a	  shift	  towards	  more	  
autocratic,	  less	  inclusive	  institutions.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  definition	  of	  
positive	  and	  negative	  regime	  changes	  in	  the	  Polity	  IV	  methodology	  as	  well.	  	  
Statistical	  Analysis	  
Sample	  and	  Variables	  
The	  sample	  universe	  under	  consideration	  includes	  all	  the	  countries	  for	  
which	  data	  were	  available	  within	  the	  ICRG	  Database,	  the	  Polity	  IV	  Database	  and	  
the	  World	  Bank	  Database.	  The	  dataset	  contains	  information	  for	  146	  countries	  from	  
1985	  until	  August	  2011	  for	  the	  following	  variables:	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109	  Philippe	  Schmitter	  and	  Terry	  Karl,	  “The	  types	  of	  democracy	  emerging	  in	  Southern	  and	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  South	  and	  
Central	  America,”	  in	  Bound	  to	  change:	  consolidating	  democracy	  in	  East	  Central	  Europe,	  Ed.	  Peter	  Volten,	  (New	  York:	  
Institute	  for	  EastWest	  Studies,	  1992),	  42-­‐68.	  
110	  Ronald	  A.	  Francisco,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Regime	  Transition,	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  Westview	  Press,	  2000).	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Table	  3-­‐1:	  Variable	  Description	  
Sl.	  
No	  
Name	   Description	   Comment	  
1	   Country	  Name	   Name	  of	  country	   Data	  were	  available	  for	  146	  countries	  across	  the	  
three	  datasets	  –	  ICRG,	  Polity	  IV,	  and	  the	  World	  
Bank	  Database	  
2	   Year	   Year	   Data	  were	  available	  for	  the	  period	  from	  January	  
1985	  –	  August	  2011	  
3	   Fragility	   Fragility	  of	  Country	  i	  
at	  time	  t	  
This	  variable	  is	  an	  additive	  composite	  of	  other	  
variables	  representing	  conflict	  (internal	  and	  
external	  conflict),	  security	  (government	  stability	  
and	  bureaucratic	  quality)	  and	  growth	  (lagged	  
GDP	  growth	  rate).	  	  
4	   Internal	  Conflict	   Internal	  Conflict	  of	  
Country	  i	  at	  time	  t	  
The	  Internal	  Conflict	  indicator	  in	  the	  ICRG	  
ratings	  is	  an	  assessment	  of	  political	  violence	  in	  
the	  country	  and	  its	  actual	  or	  potential	  impact	  on	  
governance.	  The	  value	  ranges	  from	  zero	  (most	  
fragile)	  to	  12	  (least	  fragile).	  This	  variable	  forms	  
part	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  being	  studied.	  	  
5	   External	  Conflict	   External	  Conflict	  for	  
Country	  i	  at	  time	  t	  
The	  External	  Conflict	  indicator	  looks	  at	  both	  the	  
risk	  to	  the	  incumbent	  government	  from	  foreign	  
action,	  ranging	  from	  non-­‐violent	  external	  
pressure	  (diplomatic	  pressure,	  withholding	  of	  aid,	  
trade	  restrictions,	  territorial	  disputes,	  sanctions,	  
etc.)	  to	  violent	  external	  pressure	  (cross-­‐border	  
conflicts	  to	  all-­‐out	  war).	  The	  value	  ranges	  from	  
zero	  (most	  fragile)	  to	  12	  (least	  fragile).	  This	  
variable	  forms	  part	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  
being	  studied.	  
6	   Government	  
Stability	  
Government	  
Stability	  for	  Country	  
i	  at	  time	  t	  
This	  indicator	  measures	  both	  the	  government’s	  
ability	  to	  deliver	  its	  programs	  as	  well	  as	  its	  ability	  
to	  stay	  in	  office.	  The	  value	  ranges	  from	  zero	  (most	  
fragile)	  to	  12	  (least	  fragile).	  This	  variable	  forms	  
part	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  being	  studied.	  
7	   Bureaucratic	  
Quality	  
Bureaucratic	  Quality	  
for	  Country	  i	  at	  time	  
t	  
This	  indicator	  measures	  the	  strength	  of	  
institutions	  and	  quality	  of	  bureaucracy	  in	  a	  
country,	  which	  act	  as	  shock	  absorber	  that	  tends	  
to	  minimize	  revisions	  of	  policy	  when	  
governments	  change.	  The	  value	  ranges	  from	  zero	  
(most	  fragile)	  to	  4	  (least	  fragile).	  This	  variable	  
forms	  part	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  being	  
studied.	  
8	   Regime	  
Transition	  
Leadership	  Change	  
for	  Country	  i	  at	  time	  
t	  
The	  Regime	  Transition	  variable	  indicates	  the	  
change	  in	  the	  type	  of	  leadership	  at	  the	  level	  of	  
national	  government.	  This	  is	  the	  independent	  
variable	  under	  study.	  The	  value	  ranges	  from	  -­‐3	  to	  
+3	  (depending	  upon	  the	  nature	  of	  transition).	  
Negative	  values	  indicate	  more	  autocratic	  
characteristics,	  while	  positive	  values	  indicate	  
democratic	  characteristics.	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9	   GDP	  per	  Capita	   The	  Natural	  
Logarithmic	  value	  of	  
the	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  
of	  Country	  i	  at	  time	  t	  
This	  Indicator	  was	  obtained	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  
World	  Development	  Indicators	  Database	  
10	   Cash	  Surplus	  /	  
Deficit	  as	  a	  
portion	  of	  GDP	  
The	  ratio	  of	  the	  cash	  
surplus	  /	  deficit	  to	  
the	  overall	  GDP	  for	  
Country	  i	  at	  time	  t	  
Cash	  surplus	  or	  deficit	  is	  revenue	  (including	  
grants)	  minus	  expense,	  minus	  net	  acquisition	  of	  
nonfinancial	  assets.	  In	  the	  1986	  Government	  
Finance	  Statistics	  manual,	  nonfinancial	  assets	  
were	  included	  under	  revenue	  and	  expenditure	  in	  
gross	  terms.	  This	  cash	  surplus	  or	  deficit	  is	  closest	  
to	  the	  earlier	  overall	  budget	  balance	  (still	  missing	  
is	  lending,	  minus	  repayments,	  which	  are	  now	  a	  
financing	  item	  under	  net	  acquisition	  of	  financial	  
assets).	  
11	   GINI	  Index	   GINI	  Index	  for	  
Country	  i	  at	  time	  t	  
GINI	  index	  measures	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  
distribution	  of	  income	  (or,	  in	  some	  cases,	  
consumption	  expenditure)	  among	  individuals	  or	  
households	  within	  an	  economy	  deviates	  from	  a	  
perfectly	  equal	  distribution.	  A	  Lorenz	  curve	  plots	  
the	  cumulative	  percentages	  of	  total	  income	  
received	  against	  the	  cumulative	  number	  of	  
recipients,	  starting	  with	  the	  poorest	  individual	  or	  
household.	  The	  GINI	  index	  measures	  the	  area	  
between	  the	  Lorenz	  curve	  and	  a	  hypothetical	  line	  
of	  absolute	  equality,	  expressed	  as	  a	  percentage	  of	  
the	  maximum	  area	  under	  the	  line.	  Thus	  a	  GINI	  
index	  of	  zero	  represents	  perfect	  equality,	  while	  an	  
index	  of	  100	  implies	  perfect	  inequality.	  
12	   Adult	  Literacy	  
Rate	  
Literacy	  rate,	  adult	  
total	  (%	  of	  people	  
ages	  15	  and	  above)	  
Adult	  literacy	  rate	  is	  the	  percentage	  of	  people	  
ages	  15	  and	  above	  who	  can,	  with	  understanding,	  
read	  and	  write	  a	  short,	  simple	  statement	  on	  their	  
everyday	  life.111	  
13	   Population	   The	  Natural	  Logged	  
value	  of	  Total	  
Population	  of	  
Country	  i	  at	  time	  t	  
Total	  population	  is	  based	  on	  the	  default	  
definition	  of	  population,	  which	  counts	  all	  
residents,	  regardless	  of	  legal	  status	  or	  citizenship-­‐
-­‐except	  for	  refugees	  not	  permanently	  settled	  in	  
the	  country	  of	  asylum,	  who	  are	  generally	  
considered	  part	  of	  the	  population	  of	  their	  country	  
of	  origin.	  The	  values	  obtained	  from	  the	  World	  
Development	  Indicators	  database	  are	  midyear	  
estimates.	  
14	   Life	  Expectancy	   Life	  expectancy	  at	  
birth,	  total	  (years)	  
for	  Country	  i	  at	  time	  
t	  
Life	  expectancy	  at	  birth	  indicates	  the	  number	  of	  
years	  a	  newborn	  infant	  would	  live	  if	  prevailing	  
patterns	  of	  mortality	  at	  the	  time	  of	  its	  birth	  were	  
to	  stay	  the	  same	  throughout	  its	  life.	  
15	   Corruption	   Corruption	  for	  
Country	  i	  at	  time	  t	  
This	  indicator	  varies	  from	  zero	  (most	  corruption)	  
to	  6	  (least	  corruption)	  and	  is	  an	  assessment	  of	  
corruption	  within	  the	  political	  system.	  Corruption	  
is	  a	  threat	  to	  foreign	  investment	  for	  several	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
111	  Definition	  of	  Adult	  Literacy	  Rate	  from	  United	  Nations	  Educational,	  Scientific,	  and	  Cultural	  Organization	  (UNESCO)	  
Institute	  for	  Statistics,	  http://www.uis.unesco.org/Pages/default.aspx	  (Accessed	  January	  3,	  2012)	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reasons:	  It	  distorts	  the	  economic	  and	  financial	  
environment;	  it	  reduces	  the	  efficiency	  of	  
government	  and	  business	  by	  enabling	  people	  to	  
assume	  positions	  of	  power	  through	  patronage	  
rather	  than	  ability;	  and,	  last	  but	  not	  least,	  it	  
introduces	  an	  inherent	  instability	  into	  the	  
political	  process.	  




Country	  i	  at	  time	  t	  
This	  indicator	  is	  a	  measure	  of	  how	  responsive	  
government	  is	  to	  its	  people,	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  the	  
less	  responsive	  it	  is,	  the	  more	  likely	  it	  is	  that	  the	  
government	  will	  fall,	  peacefully	  in	  a	  democratic	  
society,	  but	  possibly	  violently	  in	  a	  non-­‐
democratic	  one.	  This	  variable	  is	  measured	  on	  a	  
scale	  of	  zero	  (least	  democratically	  accountable)	  to	  
6	  (most	  democratically	  accountable).112	  	  
17	   GDP	  Growth	  
Rate	  
GDP	  Growth	  Rate	  
for	  Country	  i	  at	  time	  
t+1	  
Annual	  percentage	  growth	  rate	  of	  GDP	  at	  market	  
prices	  based	  on	  constant	  local	  currency.	  
Aggregates	  are	  based	  on	  constant	  2000	  U.S.	  
dollars.	  GDP	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  gross	  value	  added	  by	  
all	  resident	  producers	  in	  the	  economy	  plus	  any	  
product	  taxes,	  and	  minus	  any	  subsidies	  not	  
included	  in	  the	  value	  of	  the	  products.	  It	  is	  
calculated	  without	  making	  deductions	  for	  
depreciation	  of	  fabricated	  assets	  or	  for	  depletion	  
and	  degradation	  of	  natural	  resources.	  
Bivariate	  Analysis	  
Before	  exploring	  the	  robustness	  of	  any	  association	  between	  leadership	  and	  
fragility,	  it	  is	  worth	  seeing	  whether	  a	  simple	  bivariate	  relationship	  exists	  between	  
different	  types	  of	  leadership	  change	  (positive	  or	  negative)	  and	  transition	  out	  
of/into	  fragility.113	  From	  the	  Figure	  3-­‐1	  below,	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  that	  the	  median	  level	  
of	  fragility	  associated	  with	  negative	  leadership	  change	  is	  more	  than	  the	  one	  
associated	  with	  positive	  leadership	  change	  (i.e.,	  positive	  leadership	  change	  seems	  
to	  be	  associated	  with	  a	  more	  stable,	  less	  fragile	  political-­‐economic-­‐social	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112	  For	  more	  information,	  please	  see	  how	  Democratic	  Accountability	  is	  calculated	  based	  on	  the	  ICRG	  Methodology	  at	  
http://www.prsgroup.com/ICRG_Methodology.aspx#Background	  
113	  A	  positive	  leadership	  or	  regime	  change	  is	  a	  transition	  to	  a	  more	  democratic	  and	  participatory	  type	  of	  regime.	  A	  negative	  
leadership	  or	  regime	  change	  is	  a	  transition	  to	  a	  more	  authoritarian	  and	  centralized	  type	  of	  regime.	  For	  more	  information	  on	  
this,	  please	  see	  the	  discussion	  of	  positive	  and	  negative	  regime	  change	  in	  the	  Polity	  IV	  database.	  See	  
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm	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condition).	  However,	  since	  there	  is	  some	  overlap	  of	  the	  interquartile	  range	  values,	  
it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  determine	  the	  robustness	  of	  this	  relationship	  without	  utilizing	  
multivariate	  controls.	  
	  
Figure	  3-­‐1:	  Box	  Plot	  of	  Relationship	  between	  Fragility	  and	  Leadership	  
Regression	  Model	  Specification	  
Given	  that	  data	  on	  both	  fragility	  and	  regime	  change	  exist	  for	  many	  
countries,	  over	  multiple	  years,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  determine	  the	  relationship	  between	  
fragility	  and	  leadership	  change	  using	  a	  panel	  data	  specification.	  This	  is	  superior	  to	  
simple	  cross-­‐sectional	  regressions	  as	  it	  allows	  for	  the	  systematic	  control	  of	  
country114	  and	  time115	  fixed	  effects,	  thereby	  reducing,	  but	  not	  eliminating,	  the	  
possibility	  that	  the	  results	  are	  driven	  by	  omitted	  variable	  bias.	  116	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
114	  Country	  fixed	  effects	  refers	  to	  ALL	  variables	  that	  may	  vary	  between	  countries,	  but	  not	  within	  a	  given	  country	  over	  time.	  
These	  can	  include	  variables	  such	  as	  colonial	  legacy,	  the	  size	  of	  the	  country,	  legal	  system,	  etc.	  	  
115	  Time	  fixed	  effects	  refers	  to	  ALL	  variables	  that	  do	  not	  vary	  across	  countries,	  but	  do	  vary	  over	  time.	  For	  example,	  the	  oil	  
shock	  of	  1973,	  which,	  to	  an	  extent	  had	  a	  homogeneous	  effect	  on	  global	  growth	  (depressed)	  would	  be	  considered	  a	  time-­‐fixed	  
effect	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  altered	  the	  growth	  patterns	  of	  all	  countries.	  	  
116	  This	  is	  because	  country	  and	  time	  fixed	  effects	  do	  not	  include	  variables	  such	  as	  per	  capita	  income,	  level	  of	  urbanization,	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The	  relationship	  between	  fragility	  and	  leadership	  change	  may	  be	  expressed	  as:	  	  
	  
Where	   is	  the	  level	  of	  fragility	  in	  country	  i	  in	  time	  period	  t	  
represents	  time	  fixed	  effects	  
represents	  country	  fixed	  effects	  
is	   the	  variable	   that	   indicates	   the	  nature	  of	   regime	  change	   in	  
country	  i	  in	  time	  period	  t	  
is	  the	  vector	  of	  control	  variables	  (economic,	  demographic,	  &	  political).	  
is	  the	  error	  term	  
	  
The	  null	  hypothesis	  is	  	  
Ho:	  Fragility	  (internal	  conflict)	  is	  independent	  of	  Leadership	  Change	  (regime	  
change)	  
The	  alternate	  hypothesis	  is	  
Ha:	  Fragility	  (internal	  conflict)	  and	  Leadership	  change	  (regime	  change)	  have	  a	  
robust	  association.	  	  
Country	  fixed	  effects	  control	  for	  all	  those	  characteristics	  in	  a	  country	  that	  
do	  not	  change	  over	  time.	  This	  may	  include	  such	  things	  as	  legal	  system,	  colonial	  
legacy,	  the	  size	  of	  the	  country,	  and	  so	  on.	  Time	  fixed	  effects	  control	  for	  common	  
factors	  that	  affect	  all	  countries	  in	  a	  given	  time	  period,	  in	  this	  case,	  a	  year.	  Using	  a	  
panel	  data	  set	  allows	  systematic	  control	  for	  all	  time	  and	  country	  fixed	  effects,	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thereby	  reducing	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  results	  are	  driven	  by	  omitted	  variable	  
bias.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  however,	  that,	  because	  these	  fixed	  effects	  do	  not	  
control	  for	  variables	  that	  change	  within	  countries	  and/or	  over	  time,	  it	  is	  still	  
necessary	  to	  utilize	  a	  set	  of	  control	  variables	  in	  order	  to	  mitigate	  the	  possibility	  
that	  the	  results	  are	  still	  driven	  by	  omitted	  variable	  bias.	  	  
Factor	  Analysis	  
Factor	  analysis	  was	  carried	  out	  to	  determine	  if	  the	  different	  factors	  and	  the	  
loadings	  of	  measured	  (indicator)	  variables	  on	  them	  conform	  to	  what	  is	  expected	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  pre-­‐established	  theory.	  Factor	  analysis	  was	  used	  to	  see	  if	  they	  load	  
as	  predicted	  on	  the	  expected	  number	  of	  factors.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  factor	  analysis	  
were	  positive,	  indicating	  that	  these	  variables	  load	  as	  predicted	  on	  the	  expected	  
number	  of	  factors	  (See	  Column	  (6)	  in	  Table	  3-­‐2	  for	  results	  of	  the	  factor	  analysis).	  
This	  confirms	  that	  the	  selection	  of	  the	  dependent	  variables	  is	  consistent	  with	  
theory.	  
Regression	  Analysis	  Results	  
The	  results	  of	  the	  panel	  data	  analysis	  (Table	  3-­‐2)	  are	  entirely	  consistent	  with	  
the	  alternate	  hypothesis,	  namely	  that	  there	  is	  a	  robust	  association	  between	  regime	  
change	  and	  fragility	  in	  the	  direction	  anticipated	  by	  the	  theoretical	  framework.	  
That	  is,	  a	  positive/negative	  change	  in	  regime	  type	  is	  associated	  with	  a	  statistically	  
significant	  positive/negative	  change	  in	  fragility.	  This	  robust	  association	  remains	  
significant	  at	  conventional	  confidence	  levels,	  even	  when	  controlling	  for	  country	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and	  time	  fixed	  effects	  (Regression	  Model	  1);	  the	  inclusion	  of	  economic	  control	  
variables	  (Regression	  Model	  2);	  the	  inclusion	  of	  demographic	  control	  variables	  
(Regression	  Model	  3);	  political	  control	  variables	  (Regression	  Model	  4);	  or	  all	  
Control	  Variables	  (Regression	  Model	  5).	  























































	   	   	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Time	  Fixed	  
Effects	  
Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Country	  Fixed	  
Effects	  
Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	   Yes	  
Number	  of	  
Observations	  
326	   302	   326	   326	   302	   302	  
Adjusted	  R2	   0.66	   0.65	   0.67	   0.70	   0.70	   0.67	  
	  
Note:	  Robust	  standard	  errors	  in	  parentheses;	  clustered	  by	  country.	  ***	  Denotes	  significance	  at	  the	  
1%	  level,	  **	  denotes	  significance	  at	  the	  5%	  level,	  and	  *	  denotes	  significance	  at	  the	  10%	  level.	  
Economic	  control	  variables	  include:	  (log)	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  budget	  balance	  (surplus/deficit	  as	  a	  
percent	  of	  GDP),	  GINI	  coefficient	  (level	  of	  inequality);	  demographic	  control	  variables:	  adult	  literacy	  
(%),	  (log)	  population,	  life	  expectancy	  at	  birth;	  political	  variables	  include	  level	  of	  perceived	  
corruption	  (0-­‐6),	  democratic	  accountability	  (0-­‐6).	  Given	  the	  results	  of	  the	  Hausman	  test,	  a	  fixed	  
effect,	  rather	  than	  a	  random	  effect,	  panel	  data	  specification	  was	  utilized.	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The	  overall	  fit	  of	  the	  model	  can	  be	  inferred	  by	  the	  adjusted	  R2	  value,	  which	  
is	  0.70.	  Thus	  70	  percent	  of	  the	  variance	  of	  the	  dependent	  variable	  is	  explained	  by	  
the	  independent	  variables.	  This	  is	  an	  extremely	  good	  fit	  for	  political	  science	  data.	  
The	  overall	  significance	  of	  the	  model	  was	  tested	  using	  a	  t-­‐test,	  which	  reported	  a	  
significant	  value.	  (t-­‐value	  2.37,	  p=0.019).	  As	  t>2.0	  and	  p<0.05	  the	  test,	  we	  can	  reject	  
the	  null	  hypothesis	  that	  there	  is	  no	  relationship	  between	  fragility	  and	  leadership	  
change.	  The	  overall	  fit	  of	  the	  model	  is	  significant,	  and	  leadership	  change	  is	  an	  
important	  predictor	  of	  fragility.	  	  
The	  regression	  analysis	  results	  show	  that	  there	  is	  a	  very	  robust	  association	  
between	  regime	  transition	  and	  level	  of	  fragility	  specifically	  as	  the	  hypothesis	  
anticipates;	  positive	  regime	  transition	  is	  associated	  with	  lower	  fragility	  at	  
conventional	  confidence	  levels.	  These	  results	  hold	  not	  only	  when	  only	  country	  and	  
time	  fixed	  effects	  are	  controlled	  for	  (regression	  model	  1),	  but	  also	  when	  economic	  
(regression	  model	  2),	  demographic	  (regression	  model	  3),	  political	  (regression	  
model	  4),	  or	  all	  additional	  control	  variables	  (regression	  model	  5)	  are	  controlled	  for.	  	  
Disaggregating	  Leadership	  	  
The	  results	  of	  the	  regression	  analysis	  demonstrate	  that	  there	  is	  empirical	  
evidence	  for	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  fragility	  is	  influenced	  by	  leadership	  changes.	  The	  
cross-­‐country	  time-­‐series	  analysis	  shows	  that	  leadership	  change	  is	  very	  
significantly	  associated	  with	  movement	  in	  and	  out	  of	  fragility,	  measured	  by	  
conflict,	  institutional	  strengthening,	  and	  income	  growth.	  The	  data	  available	  help	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to	  highlight	  that	  positive	  leadership	  change	  is	  associated	  with	  more	  stability.	  It	  
also	  helps	  to	  solidify	  the	  fact	  that	  negative	  leadership	  change	  is	  associated	  with	  
greater	  fragility.	  	  
In	  order	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  leadership	  that	  leads	  to	  different	  
outcomes	  in	  fragile	  states,	  however,	  it	  becomes	  necessary	  to	  undertake	  in-­‐depth	  
studies	  of	  cases	  that	  might	  identify	  potential	  causal	  mechanisms	  and	  generate	  rich	  
operational	  insights.	  	  
While	  case	  studies	  are	  good,	  without	  empirical	  data	  analysis,	  it	  becomes	  
difficult	  to	  establish	  whether	  they	  are	  describing	  overall	  trends	  or	  are	  only	  
idiosyncratic.	  Thus,	  by	  first	  establishing	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  robust	  association	  
between	  leadership	  and	  fragility	  and	  then	  selecting	  typical	  cases,	  it	  becomes	  more	  
likely	  that	  the	  causal	  mechanisms	  identified	  by	  the	  qualitative	  case	  studies	  are	  
likely	  to	  be	  important	  in	  other	  cases	  that	  exhibit	  similar	  robust	  associations.	  This	  is	  
the	  purpose	  of	  the	  cross-­‐country	  time-­‐series	  analysis,	  followed	  by	  the	  in-­‐depth	  
case	  studies	  in	  the	  following	  chapter	  of	  the	  dissertation.	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4. Leadership	  and	  Fragility:	  Country	  Case	  Studies	  
Rationale	  behind	  Choice	  of	  Country	  Cases	  
The	  goal	  of	  this	  dissertation	  is	  to	  study	  and	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  
leadership	  that	  leads	  to	  different	  outcomes	  in	  fragile	  states.	  The	  country	  cases	  
selected	  are	  Rwanda,	  Uganda,	  South	  Africa	  and	  Zimbabwe.	  	  
Zimbabwe	  is	  the	  archetypal	  example	  of	  a	  leadership	  strategy	  gone	  wrong	  in	  
a	  country	  that	  was	  once	  seen	  on	  the	  verge	  of	  breaking	  out	  of	  the	  orbit	  of	  poverty	  in	  
which	  most	  post-­‐conflict,	  post-­‐transition	  states	  seem	  to	  be	  mired.	  Robert	  Mugabe	  
struggled	  against	  White	  supremacist	  rule	  and	  was	  elected	  as	  the	  first	  Prime	  
Minister	  of	  Zimbabwe	  in	  1980.	  His	  policies	  over	  the	  last	  15	  years,	  however,	  have	  
brought	  economic	  ruin	  to	  Zimbabwe,	  along	  with	  worsening	  relations	  between	  the	  
Black	  majority	  and	  the	  White	  minority.	  	  
Uganda	  has	  been	  an	  intermediate	  case,	  in	  that,	  it	  has	  overcome	  civil	  war	  
and	  experienced	  stability	  and	  economic	  growth,	  but	  has	  continuing	  ethnic	  
violence	  and	  institutional	  weakness.	  Yoweri	  Museveni’s	  leadership	  strategy	  seems	  
to	  have	  prioritized	  security	  and	  economic	  growth	  over	  political	  participation.	  
Rwanda’s	  case	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  successful	  transition	  out	  of	  fragility	  and	  has	  
experienced	  societal	  reconciliation	  and	  economic	  gains.	  Paul	  Kagame’s	  leadership	  
strategy	  has	  been	  able	  to	  pull	  Rwanda	  back	  from	  the	  brink	  and	  put	  it	  on	  the	  path	  
to	  becoming	  a	  middle-­‐income-­‐country	  by	  2020.	  Nonetheless,	  tensions	  continue	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between	  the	  different	  ethnic	  groups	  in	  Rwanda,	  and	  the	  sustainability	  of	  the	  
development	  trajectory	  remains	  in	  question.	  	  
Though	  South	  Africa	  was	  not	  a	  fragile	  state	  in	  the	  truest	  sense	  of	  the	  term,	  
the	  Apartheid	  regime	  had	  brought	  violent	  conflict	  to	  the	  streets.	  The	  economy	  was	  
teetering	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  collapse,	  and	  South	  Africa	  had	  become	  an	  international	  
pariah.	  In	  this	  context,	  Nelson	  Mandela’s	  leadership	  strategy	  was	  able	  to	  transform	  
the	  nation	  into	  a	  democracy	  and	  helped	  the	  process	  of	  reconciliation	  among	  the	  
Black,	  Colored,	  Indian,	  and	  White	  people	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  
Methodology	  for	  Country	  Cases	  
As	  established	  in	  Chapter	  2,	  leadership,	  once	  again,	  has	  emerged	  as	  a	  
prominent	  theme	  in	  understanding	  the	  development	  trajectories	  of	  nations.	  It	  is	  
important,	  however,	  to	  address	  the	  issue	  of	  structure	  versus	  agency	  in	  
understanding	  the	  role	  that	  leadership	  plays	  in	  improving	  governance	  and	  
development.	  	  
Early	  scholars	  like	  Apter	  and	  Pye	  placed	  greater	  emphasis	  on	  ‘agency’	  as	  the	  
central	  variable	  in	  the	  political	  development	  of	  countries.117	  The	  attention	  to	  
agency	  offered	  by	  those	  emphasizing	  leadership	  suggests	  that	  structural	  
impediments	  may	  be	  less	  important.	  The	  bulk	  of	  development	  research,	  however,	  
points	  to	  institutions	  and	  structural	  issues	  as	  the	  main	  factors	  in	  determining	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117	  See	  David	  E.	  Apter,	  “Political	  Religion	  in	  the	  New	  Nations,”	  in	  Clifford	  Geertz,	  ed.	  Old	  Societies	  and	  New	  States:	  The	  
Quest	  for	  Modernity	  in	  Asia	  and	  Africa,	  (Chicago:	  University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1963)	  and	  Lucian	  W.	  Pye,	  "The	  Process	  of	  
Political	  Modernization"	  in	  John	  J.	  Johnson,	  ed.	  The	  Role	  of	  the	  Military	  in	  Underdeveloped	  Countries	  (Princeton:	  Princeton	  
University	  Press,	  1962),	  79.	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state’s	  development	  strategy.	  The	  development	  literature	  also	  discounts	  the	  role	  
that	  agency	  plays	  in	  determining	  outcomes.	  	  
Research	  suggests	  that	  the	  debate	  of	  structure	  versus	  agency	  can	  be	  
resolved.	  The	  concern	  with	  an	  overemphasis	  on	  the	  role	  of	  individuals	  in	  
determining	  the	  development	  outcomes	  is	  understandably	  justified.	  It	  is	  important	  
to	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  structural	  and	  historical	  conditions	  in	  shaping	  and	  
constraining	  change	  agents:	  weak	  state	  institutions,	  colonial	  legacy,	  and	  continued	  
conflict,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  role	  of	  elites	  and	  coalitions.	  These	  are	  the	  different	  contexts	  
under	  which	  leaders	  have	  had	  to	  govern.	  	  In	  each	  case,	  the	  leadership	  was	  faced	  
with	  a	  particular	  structural	  context,	  replete	  with	  different	  historical,	  social,	  
economic,	  and	  political	  constraints.	  Leaders	  adopted	  different	  strategies	  to	  address	  
their	  particular	  structural	  contexts	  and	  had	  different	  outcomes	  in	  each	  case.	  	  
In	  an	  effort	  to	  capture	  the	  interaction	  between	  the	  agent	  and	  structure,	  this	  
study	  will	  include	  a	  section	  describing	  the	  context	  in	  which	  each	  of	  the	  change	  
agents	  (national	  executives)	  came	  to	  power.	  This	  section	  will	  provide	  the	  
background	  and	  the	  summary	  context	  for	  each	  case.	  The	  case	  study	  also	  will	  
include	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  challenges	  that	  the	  change	  agent	  faced	  in	  the	  beginning,	  
as	  well	  as	  over	  their	  time	  in	  office.	  The	  independent	  variables	  being	  studied	  are	  the	  
change	  agent’s	  strategy	  and	  approach	  to	  security,	  economic	  growth,	  and	  political	  
participation.	  The	  analysis	  will	  also	  consider	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  change	  
agent’s	  leadership	  strategy	  and	  the	  outcomes,	  which	  include	  economic	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development	  indicators,	  the	  security	  situation,	  and	  the	  political	  inclusion	  
(dependent	  variables).	  	  
Thus,	  we	  have,	  given	  the	  contextual	  challenges,	  	  
ΔFragility(PoliticalInclusion,EconomicGrowth,Security) = ΔLeadershipStrategy(ChangeAgent), 	  
where	  the	  Leadership	  Strategy	  (Change	  Agent)	  is	  how	  the	  change	  agent	  interacted	  
with	  the	  coalition	  and	  the	  structural	  context	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  about	  conflict	  
resolution,	  economic	  growth,	  and	  political	  participation	  (which	  determines	  state	  
legitimacy	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  people).	  More	  specifically,	  the	  dissertation	  will	  look	  at	  
whether	  the	  change	  agent’s	  strategy	  was	  inclusive	  and	  broad-­‐based,	  or	  exclusive	  
and	  elitist	  –	  across	  three	  dimensions:	  security	  and	  justice,	  economic	  growth	  and	  
inclusion,	  and	  political	  participation	  and	  inclusion.	  	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐1:	  Aspects	  of	  Leadership	  Strategy	  in	  Addressing	  Fragility	  
I	  have	  sought	  to	  create	  an	  heuristic	  index	  using	  the	  aspects	  of	  the	  
leadership	  strategy	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  4-­‐1.	  This	  index	  includes	  the	  extent	  to	  
which	  the	  change	  agent’s	  leadership	  strategy	  emphasized	  security	  and	  justice,	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impact	  on	  the	  outcomes	  of	  fragility.	  Each	  of	  the	  dimensions	  identified	  above,	  more	  
or	  less,	  can	  alleviate	  fragility,	  depending	  on	  the	  change	  agent’s	  approach.	  I	  seek	  to	  
illustrate	  a	  leadership	  strategy	  by	  assigning	  different	  values	  to	  the	  three	  aspects	  
identified	  above.	  I	  have	  chosen	  the	  following	  values:	  low	  (0.33)	  to	  indicate	  a	  
negative	  impact	  or	  exacerbation	  of	  fragility,	  medium	  (0.67)	  to	  indicate	  a	  neutral	  
impact	  on	  fragility	  outcomes,	  and	  high	  (1.00)	  to	  indicate	  a	  positive	  impact	  or	  
alleviation	  of	  fragility.	  	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐2:	  Heuristic	  Depiction	  of	  a	  Leadership	  Strategy	  
Figure	  4-­‐2	  could	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  leadership	  strategy	  that	  had	  an	  
approach	  to	  economic	  growth	  and	  inclusion	  that	  was	  oriented	  towards	  alleviating	  
fragility.	  The	  approach	  to	  security	  and	  justice	  was	  neutral	  in	  terms	  of	  its	  impact	  on	  
fragility,	  while	  the	  approach	  to	  political	  participation	  and	  inclusion	  was	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Table	  4-­‐1	  conceptualizes	  some	  of	  the	  actions	  that	  a	  leadership	  strategy	  
could	  entail	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  methodology	  and	  framework	  developed	  in	  this	  
dissertation.	  Similar	  to	  the	  values	  assigned	  to	  the	  figures	  above,	  I	  use	  the	  colors	  red	  
(low),	  amber	  (medium)	  and	  green	  (high)	  to	  indicate	  exacerbation,	  neutral	  to,	  and	  
alleviation	  of	  fragility	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  actions	  undertaken	  by	  national	  executives.	  	  
Table	  4-­‐1:	  Mapping	  Leadership	  Strategies	  to	  Fragility	  Outcomes	  
	   Exacerbating	  Fragility	   Neutral	   Alleviating	  Fragility	  
Political	  Participation	  
&	  Inclusion	  
• Routinely	  inhibiting	  
political	  competition	  
• No	  broad	  coalitions	  









• Respect	  for	  
political	  
competition	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• Reckless	  fiscal	  policies	  
&	  Budget	  deficits	  	  
• Narrow/particularistic	  
provision	  of	  public	  
goods	  
• No	  orientation	  
towards	  job	  growth	  
• Mixed	  fiscal	  
record	  








• Broad	  based	  
distribution	  of	  
public	  goods	  
• Systematic	  focus	  
on	  job	  growth	  
Security	  &	  Justice	   • Using	  state	  apparatus	  
for	  perpetrating	  
ethnic	  violence	  	  
• Centralizing	  control	  
over	  armed	  forces	  
• No	  respect	  for	  rule	  of	  
law,	  interfering	  with	  &	  
undermining	  judicial	  
institutions	  








• Some	  stretching	  
of	  legal	  authority	  
&	  judicial	  
interference	  
• Using	  state	  
apparatus	  to	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The	  premise	  is	  that	  each	  of	  the	  cases	  being	  studied	  can	  be	  evaluated	  across	  these	  
three	  dimensions.	  This	  can	  help	  facilitate	  the	  effective	  comparison	  of	  leadership	  
strategies	  across	  countries	  in	  a	  systematic	  manner.	  	  
Robert	  Mugabe’s	  Zimbabwe	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐3:	  Map	  of	  Zimbabwe118	  
The	  Structural	  Context	  for	  Mugabe’s	  Rise	  
Zimbabwe’s	  colonial	  name	  was	  Southern	  Rhodesia	  and	  was	  created	  from	  
land	  owned	  by	  the	  British	  South	  Africa	  Company.	  The	  British	  colony	  was	  largely	  
self-­‐governing,	  and	  the	  White	  settlers	  had	  established	  an	  interventionist	  state.	  The	  
State	  aimed	  mainly	  to	  protect	  the	  welfare	  of	  the	  White	  ruling	  minority	  against	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118	  Source:	  http://www.nationsonline.org	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interests	  of	  the	  majority	  Black	  population.	  White	  settlers	  benefited	  from	  the	  
reservation	  of	  senior	  posts	  in	  the	  civil	  service,	  preferential	  property	  and	  marketing	  
laws,	  as	  well	  as	  tariffs	  and	  subsidies	  that	  encouraged	  commercial	  agriculture,	  
investment	  in	  mining,	  and	  the	  emergence	  of	  a	  modest	  manufacturing	  sector.	  	  
In	  1953,	  in	  the	  face	  of	  African	  opposition,	  Britain	  consolidated	  the	  two	  
colonies	  of	  Rhodesia	  with	  Nyasaland	  in	  the	  ill-­‐fated	  Federation	  of	  Rhodesia	  and	  
Nyasaland,	  which	  was	  dominated	  by	  Southern	  Rhodesia.	  Growing	  African	  
nationalism	  and	  general	  dissent,	  particularly	  in	  Nyasaland,	  persuaded	  Britain	  to	  
dissolve	  the	  Union	  in	  1963	  and	  form	  three	  colonies,	  instead.	  	  
In	  the	  1960s,	  colonial	  rule	  was	  ending	  throughout	  the	  continent.	  As	  African-­‐
majority	  governments	  assumed	  control	  in	  neighboring	  Northern	  Rhodesia	  
(Zambia)	  and	  Nyasaland	  (Malawi),	  the	  white-­‐minority	  Rhodesian	  government,	  led	  
by	  Ian	  Smith's	  Rhodesian	  Front	  (RF)	  dropped	  the	  designation	  "Southern	  Rhodesia"	  
in	  1964	  and	  issued	  a	  Unilateral	  Declaration	  of	  Independence	  (UDI)	  from	  the	  
United	  Kingdom	  on	  November	  11,	  1965.	  This	  effectively	  repudiated	  the	  British	  plan	  
for	  the	  country	  to	  become	  a	  multi-­‐racial	  democracy.	  It	  was	  the	  first	  declaration	  of	  
independence	  by	  a	  British	  colony	  since	  the	  American	  declaration	  of	  1776,	  which	  
was,	  indeed,	  claimed	  by	  the	  Rhodesian	  government	  to	  provide	  a	  precedent.	  
The	  Ian	  Smith	  government	  lasted	  from	  1962-­‐1979	  and	  oversaw	  large-­‐scale	  
suppression	  of	  Black	  political	  and	  economic	  aspirations.	  More	  than	  500,000	  Black	  
people	  had	  been	  uprooted	  from	  their	  homes	  on	  land	  designated	  to	  be	  “White”	  
areas	  by	  the	  minority	  government	  over	  a	  period	  of	  several	  decades.	  Blacks	  had	  no	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political	  or	  economic	  opportunities,	  other	  than	  serving	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  white	  
rulers.	  	  
The	  growing	  discontent	  prompted	  the	  government	  to	  declare	  a	  state	  of	  
emergency	  in	  1965	  and	  assume	  sweeping	  powers.	  In	  addition	  to	  international	  
opposition	  and	  British	  sanctions,	  the	  white	  supremacist	  government	  was	  faced	  
with	  the	  prospect	  of	  civil	  war.	  The	  main	  challenge	  to	  White	  rule	  came	  from	  
increasingly	  militant	  organizations	  representing	  the	  disenfranchised	  African	  
majority.	  The	  Zimbabwe	  African	  National	  Union	  (ZANU),	  led	  by	  Robert	  Mugabe	  
became	  the	  focus	  of	  the	  Black	  majority’s	  aspirations.	  	  
Mugabe’s	  Early	  Life	  
Robert	  Gabriel	  Mugabe	  was	  born	  near	  Kutama	  Jesuit	  Mission	  in	  the	  Zvimba	  
District	  northwest	  of	  Salisbury,	  in	  Southern	  Rhodesia,	  to	  a	  Malawian	  father	  Gabriel	  
Matibili,	  and	  a	  Shona	  mother	  Bona,	  both	  Roman	  Catholic.	  His	  father,	  a	  carpenter,	  
abandoned	  the	  family	  in	  1934	  and	  went	  in	  search	  of	  work	  in	  Bulawayo.	  	  
Mugabe	  was	  raised	  as	  a	  Roman	  Catholic,	  studying	  in	  Marist	  Brothers	  and	  
Jesuit	  schools,	  including	  the	  exclusive	  Kutama	  College,	  headed	  by	  an	  Irish	  priest,	  
Father	  Jerome	  O'Hea,	  who	  took	  him	  under	  his	  wing.	  Through	  his	  youth,	  Mugabe	  
was	  never	  socially	  popular	  or	  physically	  active.	  He	  spent	  most	  of	  his	  time	  with	  the	  
priests	  or	  his	  mother,	  when	  he	  was	  not	  reading	  in	  the	  school's	  libraries.	  He	  was	  
described	  as	  never	  playing	  with	  other	  children,	  but	  enjoying	  his	  own	  company.	  
According	  to	  his	  brother	  Donato,	  his	  books	  were	  his	  only	  friends.	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Mugabe	  qualified	  as	  a	  teacher,	  but	  left	  to	  study	  at	  Fort	  Hare	  in	  South	  Africa	  
graduating	  in	  1951.	  It	  was	  here	  that	  he	  met	  with	  contemporaries,	  such	  as	  Julius	  
Nyerere,	  Herbert	  Chitepo,	  Robert	  Sobukwe	  and	  Kenneth	  Kaunda.	  By	  the	  time	  
Mugabe	  returned	  to	  Southern	  Rhodesia	  in	  1952,	  he	  was	  completely	  hostile	  to	  the	  
system	  of	  White	  supremacy	  that	  still	  prevailed	  there.	  Mugabe,	  however,	  continued	  
his	  studies	  rather	  than	  engage	  in	  political	  activity.	  To	  his	  political	  friends	  in	  the	  
1950s,	  he	  appeared	  to	  be	  a	  nationalist	  at	  heart,	  but	  reluctant	  to	  engage	  in	  activism	  
of	  any	  sort.	  In	  1955,	  Mugabe	  moved	  to	  Northern	  Rhodesia	  (Zambia)	  to	  take	  up	  a	  
post	  in	  a	  teacher	  training	  college.	  There,	  he	  earned	  his	  third	  degree	  from	  London	  
University	  and	  moved	  again	  to	  the	  Takoradi	  Teacher	  Training	  College,	  in	  Ghana.	  	  
Mugabe’s	  Entry	  into	  Politics	  
	  
Mugabe	  found	  inspiration	  to	  engage	  in	  political	  activity	  during	  his	  time	  in	  
Ghana.	  He	  was	  inspired	  by	  the	  Ghanaian	  freedom	  struggle	  led	  by	  Kwame	  
Nkrumah.	  This	  movement	  led	  to	  Ghana	  becoming	  the	  first	  black	  African	  colony	  to	  
gain	  independence.	  	  
At	  the	  time,	  Ghana	  was	  teeming	  with	  optimism	  and	  ambition,	  and	  
Nkrumah	  saw	  himself	  as	  a	  revolutionary	  Pan-­‐Africanist	  leader.	  He	  wanted	  to	  
transform	  Ghana	  into	  an	  industrial	  power,	  a	  center	  of	  learning,	  and	  a	  model	  
socialist	  society	  that	  other	  states	  in	  Africa	  would	  want	  to	  emulate.	  Nkrumah	  
wanted	  to	  lead	  a	  “United	  States	  of	  Africa”	  that	  could	  rival	  the	  United	  States	  of	  
America	  or	  the	  Soviet	  Union	  in	  terms	  economic	  and	  political	  might.	  He	  sought	  to	  
use	  Ghana	  as	  a	  launching	  pad	  for	  this	  ambition.	  Mugabe	  reveled	  in	  this	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environment	  of	  ambition	  and	  rhetoric	  and	  began	  to	  accept	  the	  principles	  of	  
Marxism.	  It	  was	  also	  in	  Ghana	  that	  Mugabe	  met	  Sally	  Heyfron,	  his	  future	  wife.	  	  
In	  Rhodesia,	  the	  political	  tempo	  had	  changed	  by	  this	  time.	  In	  1957,	  a	  new	  
nationalist	  organization,	  the	  African	  National	  Congress	  (ANC),	  had	  been	  launched	  
by	  Joshua	  Nkomo	  and	  sought	  to	  project	  a	  moderate	  image.	  The	  ANC	  stood	  for	  
non-­‐racialism	  and	  economic	  progress	  for	  all.	  It	  sought	  the	  abolition	  of	  
discriminatory	  laws,	  land	  reform,	  and	  voting	  rights	  for	  all	  people,	  irrespective	  of	  
race,	  sex,	  or	  income.	  Within	  a	  short	  time,	  the	  ANC	  succeeded	  in	  establishing	  a	  
mass	  movement	  in	  both	  the	  urban	  and	  rural	  areas.	  A	  bloated	  population,	  
widespread	  poverty,	  and	  lack	  of	  economic	  opportunities	  for	  Blacks	  had	  led	  to	  
growing	  unrest	  among	  the	  people.	  Though	  the	  ANC	  had	  not	  caused	  any	  open	  
disorder,	  the	  Rhodesian	  government	  responded	  in	  an	  extreme	  manner	  by	  banning	  
the	  ANC,	  in	  February,	  1959.	  This	  was	  done	  on	  the	  pretext	  that	  the	  ANC	  and	  its	  
leaders	  were	  inciting	  the	  Black	  population	  to	  defy	  the	  law	  and	  ridicule	  government	  
authority.	  More	  than	  500	  ANC	  members	  were	  arrested,	  and	  300	  were	  detained.119	  	  
Joshua	  Nkomo	  had	  left	  Rhodesia	  to	  attend	  a	  conference	  on	  African	  
liberation	  organized	  by	  Kwame	  Nkrumah	  in	  December,	  1958,	  and,	  thus,	  managed	  
to	  escape	  arrest.	  He	  moved	  to	  London	  where	  he	  established	  a	  base	  of	  operations.	  
Nkomo	  moved	  back	  to	  Rhodesia	  in	  1960	  to	  establish	  a	  new	  organization,	  the	  
National	  Democratic	  Party	  (NDP)	  that	  demanded	  political	  power	  in	  addition	  to	  
the	  redressing	  of	  grievances	  related	  to	  land	  and	  property-­‐based	  discrimination.	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The	  NDP	  attempted	  to	  convince	  Britain	  to	  put	  pressure	  over	  the	  White	  minority	  
government	  in	  Rhodesia	  to	  cede	  to	  their	  demands.	  	  
Mugabe	  returned	  to	  Rhodesia	  in	  1960	  to	  introduce	  his	  wife	  Sally	  to	  his	  
mother	  and	  planned	  to	  return	  to	  Ghana	  after	  the	  visit;	  however,	  he	  found	  himself	  
caught	  up	  in	  the	  political	  developments	  in	  Rhodesia.	  Leopold	  Takawira,	  Mugabe’s	  
Catholic	  teacher,	  asked	  him	  to	  stay	  back	  and	  join	  the	  cause.	  While	  Mugabe	  
considered	  his	  options,	  the	  government	  arrested	  several	  senior	  NDP	  officials,	  
including	  Takawira,	  charging	  them	  under	  the	  Unlawful	  Organizations	  Act.	  	  
This	  move	  prompted	  Mugabe	  to	  join	  7000	  Africans	  who	  set	  out	  from	  the	  
Black	  suburb	  of	  Highfield	  to	  march	  the	  eight	  miles	  to	  Salisbury,	  to	  protest	  before	  
the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  house.	  On	  the	  way	  to	  Salisbury,	  they	  were	  stopped	  by	  police	  
in	  full	  riot	  gear	  near	  Harare	  Township.	  	  
By	  the	  next	  day,	  the	  crowd	  swelled	  to	  more	  than	  40,000,	  and	  a	  makeshift	  
platform	  was	  created	  for	  leaders	  to	  address	  the	  crowd.	  Mugabe	  was	  introduced	  to	  
the	  crowd	  as	  a	  distinguished	  scholar	  (he	  had	  three	  university	  degrees	  by	  now)	  who	  
had	  traveled	  across	  Africa.	  Mugabe	  spoke	  about	  his	  vision	  for	  “Zimbabwe,”	  the	  
name	  that	  the	  nationalists	  sought	  for	  Rhodesia	  and	  was	  greeted	  with	  rousing	  
applause.	  The	  government	  eventually	  asked	  the	  police	  to	  breakup	  the	  protest	  and	  
followed	  it	  up	  with	  the	  Law	  and	  Order	  Maintenance	  Act.	  The	  legislation	  was	  
meant	  to	  deal	  with	  any	  future	  African	  opposition	  by	  giving	  the	  government	  
sweeping	  powers	  to	  curb	  individual	  liberties	  and	  rights,	  essentially	  turning	  
Rhodesia	  into	  a	  police	  state.	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Mugabe’s	  Rise	  in	  Domestic	  Politics	  
	  
“The	  March	  of	  the	  7,000,”	  as	  it	  became	  known,	  propelled	  Mugabe	  to	  the	  
front	  of	  nationalist	  politics	  in	  Rhodesia.	  He	  resigned	  his	  teaching	  job	  in	  Ghana	  and	  
became	  a	  full-­‐time	  activist.	  At	  the	  inaugural	  NDP	  congress	  in	  October	  1960,	  he	  was	  
elected	  the	  publicity	  secretary	  of	  the	  organization.	  In	  that	  role,	  Mugabe	  developed	  
his	  skills	  in	  angry	  rhetoric	  against	  the	  status	  quo.	  He	  became	  increasingly	  
respected	  by	  fellow	  nationalists	  as	  a	  strategic	  thinker	  and	  disciplined	  individual.	  	  	  
Aware	  of	  the	  growing	  developments	  in	  Rhodesia,	  the	  British	  Government	  
convened	  a	  constitutional	  conference	  in	  1961,	  to	  which	  NDP	  officials	  were	  also	  
invited.	  Joshua	  Nkomo,	  NDP	  president,	  missed	  a	  golden	  opportunity	  for	  the	  
nationalists	  to	  leave	  their	  mark	  on	  the	  future	  of	  Rhodesia.	  Nkomo	  misread	  the	  real	  
intentions	  of	  the	  British	  and	  Rhodesian	  Governments.	  The	  British	  were	  anxious	  to	  
disengage	  from	  the	  colony	  and	  were	  ready	  to	  give	  the	  colony	  autonomy	  if	  African	  
advancement	  was	  established	  in	  the	  Constitution.	  The	  Rhodesian	  Government	  
sought	  to	  perpetuate	  White	  minority	  rule	  and	  acquire	  virtual	  autonomy.	  Nkomo	  
accepted	  a	  deal	  that	  gave	  the	  nationalists	  15	  out	  of	  65	  parliamentary	  seats,	  based	  on	  
a	  complex	  franchise	  that	  would	  have	  delayed	  majority	  rule	  for	  several	  decades.	  	  
Mugabe	  was	  furious	  at	  this	  concession,	  and	  others	  in	  the	  NDP	  felt	  the	  same	  
way.	  Nkomo	  had	  to	  repudiate	  this	  deal	  in	  just	  ten	  days,	  by	  which	  time	  it	  was	  too	  
late.	  The	  Constitution	  became	  law	  in	  1962.	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Mugabe	  sought	  action	  that	  he	  thought	  would	  force	  the	  British	  Government	  
to	  take	  remedial	  action	  and	  support	  the	  NDP’s	  demands	  for	  majority	  rule.	  The	  
nationalists	  resorted	  to	  violence	  to	  prevent	  Black	  voters	  from	  registering	  for	  the	  
1962	  elections.	  There	  was	  widespread	  looting,	  arson,	  sabotage,	  and	  intimidation	  of	  
Black	  voters	  who	  had	  not	  registered	  as	  NDP	  members.	  Mugabe’s	  rhetoric	  
increasingly	  became	  more	  and	  more	  violent,	  as	  he	  exhorted	  crowds	  to	  abandon	  all	  
that	  was	  European.	  At	  an	  NDP	  meeting	  in	  December	  1961,	  Mugabe	  declared,	  
“Europeans	  must	  realize	  that	  unless	  the	  legitimate	  
demands	  of	  African	  nationalism	  is	  recognized,	  then	  racial	  
conflict	  is	  inevitable.	  Today,	  you	  have	  removed	  your	  shoes.	  
Tomorrow	  you	  may	  be	  called	  upon	  to	  destroy	  them	  altogether,	  
or	  to	  perform	  other	  acts	  of	  self-­‐denial.”	  120	  
	  
It	  was	  the	  NDP’s	  last	  rally.	  The	  Government	  banned	  the	  NDP	  a	  week	  later,	  
and	  the	  nationalists	  launched	  a	  new	  organization,	  the	  Zimbabwe	  African	  People’s	  
Union	  (ZAPU),	  with	  identical	  aims	  and	  methods.	  The	  violence	  increased,	  and	  
White	  people	  and	  their	  properties	  were	  targeted.	  	  
During	  this	  upheaval,	  Nkomo	  continued	  to	  travel	  abroad,	  seeking	  
international	  support,	  but	  denying	  ZAPU	  much	  needed	  leadership.	  His	  prolonged	  
absence	  from	  Rhodesia	  and	  ZAPU	  affairs	  caused	  a	  lot	  of	  discontent	  among	  the	  
officials,	  including	  Mugabe.	  They	  argued	  that	  pseudo-­‐diplomacy	  was	  not	  the	  
solution	  to	  the	  problem	  in	  Rhodesia,	  militant	  activism	  was.	  ZAPU	  was	  banned	  in	  
nine	  months	  time,	  and	  Mugabe	  and	  others	  were	  arrested	  and	  restricted	  to	  their	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homes,	  in	  September,	  1962.	  Nkomo	  managed	  to	  evade	  arrest,	  as	  he	  was	  in	  
Mozambique	  at	  the	  time	  and	  went	  into	  hiding	  for	  some	  time.	  Nkomo’s	  efforts	  to	  
evade	  arrest	  were	  not	  seen	  favorably	  by	  other	  African	  revolutionaries,	  and	  
eventually,	  Julius	  Nyerere,	  Tanzania’s	  new	  president,	  convinced	  him	  to	  return	  to	  
Rhodesia.	  Upon	  his	  return,	  Nkomo	  was	  arrested	  and	  restricted	  to	  a	  village	  in	  the	  
Semokwe	  reserve,	  south	  of	  Bulawayo.	  	  
The	  growing	  threat	  of	  violence	  led	  to	  the	  radicalization	  among	  the	  Whites	  
as	  well.	  In	  December,	  1962,	  a	  new	  right	  wing	  party,	  the	  Rhodesian	  Front	  (RF),	  
emerged	  with	  the	  support	  of	  White	  farmers,	  who	  were	  worried	  about	  their	  lands.	  
Once	  in	  power,	  the	  RF	  moved	  swiftly	  to	  tighten	  up	  security	  laws,	  like	  the	  Law	  and	  
Order	  Maintenance	  Act,	  and	  included	  a	  mandatory	  death	  sentence	  for	  sabotage.	  
The	  RF	  was	  also	  determined	  to	  achieve	  independence	  from	  Britain,	  on	  its	  own	  
terms.	  	  
After	  the	  restriction	  order	  was	  lifted	  against	  the	  nationalists	  in	  January,	  
1963,	  Mugabe	  returned	  to	  his	  house	  in	  Highfield	  and	  began	  making	  plans	  for	  an	  
armed	  struggle.	  He	  and	  the	  other	  nationalists	  were	  convinced	  that	  this	  was	  their	  
only	  recourse.	  They	  had	  lost	  lives	  and	  resources.	  The	  three	  parties	  they	  had	  created	  
had	  been	  banned.	  Mugabe	  advocated	  the	  training	  of	  Africans	  for	  an	  armed	  
struggle	  against	  the	  Government.	  Nkomo,	  however,	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  this	  
approach.	  He	  was	  convinced	  that	  the	  only	  way	  for	  the	  nationalist	  campaign	  to	  
succeed	  was	  for	  ZAPU’s	  president	  to	  leave	  Rhodesia	  and	  set-­‐up	  a	  Government	  in	  
exile.	  He	  argued	  that	  if	  the	  Rhodesian	  Front	  seized	  independence,	  the	  NDP	  could	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potentially	  claim	  international	  recognition.	  Mugabe	  and	  the	  others	  disagreed	  with	  
this	  approach,	  but	  reluctantly	  supported	  the	  idea	  when	  they	  heard	  that	  Nyerere	  
approved	  of	  this	  plan.	  	  
When	  the	  members	  of	  ZAPU	  met	  in	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  in	  April,	  1963,	  they	  
discovered	  that	  neither	  Nyerere,	  nor	  any	  other	  African	  leader	  approved	  of	  Nkomo’s	  
plan	  of	  a	  Government	  in	  exile.	  The	  focus	  was	  on	  action	  on	  the	  ground,	  and	  
Nkomo’s	  foreign	  travels	  had	  not	  helped	  ZAPU	  domestically	  or	  internationally.	  
Mugabe	  was	  among	  Nkomo’s	  most	  vocal	  critics	  and	  called	  for	  a	  change	  in	  the	  
leadership.	  After	  arranging	  for	  his	  pregnant	  wife	  to	  travel	  to	  Ghana,	  Mugabe	  
planned	  his	  return	  to	  Rhodesia.	  	  
The	  Zimbabwe	  African	  National	  Union	  Emerges	  
	  
In	  Salisbury,	  Mugabe’s	  colleagues	  formed	  a	  new	  organization,	  the	  
Zimbabwe	  African	  National	  Union	  (ZANU),	  on	  August	  8,	  1963.	  Ndabaningi	  Sithole,	  
a	  mission-­‐educated	  teacher	  and	  church	  minister,	  was	  made	  the	  leader.	  Mugabe	  
was	  elected	  as	  the	  secretary-­‐general	  in	  absentia.	  	  
ZANU	  and	  ZAPU	  both	  advocated	  for	  majority	  rule	  and	  continued	  to	  seek	  
outside	  support	  from	  the	  British	  Government.	  Both	  organizations	  recruited	  
Africans	  for	  guerilla	  training	  and	  established	  bases	  outside	  Rhodesia	  to	  coordinate	  
their	  activities.	  In	  terms	  of	  tribal	  support,	  most	  of	  the	  Ndebele	  and	  Kalanga	  stood	  
by	  Nkomo.	  Both	  groups	  received	  support	  from	  the	  Shona.	  Nkomo’s	  strongest	  
support	  came	  from	  Salisbury	  and	  Bulawayo,	  the	  two	  big	  cities	  in	  Rhodesia.	  ZANU	  
received	  support	  from	  the	  South,	  East,	  and	  Midlands.	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As	  each	  group	  tried	  to	  assert	  itself,	  the	  differences	  between	  ZAPU	  and	  
ZANU,	  quickly	  escalated	  into	  violent	  conflict.	  The	  cause	  of	  Nationalism	  seemed	  to	  
take	  a	  backseat,	  as	  the	  violence	  spread	  across	  the	  country.	  This	  inter-­‐group	  rivalry	  
also	  caused	  many	  sympathizers	  abroad	  to	  become	  disenchanted	  with	  the	  
nationalists.	  It	  also	  provided	  the	  RF	  leaders	  with	  additional	  ammunition	  for	  their	  
claims	  that	  Black	  rule	  would	  bring	  chaos	  to	  Rhodesia.	  	  
Mugabe	  returned	  to	  Rhodesia,	  in	  December	  1963,	  and	  was	  arrested	  on	  
arrival.	  At	  his	  trial,	  Mugabe	  refused	  to	  retract	  any	  of	  the	  subversive	  statements	  that	  
he	  was	  accused	  of	  making,	  and,	  in	  March	  1964,	  he	  was	  sentenced	  to	  21	  months	  in	  
prison.	  Other	  nationalist	  leaders	  were	  also	  placed	  in	  restriction.	  Nkomo	  was	  sent	  
to	  ten	  years	  detention	  near	  the	  Mozambique	  border.	  The	  warring	  between	  ZAPU	  
and	  ZANU	  continued	  until	  August	  1964,	  when	  Prime	  Minister	  Ian	  Smith	  banned	  
both	  ZAPU	  and	  ZANU	  and	  rounded	  up	  every	  nationalist	  leader	  and	  imprisoned	  
them.	  	  
Mugabe’s	  Time	  in	  Prison	  
	  
Mugabe	  continued	  to	  be	  self-­‐disciplined	  in	  prison,	  as	  he	  was	  outside,	  and	  
urged	  his	  colleagues	  to	  use	  their	  time	  to	  plan	  for	  the	  liberation	  of	  Zimbabwe.	  He	  
was	  shifted	  from	  Salisbury	  to	  Wha	  Wha	  Prison	  and	  then	  to	  Sikombela,	  in	  Que	  
Que.	  In	  1966,	  Mugabe	  was	  taken	  back	  to	  Salisbury	  to	  a	  large	  communal	  prison	  cell	  
that	  he	  shared	  with	  Ndabaningi	  Sithole,	  Edgar	  Tekere,	  and	  Enos	  Nkala.	  Mugabe	  
resumed	  his	  studies	  with	  dedication,	  and	  in	  the	  eight	  years	  that	  he	  spent	  in	  
Salisbury	  prison,	  he	  earned	  three	  more	  degrees	  in	  law	  and	  economics	  from	  London	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University.	  Mugabe	  gained	  the	  reputation	  of	  being	  a	  hard-­‐working,	  single-­‐minded	  
individual,	  who	  was	  preparing	  for	  bigger	  challenges	  in	  his	  life.121	  	  	  
While	  in	  prison,	  Mugabe	  was	  informed	  that	  his	  son	  had	  died	  at	  the	  home	  of	  
Sally’s	  parents	  in	  Ghana.	  He	  was	  absolutely	  grief	  stricken	  and	  sobbed	  openly	  when	  
he	  heard	  the	  news.	  He	  petitioned	  the	  Government	  for	  temporary	  release	  to	  travel	  
to	  Ghana	  to	  mourn	  his	  son	  and	  to	  comfort	  his	  wife.	  The	  Government	  refused,	  and	  
Mugabe	  never	  forgot	  or	  forgave	  the	  Government	  for	  this	  incident.	  By	  the	  end	  of	  
the	  1960s,	  there	  was	  no	  sign	  that	  the	  government	  would	  ever	  release	  political	  
prisoners.	  	  
Ian	  Smith’s	  Government	  had	  declared	  independence	  from	  Britain	  in	  1965.	  
He	  was	  determined	  to	  entrench	  White	  rule	  in	  Rhodesia	  and	  not	  make	  any	  more	  
concessions	  in	  terms	  of	  transitioning	  to	  majority	  rule.	  In	  1966,	  the	  British	  sought	  
to	  make	  a	  deal	  with	  the	  RF	  Government	  that	  would	  have	  postponed	  majority	  rule	  
well	  into	  the	  21st	  century,	  but	  Smith	  was	  confident	  that	  he	  could	  get	  better	  terms.	  
In	  1967,	  the	  British	  tried	  to	  reach	  a	  settlement	  again,	  but	  Smith	  would	  not	  budge.	  
In	  1969,	  he	  introduced	  a	  new	  Constitution	  that	  would	  keep	  power	  within	  the	  
hands	  of	  the	  White	  minority	  indefinitely.	  	  
In	  1971,	  Smith’s	  Government	  finally	  agreed	  to	  a	  British	  proposal	  that	  would	  
keep	  power	  within	  the	  White	  minority	  until	  2035.	  Strong	  African	  opposition	  to	  this	  
deal	  prompted	  the	  British	  to	  test	  public	  opinion	  concerning	  the	  deal.	  The	  deal	  fell	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  Martin	  Meredith,	  Mugabe:	  Power,	  Plunder,	  and	  the	  Struggle	  for	  Zimbabwe,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Public	  Affairs,	  2007),	  32-­‐35.	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through	  because	  the	  settlement	  terms	  were	  not	  acceptable	  to	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  
population.	  	  
Bishop	  Abel	  Muzorewa	  led	  the	  opposition	  to	  this	  deal	  and	  warned	  of	  the	  
deep	  undercurrents	  of	  bitterness	  rising	  among	  the	  African	  population.	  Instead	  of	  
trying	  to	  mend	  relations,	  Smith	  blamed	  the	  African	  opposition	  for	  the	  failure	  of	  
the	  deal	  and	  imposed	  even	  more	  draconian	  measures	  to	  control	  them.	  	  	  
The	  Revolutionary	  Struggle	  in	  Zimbabwe	  
	  
Limited	  guerrilla	  activity	  began	  in	  1966,	  but	  ZANU’s	  military	  campaign	  in	  
the	  Northeast,	  in	  1972,	  marked	  the	  beginning	  of	  an	  increasingly	  successful	  
challenge	  to	  the	  regime.	  The	  guerilla	  movement	  also	  received	  support	  from	  
Botswana,	  Zambia,	  and	  Mozambique	  in	  their	  efforts	  to	  oust	  the	  White	  supremacist	  
government.	  Over	  the	  years,	  the	  fighting	  against	  Ian	  Smith's	  Government	  
intensified.	  Rhodesia	  had	  also	  lost	  the	  support	  of	  Mozambique,	  and	  South	  Africa	  
began	  to	  cut	  back	  its	  support	  from	  1975	  onwards.	  	  
In	  December,	  1974,	  Mugabe	  was	  released	  after	  11	  years	  in	  prison.	  By	  this	  
time,	  he	  was	  completely	  dedicated	  to	  the	  revolutionary	  cause.	  The	  death	  of	  his	  son	  
and	  the	  inhumane	  treatment	  by	  the	  RF	  Government	  made	  the	  cause	  even	  more	  
important	  to	  him.	  Martin	  Meredith	  argues	  that	  though	  Mugabe	  impressed	  people	  
who	  met	  him	  with	  his	  soft-­‐spoken	  demeanor,	  his	  broad	  intellect,	  and	  his	  articulate	  
manner,	  all	  this	  disguised	  a	  hardened	  and	  single-­‐minded	  ambition.122	  Mugabe’s	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  Struggle	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  2007),	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efforts	  faced	  significant	  challenges.	  While	  he	  was	  intent	  on	  resuming	  the	  
revolutionary	  struggle	  under	  ZANU’s	  banner,	  African	  leaders,	  like	  Kaunda	  and	  
Nyerere,	  were	  determined	  to	  bring	  about	  unity	  between	  ZANU	  and	  ZAPU.	  	  
Soon	  after	  his	  arrival	  in	  Mozambique,	  Mugabe	  was	  placed	  under	  restriction	  
in	  the	  port	  of	  Quelimane	  to	  prevent	  him	  from	  disrupting	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  
combined	  guerilla	  army,	  the	  Zimbabwean	  People’s	  Army	  (ZIPA).	  ZIPA	  was	  beset	  
by	  internal	  rivalries	  and	  disintegrated	  after	  a	  series	  of	  clashes.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  
August,	  1977,	  that	  Mugabe	  was	  able	  to	  retake	  total	  control	  of	  ZANU.	  The	  rivalry	  
between	  ZAPU	  and	  ZANU	  continued	  unabated,	  even	  though	  they	  were	  banded	  
together	  as	  the	  Patriotic	  Front	  (PF).	  	  
Mugabe’s	  Zimbabwe	  African	  National	  Liberation	  Army	  (ZANU’s	  military	  
arm)	  faced	  the	  brunt	  of	  the	  Rhodesian	  military.	  Constantly	  short	  of	  food	  and	  
supplies,	  the	  army	  was	  based	  out	  of	  Mozambique	  and	  received	  Chinese	  support.	  
Nkomo’s	  guerilla	  fighters	  operated	  out	  of	  bases	  in	  Zambia	  and	  had	  substantial	  
Russian	  support.	  Most	  of	  Nkomo’s	  well-­‐trained	  army	  remained	  in	  reserve	  and	  did	  
not	  get	  involved	  in	  the	  war	  effort.	  Mugabe	  suspected	  that	  Nkomo	  was	  saving	  them	  
for	  an	  attack	  on	  ZANU.	  Mugabe	  was	  furious	  when	  he	  learned	  of	  the	  secret	  
negotiations	  between	  Nkomo	  and	  Smith,	  in	  1978,	  to	  achieve	  a	  settlement	  that	  
would	  lead	  Nkomo	  to	  power	  separately.	  	  	  
Persuasion	  from	  the	  South	  African	  President	  John	  Vorster,	  himself	  under	  
pressure	  from	  Henry	  Kissinger,	  forced	  Prime	  Minister	  Ian	  Smith	  to	  accept,	  in	  
principle,	  that	  White	  minority	  rule	  could	  not	  continue	  indefinitely.	  On	  March	  3,	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1978,	  Bishop	  Abel	  Muzorewa,	  Ndabaningi	  Sithole,	  and	  other	  moderate	  leaders	  
signed	  an	  agreement	  at	  the	  Governor's	  Lodge	  in	  Salisbury,	  which	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  
an	  interim	  power-­‐sharing	  Government,	  in	  preparation	  for	  elections.	  	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Internal	  Settlement,	  the	  country’s	  first	  multi-­‐racial	  
elections	  were	  held	  in	  April	  1979.	  The	  United	  African	  National	  Council	  (UANC)	  
party	  won	  a	  majority	  in	  this	  election.	  On	  June	  1,	  1979,	  the	  leader	  of	  UANC,	  Abel	  
Muzorewa,	  became	  prime	  minister,	  and	  the	  country's	  name	  was	  changed	  to	  
Zimbabwe	  Rhodesia.	  The	  internal	  settlement	  essentially	  left	  control	  of	  the	  
country's	  police,	  security	  forces,	  civil	  service	  and	  judiciary	  in	  White	  hands.	  It	  also	  
assured	  Whites	  of	  about	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  seats	  in	  parliament.	  However,	  
international	  recognition	  did	  not	  follow	  and	  sanctions	  were	  not	  lifted.	  The	  two	  
'Patriotic	  Front'	  groups	  under	  Mugabe	  and	  Joshua	  Nkomo	  refused	  to	  participate	  in	  
this	  arrangement	  and	  continued	  the	  war.	  
The	  Lancaster	  House	  Agreement	  
	  
Following	  the	  fifth	  Commonwealth	  Heads	  of	  Government	  Meeting	  
(CHOGM),	  held	  in	  Lusaka,	  Zambia,	  from	  August	  1-­‐7,	  1979,	  the	  British	  Government	  
invited	  Muzorewa	  and	  the	  revolutionary	  leaders	  of	  the	  Patriotic	  Fronts	  to	  
participate	  in	  a	  Constitutional	  Conference	  at	  Lancaster	  House	  in	  London.	  The	  
purpose	  of	  the	  Conference	  was	  to	  discuss	  and	  reach	  agreement	  on	  the	  terms	  of	  an	  
independence	  Constitution.	  The	  Conference	  also	  sought	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  
different	  parties	  would	  settle	  their	  differences	  by	  political	  means,	  and	  that	  the	  
British	  would	  supervise	  elections.	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Lord	  Carrington,	  Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Foreign	  and	  Commonwealth	  Affairs	  
of	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  chaired	  the	  conference.	  The	  Conference	  took	  place	  from	  
September	  10,	  to	  December	  15,	  1979,	  with	  47	  plenary	  sessions.	  Smith,	  Mugabe,	  
Nkomo,	  Muzorewa,	  and	  others	  attended	  the	  Lancaster	  House	  conference.	  On	  
December	  1,	  1979,	  delegations	  from	  the	  British	  and	  Rhodesian	  Governments	  and	  
the	  Patriotic	  Front	  signed	  the	  Lancaster	  House	  Agreement,	  ending	  the	  civil	  war.	  
The	  parties	  to	  the	  talks	  also	  agreed	  on	  a	  new	  Constitution	  for	  a	  new	  Republic	  of	  
Zimbabwe	  with	  elections	  to	  be	  held	  in	  February,	  1980.	  	  
Despite	  a	  hard-­‐fought	  guerilla	  campaign	  from	  1972-­‐1979,	  Robert	  Mugabe	  
and	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  gained	  power	  not	  because	  of	  their	  victory	  in	  the	  battlefield,	  but	  
as	  the	  result	  of	  an	  elite	  pact.	  Mugabe	  had	  to	  enter	  into	  a	  negotiated	  political	  
settlement	  brokered	  by	  the	  departing	  colonial	  authority.	  	  
The	  Independence	  Constitution	  contained	  several	  legal	  constraints	  that	  
forced	  Mugabe	  to	  make	  concessions.	  For	  instance,	  twenty	  seats	  in	  parliament	  were	  
reserved	  for	  Whites,	  civil	  service	  pensions	  were	  guaranteed,	  and	  property	  rights	  of	  
Whites	  (including	  land	  and	  other	  holdings)	  were	  protected.	  The	  Lancaster	  House	  
Agreement	  also	  involved	  an	  implicit	  bargain:	  while	  Blacks	  would	  be	  allowed	  to	  
ascend	  to	  positions	  of	  political	  leadership,	  Whites	  would	  continue	  to	  enjoy	  
ownership	  of	  the	  means	  of	  economic	  production.	  This	  pacted	  regime	  transition	  
essentially	  brought	  about	  further	  division	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  power	  in	  
Zimbabwe.	  It	  did	  not	  address	  the	  Black	  Zimbabweans’	  aspirations	  regarding	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remedying	  the	  stark	  economic	  inequalities	  that	  existed	  in	  the	  country.123	  In	  one	  
sense,	  the	  pact	  was	  bound	  to	  fail,	  as	  it	  did	  not	  address	  the	  asymmetric	  division	  of	  
power.	  	  
The	  Approach	  to	  Political	  Participation	  and	  Inclusion	  
In	  the	  1980	  parliamentary	  elections,	  Mugabe’s	  ZANU-­‐PF	  won	  63	  percent	  of	  
the	  national	  vote.	  ZANU-­‐PF	  gained	  57	  of	  the	  80	  parliamentary	  seats	  reserved	  for	  
Blacks	  in	  the	  parliament.	  More	  than	  anything,	  this	  had	  been	  a	  vote	  for	  peace,	  as	  
most	  black	  Africans	  in	  Zimbabwe	  knew	  that	  anything	  other	  than	  a	  victory	  for	  
ZANU-­‐PF	  would	  have	  caused	  Mugabe	  to	  revert	  to	  violent	  resistance.	  Mugabe	  
initially	  surprised	  his	  critics	  by	  emulating	  Jomo	  Kenyatta	  in	  Kenya	  and	  announced	  
a	  policy	  of	  racial	  reconciliation.	  His	  sincerity	  in	  this	  effort	  remains	  in	  question,	  but,	  
at	  least	  provisionally,	  ZANU-­‐PF	  acknowledged	  the	  need	  for	  a	  truce	  with	  White	  
business	  and	  commerce	  leaders,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  administrative	  elites.	  	  
As	  Prime	  Minister,	  Mugabe	  appointed	  two	  White	  Cabinet	  Ministers,	  
including	  a	  leader	  of	  commercial	  farmers	  as	  the	  Minister	  of	  Agriculture.	  He	  
retained	  the	  heads	  of	  the	  National	  Intelligence	  Agency	  and	  the	  Army	  for	  a	  brief	  
period.	  	  
Mugabe	  seemed	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  members	  had	  
matured	  politically	  in	  prison,	  combat,	  or	  exile,	  and	  that	  they	  lacked	  the	  necessary	  
skills	  and	  experience	  to	  control	  and	  manage	  an	  extensive	  state	  apparatus.	  Many	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
123	  A	  pacted	  transition	  refers	  a	  democratic	  transition	  that	  occurs	  when	  pacts	  or	  agreements	  among	  the	  elites	  of	  formerly	  
undemocratic	  states	  permit	  the	  establishment	  of	  democratic	  government.	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older	  loyalists,	  like	  Leopold	  Takawira	  had	  died	  in	  the	  revolutionary	  struggle,	  and	  
as	  a	  result,	  Mugabe	  had	  to	  install	  ZANU’s	  younger	  intellectuals	  in	  key	  government	  
positions.	  For	  instance,	  Dingai	  Mutumbuka	  was	  appointed	  as	  Education	  minister,	  
and	  Herbert	  Ushewokuze	  received	  the	  Health	  portfolio.	  Tribal	  leaders,	  like	  
Eddison	  Zvogbo,	  from	  Masvingo,	  and	  Kumbirai	  Kangai,	  from	  Manicaland,	  were	  
also	  included	  in	  the	  cabinet,	  both,	  for	  their	  professional	  expertise	  and	  for	  regional	  
balance.	  Initially,	  Mugabe	  sought	  to	  bring	  rivals	  from	  the	  PF-­‐ZAPU	  into	  the	  
Government	  and	  appointed	  four	  cabinet	  ministers	  from	  ZAPU.	  He	  even	  offered	  the	  
ceremonial	  position	  of	  President	  to	  Joshua	  Nkomo.	  	  
Table	  4-­‐2:	  1980	  Zimbabwe	  Parliamentary	  Election	  Results124	  
Parliamentary	  Election	   1980	  
ZANU-­‐PF	  (Robert	  Mugabe)	   57	  
Rhodesian	  Front	  (Ian	  Smith)	   20	  
PF-­‐ZAPU	  (Joshua	  Nkomo)	   20	  
UANC	  (Abel	  Muzorewa)	   3	  
Total	  Seats	   100	  
	  
Thus,	  the	  first	  post-­‐independence	  cabinet	  was	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  “old	  
guard”	  nationalists,	  young	  intellectuals,	  regional	  tribal	  leaders,	  guerilla	  
commanders,	  and	  professionals.	  During	  the	  early	  days	  of	  his	  administration,	  
Mugabe	  did	  not	  seek	  to	  assert	  himself	  as	  the	  “strong-­‐man.”	  This	  was	  in	  contrast	  to	  
the	  approach	  that	  Joshua	  Nkomo	  had	  taken	  to	  leading	  the	  PF-­‐ZAPU	  as	  a	  dominant	  
African	  “big	  man.”	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124	  See	  African	  Elections	  Database,	  http://africanelections.tripod.com/zw	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Instead,	  Mugabe	  strengthened	  his	  hold	  over	  the	  party	  and	  the	  military	  as	  
Prime	  Minister	  by	  co-­‐opting	  the	  factional	  leaders	  into	  his	  Cabinet.	  	  The	  fragile	  elite	  
coalition,	  however,	  would	  not	  last	  long	  and	  unraveled	  in	  1982.	  There	  were	  major	  
outbreaks	  of	  violence	  between	  ZIPRA	  (PF-­‐ZAPU’s	  military	  arm)	  and	  ZANLA	  
(ZANU-­‐PF’s	  military	  arm)	  awaiting	  integration	  into	  the	  National	  Army.	  ZAPU	  was	  
believed	  to	  have	  been	  planning	  an	  armed	  revolt	  to	  make	  up	  for	  ZAPU's	  poor	  
showing	  in	  the	  1980	  elections.	  Major	  arms	  caches	  were	  discovered	  in	  early	  1982,	  
and	  this	  caused	  a	  decisive	  rift	  between	  ZANU	  and	  ZAPU.125	  	  
In	  1983,	  Mugabe	  fired	  Nkomo	  from	  his	  cabinet,	  triggering	  bitter	  fighting	  
between	  ZAPU	  and	  ZANU	  supporters	  in	  the	  Ndebele-­‐speaking	  region	  of	  the	  
country.	  Mugabe	  accused	  the	  Ndebele	  tribe	  of	  plotting	  to	  overthrow	  him	  after	  
sacking	  Nkomo.	  Between	  1982	  and	  1985,	  the	  military	  crushed	  armed	  resistance	  
from	  Ndebele	  groups	  in	  the	  provinces	  of	  Matabeleland	  and	  the	  Midlands,	  leaving	  
Mugabe's	  rule	  secure.	  Mugabe	  has	  been	  accused	  by	  the	  BBC	  of	  committing	  mass	  
murder	  during	  this	  period	  of	  his	  rule.126	  
From	  the	  beginning,	  Mugabe’s	  Government	  moved	  to	  penetrate	  the	  state	  
apparatus	  in	  the	  peasant	  farming	  areas.	  It	  did	  so	  by	  appointing	  party	  loyalists	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125	  Some	  scholars	  believe	  that	  the	  rift	  between	  the	  ZANU	  and	  ZAPU	  was	  engineered	  by	  South	  African	  agents.	  South	  Africa's	  
Apartheid	  Regime	  followed	  a	  policy	  of	  destabilizing	  Zimbabwe	  by	  military	  means,	  while	  blaming	  ZAPU	  for	  the	  actions	  of	  
South	  African	  agents,	  helped	  to	  escalate	  the	  breakdown	  between	  ZAPU	  and	  ZANU	  in	  the	  early	  1980s.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  led	  
Zimbabwe	  to	  retain	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  throughout	  the	  1980s.	  See,	  The	  Catholic	  Commission	  for	  Justice	  and	  Peace	  in	  
Zimbabwe,	  Report	  on	  the	  1980s	  disturbances	  in	  Matabeleland	  and	  the	  Midlands,	  (March	  1997),	  
http://ia600409.us.archive.org/9/items/BreakingTheSilenceBuildingTruePeace/MatabelelandReport.pdf	  (accessed	  
December	  26,	  2011).	  	  	  
126	  See	  Mugabe:	  The	  price	  of	  silence,	  BBC,	  10	  March	  2002	  available	  at	  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/panorama/1844779.stm	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District	  Administrators	  and	  replacing	  the	  old	  system	  of	  native	  administration	  with	  
District	  Councils.	  ZANU-­‐PF	  worked	  to	  get	  its	  candidates	  elected	  to	  these	  local	  
government	  bodies	  and	  a	  hierarchy	  of	  development	  committees	  (See	  Figure	  4-­‐4).	  
ZANU-­‐PF	  was	  successful	  in	  doing	  this	  in	  all	  of	  Zimbabwe’s	  provinces,	  except	  
Matabeleland.	  The	  District	  Councils	  were	  responsible	  for	  public	  service	  delivery,	  
and	  ZANU-­‐PF	  used	  its	  presence	  at	  this	  level	  to	  claim	  political	  legitimacy.	  	  
Mugabe	  directed	  a	  large	  proportion	  of	  funding	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Local	  
Government,	  Urban,	  and	  Rural	  Development,	  which	  was	  in	  charge	  of	  disbursing	  
patronage	  opportunities	  at	  the	  various	  levels	  of	  the	  hierarchy.	  Thus,	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  
was	  able	  to	  consolidate	  its	  own	  position	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  White	  settlers	  and	  other	  rival	  
political	  parties,	  like	  the	  PF-­‐ZAPU,	  through	  the	  use	  of	  force	  and	  patronage.	  
Mugabe	  sought	  to	  establish	  party	  hegemony	  for	  ZANU-­‐PF	  under	  a	  banner	  of	  
national	  unity.	  This	  was	  to	  ensure	  that	  political	  competition	  would	  be	  between	  
different	  factions	  within	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF,	  and	  not	  among	  parties.	  The	  governing	  
coalition	  also	  created	  a	  political	  space	  where	  leaders	  could	  pursue	  their	  own	  
personal	  interests	  using	  state	  resources.	  	  
Mugabe’s	  Government	  also	  moved	  quickly	  to	  Africanize	  the	  civil	  service,	  
which	  was	  dominated	  by	  the	  White	  minority.	  The	  Government	  initially	  instituted	  
a	  politically	  neutral	  and	  professional	  Public	  Service	  Commission	  and	  protected	  the	  
principle	  of	  merit	  recruitment.	  To	  promote	  Africanization	  of	  the	  Civil	  Service,	  the	  
Government	  doubled	  the	  size	  of	  the	  bureaucracy,	  handed	  promotions	  to	  Blacks	  
who	  had	  been	  long	  held	  back,	  and	  accommodated	  those	  returning	  from	  the	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diaspora.	  These	  institutional	  developments	  strengthened	  the	  position	  of	  the	  party	  
with	  respect	  to	  the	  civil	  service;	  however,	  they	  also	  led	  to	  the	  flight	  of	  qualified	  
White	  bureaucrats	  out	  of	  Zimbabwe.	  	  
	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐4:	  The	  Hierarchical	  Organization	  of	  ZANU-­‐PF	  in	  Mugabe's	  Zimbabwe	  
The	  victory	  in	  the	  1985	  parliamentary	  elections	  (see	  Table	  4-­‐3)	  further	  
cemented	  Mugabe’s	  hold	  on	  power.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  interparty	  violence	  that	  had	  
started	  after	  the	  collapse	  of	  the	  first	  coalition	  government,	  in	  1982,	  continued	  until	  
a	  national	  Unity	  Accord	  was	  signed	  in	  1987.	  The	  Accord	  restored	  the	  coalition	  
between	  ZANU-­‐PF	  and	  PF-­‐ZAPU,	  and	  brought	  peace	  to	  the	  country.	  	  
The	  Unity	  Accord	  created	  a	  virtual	  one-­‐party	  state.	  In	  retrospect,	  the	  Unity	  
Accord	  was	  a	  Trojan	  horse	  for	  Mugabe’s	  efforts	  to	  bring	  ZANU-­‐PF	  control	  over	  the	  
Sindebele-­‐speaking	  regions	  of	  Zimbabwe.	  It	  helped	  achieve	  what	  his	  previous	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was	  amended	  to	  create	  an	  executive	  Presidency,	  with	  Mugabe	  as	  the	  President	  and	  
Nkomo	  as	  one	  of	  two	  national	  Vice-­‐Presidents.	  	  
Table	  4-­‐3:	  1985	  Zimbabwe	  Parliamentary	  Election	  Results127	  
Parliamentary	  Election	   1985	  
ZANU-­‐PF	   64	  
PF-­‐ZAPU	   15	  
CAZ	   15	  
Independent	  Zimbabwe	  Group	   4	  
Independents	   1	  
ZANU-­‐Ndonga	   1	  
Total	  Seats	   100	  
	  
With	  the	  expiration	  of	  the	  Lancaster	  House	  Agreement’s	  stipulations	  in	  
April	  1990,	  the	  Government	  moved	  to	  create	  a	  de	  jure	  one	  party	  state.	  Mugabe’s	  
party	  leaders	  had	  already	  ensured	  the	  passage	  of	  a	  resolution	  favoring	  the	  one-­‐
party	  idea	  at	  ZANU-­‐PF’s	  National	  Congress,	  in	  December	  1989.	  The	  argument	  was	  
that	  single-­‐party	  rule	  was	  consistent	  with	  African	  traditions	  and	  was	  essential	  to	  
establishing	  a	  society	  free	  of	  class	  and	  other	  ethnic	  cleavages.	  A	  single	  party	  was	  
also	  important	  in	  helping	  coherent	  development	  planning.	  When	  faced	  with	  
opposition	  from	  Britain	  on	  this,	  Mugabe	  insisted	  that	  the	  British	  had	  no	  right	  to	  
teach	  democracy	  to	  the	  Zimbabweans.	  	  
Though	  the	  ruling	  elites	  wanted	  to	  create	  the	  one-­‐party	  state,	  a	  public	  
opinion	  survey,	  conducted	  in	  1990,	  by	  the	  University	  of	  Zimbabwe,	  showed	  that	  60	  
percent	  of	  the	  population	  was	  opposed	  to	  it.	  There	  was	  considerable	  opposition	  
from	  within	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  as	  well,	  with	  former	  President	  Canaan	  Banana	  claiming	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that	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  had	  already	  attained	  a	  de	  facto	  one	  party	  state	  through	  popular	  
support	  at	  the	  ballot	  box,	  and	  there	  was	  no	  need	  to	  entrench	  this	  legally	  into	  the	  
Constitution.	  	  
The	  move	  to	  a	  one-­‐party	  state	  seemed	  out	  of	  sync	  with	  the	  times.	  
Neighboring	  Kenya,	  Mozambique,	  and	  Zambia	  were	  moving	  towards	  multi-­‐party	  
regimes.	  The	  intentions	  of	  Mugabe	  and	  his	  elite	  were	  becoming	  clearer.	  They	  
sought	  to	  hold	  onto	  power	  at	  any	  cost	  and	  worked	  to	  “game”	  the	  system	  in	  order	  
to	  do	  so.	  	  
By	  this	  time,	  Mugabe	  had	  demonstrated	  an	  inability	  to	  tolerate	  the	  
expression	  of	  political	  dissent	  of	  any	  sort.	  In	  1988,	  he	  had	  expelled	  Edgar	  Tekere,	  
ZANU-­‐PF’s	  Secretary	  General	  and	  Cabinet	  Minister	  for	  alleging	  corruption	  against	  
the	  party	  leadership.	  In	  1989,	  Tekere	  formed	  the	  Zimbabwe	  Unity	  Movement	  
(ZUM)	  on	  a	  platform	  that	  promised	  employment,	  market	  reform,	  and	  opposition	  
to	  a	  one-­‐party	  state.	  ZUM	  formed	  an	  alliance	  with	  the	  white-­‐led	  Conservative	  
Alliance	  of	  Zimbabwe	  (CAZ).	  	  
In	  1990,	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  leadership	  did	  its	  best	  to	  stifle	  an	  emerging	  
opposition	  –	  both	  internally	  and	  externally.	  The	  ZANU-­‐PF	  also	  faced	  opposition	  
from	  Abel	  Muzorewa	  (UANC)	  and	  Ndabaningi	  Sithole	  (ZANU-­‐Ndongo).	  The	  
ruling	  elites	  resorted	  to	  the	  standard	  dirty	  tricks	  employed	  by	  incumbents,	  
including	  monopolizing	  the	  public	  airwaves,	  disrupting	  opposition	  rallies,	  
directing	  official	  resources	  in	  the	  ruling	  party	  campaign,	  and	  threatening	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opposition	  candidates.	  Mugabe	  won	  the	  Presidential	  Election	  with	  83	  percent	  of	  
the	  vote	  (See	  Table	  4-­‐4).	  	  
Table	  4-­‐4:	  1990	  Zimbabwe	  President	  Election	  Results128	  
Presidential	  Election	  	   1990	  
Robert	  Mugabe	  (ZANU-­‐PF)	   83.05%	  
Edgar	  Tekere	  (ZUM)	   16.95%	  
	  
After	  the	  1990	  elections,	  President	  Mugabe	  moved	  to	  revive	  the	  Law	  and	  
Order	  Maintenance	  Act,	  which	  in	  the	  past	  had	  been	  used	  by	  the	  White	  minority	  
regime	  to	  control	  and	  prohibit	  political	  opposition.	  He	  established	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
Political	  Affairs	  within	  the	  purview	  of	  the	  President’s	  Office	  to	  further	  consolidate	  
his	  power.	  	  
The	  Cabinet	  was	  expanded	  and	  loyalists	  were	  given	  plum	  positions.	  When	  
Members	  of	  Parliament	  tried	  to	  exercise	  their	  authority	  and	  questioned	  the	  
Government’s	  budget,	  they	  were	  labeled	  as	  traitors.	  If	  independent-­‐minded	  
individuals	  ran	  for	  office	  and	  won	  elections,	  ZANU-­‐PF	  intervened	  to	  overturn	  the	  
election	  results.	  The	  Politburo	  and	  Central	  Committee	  of	  ZANU-­‐PF	  gradually	  
usurped	  the	  policy-­‐making	  roles	  of	  the	  Cabinet	  and	  the	  parliament,	  ensuring	  that	  
the	  party	  controlled	  virtually	  every	  institution	  in	  Zimbabwe.	  	  
In	  the	  1980s,	  opposition	  to	  the	  Government’s	  economic	  mismanagement	  
and	  perceived	  closeness	  with	  economic	  special	  interests	  led	  to	  rifts	  between	  the	  
ZANU-­‐PF	  officials	  and	  the	  workers	  who	  belonged	  to	  Zimbabwe	  Congress	  of	  Trade	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Unions	  (ZCTU).	  Led	  by	  Morgan	  Tsvangirai,	  the	  union	  workers	  and	  University	  of	  
Zimbabwe	  students	  called	  for	  greater	  representation	  in	  ZANU-­‐PF	  structures.	  The	  
Government	  responded	  by	  closing	  down	  the	  University	  of	  Zimbabwe	  and	  the	  
police	  violently	  cracked	  down	  on	  students’	  and	  union	  workers’	  protests.	  	  
By	  1990,	  the	  ZCTU	  was	  vocal	  about	  their	  support	  for	  a	  multi-­‐party	  system.	  It	  
grew	  in	  terms	  of	  organizational	  strength	  and	  was	  buoyed	  by	  increased	  support	  
among	  laid-­‐off	  workers	  and	  a	  weakening	  of	  state	  institutions	  (due	  to	  lack	  of	  
money).	  However,	  despite	  the	  growing	  opposition,	  Mugabe	  easily	  managed	  to	  win	  
the	  1996	  elections,	  with	  close	  to	  93	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  (See	  Table	  4-­‐5).	  	  
Table	  4-­‐5:	  1996	  Zimbabwe	  Presidential	  Election	  Results129	  
Presidential	  Election	   1996	  
Robert	  Mugabe	  (ZANU-­‐PF)	   92.70%	  
Abel	  Muzorewa	  (United	  Party)	   4.80%	  
Ndabaningi	  Sithole	  (ZANU-­‐Ndonga)	   2.40%	  
	   	  
The	  emergence	  of	  a	  National	  Constitutional	  Assembly	  (NCA),	  in	  1997,	  was	  a	  
major	  step	  in	  the	  organization	  of	  collective	  action	  in	  independent	  Zimbabwe.	  The	  
NCA	  was	  a	  broad	  alliance	  of	  professionals,	  union	  workers,	  media	  personnel,	  non-­‐
governmental	  organizations	  (NGOs),	  women’s	  and	  religious	  organizations.	  It	  
called	  for	  a	  new	  Constitution	  that	  would	  replace	  the	  Lancaster	  House	  
Constitution,	  which	  had	  been	  amended	  several	  times	  to	  entrench	  ZANU-­‐PF	  in	  
power.	  The	  NCA	  was	  successful	  in	  bringing	  about	  a	  boycott	  of	  the	  Government’s	  
official	  Constitutional	  Commission.	  As	  the	  decade	  ended,	  Zimbabwean	  civil	  society	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arose	  to	  challenge	  the	  entrenched	  ruling	  party	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  its	  economic	  
mismanagement,	  rampant	  corruption,	  and	  nepotism.	  Morgan	  Tsvangirai	  and	  the	  
ZCTU	  announced	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  new	  political	  party,	  the	  Movement	  for	  
Democratic	  Change	  (MDC),	  whose	  main	  aims	  included	  “a	  struggle	  for	  jobs,	  
decency,	  and	  democracy.”130	  	  
By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1990s,	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  leadership	  coalition	  had	  become	  
narrower	  and	  less	  cohesive.	  There	  were	  growing	  rifts	  between	  the	  coalition	  
members	  about	  who	  would	  succeed	  Mugabe.	  The	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  
regime	  was	  also	  being	  openly	  questioned.	  Mugabe	  won	  93	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  
because	  opposition	  parties	  pulled	  out	  of	  the	  election,	  citing	  irregularities	  and	  
intimidation.	  Barely	  one-­‐third	  of	  the	  registered	  voters	  bothered	  to	  turnout	  for	  the	  
election.131	  	  
Mugabe	  faced	  serious	  internal	  opposition	  from	  the	  Zimbabwe	  National	  
Liberation	  War	  Veterans’	  Association	  (ZNLWA),	  led	  by	  Chenjerai	  Hunzvi.	  Hunzvi	  
protested	  their	  exclusion	  from	  the	  spoils	  of	  state	  patronage,	  when	  it	  came	  to	  light	  
that	  senior	  ZANU-­‐PF	  members	  had	  illicitly	  helped	  themselves	  to	  massive	  handouts	  
from	  a	  War	  Victims’	  Compensation	  Fund.	  The	  President	  was	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  
negotiate	  with	  the	  veterans	  as	  he	  heavily	  depended	  upon	  them	  for	  their	  support	  in	  
enforcing	  his	  illegitimate	  regime.	  He	  acceded	  to	  their	  demands	  and	  disbursed	  
generous	  gratuities	  and	  pensions.	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This	  unbudgeted	  expenditure	  further	  drained	  the	  already	  depleted	  treasury	  
and	  put	  the	  Zimbabwean	  Dollar	  in	  a	  free-­‐fall.	  By	  caving	  into	  their	  demands,	  
Mugabe	  put	  an	  end	  to	  the	  era	  of	  Structural	  Adjustment	  and	  entered	  an	  era	  where	  
economic	  rationality	  was	  abandoned	  in	  the	  search	  for	  political	  survival.	  	  
In	  2000,	  the	  ruling	  coalition	  was	  losing	  mass	  support	  to	  an	  emerging	  
opposition	  led	  by	  the	  MDC.	  The	  turning	  point	  seemed	  to	  be	  the	  referendum	  on	  a	  
new	  constitution.	  The	  Government’s	  official	  draft	  of	  the	  Constitution	  ignored	  
popular	  views	  for	  a	  reduction	  in	  presidential	  powers.	  In	  a	  referendum	  vote	  in	  
February,	  2000,	  a	  55	  percent	  majority	  voted	  “No”	  on	  the	  Government’s	  draft.	  It	  was	  
the	  ruling	  party’s	  first	  defeat	  at	  the	  polls.	  Blaming	  the	  loss	  on	  the	  MDC	  and	  
declaring	  it	  as	  a	  front	  for	  the	  White	  minority,	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  openly	  intensified	  its	  
efforts	  to	  crush	  the	  opposition	  movement	  that	  threatened	  its	  hold	  on	  power.	  	  
Mugabe	  unleashed	  a	  reign	  of	  intimidation,	  terror	  and	  militarization	  casting	  
aside	  any	  pretense	  of	  adherence	  to	  legal	  or	  normative	  limits.	  Afraid	  of	  losing	  the	  
upcoming	  Parliamentary	  elections,	  the	  ruling	  party	  played	  the	  “land	  card,”	  and	  
called	  for	  a	  campaign	  of	  invasions	  of	  White	  farms.	  In	  the	  next	  two	  years,	  11	  million	  
hectares	  of	  land	  were	  confiscated	  from	  4,000	  White	  farmers	  and	  redistributed	  
among	  127,000	  small-­‐farm	  families	  and	  7,200	  Black	  commercial	  farmers.132	  	  
Mugabe	  faced	  Tsvangirai	  in	  presidential	  elections	  in	  March	  2002.	  Mugabe	  
defeated	  Tsvangirai	  by	  57	  percent	  to	  42	  percent,	  amid	  widespread	  violence,	  
intimidation,	  and	  the	  prevention	  of	  large	  numbers	  of	  citizens	  in	  urban	  areas	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132	  Michael	  Bolton	  and	  Eldred	  Masunungure,	  “The	  Anatomy	  of	  Political	  Predation:	  Leaders,	  Elites,	  and	  Coalitions	  in	  
Zimbabwe,	  1980-­‐2010,”	  Research	  Paper	  09,	  Developmental	  Leadership	  Program,	  (Canberra:	  AUSAID,	  2010),	  23.	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voting.	  The	  conduct	  of	  the	  elections	  was	  widely	  viewed	  internationally	  as	  having	  
been	  manipulated.	  Many	  countries,	  such	  as	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  the	  European	  
Union,	  and	  the	  United	  States,	  as	  well	  as	  Tsvangirai's	  MDC,	  asserted	  that	  the	  result	  
was	  rigged.	  The	  opposition	  to	  ZANU-­‐PF	  and	  Mugabe	  continued	  to	  grow	  in	  the	  21st	  
century.	  It	  was	  aided	  by	  a	  weakening	  of	  state	  capacity	  due	  to	  the	  economic	  
catastrophe	  that	  had	  been	  20	  years	  in	  the	  making.	  	  
In	  March	  2007,	  Tsvangirai	  was	  arrested	  and	  beaten	  following	  a	  prayer	  
meeting	  in	  the	  Harare	  suburb	  of	  Highfield.	  One	  MDC	  activist	  was	  killed	  by	  police,	  
50	  were	  hospitalized,	  and	  more	  than	  200	  MDC	  members	  were	  arrested.	  Mugabe	  
declared	  that	  Tsvangirai	  and	  the	  others	  deserved	  the	  police	  beatings,	  as	  there	  was	  
a	  ban	  on	  attending	  political	  rallies.	  After	  this	  incident,	  there	  was	  an	  upsurge	  of	  
state-­‐sponsored	  violence	  against	  MDC	  leaders	  and	  their	  families.	  The	  regime	  
portrayed	  the	  MDC	  leaders	  as	  terrorists,	  invaded	  their	  homes,	  and	  beat	  them	  in	  
front	  of	  their	  families.	  Media	  coverage	  of	  these	  events	  evoked	  international	  
condemnation	  of	  the	  Mugabe	  regime.	  	  
The	  crackdown	  of	  2007	  and	  the	  growing	  regional	  unease	  about	  the	  barbaric	  
violence	  and	  instability	  in	  Zimbabwe	  prompted	  South	  African	  President	  Thabo	  
Mbeki	  to	  step-­‐in	  to	  facilitate	  dialogue	  between	  the	  Government	  and	  the	  
opposition.	  The	  ZANU-­‐PF	  was	  reluctant	  to	  hold	  talks	  with	  the	  MDC.	  Mugabe	  
delayed	  sending	  envoys	  to	  the	  talks	  in	  Pretoria	  and	  refused	  to	  enter	  into	  face-­‐to-­‐
face	  deliberations	  with	  MDC	  leaders.	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In	  December,	  2007,	  the	  Government	  announced	  that	  it	  would	  allow	  
political	  rallies	  as	  long	  as	  police	  deemed	  no	  threat	  of	  violence.	  It	  also	  declared	  that	  
it	  would	  selectively	  allow	  licensing	  of	  journalists	  and	  broadcasters.	  In	  addition,	  the	  
Government	  agreed	  to	  work	  on	  constitutional	  reform.	  Immediately	  after	  the	  talks,	  
however,	  Mugabe	  unilaterally	  announced	  a	  timetable	  for	  elections	  on	  March	  29,	  
2008.	  He	  did	  so	  without	  addressing	  the	  MDC’s	  precondition	  of	  comprehensive	  
constitutional	  reform.	  	  
It	  was	  clear	  that	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  did	  not	  intend	  to	  abide	  by	  the	  agreements	  
and	  police	  continued	  to	  harass	  MDC	  gatherings.	  In	  an	  attempt	  to	  reinforce	  its	  
rural	  base,	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  turned	  tribal	  chiefs	  and	  other	  traditional	  leaders	  into	  
party	  officials.	  These	  officials	  were	  given	  generous	  gratuities	  and	  expected	  to	  act	  as	  
the	  agents	  of	  ZANU-­‐PF	  and	  help	  deliver	  the	  rural	  vote	  (by	  force,	  if	  necessary).	  	  
In	  the	  March,	  2008,	  parliamentary	  and	  presidential	  elections,	  it	  seemed	  as	  
though	  the	  opposition	  had	  won	  with	  the	  MDC-­‐Tsvangirai	  winning	  99	  seats	  in	  the	  
lower	  house,	  compared	  to	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF’s	  97.	  After	  suspiciously	  long	  delays,	  the	  
Zimbabwe	  Election	  Commission	  (ZEC)	  announced	  that	  neither	  Tsvangirai	  (48	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Table	  4-­‐6:	  2008	  Zimbabwe	  Presidential	  Election	  Results133	  
Presidential	  Election	   2008	  
Round	  1	   	  	  
Robert	  Mugabe	  (ZANU-­‐PF)	   43%	  
Morgan	  Tsvangirai	  (MDC)	   48%	  
	  	   	  	  
Round	  2	   	  	  
Robert	  Mugabe	  (ZANU-­‐PF)	   86%	  
Morgan	  Tsvangirai	  (MDC)	   9%	  
	  
A	  Constitutionally	  mandated	  run-­‐off	  election	  was	  scheduled	  for	  June	  27,	  
2008.	  In	  the	  run	  up	  to	  the	  election,	  Government-­‐sponsored	  violence	  caused	  the	  
deaths	  of	  more	  than	  100	  MDC	  officials	  and	  injured	  and	  displaced	  more	  than	  
200,000	  people.	  Tsvangirai	  withdrew	  from	  the	  contest,	  and	  Mugabe	  won	  with	  86%	  
of	  the	  vote	  from	  a	  brutalized	  and	  shrunken	  electorate.	  	  
In	  reality,	  Mugabe	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  face	  of	  a	  military	  regime	  effectively	  
being	  run	  by	  Emmerson	  Mnangagwa,	  a	  senior	  politburo	  member	  and	  a	  contender	  
for	  succession,	  who	  now	  chairs	  the	  JOC.	  Washington	  Post	  reporter	  Craig	  Timberg	  
noted	  in	  his	  July	  5,	  2008	  article,	  that	  Mugabe	  had	  informed	  the	  security	  chiefs	  that	  
he	  had	  lost	  the	  presidential	  vote	  and	  intended	  to	  surrender	  power.	  But	  the	  
commander	  of	  the	  Zimbabwe	  Defense	  Forces	  (ZDF),	  Constantine	  Chiwenga,	  Police	  
chief	  Augustine	  Chihuri,	  Air	  Force	  head	  Perance	  Shiri,	  and	  Director	  of	  prisons	  
Paradzai	  Zimondi	  allegedly	  vetoed	  this	  proposal.134	  The	  ZANU-­‐PF	  elite	  had	  much	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
133	  See	  Election	  Guide,	  http://www.electionguide.org/	  
134	  See	  Craig	  Timberg,	  “Inside	  Mugabe’s	  Violent	  Crackdown,”	  Washington	  Post,	  (July	  5,	  2008).	  	  
	   106	  
to	  lose	  from	  ceding	  power	  to	  the	  opposition,	  including	  the	  risk	  of	  being	  persecuted	  
for	  their	  abuse	  of	  power	  since	  Zimbabwe’s	  independence.	  	  
For	  the	  past	  two	  years,	  a	  regime	  transition	  has	  been	  underway	  in	  Zimbabwe	  
on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  fragile	  and	  contested	  elite	  political	  settlement.	  The	  new	  
settlement	  was	  no	  leader’s	  first	  choice	  and	  Mugabe	  and	  Tsvangirai	  agreed	  
reluctantly	  under	  intense	  international	  pressure.	  The	  parties	  signed	  the	  Global	  
Political	  Agreement	  (GPA)	  to	  form	  a	  Government	  of	  National	  Unity	  (GNU),	  with	  
Mugabe	  as	  President	  and	  Tsvangirai	  as	  Prime	  Minister.	  The	  power-­‐sharing	  
agreement	  offered	  an	  antidote	  to	  political	  polarization,	  a	  mechanism	  for	  the	  
peaceful	  resolution	  of	  disputes,	  and	  an	  opportunity	  to	  attend	  to	  the	  urgent	  
humanitarian	  and	  development	  needs	  of	  the	  Zimbabwean	  people.	  The	  GPA	  called	  
for	  a	  division	  and	  dispersion	  of	  executive	  authority	  and	  sought	  to	  break	  down	  the	  
old	  party-­‐state	  nexus;	  however,	  this	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  realized.	  	  
Mugabe	  selectively	  implemented	  the	  terms	  of	  the	  GPA	  and	  reverted	  
repeatedly	  to	  exercising	  executive	  powers	  to	  make	  key	  political	  decisions	  without	  
the	  consent	  of	  the	  MDC.	  As	  of	  late	  2011,	  the	  coalition	  Government	  remained	  
deadlocked	  with	  regard	  to	  re-­‐working	  the	  Constitution	  and	  electoral	  framework.	  	  
Mugabe	  and	  his	  elites	  have	  approached	  political	  participation	  and	  inclusion	  
in	  a	  purely	  opportunistic	  manner.	  They	  manipulated	  the	  political	  system	  to	  give	  
the	  executive	  more	  power.	  This	  is	  clear	  in	  the	  way	  Mugabe	  abolished	  the	  post	  of	  
Prime	  Minister	  and	  opted	  for	  a	  Presidential	  System.	  Under	  the	  pretext	  of	  
reforming	  the	  system,	  Mugabe	  bestowed	  the	  executive	  with	  even	  greater	  powers	  to	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subvert	  the	  original	  legal	  system.	  Over	  the	  years,	  Mugabe	  openly	  used	  violence	  to	  
suppress	  any	  political	  competition	  and	  routinely	  detained	  and	  intimidated	  those	  
who	  were	  perceived	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  his	  authoritarian	  regime.	  
The	  Approach	  to	  Economic	  Growth	  and	  Inclusion	  
Initially,	  the	  Government	  followed	  a	  corporatist	  model.	  This	  involved	  
Government	  management	  of	  the	  economy,	  including	  maintaining	  policies	  first	  
instituted	  by	  the	  previous	  Government	  to	  deal	  with	  UN-­‐sanctions	  imposed	  in	  1965.	  
The	  State	  already	  controlled	  ownership	  of	  utilities	  and	  agricultural	  marketing	  
agencies.	  The	  new	  Government	  added	  to	  this	  by	  buying	  out	  more	  private	  
companies.	  The	  Government	  also	  extended	  existing	  protectionist	  policies.	  
Zimbabwe	  adopted	  a	  growth	  strategy	  that	  sought	  to	  blend	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  
principles	  with	  a	  capitalist	  economy.	  	  
Mugabe	  did	  not	  attempt	  reforms	  that	  would	  push	  the	  economy	  in	  an	  
explicitly	  socialist	  direction,	  most	  obviously	  with	  regard	  to	  land	  redistribution.	  But	  
Mugabe	  and	  his	  party	  were	  schooled	  in	  Marxist	  economics,	  and	  their	  reaction	  to	  
economic	  crises	  tended	  to	  follow	  a	  Marxist	  path.	  For	  instance,	  the	  maize	  meal	  
shortages	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  were	  addressed	  by	  the	  State	  taking	  over	  milling	  
companies,	  rather	  than	  encouraging	  of	  competition.	  
Mugabe’s	  team,	  however,	  also	  seemed	  to	  understand	  that	  they	  needed	  the	  
country’s	  productive	  assets	  (which	  were	  under	  White	  control)	  in	  order	  to	  have	  a	  
realistic	  chance	  of	  raising	  Black	  living	  standards.	  Even	  though	  the	  inequality	  in	  
land	  distribution	  was	  a	  key	  issue	  during	  the	  revolutionary	  struggle,	  Mugabe	  could	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not	  afford	  to	  alienate	  the	  commercial	  farmers	  on	  whom	  the	  Government	  depended	  
to	  feed	  the	  hungry	  Black	  people.	  Instead	  of	  trying	  to	  capture	  the	  White	  lands,	  the	  
Government	  chose	  to	  invest	  in	  improving	  access	  to	  agricultural	  and	  social	  services	  
for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population,	  who	  were	  small-­‐scale	  Black	  farmers.	  	  
The	  new	  Government	  propagated	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  new	  economic	  policies,	  
introducing	  a	  minimum	  wage	  and	  virtually	  eliminating	  the	  right	  to	  fire	  workers.	  
Total	  spending	  on	  education	  nearly	  tripled	  (from	  Z$227.6	  million	  to	  Z$628.0	  
million),	  as	  did	  Government	  spending	  on	  healthcare	  (from	  Z$66.4	  million	  to	  
Z$188.6	  million),	  between	  1979	  and	  1990.	  In	  the	  1980s,	  expenditure	  on	  public-­‐
sector	  employment	  rose	  by	  60	  percent	  and	  on	  the	  civil	  service	  by	  12	  percent	  per	  
annum.	  Central	  Government	  expenditure	  tripled	  and	  increased	  its	  share	  from	  32.5	  
percent	  of	  GDP	  in	  1979	  to	  44.6	  percent,	  in	  1989.	  Interest	  rates	  were	  artificially	  
capped.135	  
During	  this	  time,	  the	  consequences	  were	  rather	  mixed.	  There	  was	  an	  
exodus	  of	  White	  skilled	  Zimbabweans	  to	  other	  Commonwealth	  countries	  because	  
of	  insecurities	  stemming	  from	  Mugabe’s	  rhetoric	  against	  the	  white	  minority	  during	  
the	  Independence	  struggle.	  Economic	  inequality	  within	  the	  population	  decreased,	  
however,	  and	  provision	  of	  education	  and	  healthcare	  became	  more	  widespread.	  	  
There	  were	  several	  reasons	  for	  the	  mixed	  performance	  of	  the	  economy.	  
Protection	  sustained	  existing	  high-­‐cost	  companies,	  but	  discouraged	  exports	  by	  
raising	  the	  costs	  of	  inputs	  to	  exporters.	  This	  led	  to	  a	  critical	  shortage	  of	  the	  foreign	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135	  See	  Edward	  Brett,	  “From	  Corporatism	  to	  Liberalization	  in	  Zimbabwe:	  Economic	  Policy	  Regimes	  and	  Political	  Crisis,	  
1980–97,”	  International	  Political	  Science	  Review,	  Vol.	  26,	  No.	  1,	  (January	  2005),	  91-­‐106.	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exchange	  needed	  to	  acquire	  imported	  technology.	  Foreign	  companies	  were	  not	  
allowed	  to	  remit	  dividends,	  and	  new	  foreign	  investment	  was	  actively	  discouraged.	  
The	  need	  to	  get	  permission	  and	  licenses	  for	  new	  investment	  and	  the	  dismissal	  of	  
individual	  workers	  imposed	  unwieldy	  time	  and	  transaction	  costs.	  Repressed	  
interest	  rates	  discouraged	  saving,	  and	  the	  Government’s	  strong	  propensity	  to	  
borrow	  reduced	  the	  supply	  of	  capital	  to	  all	  but	  favored	  borrowers,	  while	  stoking	  
inflation.	  The	  regime	  did	  not	  encourage,	  and	  even	  suppressed,	  the	  development	  of	  
independent	  new	  African	  businesses	  because	  of	  the	  threat	  they	  were	  thought	  to	  
pose	  to	  ZANU’s	  political	  monopoly.	  
Public	  spending	  skyrocketed,	  particularly	  in	  the	  areas	  of	  civil	  service	  
employment,	  spending	  on	  social	  services,	  drought	  relief,	  and	  subsidies	  for	  
Government	  owned	  companies.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  generated	  a	  chronic	  budget	  deficit,	  a	  
high	  tax	  regime,	  and	  a	  rapid	  increase	  in	  public	  debt;	  all	  of	  which	  created	  a	  drag	  on	  
the	  economy.	  Private	  investment	  was	  crowded	  out	  by	  shortages	  of	  credit	  stemming	  
from	  the	  fiscal	  deficit,	  high	  taxes	  and	  the	  shortages	  of	  foreign	  exchange.	  	  
The	  overall	  effects	  of	  these	  constraints	  favored	  existing	  capital-­‐intensive	  
producers,	  biasing	  the	  economy	  against	  the	  areas	  labor-­‐intensive	  activities.	  	  
Compounding	  the	  problem,	  private	  companies	  were	  effectively	  discouraged	  
from	  employing	  new	  workers	  because	  of	  controls	  over	  wages	  and	  employment.	  
This	  had	  two	  politically	  significant	  consequences.	  First,	  it	  suppressed	  the	  
emergence	  of	  a	  genuinely	  entrepreneurial	  African	  business	  class	  and	  reduced	  the	  
political	  support	  of	  those	  who	  did	  make	  their	  way	  despite	  these	  problems.	  Second,	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it	  turned	  unemployment	  into	  a	  major	  threat	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  regime,	  
especially	  in	  urban	  areas.	  In	  real	  terms,	  wages	  declined	  over	  the	  decade.	  
By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  1980s,	  there	  was	  increasing	  agreement	  among	  
Government	  elites	  that	  new	  economic	  policies	  needed	  to	  be	  implemented	  for	  the	  
long-­‐term	  survival	  of	  the	  regime.	  The	  Government	  consulted	  the	  World	  Bank	  for	  
its	  assistance	  in	  helping	  the	  ailing	  economy.	  The	  new	  Economic	  Structural	  
Adjustment	  Program	  (ESAP)	  designed	  by	  the	  Government	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  set	  
out	  to	  encourage	  job-­‐creating	  growth	  and	  reduce	  the	  fiscal	  deficit.	  It	  did	  so	  by	  
transferring	  control	  over	  prices	  from	  the	  state	  to	  the	  market	  and	  improving	  access	  
to	  foreign	  exchange.	  The	  program	  also	  sought	  to	  reduce	  administrative	  controls	  
over	  investment	  and	  employment	  decisions.	  It	  had	  widespread	  local	  support.	  A	  40	  
percent	  devaluation	  of	  the	  Zimbabwean	  dollar	  was	  allowed	  to	  occur	  and	  price	  and	  
wage	  controls	  were	  removed.	  
The	  austerity	  plan	  in	  Zimbabwe	  was	  followed	  by	  economic	  problems	  of	  
increased	  severity.	  Growth,	  employment,	  wages,	  and	  social	  service	  spending	  
contracted	  sharply.	  Inflation	  was	  not	  reduced,	  the	  deficit	  remained	  well	  above	  
target,	  and	  many	  industrial	  firms,	  notably	  in	  textiles	  and	  footwear,	  closed	  in	  
response	  to	  increased	  competition	  and	  high	  real	  interest	  rates.	  The	  incidence	  of	  
poverty	  in	  the	  country	  increased	  during	  this	  time.	  On	  the	  positive	  side,	  capital	  
formation	  and	  the	  percentage	  of	  exports	  in	  GDP	  increased,	  and	  urban–rural	  
inequality	  fell.	  
	   111	  
The	  new	  policies	  were	  undermined	  by	  extremely	  unfavorable	  natural	  and	  
economic	  conditions.	  Drought	  reduced	  agricultural	  output,	  exports,	  public	  
revenue,	  and	  demand	  for	  local	  manufacturing.	  Growth	  during	  three	  drought-­‐
affected	  years	  (1992,	  1993,	  and	  1995)	  averaged	  2.6	  percent;	  during	  three	  good	  years	  
(1991,	  1994,	  and	  1996)	  it	  was	  6.5	  percent.	  The	  new	  ANC	  regime	  in	  South	  Africa	  
canceled	  its	  trade	  agreement	  with	  Zimbabwe	  at	  this	  time	  and	  subjected	  its	  exports	  
to	  punitive	  tariffs,	  just	  as	  Zimbabwe	  reduced	  its	  own,	  contributing	  significantly	  to	  
deindustrialization.	  	  
The	  Government's	  failure	  to	  bring	  the	  fiscal	  deficit	  under	  control	  
undermined	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  the	  program.	  This	  led	  to	  further	  growth	  in	  
Government	  borrowing,	  sharp	  increases	  in	  interest	  rates,	  and	  upward	  pressure	  on	  
the	  exchange	  rate,	  just	  as	  local	  firms	  were	  exposed	  to	  intensified	  foreign	  
competition.	  	  
Many	  firms	  failed,	  many	  others	  were	  forced	  to	  restructure,	  and	  new	  
investment	  was	  discouraged	  in	  both	  the	  formal	  and	  increasingly	  important	  
informal	  sector.	  The	  limited	  cuts	  that	  were	  made	  concentrated	  on	  the	  social	  
services	  and	  led	  to	  serious	  reductions	  in	  the	  quality	  of	  health	  and	  education.	  	  
The	  Government's	  austerity	  plan,	  coupled	  with	  a	  relatively	  weak	  and	  highly	  
protected	  economy	  came	  far	  too	  quickly.	  Uncompetitive	  industries	  were	  
eliminated	  and	  workers	  were	  laid	  off.	  But	  this	  happened	  in	  such	  a	  sudden	  and	  
disruptive	  manner	  as	  to	  cause	  economic	  chaos.	  The	  public	  reaction	  to	  the	  disaster	  
only	  further	  undermined	  the	  economy,	  perpetuating	  a	  vicious	  cycle.	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In	  the	  1990s,	  there	  were	  increasing	  demands	  for	  greater	  native	  African	  
participation	  in	  ownership	  of	  the	  economy	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  continuing	  racial	  
inequalities	  in	  the	  post-­‐colonial	  economy.	  For	  example,	  in	  1991,	  50	  percent	  of	  the	  
population	  received	  less	  than	  15	  percent	  of	  total	  annual	  incomes	  and	  contributed	  
to	  about	  15	  percent	  of	  total	  consumption.	  By	  contrast,	  the	  richest	  three	  percent	  of	  
the	  population	  received	  30	  percent	  of	  total	  incomes	  and	  were	  responsible	  for	  30	  
percent	  of	  total	  consumption.	  	  
The	  Government-­‐controlled	  economy	  of	  the	  1980s	  tried	  to	  redistribute	  
wealth	  to	  the	  Black	  majority,	  while	  trying	  to	  maintain	  racial	  harmony.	  The	  
structural	  adjustment	  program	  and	  other	  reforms	  in	  the	  1990s	  coupled	  with	  
increasing	  unemployment	  and	  unrest,	  led	  to	  growing	  complaints	  against	  the	  
unequal	  distribution	  of	  wealth,	  which	  seemed	  to	  be	  moving	  from	  the	  White	  
minority	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  elite.	  The	  ZANU-­‐PF	  elite	  periodically	  
manipulated	  the	  issue	  of	  unequal	  wealth	  distribution	  to	  shore	  up	  support	  from	  the	  
Black	  majority.	  	  
In	  the	  late	  1980s,	  opposition	  parties,	  such	  as	  the	  Zimbabwe	  Unity	  
Movement	  and	  the	  Forum	  Party,	  had	  demonstrated	  the	  potential	  for	  political	  
opposition	  from	  disconcerted	  sections	  of	  the	  African	  middle	  class.	  This	  emphasis	  
on	  redistribution	  of	  wealth	  from	  Whites	  to	  Blacks	  was	  a	  policy	  that	  the	  
Government	  began	  to	  pursue	  openly	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  This	  policy	  led	  to	  the	  death	  
of	  the	  manufacturing	  industries	  and	  commercial	  farms	  that	  had	  been	  responsible	  
for	  maintaining	  some	  economic	  stability.	  The	  Government	  sought	  to	  redistribute	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jobs	  and	  wealth	  from	  the	  Whites	  to	  the	  Blacks,	  but	  did	  not	  focus	  on	  a	  
comprehensive	  policy	  of	  skills	  development	  and	  job	  growth	  that	  could	  address	  the	  
growing	  unemployment	  problem.	  	  
Zimbabwe's	  economy	  has	  shrunk	  consistently	  since	  2000,	  in	  an	  atmosphere	  
of	  political	  turmoil,	  capital	  flight,	  and	  mismanagement.	  Inflation	  has	  spiraled	  out	  
of	  control,	  and	  the	  underpinnings	  of	  the	  economy	  in	  agriculture	  and	  industry	  have	  
been	  dissipated.	  The	  economic	  policies	  of	  ZANU-­‐PF	  have	  become	  erratic	  and	  lack	  
any	  sense	  of	  rationality.	  For	  instance,	  when	  the	  country	  was	  faced	  with	  
skyrocketing	  inflation	  in	  the	  mid	  2000s,	  the	  Government	  announced	  a	  plan	  that	  
required	  citizens	  to	  turn	  in	  their	  old	  currency	  to	  receive	  devalued	  banknotes	  
marked	  in	  higher	  denominations.	  The	  Government	  then	  mandated	  that	  retailers	  
cut	  the	  prices	  of	  basic	  commodities	  by	  50	  percent.	  This	  led	  to	  a	  disappearance	  of	  
basic	  commodities	  from	  shops,	  as	  producers	  were	  unable	  to	  supply	  goods	  below	  
the	  cost	  of	  production.	  Instead,	  a	  gray	  market	  developed,	  where	  commodities	  were	  
sold	  at	  higher	  prices	  in	  foreign	  currencies.	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Figure	  4-­‐5:	  Economic	  Performance	  Under	  Mugabe136	  
Despite	  these	  policy	  failures,	  Mugabe	  and	  his	  elite	  continued	  to	  print	  
currency	  notes,	  which	  led	  to	  six-­‐digit	  hyperinflation	  that	  rendered	  the	  
Zimbabwean	  dollar	  nearly	  worthless.	  Both	  unemployment	  and	  poverty	  rates	  run	  
near	  80	  percent.	  The	  impact	  on	  education	  has	  been	  even	  more	  drastic.	  From	  an	  
overall	  pass	  rate	  of	  72	  percent	  in	  the	  national	  O-­‐level	  examinations	  in	  the	  mid	  
1990s,	  the	  pass	  rate	  had	  fallen	  to	  11	  percent	  in	  2007.	  The	  UNICEF	  noted	  that	  94	  
percent	  of	  Zimbabwe’s	  rural	  schools	  were	  closed	  in	  2009,	  and	  66	  out	  of	  70	  schools	  
were	  abandoned.137	  Figure	  4-­‐5	  illustrates	  the	  descent	  of	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  due	  to	  the	  
disastrous	  economic	  policies	  adopted	  by	  Mugabe’s	  administration.	  The	  reversal	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
136	  See	  World	  Development	  Indicators	  available	  at	  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator	  	  
137	  See	  Jan	  Rath,	  “Zimbabwe	  chaos	  wipes	  out	  education	  for	  4.5	  million	  pupils.,”	  Times	  Online,	  2008.	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the	  trend	  in	  the	  last	  couple	  of	  years	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  Government	  of	  
National	  Unity	  that	  has	  been	  in	  power	  since	  late	  2008.	  
Mugabe’s	  approach	  to	  economic	  policy	  and	  inclusion	  was	  initially	  a	  form	  of	  
socialism,	  coupled	  with	  an	  impetus	  on	  the	  redistribution	  of	  wealth.	  Corruption	  
and	  mismanagement	  of	  the	  economy	  by	  his	  administration	  and	  the	  controversial	  
and	  violent	  eviction	  of	  white	  farmers	  from	  their	  lands,	  however,	  has	  led	  to	  an	  
economic	  meltdown.	  	  
The	  reasons	  are	  not	  difficult	  to	  see.	  The	  White-­‐minority	  controlled	  the	  
majority	  of	  the	  economic	  resources	  and	  means	  of	  production	  in	  Zimbabwe.	  Their	  
alienation,	  coupled	  with	  gross	  economic	  mismanagement	  and	  lack	  of	  skilled	  
workers,	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  economic	  disaster.	  Despite	  his	  socialist	  
background,	  Mugabe	  and	  his	  elite	  have	  focused	  on	  amassing	  huge	  amounts	  of	  
wealth	  for	  themselves	  and	  their	  families.	  Meanwhile,	  a	  majority	  of	  Zimbabweans	  
continue	  to	  suffer	  in	  abject	  poverty	  and	  hopelessness.	  	  
The	  Approach	  to	  Security	  and	  Justice	  	  
Postcolonial	  states	  like	  Zimbabwe	  inherited	  a	  repressive	  state	  security	  
apparatus	  geared	  towards	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  colonial	  regime.	  These	  structures	  
were	  assigned	  wide	  powers	  and	  were	  subject	  to	  little	  oversight	  or	  accountability.	  
Mugabe	  gave	  top	  priority	  to	  strengthening	  the	  Government’s	  coercive	  apparatus.	  	  
The	  influence	  of	  the	  armed	  liberation	  struggle	  on	  the	  conduct	  of	  state	  
security	  in	  Zimbabwe	  is	  relevant	  even	  until	  today.	  By	  their	  very	  nature,	  armed	  
liberation	  movements	  operate	  underground	  in	  an	  environment	  of	  intense	  secrecy.	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The	  shared	  experiences	  of	  those	  involved	  in	  the	  armed	  struggle	  in	  Zimbabwe	  
contributed	  to	  who	  became	  part	  of	  the	  post	  colonial	  structures.	  	  
The	  first	  priority	  was	  to	  assert	  ZANU-­‐PF	  control	  over	  key	  security	  agencies.	  
Mugabe	  did	  this	  by	  appointing	  loyalists	  from	  the	  nationalist	  struggle	  to	  top	  
positions	  in	  the	  Cabinet	  and	  the	  state	  security	  apparatus.	  A	  Joint	  High	  Command	  
was	  set	  up	  to	  oversee	  the	  integration	  of	  three	  rival	  forces	  –	  the	  ZANLA	  (ZANU’s	  
military	  wing),	  the	  ZIPRA	  (ZAPU’s	  military	  wing),	  and	  remnants	  of	  the	  Rhodesian	  
Army	  –	  into	  a	  unified	  Zimbabwe	  National	  Army.	  	  
From	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  rule	  in	  1980,	  Mugabe	  sought	  to	  keep	  control	  of	  
the	  defense	  forces,	  intelligence,	  and	  provincial	  administration	  in	  the	  Office	  of	  the	  
Prime	  Minister.	  The	  military	  still	  exerted	  considerable	  influence	  over	  the	  general	  
population,	  and	  Mugabe	  wanted	  to	  ensure	  its	  loyalty.	  He	  promoted	  former	  guerilla	  
commanders	  from	  ZANLA	  to	  become	  heads	  of	  the	  security	  forces	  and	  the	  
intelligence	  forces.	  The	  ideology	  of	  the	  armed	  struggle	  also	  brought	  along	  with	  it	  a	  
sense	  of	  entitlement	  with	  regard	  to	  governing	  the	  state	  and	  to	  enjoying	  the	  
benefits	  that	  power	  brought.	  	  
Mugabe	  also	  oversaw	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Fifth	  Brigade,	  which	  consisted	  
exclusively	  of	  fighters	  recruited	  from	  the	  Shona-­‐speaking	  tribes.	  This	  type	  of	  
discrimination	  led	  to	  sporadic	  insurgencies	  by	  former	  ZIPRA	  commanders,	  who	  
were	  disgruntled	  with	  Mugabe’s	  attempts	  to	  consolidate	  power.	  The	  insurgencies	  
gave	  Mugabe	  an	  excuse	  to	  dismiss	  Nkomo	  and	  other	  ZAPU	  ministers	  in	  1982,	  
charging	  them	  as	  enemies	  of	  the	  State.	  Mugabe	  then	  proceeded	  to	  unleash	  a	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violent	  pogrom	  against	  the	  rural	  population	  of	  Matabeleland,	  whom	  he	  accused	  of	  
aiding	  South	  African	  interests.	  This	  was	  part	  of	  Mugabe’s	  “Gukurahundi	  
Campaign”	  to	  eliminate	  resistance	  to	  the	  Shona-­‐dominated	  ZANU-­‐PF	  across	  the	  
country.	  This	  violence,	  however,	  led	  to	  the	  alienation	  of	  the	  Ndebele-­‐speakers	  and	  
Sindebele-­‐speakers	  from	  Mugabe’s	  government.	  	  
For	  the	  past	  three	  decades,	  Mugabe	  and	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  elite	  have	  used	  
violence	  as	  a	  tool	  to	  maintain	  political	  control	  and	  to	  further	  their	  personal	  
agendas.	  The	  close	  ties	  between	  the	  military	  elite	  and	  Mugabe	  have	  ensured	  his	  
personal	  control	  over	  the	  years.	  Mugabe	  has	  used	  the	  sensitive	  issue	  of	  land	  
redistribution	  to	  sponsor	  State-­‐backed	  violence	  against	  the	  minority	  White-­‐
settlers.	  The	  “land-­‐invasions”	  by	  “war	  veterans”	  and	  the	  speed	  and	  zeal	  with	  which	  
the	  government	  rolled	  out	  the	  land	  redistribution	  program	  hastened	  the	  descent	  
into	  economic	  crisis	  and	  political	  turmoil.	  	  
In	  1998,	  Mugabe's	  intervention	  in	  the	  civil	  war	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  
of	  the	  Congo	  (Kinshasa)—purportedly	  to	  protect	  his	  personal	  investments—
resulted	  in	  suspension	  of	  international	  economic	  aid	  for	  Zimbabwe.	  This	  
suspension	  of	  aid	  and	  the	  millions	  of	  dollars	  spent	  to	  intervene	  in	  the	  war	  further	  
weakened	  Zimbabwe's	  already	  troubled	  economy.	  In	  part	  through	  its	  control	  of	  the	  
media,	  the	  huge	  parastatal	  sector	  of	  the	  economy,	  and	  the	  security	  forces,	  the	  
Government	  managed	  to	  keep	  organized	  political	  opposition	  to	  a	  minimum	  
through	  most	  of	  the	  1990s.	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During	  the	  2000s,	  Zimbabwe’s	  electoral	  authoritarian	  regime	  hardened	  
considerably.	  The	  polity	  became	  militarized,	  and	  the	  military	  was	  politicized.	  
Though	  military	  commanders	  had	  always	  sat	  on	  key	  committees	  and	  policy-­‐
making	  bodies,	  most	  of	  their	  influence	  was	  behind	  the	  scenes.	  	  
When	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  began	  to	  lose	  elections,	  senior	  military	  officers	  were	  
seconded	  into	  strategic	  political	  posts	  previously	  held	  by	  civilians.	  Serving	  or	  
military	  officers	  were	  appointed	  to	  lead	  strategic	  corporations,	  like	  the	  railways,	  
the	  national	  oil	  company,	  and	  others.	  	  
A	  Joint	  Operations	  Command	  (JOC)	  had	  sidelined	  the	  civilian	  Cabinet	  as	  
the	  supreme,	  but	  unofficial,	  decision-­‐making	  body	  of	  the	  State.	  The	  JOC	  reports	  
directly	  to	  the	  President	  and	  does	  not	  consult	  with	  any	  other	  government	  body.	  
Over	  the	  past	  decade,	  the	  JOC	  and	  its	  intelligence	  agencies	  have	  been	  successful	  in	  
intimidating	  opposition	  leaders	  and	  have	  cracked	  down	  on	  any	  opposition	  political	  
activity.	  The	  violence	  has	  had	  the	  effect	  of	  reducing	  political	  participation	  among	  
the	  Zimbabweans.	  	  
Zimbabwe’s	  security	  situation	  remains	  tense.	  The	  Armed	  Forces	  have	  
deeply	  entrenched	  themselves	  into	  the	  polity	  of	  the	  state,	  and	  have	  no	  
accountability	  or	  transparency	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  the	  broader	  public.	  The	  armed	  forces	  have	  
been	  used	  time	  and	  again	  to	  perpetrate	  violence	  for	  political	  ends.	  Mugabe	  has	  
demonstrated	  a	  willingness	  to	  use	  excessive	  force	  against	  perceived	  enemies.	  	  
The	  enforcement	  of	  the	  law	  in	  Zimbabwe	  has	  also	  taken	  on	  a	  political	  
flavor.	  The	  police	  and	  intelligence	  agencies	  have	  sided	  with	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  activists	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and	  contributed	  to	  the	  erosion	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  Zimbabwe.	  For	  instance,	  during	  
the	  land	  invasions,	  the	  police	  took	  no	  action	  against	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  
violence.	  The	  police	  have	  engaged	  in	  several	  human	  rights	  violations	  over	  the	  
years,	  as	  well.	  Figure	  4-­‐6	  illustrates	  the	  variation	  in	  the	  level	  of	  conflict	  in	  
Zimbabwe	  since	  Mugabe	  took	  power.	  The	  analysis	  reveals	  that	  the	  level	  of	  violence	  
increases	  during	  the	  time	  of	  elections	  or	  referendums.	  	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐6:	  Level	  of	  Conflict	  Under	  Mugabe138	  
Due	  to	  the	  vast	  network	  of	  patronage	  that	  Mugabe	  and	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  have	  
created,	  there	  is	  no	  system	  of	  checks	  and	  balances	  in	  Zimbabwe	  that	  can	  possibly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
138	  The	  measure	  for	  level	  of	  conflict	  was	  developed	  using	  the	  Internal	  and	  External	  conflict	  indicators	  from	  the	  
International	  Conflict	  Risk	  Group	  (ICRG)	  Database.	  These	  indicators	  have	  also	  been	  used	  in	  the	  panel	  data	  analysis	  in	  
chapter	  3.	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prevent	  the	  subversion	  of	  the	  State	  apparatus	  by	  the	  regime	  for	  its	  selfish	  ends.	  
There	  have	  been	  attacks	  on	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary	  ever	  since	  
independence,	  with	  the	  Executive	  encroaching	  on	  the	  authority	  of	  legal	  
institutions	  in	  Zimbabwe.	  Over	  the	  past	  decade,	  many	  judges	  have	  resigned	  
because	  the	  government	  could	  not	  guarantee	  their	  security.	  A	  number	  of	  judges,	  
who	  have	  been	  appointed	  by	  the	  President,	  have	  been	  accused	  of	  corruption.	  
Zimbabwe	  ranks	  within	  the	  bottom	  ten	  percent	  of	  countries	  worldwide	  in	  
terms	  of	  respect	  for	  rule	  of	  law.	  There	  is	  no	  separation	  of	  powers	  between	  the	  
executive,	  legislative,	  and	  judiciary	  branches.	  The	  executive	  has	  overpowered	  the	  
other	  two	  branches	  and	  continues	  to	  exert	  undue	  influence	  and	  pressure	  over	  the	  
judicial	  system.	  Mugabe	  has	  subverted	  the	  entire	  security	  apparatus	  of	  Zimbabwe	  
to	  serve	  his	  authoritarian	  regime.	  	  
Analysis:	  Mugabe	  as	  the	  Change	  Agent	  
When	  Mugabe	  took	  over	  the	  reins	  of	  power	  in	  Zimbabwe	  in	  1980,	  it	  was	  
hard	  to	  imagine	  that	  the	  new	  hero	  of	  the	  people	  would	  lead	  them	  to	  starvation,	  
ruin,	  and	  anarchy.	  No	  one	  expected	  Zimbabwe	  to	  become	  the	  “sick	  man”	  of	  
southern	  Africa,	  beset	  by	  violence,	  and	  a	  security	  concern	  for	  its	  neighbors.	  From	  
the	  beginning,	  Mugabe	  and	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  elite	  presented	  themselves	  as	  liberators	  
who	  were	  the	  reason	  for	  Zimbabwe’s	  existence	  and	  as	  builders	  the	  new	  nation.	  	  
The	  contribution	  of	  other	  revolutionaries,	  like	  Joshua	  Nkomo,	  Abel	  
Muzorewa	  and	  others,	  was	  trivialized.	  The	  ruling	  party,	  ZANU-­‐PF,	  propagated	  the	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fiction	  that	  its	  military	  arm,	  the	  ZANLA,	  was	  responsible	  for	  the	  freedom	  that	  
Zimbabweans	  enjoyed	  and,	  hence,	  ZANU-­‐PF	  had	  the	  right	  to	  rule.	  	  
Mugabe	  saw	  the	  State	  as	  the	  most	  valuable	  prize	  in	  African	  politics	  because	  
State	  power	  can	  be	  used	  to	  create	  opportunities	  for	  private	  gain.	  Where	  private	  
sector	  opportunities	  are	  limited,	  public	  office	  remains	  the	  most	  reliable	  means	  of	  
accumulating	  wealth.	  In	  Zimbabwe,	  the	  quest	  for	  power	  and	  wealth	  expressed	  
itself	  in	  the	  form	  of	  violence,	  blatant	  corruption,	  and	  nepotism.	  	  
The	  years	  of	  colonial	  domination	  and	  suppression,	  and	  the	  years	  spent	  in	  
jail	  and	  in	  fighting	  against	  the	  oppressors	  almost	  became	  a	  license	  for	  Mugabe	  and	  
his	  elites	  to	  accumulate	  wealth.	  They	  used	  the	  most	  viable	  agency	  for	  such	  
accumulation	  –	  the	  State.139	  Mugabe’s	  leadership	  strategy	  has	  indeed	  been	  oriented	  
towards	  the	  accumulation	  of	  wealth	  and	  power.	  The	  nationalist	  story	  of	  the	  
struggle	  against	  the	  White	  minority	  rule	  and	  that	  of	  fallen	  heroes	  in	  the	  service	  of	  
Black	  Zimbabweans	  has	  been	  manipulated	  by	  Mugabe	  and	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF	  elite	  in	  
every	  election	  since	  1980.	  	  
Mugabe’s	  agenda	  of	  monopolizing	  power	  and	  controlling	  resources	  was	  
partly	  derailed	  by	  adverse	  circumstances,	  internal	  squabbles	  within	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF,	  
and	  the	  resilience	  of	  the	  Zimbabwean	  people	  in	  struggling	  to	  keep	  some	  
democratic	  spaces	  open:	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Zimbabwe,	  in	  the	  media,	  in	  the	  trade-­‐
unions,	  and	  by	  the	  Movement	  for	  Democratic	  Change,	  all	  of	  which	  formed	  a	  
frontal	  challenge	  to	  the	  absolutist	  rule	  of	  the	  ZANU-­‐PF.	  The	  culmination	  of	  their	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  Bolton	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  Predation:	  Leaders,	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  in	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efforts	  resulted	  in	  the	  globally	  brokered	  power-­‐sharing	  agreement	  in	  2008.	  The	  
coalition	  government,	  however,	  has	  been	  rendered	  dysfunctional	  by	  Mugabe’s	  
uncooperativeness.	  Mugabe’s	  strategy	  of	  patronage	  has	  created	  a	  cadre	  of	  
lieutenants	  who	  do	  not	  have	  any	  democratic	  credentials	  or	  any	  education	  in	  
economics.	  The	  culture	  of	  violence	  and	  recklessness	  dominates	  ZANU-­‐PF	  and	  has,	  
to	  a	  great	  extent,	  permeated	  into	  the	  society	  as	  well.	  As	  a	  result,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  see	  
what	  a	  post-­‐Mugabe	  Zimbabwe	  will	  look	  like.	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  
Mugabe	  began	  with	  ostensibly	  good	  intentions	  for	  the	  Black	  majority	  in	  
Zimbabwe.	  Sadly	  for	  Zimbabwe,	  however,	  he	  became	  dictatorial	  pretty	  soon,	  and	  
used	  the	  government	  apparatus	  to	  extend	  control	  over	  the	  population.	  Mugabe	  has	  
held	  onto	  power	  for	  more	  than	  three	  decades	  now,	  and	  in	  that	  period,	  he	  has	  not	  
sought	  to	  build	  checks-­‐and-­‐balance	  institutions	  but	  used	  coercive	  power	  and	  
violence	  to	  keep	  his	  opposition	  at	  bay.	  Zimbabwe	  is	  a	  classic	  example	  of	  how	  bad	  
leadership	  can	  derail	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  prospects	  of	  a	  nation	  and	  take	  it	  into	  the	  
depths	  of	  fragility.	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Yoweri	  Museveni’s	  Uganda	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐7:	  Map	  of	  Uganda140	  
The	  Structural	  Context	  of	  Museveni’s	  Rise	  
	   At	  the	  time	  of	  its	  independence	  from	  Britain	  in	  1962,	  Uganda	  was	  an	  
emerging	  success	  story,	  with	  rapid	  agricultural	  growth	  and	  a	  developing	  industrial	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sector.	  The	  first	  government	  after	  independence	  was	  a	  coalition	  of	  Northern	  and	  
Southern	  interests,	  led	  by	  Milton	  Obote	  as	  Prime	  Minister.	  Its	  politics	  and	  society,	  
however,	  continued	  to	  be	  deeply	  divided	  along	  ethnic	  lines;	  a	  consequence	  of	  its	  
colonial	  legacy.	  	  
	   The	  British	  had	  pulled	  together	  different	  ethnic	  groups	  and	  artificially	  
created	  Uganda	  (like	  most	  modern	  African	  states),	  and	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  
various	  groups	  continued	  after	  independence.	  The	  late	  1960s	  dramatically	  reversed	  
progress	  when	  political	  instability	  was	  followed	  by	  a	  coup	  led	  by	  General	  Idi	  Amin	  
in	  January	  1971.	  General	  Amin	  was	  initially	  popular,	  particularly	  when	  he	  expelled	  
the	  Asian	  community	  in	  1972,	  but	  the	  incompetence	  and	  violence	  of	  his	  regime	  
brought	  society	  to	  the	  point	  of	  collapse	  in	  the	  late	  1970s.	  It	  was	  during	  this	  period	  
that	  Yoweri	  Museveni	  embarked	  on	  a	  journey	  to	  bring	  change	  in	  Uganda.	  	  
Museveni’s	  Early	  Life	  
“If	  a	  Government	  does	  not	  bother	  to	  solve	  the	  problems	  of	  its	  people,	  what	  does	  it	  
expect?	  Does	  it	  expect	  peace?”141	  
Yoweri	  Kaguta	  Museveni	  was	  born	  to	  Amos	  Kaguta	  and	  Esteeri	  Kokundeka	  
in	  1944	  in	  Ntungamo,	  in	  southwestern	  Uganda.	  Museveni	  was	  born	  into	  the	  
Banyankole	  ethnic	  group.	  	  
In	  1967,	  Museveni	  entered	  the	  University	  of	  Dar	  es	  Salaam,	  in	  Tanzania,	  
where	  he	  studied	  economics	  and	  political	  science.	  During	  the	  course	  of	  his	  studies,	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  Yoweri	  Museveni,	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  for	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  Problem?,	  (Minneapolis:	  University	  of	  Minnesota	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he	  was	  greatly	  influenced	  by	  leftist	  ideology	  and	  became	  a	  Marxist.	  It	  was	  during	  
his	  University	  education	  that	  Museveni	  began	  involving	  himself	  in	  radical	  pan-­‐
African	  politics.	  He	  formed	  the	  University	  Students'	  African	  Revolutionary	  Front	  
activist	  group	  and	  led	  a	  student	  delegation	  to	  Frelimo	  territory	  in	  Portuguese	  
Mozambique,	  where	  he	  received	  guerrilla	  training.	  By	  now,	  Museveni	  was	  so	  
influenced	  by	  Leftist	  ideology	  that	  he	  wrote	  a	  dissertation	  on	  the	  applicability	  of	  
Frantz	  Fanon's	  ideas	  on	  revolutionary	  violence	  to	  post-­‐colonial	  Africa.142	  
In	  1970,	  Museveni	  joined	  the	  Uganda’s	  intelligence	  service	  under	  President	  
Milton	  Obote.	  This	  stint	  was	  short-­‐lived,	  as	  Major	  General	  Idi	  Amin	  seized	  power	  
in	  January	  1971	  through	  a	  military	  coup.	  Museveni	  fled	  to	  Tanzania	  with	  other	  
exiles,	  including	  the	  deposed	  president	  Obote.	  	  
The	  Revolutionary	  Struggle	  
	  
The	  power	  bases	  of	  Amin	  and	  Obote	  were	  very	  different	  and	  this	  led	  to	  a	  
significant	  ethnic	  and	  regional	  aspect	  to	  the	  resulting	  conflict.	  Obote	  was	  from	  the	  
Lango	  ethnic	  group	  of	  the	  central	  north,	  while	  Amin	  was	  a	  Kakwa,	  from	  the	  
northwestern	  corner	  of	  the	  country.	  The	  British	  Colonial	  Government	  had	  
organized	  the	  colony's	  internal	  politics	  so	  that	  the	  Lango	  and	  Acholi	  dominated	  
the	  national	  military,	  while	  people	  from	  southern	  parts	  of	  the	  country	  were	  active	  
in	  business.	  This	  situation	  continued	  until	  the	  coup,	  when	  Amin	  filled	  the	  top	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  Essays	  on	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positions	  of	  government	  with	  Kakwa	  and	  Lugbara	  and	  violently	  repressed	  the	  
Lango	  and	  their	  Acholi	  allies.	  
The	  forces	  opposed	  to	  Idi	  Amin,	  who	  were	  predominantly	  Lango	  and	  
Acholi,	  attacked	  Uganda	  from	  Tanzania	  in	  September,	  1972.	  They	  were	  repelled	  
and	  suffered	  heavy	  losses.	  The	  precarious	  situation	  of	  the	  rebels	  was	  compounded	  
by	  a	  peace	  agreement	  signed	  later	  in	  the	  year	  by	  Tanzania	  and	  Uganda,	  in	  which	  
rebels	  were	  denied	  the	  use	  of	  Tanzanian	  soil	  for	  aggression	  against	  Uganda.	  
During	  this	  period,	  Museveni	  briefly	  worked	  as	  a	  lecturer	  at	  a	  co-­‐operative	  college	  
in	  Moshi,	  in	  northern	  Tanzania,	  before	  breaking	  away	  from	  the	  mainstream	  
opposition	  and	  forming	  the	  Front	  for	  National	  Salvation	  (FRONASA)	  in	  1973.143	  	  
In	  October	  1978,	  Idi	  Amin	  ordered	  the	  invasion	  of	  Tanzania	  in	  order	  to	  
claim	  the	  Kagera	  province	  for	  Uganda.	  In	  March	  1979,	  Museveni	  and	  FRONASA	  
attended	  a	  gathering	  of	  28	  Ugandan	  rebel	  groups	  in	  the	  northern	  Tanzanian	  town	  
of	  Moshi.	  The	  various	  groups	  came	  together	  setting	  aside	  their	  differences	  in	  order	  
to	  try	  to	  jointly	  topple	  Idi	  Amin.	  	  
The	  different	  groups	  established	  the	  Uganda	  National	  Liberation	  Front	  
(UNLF).	  At	  this	  gathering,	  Museveni	  was	  appointed	  to	  an	  eleven-­‐member	  
Executive	  Council.	  The	  gathering	  also	  established	  the	  National	  Consultative	  
Council	  (NCC),	  in	  which	  each	  of	  the	  28	  groups	  had	  one	  representative.	  The	  UNLF	  
joined	  forces	  with	  the	  Tanzanian	  army	  to	  launch	  a	  counter-­‐attack	  that	  culminated	  
in	  the	  toppling	  of	  the	  Amin	  regime	  in	  April	  1979.	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  See	  Chronology	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  end	  the	  violence	  in	  northern	  Uganda,”	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Museveni	  was	  appointed	  as	  the	  Minister	  of	  State	  for	  Defense	  in	  the	  new	  
UNLF	  Government,	  in	  1979.	  At	  35,	  Museveni	  was	  the	  youngest	  minister	  in	  Yusuf	  
Lule's	  administration.	  He	  oversaw	  the	  integration	  of	  the	  thousands	  of	  troops	  that	  
he	  recruited	  into	  FRONASA	  during	  the	  war	  into	  the	  new	  Ugandan	  National	  Army.	  
They	  retained	  their	  loyalty	  to	  Museveni	  and	  would	  prove	  crucial	  in	  later	  rebellions	  
against	  the	  second	  Obote	  regime.	  
The	  NCC	  selected	  Godfrey	  Binaisa	  as	  the	  new	  chairman	  of	  the	  UNLF	  after	  
infighting	  led	  to	  the	  deposition	  of	  Yusuf	  Lule,	  in	  June	  1979.	  Attempts	  to	  
consolidate	  power	  continued	  with	  Binaisa	  in	  a	  similar	  manner	  to	  that	  of	  his	  
predecessor.	  In	  November	  1979,	  Museveni	  was	  reshuffled	  from	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
Defense	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Regional	  Cooperation,	  with	  Binaisa	  himself	  taking	  over	  
the	  key	  defense	  role.	  	  
In	  May	  1980,	  Binaisa	  was	  placed	  under	  house	  arrest	  after	  an	  attempt	  to	  
dismiss	  Oyite	  Ojok,	  the	  army	  chief	  of	  staff	  –	  in	  a	  de	  facto	  coup	  led	  by	  Paulo	  
Muwanga,	  Yoweri	  Museveni,	  Oyite	  Ojok,	  and	  Tito	  Okello.	  A	  Presidential	  
Commission,	  with	  Museveni	  as	  Vice-­‐Chairman,	  was	  installed	  and	  the	  Commission	  
quickly	  announced	  plans	  for	  a	  general	  election	  in	  December.	  
The	  Emergence	  of	  the	  National	  Resistance	  Movement	  
	  
By	  1980,	  Museveni	  was	  a	  relatively	  well-­‐known	  national	  figure.	  He	  
established	  a	  new	  political	  party,	  the	  Uganda	  Patriotic	  Movement	  (UPM),	  which	  
he	  would	  lead	  in	  the	  elections.	  Museveni	  sought	  to	  compete	  against	  three	  other	  
political	  groupings	  –	  the	  Uganda	  People's	  Congress	  (UPC),	  led	  by	  former	  president	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Milton	  Obote,	  the	  Conservative	  Party	  (CP),	  and	  the	  Democratic	  Party	  (DP).	  The	  
main	  contenders	  were	  the	  UPC	  and	  DP.	  The	  official	  results	  declared	  UPC	  the	  
winner,	  with	  Museveni's	  UPM	  gaining	  only	  one	  of	  the	  126	  available	  seats	  (see	  Table	  
4-­‐7	  for	  a	  detailed	  breakdown	  of	  the	  seats).	  	  
A	  number	  of	  irregularities	  compromised	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  election.	  
During	  the	  election	  planning,	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  ruling	  commission,	  Paulo	  
Muwanga,	  supported	  the	  UPC's	  view	  that	  each	  candidate	  should	  have	  a	  separate	  
ballot	  box.	  This	  was	  fiercely	  opposed	  by	  the	  other	  parties,	  which	  maintained	  that	  it	  
would	  make	  the	  election	  easier	  to	  manipulate.	  	  
The	  configuration	  of	  the	  political	  boundaries	  of	  constituencies	  might	  also	  
have	  aided	  the	  UPC.	  Constituencies	  in	  generally	  pro-­‐UPC	  northern	  Uganda	  
contained	  proportionally	  fewer	  voters	  than	  the	  anti-­‐UPC	  Buganda.	  
Gerrymandering	  the	  constituencies	  allowed	  more	  power	  to	  be	  claimed	  by	  Obote's	  
party.	  	  
Suspicions	  of	  electoral	  fraud	  were	  compounded	  by	  Muwanga's	  
announcement	  on	  the	  day	  of	  the	  election	  that	  all	  results	  needed	  to	  be	  cleared	  by	  
him	  before	  they	  were	  announced	  publicly.	  The	  losing	  parties	  refused	  to	  recognize	  
the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  new	  regime,	  citing	  widespread	  electoral	  irregularities.144	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144	  “Protracted	  conflict,	  elusive	  peace	  -­‐	  Initiatives	  to	  end	  the	  violence	  in	  northern	  Uganda,”	  Okello	  Lucima,	  ed.,	  Accord	  Issue	  
No.	  11,	  (Conciliation	  Resources,	  2002).	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Table	  4-­‐7:	  1980	  Uganda	  Election	  Results	  145	  
Party	   Seats	  
Uganda	  People's	  Congress	   73	  
Democratic	  Party	   52	  
Uganda	  Patriotic	  Movement	   1	  
Conservative	  Party	   0	  
Total	  seats	   126	  
	  
Unhappy	  with	  the	  manipulated	  election	  results	  (see	  Table	  4-­‐7),	  Museveni	  
returned	  with	  his	  supporters	  to	  his	  support	  base	  in	  the	  Bantu-­‐dominated	  south	  
and	  southwest.	  There	  he	  formed	  the	  Popular	  Resistance	  Army	  (PRA).	  He	  also	  
planned	  a	  rebellion	  against	  the	  second	  Obote	  regime	  (Obote	  II)	  and	  its	  armed	  
forces,	  the	  Uganda	  National	  Liberation	  Army	  (UNLA).	  Museveni	  sought	  to	  fight	  
the	  second	  Obote	  regime,	  not	  only	  due	  to	  the	  rigged	  election,	  but	  also	  to	  
dismantle	  the	  system	  of	  military	  Government	  that	  had	  institutionalized	  state	  
violence	  based	  on	  sectarianism.146	  	  
The	  insurgency	  began	  with	  an	  attack	  on	  an	  army	  installation	  in	  the	  central	  
Mubende	  district	  on	  February	  6,	  1981.	  The	  PRA	  later	  merged	  with	  former	  president	  
Yusuf	  Lule's	  fighting	  group,	  the	  Uganda	  Freedom	  Fighters	  (UFF),	  to	  create	  the	  
National	  Resistance	  Army	  (NRA)	  with	  its	  political	  wing,	  the	  National	  Resistance	  
Movement	  (NRM)	  in	  1981.	  Two	  other	  rebel	  groups,	  the	  Uganda	  National	  Rescue	  
Front	  (UNRF)	  and	  Former	  Uganda	  National	  Army	  (FUNA),	  formed	  in	  West	  Nile	  
from	  the	  remnants	  of	  Amin's	  supporters,	  also	  engaged	  Obote's	  forces.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145	  See	  Africa	  Elections	  Database,	  http://africanelections.tripod.com/	  
146	  See	  Chapter	  2	  in	  Aili	  Mari	  Tripp,	  Museveni’s	  Uganda:	  Paradoxes	  of	  Power	  in	  a	  Hybrid	  Regime,	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  Lynne	  
Rienner	  Publishers,	  2010),	  46-­‐48.	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On	  July	  27,	  1985,	  sub-­‐factionalism	  within	  the	  UPC	  Government	  led	  to	  a	  
successful	  military	  coup	  against	  Obote	  by	  his	  former	  army	  commander,	  
Lieutenant-­‐General	  Tito	  Okello,	  an	  Acholi.	  Museveni	  and	  the	  NRM/A	  saw	  this	  as	  a	  
hijacking	  of	  the	  revolution	  that	  they	  had	  been	  fighting	  for	  four	  years.	  The	  UNLA	  
was	  also	  viewed	  as	  having	  been	  discredited	  by	  gross	  human	  rights	  violations	  
during	  Obote	  II.	  Despite	  having	  reservations,	  the	  NRM/A	  eventually	  agreed	  to	  
peace	  talks	  presided	  over	  by	  a	  Kenyan	  delegation	  headed	  by	  President	  Daniel	  arap	  
Moi.	  
The	  peace	  talks	  lasted	  from	  August	  26	  to	  December	  17,	  1985,	  and	  were	  quite	  
acrimonious.	  The	  resulting	  ceasefire	  broke	  down	  almost	  immediately.	  The	  final	  
agreement,	  signed	  in	  Nairobi,	  called	  for	  a	  ceasefire,	  the	  demilitarization	  of	  
Kampala,	  the	  integration	  of	  the	  NRA	  and	  government	  forces,	  and	  absorption	  of	  the	  
NRA	  leadership	  into	  the	  Military	  Council.	  These	  conditions	  were	  never	  met.	  	  
The	  prospects	  for	  a	  lasting	  agreement	  were	  limited	  by	  several	  factors,	  
including	  the	  Kenyan	  team's	  lack	  of	  an	  in-­‐depth	  knowledge	  of	  the	  situation	  in	  
Uganda	  and	  the	  exclusion	  of	  relevant	  Ugandan	  and	  international	  actors	  from	  the	  
talks.	  Ultimately,	  Museveni	  and	  his	  allies	  refused	  to	  share	  power	  with	  generals	  
they	  did	  not	  respect.	  This	  refusal	  to	  share	  power	  also	  stemmed	  from	  their	  belief	  
that	  the	  NRA	  had	  the	  capacity	  to	  achieve	  an	  outright	  military	  victory.	  
By	  this	  stage,	  the	  NRA	  had	  developed	  an	  unstoppable	  momentum.	  By	  
January	  22,	  1986,	  Government	  troops	  in	  Kampala	  had	  begun	  to	  quit	  their	  posts	  en	  
masse,	  as	  the	  rebels	  gained	  ground	  from	  the	  south	  and	  southwest.	  On	  January	  25,	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1986,	  the	  Museveni-­‐led	  faction	  finally	  captured	  the	  capital.	  The	  NRA	  toppled	  
Okello's	  Government	  and	  declared	  victory	  the	  next	  day.	  	  
Museveni	  was	  sworn	  in	  as	  president	  three	  days	  later	  on	  January	  26,	  1986.	  
“This	  is	  not	  a	  mere	  change	  of	  guard,	  it	  is	  a	  fundamental	  change,”	  said	  Museveni	  at	  
his	  swearing-­‐in	  ceremony,	  conducted	  by	  British-­‐born	  chief	  justice	  Peter	  Allen.	  
Speaking	  to	  a	  crowd	  of	  thousands	  of	  people	  outside	  the	  Ugandan	  parliament,	  the	  
new	  president	  promised	  a	  return	  to	  democracy	  and	  said:	  	  
“The	  people	  of	  Africa,	  the	  people	  of	  Uganda,	  are	  entitled	  to	  a	  
democratic	  government.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  favor	  from	  any	  regime.	  The	  
sovereign	  people	  must	  be	  the	  public,	  not	  the	  government…	  No	  one	  
should	  think	  that	  what	  is	  happening	  in	  our	  country	  today	  is	  a	  mere	  
change	  of	  guard:	  it	  is	  a	  fundamental	  change	  in	  the	  politics	  of	  our	  
country.	  In	  Africa,	  we	  have	  seen	  so	  many	  changes	  that	  change,	  as	  
such,	  is	  nothing	  short	  of	  mere	  turmoil.	  We	  have	  had	  one	  group	  getting	  
rid	  of	  another	  one,	  only	  for	  it	  to	  turn	  out	  worse	  than	  the	  group	  it	  
displaced.	  Please	  do	  not	  count	  us	  in	  that	  group	  of	  people.”147	  
The	  Approach	  to	  Political	  Participation	  and	  Inclusion	  
In	  the	  beginning	  stages	  of	  the	  conflict,	  Museveni	  explained	  why	  he	  and	  his	  
group	  chose	  to	  fight	  and	  why	  they	  expected	  to	  win.	  	  
“We	  are	  fighting	  a	  just	  cause.	  We	  are	  fighting	  for	  democratic	  
rights	  and	  human	  dignity	  of	  our	  people,	  all	  of	  which	  have	  been	  
trampled	  upon	  by	  Obote	  and	  his	  erstwhile	  protégé	  Amin	  for	  nearly	  two	  
decades.	  Our	  women	  shall	  no	  longer	  be	  raped	  by	  bandit	  soldiers;	  our	  
citizens	  shall	  not	  be	  robbed	  or	  beaten	  at	  roadblocks;	  nobody,	  not	  even	  
a	  tramp	  on	  the	  road,	  shall	  be	  killed	  unless	  so	  condemned	  by	  the	  courts.	  
Court	  orders	  shall	  be	  obeyed	  by	  even	  the	  highest	  government	  officials;	  
elections	  shall	  take	  place	  and	  they	  shall	  not	  be	  rigged;	  the	  right	  to	  be	  
treated	  with	  respect	  and	  courtesy	  by	  these	  so-­‐called	  officials,	  the	  right	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147	  Yoweri	  Museveni,	  Presidential	  Inauguration	  Speech,	  (1986).	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to	  life,	  the	  right	  to	  dignity,	  are	  not	  favors	  to	  be	  bestowed	  by	  anybody.	  
They	  belong	  to	  our	  people	  by	  right.”148	  
	  
During	  the	  early	  stages	  of	  the	  National	  Resistance	  Movement,	  Museveni	  
strove	  to	  build	  the	  morale	  and	  strengthen	  the	  ideology	  of	  his	  supporters.	  He	  did	  so	  
to	  build	  a	  more	  effective	  military	  force,	  by	  also	  to	  explain	  his	  inclusive	  philosophy	  
to	  the	  rural	  people,	  whose	  support	  he	  needed.	  	  
Museveni	  sought	  to	  address	  the	  attitude	  of	  the	  people	  towards	  the	  role	  of	  
Government	  and	  their	  own	  progress.	  In	  the	  feudal	  and	  colonial	  systems,	  people	  
looked	  to	  the	  Government	  to	  provide	  all	  the	  solutions	  to	  their	  problems.	  When	  
they	  were	  hungry,	  the	  people	  asked	  to	  be	  fed	  by	  the	  Government.	  In	  exchange,	  
they	  followed	  orders	  of	  the	  king,	  whose	  own	  goals	  were	  often	  the	  pursuit	  of	  ethnic	  
or	  sectarian	  rivalries	  or	  self-­‐enrichment.149	  	  
Museveni	  saw	  that	  the	  way	  to	  break	  out	  of	  this	  cycle	  of	  poverty	  and	  violence	  
was	  to	  encourage	  individuals	  to	  seek	  solutions	  to	  their	  own	  problems	  by	  taking	  an	  
active	  role	  in	  societal	  and	  economic	  life.	  The	  politics	  of	  differences	  and	  ethnic	  
cleavages	  was	  the	  root	  cause	  of	  Uganda’s	  problems	  according	  to	  Museveni,	  and	  the	  
poverty	  and	  socio-­‐economic	  dependence	  of	  Uganda’s	  poor	  farmers	  forced	  them	  
into	  following	  the	  chief’s	  orders	  rather	  than	  participating	  in	  the	  running	  of	  their	  
community’s	  affairs.	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  Yoweri	  Museveni,	  Selected	  Articles	  on	  the	  Ugandan	  Resistance	  War,	  (1985).	  	  
149	  Colin	  Waugh,	  Paul	  Kagame	  and	  Rwanda:	  Power,	  Genocide,	  and	  the	  Rwandan	  Patriotic	  Front,	  (Jefferson,	  NC:	  MacFarland	  
&	  Company,	  2004),	  32-­‐34.	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The	  Movement	  Structure	  
	  
Museveni’s	  mobilization	  pattern	  consisted	  of	  winning	  over	  a	  sufficient	  
number	  of	  people	  to	  join	  the	  movement	  in	  each	  village.	  Once	  this	  was	  done,	  these	  
individuals	  would	  be	  organized	  into	  a	  village	  Resistance	  Council,	  which	  in	  turn	  
would	  be	  part	  of	  a	  parish	  Resistance	  Council.	  The	  Parish	  Resistance	  Council	  would	  
send	  representatives	  to	  a	  county	  Council.	  The	  County	  Council	  would	  send	  
representatives	  to	  a	  district	  Council.	  At	  the	  top	  of	  the	  movement	  structure,	  was	  the	  
National	  Resistance	  Council,	  which	  completed	  the	  comprehensive	  executive	  
network.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  local	  representatives	  had	  the	  power	  to	  deal	  with	  their	  
own	  local	  issues.	  	  	  
This	  proposed	  pyramid	  structure	  itself	  was	  revolutionary	  in	  terms	  of	  giving	  
power	  to	  the	  people	  and	  was	  in	  direct	  opposition	  to	  the	  colonial	  and	  post-­‐colonial	  
regimes	  that	  sought	  to	  concentrate	  power	  in	  the	  executive	  (see	  Figure	  4-­‐8).	  The	  
NRM	  approach	  was	  comprehensive	  and	  aimed	  at	  bringing	  power	  to	  the	  people.	  
Museveni	  dismantled	  the	  colonial	  institutions	  that	  concentrated	  power	  in	  the	  
hands	  of	  chiefs	  and	  executives	  and	  gave	  the	  power	  to	  the	  local	  Resistance	  Councils.	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Figure	  4-­‐8:	  The	  National	  Resistance	  Movement	  Structure	  
Before	  Museveni	  assumed	  power	  in	  1986,	  he	  sought	  to	  introduce	  a	  system	  of	  
government	  that	  was	  non-­‐sectarian	  and	  broad-­‐based.	  This	  notion	  had	  its	  roots	  in	  
the	  Uganda	  National	  Liberation	  Front’s	  idea	  of	  a	  politics	  of	  consensus.	  This	  idea	  
was	  enshrined	  in	  Museveni’s	  ten-­‐point	  program	  for	  an	  eventual	  government,	  
covering	  1)	  democracy,	  2)	  security,	  3)	  consolidation	  of	  national	  unity,	  4)	  defending	  
national	  independence,	  5)	  building	  an	  independent,	  integrated	  and	  self-­‐sustaining	  
economy,	  6)	  improving	  social	  services,	  7)	  eliminating	  corruption	  and	  misuse	  of	  
power,	  8)	  redressing	  inequality,	  9)	  cooperating	  with	  other	  African	  countries,	  and	  
10)	  establishing	  a	  mixed	  economy.150	  	  
Analysis	  of	  Museveni’s	  actions	  suggests	  that	  Museveni	  sought	  to	  be	  as	  
accommodative	  as	  possible	  in	  the	  pre-­‐transition	  years.	  His	  approach	  was	  largely	  
democratic,	  participatory,	  and,	  yet,	  opportunistic.	  Museveni	  wanted	  to	  win	  the	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  See	  Chapter	  2	  in	  Aili	  Mari	  Tripp,	  Museveni’s	  Uganda:	  Paradoxes	  of	  Power	  in	  a	  Hybrid	  Regime,	  (Boulder,	  CO:	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war,	  and	  hence	  sought	  to	  co-­‐opt	  parties	  from	  all	  sides	  of	  the	  political	  spectrum.	  He	  
heavily	  relied	  on	  military	  strength	  to	  attain	  power	  and	  believed	  that	  strength	  alone	  
would	  bring	  peace	  to	  conflict-­‐torn	  Uganda.	  	  
The	  post-­‐independence	  regimes	  in	  Uganda	  had	  been	  characterized	  by	  
corruption,	  factionalism,	  and	  an	  inability	  to	  restore	  order	  and	  gain	  popular	  
legitimacy.	  When	  Museveni	  came	  to	  power,	  he	  sought	  to	  pacify	  the	  opposition	  by	  
incorporating	  leaders	  representing	  a	  variety	  of	  interests,	  even	  former	  opponents	  
that	  he	  had	  fought	  during	  the	  Bush	  war.	  A	  law	  guaranteed	  amnesty	  to	  all	  
combatants,	  police,	  and	  personnel	  in	  prison	  and	  state	  security	  agencies	  who	  might	  
have	  otherwise	  been	  subject	  to	  prosecution.	  Former	  rebels	  groups	  were	  
incorporated	  into	  the	  NRA,	  including	  those	  who	  had	  formerly	  been	  associated	  
with	  Idi	  Amin.151	  	  
A	  Broad-­‐based	  Coalition	  
	  
In	  terms	  of	  the	  political	  coalition,	  Museveni	  initially	  sought	  to	  build	  a	  
government	  of	  national	  unity	  and	  heal	  the	  divisions	  created	  by	  past	  party	  
differences.	  He	  tried	  appeasing	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  ethnic	  groups	  by	  giving	  them	  
representation	  within	  the	  Movement	  and	  Government.	  Museveni	  was	  able	  to	  bring	  
together	  the	  pro-­‐monarchy	  Ganda	  ethnic	  group,	  Protestant	  clergy,	  Catholics,	  
members	  of	  the	  UPM,	  former	  Idi	  Amin	  supporters	  from	  West	  Nile,	  Leftists	  from	  
the	  eastern	  parts	  of	  the	  country,	  and	  his	  own	  supporters	  from	  the	  South	  and	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  Aili	  Mari	  Tripp,	  Museveni’s	  Uganda:	  Paradoxes	  of	  Power	  in	  a	  Hybrid	  Regime,	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  
2010),	  48.	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southwest.152	  Some	  of	  these	  groups	  had	  been	  in	  conflict	  for	  more	  than	  twenty	  
years.	  	  	  	  
Decentralization	  policy	  is	  but	  one	  of	  several	  NRM	  policies	  that	  were	  
implemented	  as	  part	  of	  a	  political	  strategy	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  fundamental	  change	  in	  
state	  and	  society.	  The	  strategy	  was	  influenced	  by	  Museveni’s	  understanding	  of	  the	  
basic	  forces	  at	  work	  in	  Uganda,	  and	  his	  experience	  with	  fractious	  post-­‐
independence	  politics.	  The	  starting	  point	  of	  this	  strategy	  was	  the	  incorporation	  of	  
as	  many	  groups	  as	  possible	  in	  a	  Government	  of	  National	  Unity	  to	  operate	  strictly	  
for	  an	  interim	  period.	  	  
Several	  factors	  contributed	  to	  this	  choice.	  In	  terms	  of	  territorial	  control,	  the	  
NRM	  was	  in	  a	  relatively	  weak	  position	  and	  needed	  to	  avoid	  conflict	  with	  as	  many	  
opponents	  as	  possible.153	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  NRM	  leadership	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  elite-­‐
dominated	  sets	  of	  interests	  that	  had	  been	  contending	  for	  State	  power	  since	  
independence,	  manipulating	  and	  deepening	  the	  sources	  of	  conflict	  in	  the	  process.	  
By	  incorporating	  these	  contenders,	  short-­‐term	  peace	  could	  be	  achieved.	  	  
The	  challenge	  for	  the	  NRM	  was	  to	  achieve	  long-­‐term	  change	  in	  Uganda.	  For	  
this	  to	  happen,	  the	  NRM	  required	  political	  space	  to	  implement	  a	  broad	  package	  of	  
policies	  seeking	  to	  resolve	  conflict	  and	  reform	  the	  country.	  A	  Government	  of	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  See	  Joseph	  Oloka-­‐Onyango,	  “New-­‐Breed	  Leadership,	  Conflict,	  and	  Reconstruction	  in	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  Region	  of	  Africa:	  A	  
Sociopolitical	  Biography	  of	  Uganda's	  Yoweri	  Kaguta	  Museveni”,	  Africa	  Today	  -­‐	  Volume	  50,	  Number	  3,	  (Spring	  2004),	  29–52.	  
153	  “Building	  State	  Capacity	  in	  Africa:	  Learning	  from	  Performance	  and	  Results,”	  Poul	  Engberg-­‐Pedersen	  and	  Brian	  Levy	  in	  
Building	  State	  Capacity	  in	  Africa:	  New	  Approaches,	  Emerging	  Lessons,	  eds.	  Brian	  Levy	  and	  Sahr	  Kpundeh,	  (Washington	  DC:	  
World	  Bank	  Institute	  and	  the	  Africa	  region	  Vice-­‐Presidency	  of	  the	  World	  Bank,	  2004).	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National	  Unity	  would	  help	  create	  this	  space	  for	  reform;	  a	  luxury	  not	  enjoyed	  by	  
many	  other	  African	  governments.	  	  
The	  NRM	  declared	  a	  four-­‐year	  interim	  government,	  comprising	  a	  broader	  
ethnic	  base	  than	  its	  predecessors.	  The	  sectarian	  violence,	  which	  had	  overshadowed	  
Uganda's	  recent	  history,	  was	  put	  forward	  as	  a	  justification	  for	  restricting	  the	  
activities	  of	  the	  political	  parties	  and	  their	  ethnically-­‐distinct	  supporter	  bases.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  first	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  passed	  by	  the	  NRM	  was	  an	  anti-­‐
sectarianism	  statute	  in	  1988.	  Museveni	  assigned	  Eriya	  Kategaya,	  the	  chairman	  of	  
the	  Political	  and	  Diplomatic	  Committee,	  to	  reach	  out	  to	  different	  political	  forces	  
and	  to	  help	  create	  this	  consensus.154	  Election	  to	  the	  legislative	  body,	  the	  National	  
Resistance	  Council	  (NRC),	  was	  based	  on	  individual	  merit,	  rather	  than	  party	  
affiliation.	  This	  was	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  meritocracy	  would	  help	  alleviate	  some	  
of	  the	  cleavages	  exacerbated	  by	  sectarian	  politics.	  	  
Museveni’s	  first	  cabinet	  reflected	  the	  effort	  to	  balance	  political	  and	  ethnic	  
representatives.	  It	  included	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  individuals,	  primarily	  from	  the	  
Democratic	  Party,	  which	  held	  at	  least	  ten	  key	  ministries,	  including	  Internal	  Affairs,	  
Finance,	  Agriculture,	  Commerce,	  Constitutional	  Affairs,	  Energy,	  Justice,	  Regional	  
Affairs,	  and	  Economic	  Development,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  position	  of	  attorney	  general.	  
The	  cabinet	  also	  included	  the	  leaders	  of	  the	  Conservative	  Party,	  the	  UNRF,	  and	  the	  
UPC.	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  Kizza	  Besigya,	  “An	  Insider’s	  View	  of	  How	  NRM	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  Monitor,	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Museveni	  personally	  selected	  the	  representatives	  of	  the	  various	  factions	  to	  
serve	  on	  his	  cabinet.	  In	  terms	  of	  geographical	  diversity,	  the	  cabinet	  had	  four	  
northerners	  out	  of	  a	  total	  of	  33,	  with	  the	  south	  and	  southwest	  taking	  the	  lions’	  
share	  of	  the	  pie.	  	  
The	  Evolution	  of	  the	  National	  Resistance	  Movement	  
	  	  
The	  non-­‐party	  system	  did	  not	  prohibit	  political	  parties,	  but	  prevented	  them	  
from	  fielding	  candidates	  directly	  in	  elections.	  In	  particular,	  elections	  were	  not	  
based	  on	  political	  party	  campaigning.	  The	  NRM	  system	  was	  defined	  as	  a	  no-­‐party	  
system	  that	  welcomed	  anyone	  who	  wished	  to	  contribute	  to	  building	  the	  future	  of	  
the	  country.	  	  
A	  system	  of	  Resistance	  Councils,	  directly	  elected	  at	  the	  parish	  level,	  was	  
established	  to	  manage	  local	  affairs,	  including	  the	  equitable	  distribution	  of	  fixed-­‐
price	  commodities.	  The	  election	  of	  Resistance	  Councils	  representatives	  was	  the	  
first	  direct	  experience	  many	  Ugandans	  had	  with	  democracy	  after	  many	  decades	  of	  
varying	  levels	  of	  authoritarianism.	  The	  replication	  of	  the	  structure	  up	  to	  the	  
district	  level	  has	  been	  credited	  with	  helping	  even	  people	  at	  the	  local	  level	  
understand	  the	  higher-­‐level	  political	  structures.	  	  
This	  broad-­‐based	  nature	  of	  the	  NRM,	  however,	  slowly	  began	  to	  change	  over	  
time.	  The	  1994	  Constituent	  Assembly	  (CA)	  elections	  were	  conducted	  amidst	  
arrests	  and	  treason	  charges	  being	  leveled	  against	  multipartyists.	  The	  election	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results	  led	  to	  a	  strengthening	  of	  the	  belief	  in	  Uganda	  that	  the	  broad-­‐based	  nature	  
of	  the	  NRM	  had	  all	  but	  disappeared.	  	  
The	  multipartyists	  were	  accused	  of	  using	  their	  positions	  in	  government	  to	  
weaken	  and	  destabilize	  the	  NRM.	  Tensions	  surfaced	  between	  the	  NRM	  leaders	  and	  
individuals	  who	  were	  considered	  broad-­‐based	  and	  potential	  threats	  to	  Museveni	  
and	  his	  elites.	  There	  was	  a	  growing	  sense	  within	  the	  NRM	  leadership	  that	  they	  
could	  dispense	  with	  broad-­‐based	  politics	  without	  political	  cost	  because	  the	  NRM	  
was	  so	  popular	  at	  the	  time.	  	  
Museveni	  and	  the	  NRM	  elite	  saw	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly	  elections	  as	  an	  
important	  step	  in	  helping	  the	  NRM	  solidify	  its	  power.	  Sensing	  this	  possibility,	  the	  
NRM	  began	  to	  operate	  as	  a	  de	  facto	  party,	  secretly	  supporting	  NRM	  candidates	  
and	  publicly	  discrediting	  multipartyists.	  Museveni	  directed	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  
Movement	  Group	  in	  the	  Constituent	  Assembly	  with	  the	  support	  of	  special	  interest	  
groups.	  The	  Movement	  Group	  was	  established	  through	  ten	  presidential	  
appointments	  and	  six	  elected	  representatives	  in	  the	  assembly	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  
lobbying	  for	  the	  NRM’s	  position	  on	  different	  policies.	  Pressure	  from	  the	  NRM	  also	  
resulted	  in	  the	  formation	  of	  a	  Movement	  Caucus	  in	  the	  Assembly.	  The	  NRM,	  thus,	  
had	  all	  but	  abandoned	  its	  broad-­‐based	  position	  and	  had	  turned	  into	  a	  political	  
party.155	  
By	  1996,	  the	  NRM	  had	  tightened	  its	  grip	  on	  power	  in	  a	  way	  that	  left	  little	  
room	  for	  meaningful	  power	  sharing.	  In	  July	  1995,	  a	  debate	  on	  the	  future	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
155	  Kizza	  Besigya,	  “An	  Insider’s	  View	  of	  How	  NRM	  Lost	  the	  ‘Broad-­‐Base.’”	  Monitor,	  (November	  7,	  1999).	  
	   140	  
multipartyism	  was	  defeated	  by	  the	  NRM,	  and	  the	  CA	  resolved	  in	  favor	  of	  
continuing	  no-­‐party	  rule.	  	  
The	  first	  “no-­‐party”	  elections	  under	  Museveni's	  leadership	  were	  held	  on	  
May	  9,	  1996.	  Museveni	  defeated	  the	  two	  contenders	  Paul	  Ssemogerere	  and	  
Mohamed	  Mayanja.	  Museveni	  won	  with	  a	  landslide	  75.5	  per	  cent	  of	  the	  vote	  from	  a	  
turnout	  of	  72.6	  per	  cent	  of	  eligible	  voters	  (see	  Table	  4-­‐8).	  Although	  international	  
and	  domestic	  observers	  described	  the	  vote	  as	  valid,	  both	  the	  losing	  candidates	  
rejected	  the	  results.	  Museveni	  was	  sworn	  in	  as	  President	  for	  the	  second	  time	  on	  
May	  12,	  1996.	  
Table	  4-­‐8:	  1996	  Uganda	  Presidential	  Election	  Results156	  
Candidate	   Percentage	  
Yoweri	  Museveni	   75.5%	  
Paul	  Kawanga	  Ssemogerere	   22.3%	  
Muhammad	  Kibirige	  Mayanja	   2.2%	  
Turnout	   72.6%	  
	  
The	  main	  message	  in	  Museveni's	  election	  campaign	  was	  the	  restoration	  of	  
security	  and	  economic	  normality	  in	  much	  of	  the	  country.	  A	  memorable	  electoral	  
image	  produced	  by	  his	  team	  depicted	  a	  pile	  of	  skulls	  in	  the	  Luwero	  Triangle.	  This	  
powerful	  symbolism	  was	  not	  lost	  on	  the	  inhabitants	  of	  this	  region,	  who	  had	  
suffered	  rampant	  insecurity	  during	  the	  Civil	  War.	  The	  other	  candidates	  had	  
difficulty	  matching	  Museveni's	  efficacy	  in	  communicating	  his	  key	  message.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
156	  See	  The	  Electoral	  Commission	  of	  Uganda:	  Presidential	  Elections	  Results	  1996,	  
http://www.ec.or.ug/Elec_results/Nat_Res_1996.pdf	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Museveni	  seemed	  to	  have	  a	  remarkable	  ability	  to	  relate	  political	  messages	  
by	  using	  grass-­‐roots	  language,	  especially	  with	  people	  from	  the	  south.	  The	  
metaphor	  of	  “carrying	  a	  grindstone	  for	  leadership,”	  referring	  to	  an	  “authoritative	  
individual,	  bearing	  the	  burden	  of	  authority,”	  was	  just	  one	  of	  many	  imaginative	  
images	  he	  created	  for	  his	  campaign.	  He	  would	  often	  deliver	  his	  speeches	  in	  the	  
local	  colloquial	  language,	  demonstrating	  respect,	  and	  attempting	  to	  transcend	  
tribalistic	  politics.	  Museveni's	  comfort	  with	  speaking	  in	  English,	  Luganda,	  
Runyankole,	  and	  Swahili	  helped	  him	  connect	  with	  a	  wider	  audience.157	  
Until	  the	  prospect	  of	  presidential	  elections,	  Ssemogerere	  (Museveni's	  
concurrent	  political	  rival)	  had	  been	  a	  minister	  in	  the	  NRM	  government.	  His	  
decision	  to	  challenge	  the	  record	  of	  Museveni	  and	  the	  NRM,	  rather	  than	  claim	  a	  
stake	  in	  Museveni's	  "movement,"	  was	  seen	  as	  naive	  opportunism	  and	  regarded	  as	  a	  
political	  error.	  Ssemogerere's	  alliance	  with	  the	  UPC	  was	  anathema	  to	  the	  Buganda,	  
who	  might	  otherwise	  have	  lent	  him	  some	  support	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  Democratic	  
Party.	  Ssemogerere	  also	  accused	  Museveni	  of	  being	  a	  Rwandan	  and	  his	  army	  of	  
being	  dominated	  by	  Rwandans.158	  
A	  Weakening	  Coalition	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157	  See	  Joseph	  Oloka-­‐Onyango,	  “New-­‐Breed	  Leadership,	  Conflict,	  and	  Reconstruction	  in	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  Region	  of	  Africa:	  A	  
Sociopolitical	  Biography	  of	  Uganda's	  Yoweri	  Kaguta	  Museveni”,	  Africa	  Today	  -­‐	  Volume	  50,	  Number	  3,	  Spring	  2004,	  Pp.	  29–
52.	  
158	  Museveni	  was	  often	  accused	  of	  being	  Rwandan	  by	  his	  opponents	  because	  of	  his	  birthplace	  near	  the	  Uganda-­‐Rwanda	  
border.	  Museveni	  claims	  to	  be	  an	  ethnic	  Munyankole,	  kin	  to	  the	  Banyarwanda	  of	  Rwanda.	  Museveni’s	  Army	  included	  4000	  
Rwandan	  exiles.	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As	  power	  concentrated	  within	  the	  NRM,	  many	  of	  the	  Movement’s	  old	  allies	  
fell	  out	  favor	  or	  became	  disillusioned	  with	  Museveni.	  Paul	  Ssemogerere’s	  
candidacy	  in	  the	  1996	  elections	  divided	  the	  Catholic	  vote.	  By	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  the	  
relationship	  between	  the	  Buganda	  and	  the	  NRM	  had	  also	  grown	  strained,	  as	  
Museveni	  sought	  to	  pit	  different	  sections	  of	  royal	  society	  against	  one	  another.	  	  
King	  Ronald	  Mutebi	  was	  restricted	  to	  be	  in	  an	  apolitical	  role,	  and	  his	  
movements	  were	  closely	  monitored	  to	  prevent	  him	  from	  becoming	  anything	  more	  
than	  a	  cultural	  symbol.	  The	  cracks	  in	  society	  were	  once	  again	  beginning	  to	  emerge.	  
In	  addition,	  the	  growing	  perception	  was	  that	  Museveni	  favored	  his	  “own	  people”	  
when	  it	  came	  to	  government	  appointments.	  The	  Ankole	  Bahima,	  in	  particular,	  
were	  unduly	  benefiting	  from	  “State	  House	  scholarships,	  State	  House	  welfare	  
programs,	  presidential	  donations,	  and	  appointments	  to	  key	  and	  strategic	  military	  
and	  security	  offices.”159	  
The	  differences	  between	  the	  hardcore	  NRM	  supporters	  and	  those	  who	  
endorsed	  a	  more	  broad-­‐based	  meritocracy	  led	  to	  regional	  tensions	  in	  Uganda’s	  
Kabale,	  Ntungamo,	  Kasese,	  and	  Iganga	  provinces.	  The	  NRM-­‐led	  government	  
harassed	  and	  suppressed	  those	  who	  advocated	  multipartyism	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  
it	  would	  lead	  to	  confusion	  and	  exacerbate	  societal	  cleavages.	  Though	  there	  were	  
no	  legal	  grounds,	  the	  NRM	  made	  it	  very	  difficult	  for	  opposition	  parties	  to	  hold	  
meetings	  or	  sponsor	  candidates,	  unless	  approved	  by	  the	  NRM	  leadership.	  Even	  the	  
local	  Resistance	  Councils	  had	  been	  usurped	  by	  the	  NRM	  and	  turned	  into	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159	  Andrew	  Mwenda,	  “Museveni	  Doesn’t	  Favor	  Bahima,	  He	  Uses	  Them.”	  Independent,	  (April	  4,	  2008).	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instrument	  for	  maintaining	  control	  at	  the	  grassroots	  level.	  The	  Election	  
Commission	  was	  entirely	  made	  up	  of	  presidential	  appointees.	  	  
Thus,	  Museveni	  and	  the	  NRM	  elite	  systematically	  retarded	  the	  
strengthening	  of	  check-­‐and-­‐balance	  institutions.	  The	  artificial	  constraints	  on	  the	  
development	  of	  democracy	  and	  the	  insecurity	  felt	  by	  opposition	  leaders	  led	  to	  the	  
growing	  perception	  that	  power	  was	  now	  serving	  the	  interests	  of	  a	  few	  elites	  from	  
the	  western	  part	  of	  the	  country.160	  	  
As	  the	  national	  executive,	  Museveni	  began	  to	  behave	  more	  like	  his	  
predecessors.	  In	  the	  1996	  elections,	  when	  a	  majority	  of	  the	  northerners	  voted	  
against	  him,	  Museveni	  publicly	  announced	  that	  he	  would	  not	  be	  allocating	  cabinet	  
positions	  to	  this	  area,	  but	  would	  consider	  allocating	  some	  infrastructure-­‐related	  
funding.	  	  
Between	  1996	  and	  2000	  the	  popularity	  of	  the	  president	  and	  the	  NRM	  
Government	  began	  to	  decline.	  One	  main	  reason	  was	  the	  increasing	  number	  of	  
high-­‐level	  cases	  of	  corruption	  that	  were	  uncovered.	  Scandals	  were	  exposed	  relating	  
to	  the	  expropriation	  of	  money	  from	  the	  huge	  flows	  of	  international	  development	  
assistance.	  There	  were	  also	  allegations	  of	  misappropriation	  of	  wealth	  from	  the	  sale	  
of	  state	  companies	  under	  the	  privatization	  project.	  The	  web	  of	  corruption	  was	  seen	  
to	  extend	  to	  the	  highest	  levels,	  implicating	  government	  ministers	  and	  even	  
Museveni’s	  family,	  through	  his	  brother,	  General	  Salim	  Saleh.	  In	  1998,	  NRM	  MPs	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  See	  Aili	  Mari	  Tripp,	  Museveni’s	  Uganda:	  Paradoxes	  of	  Power	  in	  a	  Hybrid	  Regime,	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  
2010),	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sought	  to	  demonstrate	  their	  independence	  of	  the	  executive	  by	  forcing	  the	  removal	  
of	  guilty	  ministers.161	  
Table	  4-­‐9:	  2001	  Uganda	  Presidential	  Election	  Results162	  
Candidate	   Number	  of	  votes	   Percentage	  
Yoweri	  Museveni	   5,123,360	   69.4%	  
Kizza	  Besigye	   2,055,795	   27.7%	  
Aggrey	  Awori	   103,915	   1.4%	  
Muhammad	  Kibirige	  
Mayanja	   73,790	   1.0%	  
Francis	  Bwengye	   22,751	   0.3%	  
Karuhanga	  Chapaa	   10,080	   0.1%	  
Turnout	   7,511,606	   69.7%	  
	  
In	  the	  2001	  elections,	  Museveni	  won	  by	  a	  substantial	  majority	  (69%),	  with	  
his	  former	  Bush	  War	  associate	  and	  personal	  physician	  Kizza	  Besigye	  as	  the	  only	  
real	  challenger	  (see	  Table	  4-­‐9).	  Museveni	  travelled	  on	  a	  cheap	  Bodaboda	  
motorcycle	  taxi	  to	  submit	  his	  nomination	  form	  for	  the	  election,	  in	  what	  was	  clearly	  
seen	  as	  a	  publicity	  stunt.	  There	  were	  considerable	  acrimony	  and	  bitterness	  during	  
the	  2001	  presidential	  election	  campaign,	  and	  incidents	  of	  violence	  occurred	  
following	  the	  announcement	  of	  the	  results.	  	  
Besigye	  challenged	  the	  election	  results	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Uganda.	  
Two	  of	  the	  five	  judges	  concluded	  that	  there	  were	  illegalities	  in	  the	  elections	  and	  
that	  the	  results	  should	  be	  rejected.	  The	  other	  three	  judges	  decided	  that	  the	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  See	  Economist	  Intelligence	  Unit,	  Uganda	  Country	  Profile,	  2009,	  (London,	  UK:	  The	  Economic	  Intelligence	  Unit	  Limited,	  
2009).	  	  
162	  See	  The	  Electoral	  Commission	  of	  Uganda:	  Uganda	  Presidential	  Elections	  (March	  2001),	  
http://www.ec.or.ug/Elec_results/sum_const_2001.pdf	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illegalities	  did	  not	  affect	  the	  result	  of	  the	  election	  in	  a	  substantial	  manner.	  They	  
stated,	  however,	  that,	  “there	  was	  evidence	  that	  in	  a	  significant	  number	  of	  polling	  
stations	  there	  was	  cheating.”	  They	  also	  noted	  that	  in	  some	  areas	  of	  the	  country,	  
“the	  principle	  of	  free	  and	  fair	  elections	  was	  compromised.”	  	  
Besigye	  was	  briefly	  detained	  and	  questioned	  by	  the	  police,	  allegedly	  in	  
connection	  with	  the	  offense	  of	  treason.	  In	  September	  2001,	  Besigye	  fled	  to	  the	  
United	  States,	  claiming	  that	  his	  life	  was	  in	  danger.	  It	  was	  becoming	  increasingly	  
clear	  that	  any	  challenge	  to	  Museveni’s	  authority	  would	  not	  be	  taken	  lightly.	  	  
The	  move	  to	  Multiparty	  Politics	  in	  Uganda	  	  
	  
After	  the	  2001	  elections,	  Museveni	  and	  the	  NRM	  elite	  began	  a	  campaign	  to	  
lift	  constitutional	  limits	  on	  the	  number	  of	  presidential	  terms.	  The	  motivation	  was	  
to	  allow	  Museveni	  to	  stand	  for	  election	  again	  in	  2006.	  The	  1995	  Ugandan	  
Constitution	  provided	  for	  a	  two-­‐term	  limit	  on	  the	  tenure	  of	  the	  president.	  	  
Given	  Uganda's	  history	  of	  dictatorial	  regimes,	  this	  check-­‐and-­‐balance	  was	  
designed	  to	  prevent	  a	  dangerous	  centralization	  of	  power	  around	  a	  long-­‐serving	  
leader.	  The	  effort	  to	  change	  Uganda’s	  Constitution	  led	  to	  the	  removal	  of	  key	  allies	  
from	  Museveni’s	  administration,	  including	  his	  childhood	  friend,	  Eriya	  Kategaya,	  
and	  Cabinet	  Minister,	  Jaberi	  Bidandi	  Ssali.	  	  
Moves	  to	  alter	  the	  Constitution	  and	  alleged	  attempts	  to	  suppress	  opposition	  
parties	  had	  attracted	  considerable	  criticism	  from	  domestic	  commentators,	  the	  
international	  community,	  and	  Uganda's	  aid	  donors.	  In	  a	  press	  release,	  the	  main	  
opposition	  party	  in	  2001,	  the	  Forum	  for	  Democratic	  Change	  (FDC),	  accused	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Museveni	  of	  engaging	  in	  a	  "life	  presidency	  project,"	  and	  of	  bribing	  members	  of	  
Parliament	  to	  vote	  against	  Constitutional	  amendments,	  FDC	  leaders	  claimed:	  
“The	  country	  is	  polarized	  with	  many	  Ugandans	  objecting	  to	  the	  
constitutional	  amendments.	  If	  Parliament	  goes	  ahead	  and	  removes	  
term	  limits	  this	  may	  cause	  serious	  unrest,	  political	  strife	  and	  may	  lead	  
to	  turmoil	  both	  through	  the	  transition	  period	  and	  thereafter	  ...	  We	  
would	  therefore	  like	  to	  appeal	  to	  President	  Museveni	  to	  respect	  
himself,	  the	  people	  who	  elected	  him	  and	  the	  Constitution	  under	  which	  
he	  was	  voted	  President	  in	  2001	  when	  he	  promised	  the	  country	  and	  the	  
world	  at	  large	  to	  hand	  over	  power	  peacefully	  and	  in	  an	  orderly	  manner	  
at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  second	  and	  last	  term.	  Otherwise	  his	  insistence	  to	  
stand	  again	  will	  expose	  him	  as	  a	  consummate	  liar	  and	  the	  biggest	  
political	  fraudster	  this	  country	  has	  ever	  known.”163	  
	  
Table	  4-­‐10:	  2005	  Uganda	  Multiparty	  System	  Referendum	  Results164	  
Question:	  "Do	  you	  agree	  to	  open	  up	  the	  political	  space	  to	  allow	  those	  who	  wish	  to	  join	  different	  
organizations	  /	  parties	  to	  do	  so	  to	  compete	  for	  political	  power?"	  
Option	   Number	  of	  votes	   Percentage	  
Yes	   3,643,223	   92.4%	  
No	   297,865	   7.6%	  
Turnout	   3,941,088	   47.3%	  
	  
The	  1995	  Constitution	  only	  lasted	  10	  years.	  In	  2005,	  following	  a	  referendum,	  
Uganda	  adopted	  a	  multiparty	  system	  (see	  Table	  4-­‐10).	  In	  order	  to	  understand	  why,	  
after	  investing	  enormous	  efforts	  to	  build	  a	  no-­‐party	  system,	  the	  NRM	  elite	  agreed	  
to	  a	  multiparty	  system,	  one	  needs	  to	  examine	  the	  broader	  historical	  and	  structural	  
context.	  Parliamentarians	  were	  forced	  to	  agree	  to	  lift	  presidential	  term	  limits	  in	  
exchange	  for	  a	  move	  toward	  multipartyism.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  executive	  office	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  "Press	  release:	  FDC	  Position	  on	  amending	  article	  105(2)	  of	  the	  constitution",	  Forum	  for	  Democratic	  Change,	  (27	  June	  
2005).	  	  
164	  See	  Results	  of	  the	  Referendum	  available	  at	  The	  Electoral	  Commission	  of	  Uganda	  
http://ec.or.ug/referendum/finalresults.pdf	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was	  strengthened	  in	  the	  process	  and	  positioned	  to	  control	  the	  electoral	  process	  in	  
the	  future.	  	  
Museveni	  and	  the	  NRM	  elite	  opened	  up	  to	  multipartyism,	  not	  because	  they	  
wished	  to	  encourage	  open	  competition,	  but	  because,	  in	  doing	  so,	  it	  could	  win	  
future	  elections	  and	  maintain	  its	  dominant	  political	  position	  with	  greater	  
legitimacy	  and	  credibility.	  The	  opening	  allowed	  it	  to	  operate	  and	  develop	  more	  
freely	  as	  the	  party	  it	  had	  already	  become.	  The	  NRM	  also	  created	  unfavorable	  
conditions	  for	  other	  political	  parties,	  like	  the	  DP	  and	  UPC,	  which	  were	  
significantly	  weaker	  in	  2005	  than	  they	  were	  in	  1994.	  The	  main	  opposition	  party,	  
the	  FDC,	  also	  suffered	  from	  divisions,	  and	  its	  members	  were	  also	  similarly	  
harassed,	  tortured,	  or	  forced	  to	  flee	  the	  country	  for	  fear	  of	  their	  lives.	  	  
Essentially,	  the	  1994	  Constituent	  Assembly	  elections	  marked	  the	  beginning	  
of	  the	  end	  of	  the	  broad-­‐based	  coalition	  that	  had	  characterized	  the	  NRM.	  After	  this	  
election,	  the	  NRM	  began	  to	  act	  as	  a	  de	  facto	  single	  party	  under	  an	  increasingly	  
authoritarian	  rule.	  Ultimately,	  the	  NRM’s	  efforts	  to	  entrench	  itself	  through	  the	  
constitution	  and	  various	  pieces	  of	  legislation	  became	  subordinated	  to	  the	  goal	  of	  
expanding	  executive	  authority	  and	  remaining	  in	  power.165	  	  
Museveni’s	  goal	  of	  remaining	  in	  power	  outweighed	  all	  other	  concerns,	  
including	  those	  of	  freedom	  of	  speech,	  freedom	  of	  association,	  political	  freedoms,	  
and	  other	  human	  rights.	  Museveni’s	  predilection	  to	  stay	  in	  power	  led	  to	  attacks	  on	  
the	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  legislature.	  The	  judiciary	  was	  never	  able	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  See	  Aili	  Mari	  Tripp,	  Museveni’s	  Uganda:	  Paradoxes	  of	  Power	  in	  a	  Hybrid	  Regime,	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  
2010),	  106-­‐108.	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to	  assert	  its	  independence	  under	  any	  of	  the	  previous	  leaders,	  but,	  under	  
Museveni’s	  first	  Government,	  there	  were	  some	  positive	  developments.	  The	  
judiciary	  proved	  to	  be	  quite	  active	  in	  pushing	  back	  against	  executive	  
encroachments;	  however,	  the	  Executive	  constantly	  challenged	  its	  influence	  and	  
power.	  	  
A	  World	  Bank	  report	  in	  May	  2005	  suggested	  that	  it	  might	  cut	  its	  support	  to	  
non-­‐humanitarian	  programs	  in	  the	  Uganda.	  	  
“We	  regret	  that	  we	  cannot	  be	  more	  positive	  about	  the	  present	  
political	  situation	  in	  Uganda,	  especially	  given	  the	  country's	  admirable	  
record	  through	  the	  late	  1990s.	  The	  Government	  has	  largely	  failed	  to	  
integrate	  the	  country's	  diverse	  peoples	  into	  a	  single	  political	  process	  
that	  is	  viable	  over	  the	  long	  term...Perhaps	  most	  significant,	  the	  
political	  trend-­‐lines,	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  President's	  apparent	  
determination	  to	  press	  for	  a	  third	  term,	  point	  downward.”166	  
	  
Museveni	  responded	  to	  the	  mounting	  international	  pressure	  by	  accusing	  
donors	  of	  interfering	  with	  domestic	  politics	  and	  using	  aid	  to	  manipulate	  poor	  
countries.	  	  
“Let	  the	  partners	  give	  advice	  and	  leave	  it	  to	  the	  country	  to	  
decide	  ...	  developed	  countries	  must	  get	  out	  of	  the	  habit	  of	  trying	  to	  use	  
aid	  to	  dictate	  the	  management	  of	  our	  countries.	  The	  problem	  with	  
those	  people	  is	  not	  the	  third	  term	  or	  fighting	  corruption	  or	  
multipartyism,	  the	  problem	  is	  that	  they	  want	  to	  keep	  us	  there	  without	  
growing.”167	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
166	  Paul	  Busharizi,	  “World	  Bank	  may	  cut	  aid”,	  New	  Vision,	  (Kampala,	  May	  17,	  2005).	  	  
167	  Frank	  Nyakairu,	  “Donors	  Fear	  Me,	  Says	  Museveni,”	  The	  Monitor,	  (26	  May	  2005).	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In	  November	  2005,	  Museveni	  was	  chosen	  as	  NRM’s	  presidential	  candidate	  
for	  the	  February	  2006,	  elections.	  His	  candidacy	  for	  a	  third	  term	  sparked	  criticism,	  
as	  he	  had	  promised	  in	  2001	  that	  he	  was	  contesting	  for	  the	  last	  term.168	  Opposition	  
leader	  Kizza	  Besigye	  returned	  from	  exile	  to	  be	  adopted	  as	  the	  candidate	  for	  a	  new	  
party,	  the	  FDC,	  but	  his	  program	  was	  duly	  interrupted	  by	  the	  authorities	  through	  a	  
series	  of	  arrests	  on	  various	  dubious	  charges.	  	  
Museveni’s	  order	  to	  arrest	  Besigye	  on	  November	  14,	  2005,	  on	  charges	  of	  
treason,	  as	  well	  as,	  concealment	  of	  treason	  and	  rape,	  sparked	  demonstrations	  and	  
riots	  in	  Kampala	  and	  other	  towns.	  Museveni’s	  punitive	  actions	  also	  had	  
international	  repercussions.	  European	  donors	  Sweden,	  the	  Netherlands	  and	  the	  
United	  Kingdom	  announced	  their	  plans	  to	  withhold	  economic	  support	  to	  
Museveni's	  Government.	  The	  donors	  expressed	  concerns	  about	  the	  future	  of	  
democracy	  in	  Uganda	  and	  cited	  Museveni's	  bid	  for	  a	  third	  term,	  the	  arrest	  of	  
Besigye,	  and	  the	  siege	  of	  the	  High	  Court	  during	  Besigye's	  hearing.	  	  	  
On	  January	  2,	  2006,	  Besigye	  was	  released	  after	  the	  High	  Court	  ordered	  his	  
immediate	  release.	  Prior	  to	  the	  election,	  a	  spokesman	  for	  the	  opposition	  FDC	  said,	  	  
“Key	  sectors	  of	  the	  economy	  are	  headed	  by	  people	  from	  the	  
president's	  home	  area...	  We	  have	  got	  the	  most	  sectarian	  regime	  in	  the	  
history	  of	  the	  country	  in	  spite	  the	  fact	  that	  there	  are	  no	  parties.”169	  	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168	  “The	  Challenges	  of	  Constitutionalizing	  Politics	  in	  Uganda,”	  Goran	  Hyden	  in	  Developing	  Uganda,	  eds.	  Holger	  Bernt	  
Hansen	  and	  Michael	  Twaddle,	  (Athens:	  Ohio	  University	  Press,	  1998).	  
169	  “Uganda:	  Nation	  decides	  on	  political	  parties,”	  UNOCHA-­‐IRIN,	  (27	  July	  2005).	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The	  February	  23,	  2006,	  elections	  were	  Uganda's	  first	  multiparty	  elections	  in	  
25	  years.	  These	  elections	  were	  seen	  as	  a	  test	  of	  Uganda’s	  democratic	  credentials.	  
Museveni	  won	  a	  convincing	  victory	  in	  the	  2006	  presidential	  elections,	  gaining	  59	  
percent	  of	  the	  national	  vote	  on	  a	  respectable	  turnout	  of	  68	  percent.	  	  
Foreign	  observers	  reported	  that	  though	  the	  election	  process	  itself	  was	  
broadly	  fair,	  there	  were	  some	  irregularities.	  They	  criticized	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  level	  
playing	  field	  for	  all	  candidates	  during	  the	  election	  campaign	  with	  reference	  to	  the	  
treatment	  of	  Besigye.	  Besigye’s	  37	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  partly	  reflected	  the	  protest	  
vote	  in	  parts	  of	  the	  north,	  which	  had	  suffered	  from	  the	  violence	  perpetrated	  by	  the	  
rebel	  Lord’s	  Resistance	  Army.	  	  
The	  NRM	  convincingly	  won	  the	  battle	  for	  parliamentary	  seats,	  taking	  187	  of	  
the	  319	  seats	  in	  the	  legislative	  election.	  The	  FDC	  became	  the	  main	  opposition	  
party.	  	  
Museveni’s	  bold	  decision	  to	  transform	  the	  NRM	  into	  a	  political	  party	  and	  
take	  on	  the	  other	  parties	  in	  elections	  paid	  off	  handsomely.	  The	  scale	  of	  the	  victory	  
in	  the	  presidential	  and	  parliamentary	  elections	  enhanced	  his	  authority	  both	  inside	  
and	  outside	  Uganda.	  Besigye	  alleged	  electoral	  fraud	  and	  vote	  rigging	  and	  rejected	  
the	  result.	  He	  contested	  the	  election	  results	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  Uganda,	  
which	  later	  ruled	  that	  the	  election	  was	  marred	  by	  intimidation,	  violence,	  voter	  
disenfranchisement,	  and	  other	  irregularities.	  The	  Court,	  however,	  voted	  4-­‐3	  to	  
uphold	  the	  results	  of	  the	  election.	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Disunity	  within	  the	  Movement	  
	  
Since	  2006,	  signs	  of	  disunity	  have	  begun	  to	  emerge	  in	  the	  NRM.	  Though	  it	  
has	  remained	  politically	  dominant,	  there	  is	  evidence	  of	  growing	  discontent	  within	  
the	  party	  since	  the	  2006	  elections.	  There	  was	  internal	  pressure	  on	  Museveni	  to	  give	  
up	  the	  chairmanship	  of	  the	  NRM	  parliamentary	  caucus	  in	  2007.	  This	  is	  possibly	  
related	  to	  the	  uncertainty	  about	  leadership	  succession.	  	  
The	  discontent	  became	  even	  more	  apparent	  in	  2008	  after	  Museveni	  
confirmed	  that	  he	  would	  stand	  for	  a	  fourth	  presidential	  term	  at	  the	  2011	  
presidential	  election,	  provided	  that	  he	  received	  the	  support	  of	  his	  party.	  The	  most	  
significant	  opposition	  to	  him	  comes	  from	  ambitious	  politicians	  within	  the	  NRM,	  
who	  see	  their	  advancement	  blocked,	  and	  those	  who	  represent	  areas	  of	  Uganda	  
where	  regional	  discontent	  has	  been	  building.	  
Political	  infighting	  among	  factions	  of	  the	  NRM	  supporting	  different	  
potential	  successors	  to	  Museveni	  has	  destabilized	  the	  party	  to	  an	  extent.	  Two	  
controversial	  political	  developments	  in	  2008	  –	  a	  dispute	  with	  Buganda	  over	  an	  
amendment	  to	  the	  Land	  Act	  and	  the	  Temangalo	  corruption	  case,170	  which	  involved	  
two	  senior	  ministers	  –	  underlined	  the	  difficulties	  that	  Museveni	  faces	  in	  keeping	  
the	  NRM	  united.	  So	  far,	  however,	  he	  has	  retained	  control,	  partly	  because	  there	  is	  
no	  obvious	  successor	  with	  sufficient	  support	  at	  present,	  and	  partly	  because	  he	  
remains	  very	  popular	  in	  rural	  areas.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170	  The	  NRM	  dominated	  Parliament	  cleared	  the	  finance	  minister	  and	  the	  security	  minister	  of	  accusations	  of	  unfairly	  using	  
political	  influence	  in	  the	  sale	  of	  land	  for	  around	  US$6m	  to	  the	  National	  Social	  Security	  Fund	  in	  the	  Temangalo	  	  affair,	  
despite	  a	  parliamentary	  committee	  report	  that	  found	  the	  ministers	  guilty.	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Museveni	  was	  reelected	  on	  February	  20,	  2011,	  with	  a	  68	  percent	  majority	  
with	  59	  percent	  of	  registered	  voters	  having	  voted.	  These	  election	  results	  were	  
disputed	  by	  both	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  opposition,	  “The	  electoral	  process	  
was	  marred	  with	  avoidable	  administrative	  and	  logistical	  failures,”	  according	  to	  the	  
European	  Union	  election	  observer	  team.171	  
Museveni	  has	  been	  successful	  in	  bringing	  relative	  stability	  and	  economic	  
growth	  to	  a	  country	  that	  has	  endured	  decades	  of	  government	  mismanagement,	  
civil	  war,	  and	  rebellion.	  It	  is	  not	  clear,	  however,	  that	  he	  has	  been	  able	  to	  establish	  
institutions	  that	  will	  be	  able	  to	  continue	  providing	  stability	  and	  economic	  
prosperity	  to	  Ugandans	  after	  his	  regime.	  Museveni	  has	  progressively	  limited	  
political	  contestation	  and	  freedom	  by	  coopting	  and	  even	  intimidating	  potential	  
threats	  to	  his	  power.	  	  
The	  Approach	  to	  Economic	  Growth	  and	  Inclusion	  
By	  the	  time	  Yoweri	  Museveni	  and	  the	  National	  Resistance	  Movement	  
(NRM)	  came	  to	  power	  in	  1986,	  the	  economy	  was	  in	  ruins.	  Uganda’s	  new	  NRM	  
leadership	  was	  influenced	  initially	  by	  left-­‐wing	  ideology,	  but	  was	  pragmatic	  
enough	  to	  recognize	  that	  external	  financial	  assistance	  was	  needed	  to	  kick-­‐start	  the	  
economy.	  The	  new	  Government	  enjoyed	  widespread	  international	  support	  and	  
focused	  on	  fixing	  the	  ailing	  economy.	  Museveni	  initiated	  economic	  policies	  
designed	  to	  combat	  key	  problems,	  such	  as	  hyperinflation	  and	  the	  balance	  of	  
payments.	  Abandoning	  his	  Marxist	  ideals	  after	  his	  initial	  economic	  policies	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171	  "Uganda's	  Museveni	  wins	  disputed	  presidential	  vote,"	  Reuters,	  (February	  20,	  2011).	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backfired,	  Museveni	  embraced	  the	  neoliberal	  structural	  adjustments	  advocated	  by	  
the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  International	  Monetary	  Fund	  (IMF).	  	  
	   Museveni’s	  pragmatic	  approach	  to	  economic	  development,	  growth	  and	  
security	  was	  quite	  different	  from	  the	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  approach	  that	  had	  been	  
taken	  by	  many	  other	  revolutionary	  leaders.	  He	  pointed	  to	  intractable	  rural	  poverty	  
and	  the	  persistent	  inability	  of	  the	  people	  to	  achieve	  progress.	  	  
While	  other	  countries	  in	  the	  developed	  world	  had	  been	  able	  to	  overcome	  
problems	  of	  famine,	  drought,	  and	  disease,	  these	  challenges	  loomed	  large	  over	  
African	  states.	  The	  colonial	  legacy	  of	  slavery,	  a	  feudal	  approach	  to	  agriculture,	  and	  
the	  impoverishment	  of	  local	  economies	  was	  a	  central	  point	  in	  his	  argument.	  He	  
contended	  that	  farmers	  in	  the	  former	  colonies	  were	  trying	  to	  grow	  cash	  crops	  like	  
tea,	  coffee,	  and	  cotton	  for	  export,	  while	  having	  no	  real	  way	  of	  growing	  basic	  food	  
crops	  to	  sustain	  themselves.	  The	  overreliance	  on	  export	  based	  crops	  left	  them	  
vulnerable	  to	  the	  fluctuations	  in	  commodity	  prices	  and	  demand	  in	  developed	  
countries.	  	  
Museveni	  argued	  that	  the	  priorities	  adopted	  by	  post-­‐colonial	  governments	  
were	  flawed.	  Instead	  of	  allocating	  scarce	  resources	  for	  rural	  education	  and	  
telephones,	  he	  argued	  that	  it	  was	  more	  important	  to	  focus	  on	  improving	  local	  
transport,	  building	  roads,	  and	  enhancing	  the	  ability	  to	  communicate	  physically.	  
This	  would	  enable	  the	  flow	  of	  goods	  and	  services	  within	  the	  local	  and	  regional	  
economy.	  It	  would	  also	  help	  create	  a	  market	  that	  would	  set	  the	  stage	  for	  further	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growth.	  He	  pointed	  out	  that	  Uganda’s	  poor	  road	  network	  greatly	  stunted	  this	  
possibility.	  	  
Uganda	  began	  participating	  in	  an	  IMF	  Economic	  Recovery	  Program	  (ERP)	  
in	  1987.	  Its	  objectives	  included	  the	  restoration	  of	  incentives	  to	  encourage	  growth,	  
investment,	  employment	  and	  exports;	  the	  promotion	  and	  diversification	  of	  trade	  
with	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  export	  promotion;	  the	  removal	  of	  bureaucratic	  
constraints	  and	  divestment	  from	  ailing	  public	  enterprises	  so	  as	  to	  enhance	  
sustainable	  economic	  growth	  and	  development	  through	  the	  private	  sector;	  as	  well	  
as	  the	  liberalization	  of	  trade	  at	  all	  levels.	  
The	  absurdly	  high	  official	  exchange	  rate	  was	  abolished	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  black-­‐
market	  driven	  rate.	  A	  77	  percent	  devaluation	  of	  the	  shilling	  in	  1987	  was	  followed	  by	  
other	  devaluations	  and	  a	  gradual	  relaxation	  of	  exchange	  controls,	  until	  the	  
currency’s	  value	  became	  market-­‐determined,	  in	  1993.	  	  
Museveni	  declared	  that	  “inflation	  is	  indiscipline,”	  and,	  from	  early	  1992	  
onward	  inflation	  was	  duly	  tamed.	  Inflation,	  which	  was	  over	  200	  percent	  in	  1987,	  
was	  tackled	  by	  imposing	  strict	  controls	  on	  budgetary	  spending	  and	  curbing	  
monetary	  expansion.	  The	  authorities	  pressed	  ahead	  with	  the	  liberalization	  of	  all	  
sectors	  of	  the	  economy.	  Restrictions	  on	  imports	  were	  removed	  progressively,	  with	  
the	  establishment	  of	  an	  open	  general	  licensing	  system	  and	  the	  reduction	  and	  
harmonization	  of	  tariffs.	  The	  policy	  of	  setting	  producer	  prices	  for	  export	  crops	  was	  
abolished,	  and	  trading	  was	  opened	  up	  to	  the	  private	  sector	  -­‐	  a	  major	  factor	  in	  the	  
recovery	  of	  the	  coffee	  sector.	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A	  policy	  of	  privatization	  was	  adopted	  for	  all	  142	  government-­‐owned	  
corporations.	  Uganda’s	  investment	  law	  was	  liberalized	  to	  facilitate	  the	  repatriation	  
of	  profits,	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  attract	  foreign	  investment.	  A	  capital	  market	  was	  
established	  in	  1998,	  although	  activity	  remains	  subdued.	  The	  stabilization	  of	  the	  
economy	  allowed	  rapid	  growth	  to	  resume	  in	  the	  1990s.	  Although	  the	  rural	  
population	  benefited	  from	  high	  coffee	  prices	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  the	  Ugandan	  
authorities	  acknowledged	  that	  only	  a	  few	  people	  (especially	  in	  regions	  other	  than	  
the	  relatively	  prosperous	  south)	  benefited	  from	  the	  economic	  recovery.	  This	  
situation	  was	  made	  worse	  by	  the	  ravages	  of	  the	  HIV/AIDS	  epidemic	  and	  rebel	  
insurrections.	  
Uganda	  changed	  from	  a	  centrally-­‐controlled	  economy	  with	  few	  incentives	  
to	  produce	  much	  to	  quite	  the	  opposite;	  liberalized	  and	  decentralized	  through	  
thousands	  of	  small	  decisions	  taken	  in	  hundreds	  of	  towns	  and	  villages,	  the	  result	  
was	  a	  burst	  of	  economic	  energy.	  The	  economic	  recovery,	  to	  an	  extent,	  was	  due	  to	  
the	  “peace	  effect.”	  That	  is,	  the	  reduction	  in	  the	  hostilities	  brought	  back	  traders	  and	  
businessmen	  who	  had	  been	  forced	  into	  hiding,	  or	  exile.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  the	  
economic	  liberalization	  initially	  took	  power	  away	  from	  corrupt	  administrators	  and	  
gave	  it	  to	  local	  Resistance	  Councils,	  or	  the	  people	  themselves.	  
In	  April	  1998,	  Uganda	  became	  the	  first	  country	  to	  be	  declared	  eligible	  for	  
debt	  relief	  under	  the	  Heavily	  Indebted	  Poor	  Countries	  (HIPC)	  initiative,	  receiving	  
some	  US$700	  million	  in	  aid.	  In	  2006,	  the	  IMF	  approved	  Uganda’s	  request	  for	  a	  new	  
arrangement	  with	  the	  Fund	  under	  a	  policy	  support	  instrument	  (PSI).	  The	  PSI	  is	  a	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non-­‐financial	  program	  designed	  for	  low-­‐income	  countries	  seeking	  IMF	  advice,	  
monitoring,	  and	  endorsement	  of	  their	  policies.	  	  
Given	  its	  record	  of	  sustained	  macroeconomic	  stability	  and	  the	  completion	  
of	  its	  first-­‐generation	  structural	  reforms,	  Uganda	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  "mature	  stabilizer."	  
Uganda	  no	  longer	  needs	  IMF	  funding,	  but	  benefits	  from	  a	  continuing	  policy	  
dialogue	  that	  goes	  beyond	  a	  regular	  surveillance	  relationship.	  Despite	  its	  solid	  
economic	  record	  with	  the	  IMF,	  Uganda’s	  image	  with	  donors	  has	  been	  tarnished	  
over	  the	  years	  by	  revelations	  of	  high-­‐level	  corruption	  and	  the	  government’s	  
unwillingness	  to	  open	  up	  the	  political	  system.	  
According	  to	  surveys	  carried	  out	  by	  Uganda’s	  Bureau	  of	  Statistics,	  there	  has	  
been	  a	  steady	  decrease	  in	  the	  proportion	  of	  Ugandans	  living	  in	  absolute	  poverty,	  
from	  over	  50	  percent	  in	  1993-­‐94,	  to	  34	  percent	  in	  1999-­‐2000.	  There	  is	  still	  a	  large	  
inequality	  between	  the	  rural	  and	  urban	  areas,	  and	  there	  are	  significant	  regional	  
differences.	  In	  the	  northern	  region,	  poverty	  levels	  have	  risen	  to	  around	  70	  percent,	  
compared	  with	  60	  percent	  two	  years	  earlier.	  This	  is	  mainly	  to	  the	  adverse	  effects	  of	  
continued	  insecurity	  on	  the	  rural	  economy	  and	  Museveni’s	  preferential	  treatment	  
of	  other	  regions.	  	  
Poverty	  levels	  had	  crept	  up	  again,	  reaching	  38	  percent	  in	  2002-­‐03.	  Reasons	  
for	  this	  setback	  included	  a	  slowdown	  in	  real	  GDP	  growth,	  deterioration	  in	  the	  
terms	  of	  trade,	  and	  high	  population	  growth.	  The	  Government	  responded	  by	  
including	  remedial	  measures	  in	  the	  revised	  PEAP	  (Poverty	  Eradication	  Action	  
Plan),	  and	  the	  2004-­‐05	  Budget	  sought	  to	  tackle	  these	  factors.	  There	  is	  evidence	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that	  improvements	  in	  the	  delivery	  of	  public	  services	  helped	  mitigate	  some	  of	  the	  
problems	  stemming	  from	  the	  rise	  in	  poverty	  rates.	  The	  poverty	  rate	  fell	  to	  31	  
percent	  in	  2005	  on	  account	  of	  these	  proactive	  steps	  taken	  by	  the	  government.172	  	  
Figure	  4-­‐9	  shows	  the	  variation	  in	  the	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  during	  Museveni’s	  time	  in	  
power.	  	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐9:	  Economic	  Performance	  Under	  Museveni173	  
	  
Strong	  economic	  growth	  has	  enabled	  substantial	  poverty	  reduction	  and	  
some	  progress	  towards	  Millennium	  Development	  Goals	  (MDG).	  With	  the	  
proportion	  of	  people	  living	  in	  poverty	  at	  25	  percent	  in	  2009-­‐10,	  Uganda	  has	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172	  See	  http://www.undp.or.ug/focusarea/3	  
173	  See	  World	  Development	  Indicators	  available	  at	  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator	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surpassed	  the	  2015	  Millennium	  Development	  Goal	  of	  halving	  the	  56	  percent	  
poverty	  rate	  recorded	  in	  1992-­‐93.	  	  
There	  is	  also	  significant	  progress	  towards	  reducing	  the	  share	  of	  the	  
population	  suffering	  from	  hunger.	  Uganda	  also	  may	  achieve	  the	  goals	  of	  universal	  
primary	  education,	  gender	  parity,	  and	  combating	  HIV/AIDS.	  	  
Nonetheless,	  progress	  in	  completion	  of	  primary	  education,	  child	  and	  
maternal	  mortality,	  access	  to	  reproductive	  health,	  incidence	  of	  malaria	  and	  other	  
diseases,	  has	  been	  slow.	  There	  are	  growing	  concerns	  about	  the	  uneven	  progress.	  
Inequality	  is	  increasing,	  while	  there	  are	  distinct	  geographical	  patterns	  of	  unequal	  
outcomes	  in	  health	  and	  education	  amidst	  uneven	  access	  to	  services.	  This	  poses	  
serious	  challenges	  to	  Museveni’s	  aspiration	  for	  Uganda	  to	  become	  a	  middle-­‐
income	  country	  within	  one	  generation.174	  
Economic	  conditions	  are	  best	  in	  the	  south,	  partly	  due	  to	  its	  climatic	  
advantages	  for	  agriculture,	  but	  also	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  region	  has	  been	  largely	  
peaceful	  and	  is	  well	  served	  by	  roads.	  Museveni	  has	  focused	  his	  attention	  in	  this	  
area	  and	  has	  been	  able	  to	  steer	  a	  significant	  proportion	  of	  Government	  funds	  
towards	  the	  development	  of	  the	  South	  and	  Southwest	  regions.	  The	  South	  also	  
contains	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  population,	  the	  most	  productive	  agriculture,	  the	  bulk	  
of	  manufacturing	  and	  the	  best-­‐developed	  services.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
174	  See	  World	  Bank,	  Uganda	  Country	  Brief.	  Available	  at	  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/UGANDAEXTN/0,,menuPK:374947~pagePK:1411
32~piPK:141107~theSitePK:374864,00.html	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The	  main	  road	  network,	  from	  the	  Kenyan	  border	  at	  Busia	  to	  Kampala,	  then	  
westwards	  to	  Rwanda	  and	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  Congo,	  forms	  part	  of	  the	  
"northern	  corridor"	  between	  the	  Indian	  Ocean	  and	  Central	  Africa.	  Uganda’s	  North	  
and	  West	  have	  suffered	  economically,	  both	  because	  of	  their	  remoteness	  and	  
border	  instability.	  The	  Karamoja	  region	  in	  the	  Northeast	  is	  culturally	  distinct	  and	  
economically	  underdeveloped.	  The	  historical	  ethnic	  tensions	  between	  Uganda’s	  
Nilotic	  North	  and	  Bantu	  South	  have	  also	  contributed	  to	  regional	  economic	  
disparities.	  These	  already	  existing	  cleavages	  have	  been	  exacerbated	  by	  Museveni’s	  
vindictive	  policies.	  
The	  people	  of	  the	  north	  have	  generally	  felt	  neglected	  by	  the	  NRM	  
Government,	  whose	  political	  support	  base	  is	  in	  the	  south.	  The	  economic	  benefits	  
experienced	  under	  the	  NRM	  have	  been	  largely	  confined	  to	  the	  south,	  although	  
that	  area	  has	  suffered	  proportionally	  worse	  from	  the	  HIV/AIDS	  epidemic.	  Over	  the	  
past	  few	  years,	  the	  Government	  has	  introduced	  measures	  to	  promote	  development	  
in	  the	  North.	  Not	  much	  has	  been	  accomplished,	  however,	  due	  to	  the	  presence	  of	  
Lord’s	  Resistance	  Army	  rebels	  in	  northern	  Uganda,	  	  
The	  Approach	  to	  Security	  and	  Justice	  
The	  NRM	  came	  to	  power	  promising	  to	  restore	  security	  and	  respect	  for	  
human	  rights.	  Security	  featured	  prominently	  in	  the	  NRM's	  ten-­‐point	  program.	  
Museveni	  noted	  in	  his	  swearing	  in	  speech:	  
“The	  second	  point	  on	  our	  program	  is	  security	  of	  person	  and	  
property.	  Every	  person	  in	  Uganda	  must	  have	  absolute	  security	  to	  live	  
wherever	  he	  wants.	  Any	  individual,	  any	  group	  who	  threatens	  the	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security	  of	  our	  people	  must	  be	  smashed	  without	  mercy.	  The	  people	  of	  
Uganda	  should	  die	  only	  from	  natural	  causes	  which	  are	  beyond	  our	  
control,	  but	  not	  from	  fellow	  human	  beings	  who	  continue	  to	  walk	  the	  
length	  and	  breadth	  of	  our	  land.”175	  
	  
Although	  Museveni	  now	  headed	  up	  a	  new	  government	  in	  Kampala,	  the	  
NRM	  could	  not	  project	  its	  influence	  fully	  across	  Ugandan	  territory	  and	  found	  itself	  
fighting	  a	  number	  of	  insurgencies	  in	  Northern	  Uganda.	  From	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  
presidency,	  Museveni	  drew	  strong	  support	  from	  the	  Bantu-­‐speaking	  south	  and	  
southwest.	  Museveni	  also	  convinced	  the	  Karamojong,	  a	  group	  of	  semi-­‐nomads	  in	  
the	  sparsely	  populated	  northeast	  that	  had	  never	  had	  a	  significant	  political	  voice,	  to	  
align	  with	  him	  by	  offering	  them	  a	  stake	  in	  the	  new	  government.	  	  
The	  northern	  region	  along	  the	  Sudanese	  border	  proved	  more	  troublesome.	  
In	  the	  West	  Nile	  sub-­‐region,	  the	  Kakwa	  and	  Lugbara	  (groups	  that	  had	  previously	  
supported	  Amin),	  the	  UNRF	  and	  FUNA	  rebel	  groups	  fought	  for	  years	  until	  a	  
combination	  of	  military	  offensives	  and	  diplomacy	  pacified	  the	  region;	  the	  leader	  of	  
the	  UNRF,	  Moses	  Ali,	  gave	  up	  his	  struggle	  to	  become	  Second	  Deputy	  Prime	  
Minister.	  	  
People	  from	  the	  northern	  part	  of	  the	  country	  viewed	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  
southerner-­‐led	  government	  with	  concern.	  Rebel	  groups	  sprang	  up	  among	  the	  
Lango,	  Acholi	  and	  Teso,	  though	  they	  were	  overwhelmed	  by	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  
NRA	  except	  in	  the	  far	  north	  where	  the	  Sudanese	  border	  provided	  a	  safe	  haven.	  The	  
Acholi	  rebel	  Uganda	  People's	  Democratic	  Army	  (UPDA)	  failed	  to	  defeat	  the	  NRA	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  Yoweri	  Museveni,	  Presidential	  Inauguration	  Speech,	  (1986).	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occupation	  of	  Acholiland.	  This	  was	  followed	  by	  the	  chiliasm	  of	  the	  Holy	  Spirit	  
Movement	  (HSM).176	  The	  defeat	  of	  both	  the	  UPDA	  and	  HSM	  left	  the	  rebellion	  to	  a	  
group	  that	  eventually	  became	  known	  as	  the	  Lord's	  Resistance	  Army,	  which	  would	  
turn	  against	  the	  Acholi,	  as	  well.	  
The	  NRA	  subsequently	  earned	  a	  reputation	  for	  respecting	  the	  rights	  of	  
civilians.	  Museveni	  later	  received	  criticism	  for	  using	  child	  soldiers.	  Undisciplined	  
elements	  within	  the	  NRA	  soon	  tarnished	  a	  hard-­‐won	  reputation	  for	  fairness.	  In	  
March	  1989,	  Amnesty	  International	  published	  a	  human	  rights	  report	  on	  Uganda,	  
which	  documented	  gross	  human	  rights	  violations	  committed	  by	  NRA	  troops.177	  	  
In	  one	  of	  the	  most	  intense	  phases	  of	  the	  war,	  between	  October	  and	  
December	  1988,	  the	  NRA	  forcibly	  cleared	  approximately	  100,000	  people	  from	  their	  
homes	  in	  and	  around	  Gulu	  town.	  Soldiers	  committed	  hundreds	  of	  extrajudicial	  
executions,	  as	  they	  forcibly	  moved	  people,	  burning	  down	  homes	  and	  granaries.	  
There	  were	  few	  reports	  of	  the	  systematic	  torture	  similar	  to	  those	  committed	  
during	  Amin	  and	  Obote's	  regimes.	  	  
Museveni	  announced	  the	  end	  of	  the	  war	  in	  the	  northern	  and	  eastern	  
provinces	  on	  October	  9,	  1988.	  Peace,	  however,	  was	  still	  elusive,	  as	  these	  areas	  
continued	  to	  simmer	  with	  conflict	  well	  into	  the	  1990s.	  As	  the	  conflict	  persisted,	  
Museveni	  and	  the	  NRM	  were	  not	  inclined	  to	  incorporate	  many	  northerners	  into	  
the	  Government.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176	  Chiliasm	  is	  the	  belief	  that	  Christ	  will	  return	  to	  earth	  in	  visible	  form	  and	  establish	  a	  kingdom	  to	  last	  1000	  years,	  after	  
which	  the	  world	  will	  come	  to	  an	  end.	  
177	  See	  Amnesty	  International,	  Uganda,	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Record	  1986–1989.	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While	  the	  south	  and	  west	  continued	  to	  be	  well	  represented,	  the	  north	  was	  
not.	  Between	  1986	  and	  1988,	  northerners	  accounted	  for	  only	  four	  positions,	  
easterners	  accounted	  for	  two	  positions,	  and	  by	  1995,	  only	  a	  few	  multipartyists	  
could	  be	  found	  in	  the	  cabinet.	  The	  majority	  of	  positions	  went	  to	  those	  who	  
supported	  the	  “no-­‐party”	  movement	  system.	  	  
Figure	  4-­‐10	  shows	  the	  variation	  in	  the	  level	  of	  conflict	  under	  Museveni.	  The	  
figure	  illustrates	  the	  periods	  of	  violence	  during	  his	  consolidation	  of	  power,	  and	  
also	  shows	  the	  increasing	  incidence	  of	  conflict	  in	  the	  past	  few	  years.	  This	  is	  
consistent	  with	  the	  increased	  use	  of	  State	  power	  to	  suppress	  political	  opposition.	  
The	  levels	  of	  conflict,	  however,	  are	  still	  well	  below	  the	  levels	  before	  Museveni	  
assumed	  power.	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Figure	  4-­‐10:	  Level	  of	  Conflict	  Under	  Museveni178	  
	  
	  
Museveni	  the	  Pan-­‐Africanist	  
	  
In	  terms	  of	  regional	  security,	  Museveni	  has	  long	  been	  a	  Pan-­‐Africanist,	  who	  
regularly	  questions	  the	  arbitrariness	  of	  borders	  in	  Africa	  and	  urges	  the	  
development	  of	  larger	  markets.	  He	  openly	  challenges	  the	  notion	  of	  Francophone,	  
Lusophone	  and	  Anglophone	  categorizations	  and	  urges	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  Bantu	  or	  
Afrophone	  category	  of	  nations.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178	  The	  measure	  for	  level	  of	  conflict	  was	  developed	  using	  the	  Internal	  and	  External	  conflict	  indicators	  from	  the	  
International	  Conflict	  Risk	  Group	  (ICRG)	  Database.	  These	  indicators	  have	  also	  been	  used	  in	  the	  panel	  data	  analysis	  in	  
chapter	  3.	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Museveni’s	  approach	  to	  this	  regional	  integration	  is	  essentially	  opportunistic	  
and	  militarist	  in	  nature.	  When	  he	  first	  came	  to	  power,	  Museveni	  supported	  rebel	  
elements	  against	  the	  one-­‐party	  regime	  in	  Kenya	  in	  the	  late	  1980s.	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  
were	  a	  number	  of	  skirmishes	  with	  the	  Kenyans.	  These	  were	  stopped	  only	  after	  
Museveni	  realized	  that	  President	  Daniel	  arap	  Moi	  was	  not	  a	  pushover,	  and	  that	  he	  
could	  blockade	  Uganda’s	  access	  to	  seaports.179	  The	  Kenyan	  opposition	  saw	  
Museveni	  as	  a	  dynamic	  and	  charismatic	  leader,	  who	  was	  bringing	  reform	  to	  a	  
region	  long	  prone	  to	  violent	  conflict.	  	  
Museveni’s	  thinking	  on	  the	  use	  of	  force,	  as	  a	  political	  instrument,	  regarding	  
Ugandan	  involvement	  in	  Rwandan	  politics	  is	  clear.	  There	  were	  significant	  numbers	  
of	  ethnic	  Rwandan	  Tutsi	  refugees	  in	  Uganda.	  The	  Tutsi-­‐dominated	  Rwandan	  
Patriotic	  Front	  (RPF)	  rebel	  group	  was	  a	  close	  ally	  of	  the	  NRA.	  Once	  Museveni	  had	  
solidified	  his	  hold	  on	  central	  power,	  he	  lent	  his	  support	  to	  their	  cause.	  	  
The	  RPF	  launched	  unsuccessful	  attacks	  against	  the	  Government	  of	  Rwanda	  
from	  bases	  in	  southwest	  Uganda	  from	  1990-­‐94.	  It	  was	  not	  until	  the	  Rwandan	  
Genocide	  of	  1994	  that	  the	  RPF	  took	  power	  and	  its	  leader,	  Paul	  Kagame	  (a	  former	  
officer	  in	  Museveni's	  army),	  became	  vice-­‐president.	  
Following	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide,	  the	  new	  Government	  in	  Kigali	  felt	  
threatened	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  former	  Rwandan	  soldiers	  and	  members	  of	  the	  
previous	  regime	  across	  the	  river	  in	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  the	  Congo	  (DRC).	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  See	  Joseph	  Oloka-­‐Onyango,	  “New-­‐Breed	  Leadership,	  Conflict,	  and	  Reconstruction	  in	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  Region	  of	  Africa:	  A	  
Sociopolitical	  Biography	  of	  Uganda's	  Yoweri	  Kaguta	  Museveni”,	  Africa	  Today	  -­‐	  Volume	  50,	  Number	  3,	  (Spring	  2004),	  29–52.	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These	  soldiers	  were	  receiving	  support	  from	  the	  DRC’s	  President	  Mobutu	  Sese	  
Seko.	  	  
Provocation	  by	  these	  rebels	  caused	  Rwanda	  (with	  the	  aid	  of	  Museveni)	  and	  
Laurent	  Kabila's	  rebels	  to	  overthrow	  him	  and	  take	  power	  in	  Congo.	  In	  August	  
1998,	  Rwanda	  and	  Uganda	  undertook	  to	  invade	  Congo	  again,	  this	  time	  to	  
overthrow	  Museveni	  and	  Kagame's	  former	  ally,	  Laurent	  Kabila.	  	  
Museveni	  and	  a	  few	  close	  military	  advisers	  made	  the	  decision	  to	  send	  the	  
Ugandan	  Army	  into	  the	  DRC.	  A	  number	  of	  highly-­‐placed	  sources	  indicate	  that	  the	  
Ugandan	  Parliament	  and	  civilian	  advisers	  were	  not	  consulted	  over	  the	  matter,	  as	  
was	  required	  by	  the	  1995	  Constitution.	  Museveni	  apparently	  persuaded	  an	  initially	  
reluctant	  High	  Command	  to	  go	  along	  with	  the	  venture.	  	  
The	  Ugandan	  Government	  claimed	  that	  the	  military	  intervention	  intended	  
to	  stop	  “genocide”	  against	  the	  Banyamulenge	  people	  in	  the	  DRC.	  The	  Ugandan	  
Government	  also	  alleged	  that	  Laurent	  Kabila	  had	  failed	  to	  provide	  security	  along	  
the	  border	  and	  was	  allowing	  the	  rebels	  to	  attack	  Uganda	  from	  bases	  in	  DRC.	  In	  
reality,	  the	  Ugandan	  Army	  was	  not	  deployed	  in	  the	  border	  region	  but	  more	  than	  
600	  miles	  to	  the	  west	  of	  Uganda's	  frontier	  with	  the	  DRC.	  The	  intention	  was	  to	  
support	  the	  Mouvement	  de	  Libération	  du	  Congo	  (MLC)	  rebels	  seeking	  to	  
overthrow	  Kabila.	  	  
As	  such,	  they	  were	  unable	  to	  prevent	  the	  ADF	  from	  invading	  the	  major	  
town	  of	  Fort	  Portal	  and	  taking	  over	  a	  prison	  in	  Western	  Uganda.	  Troops	  from	  
Rwanda	  and	  Uganda	  plundered	  the	  country's	  rich	  mineral	  deposits	  and	  timber.	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The	  United	  States	  responded	  to	  the	  invasion	  by	  suspending	  all	  military	  aid	  to	  
Uganda,	  a	  disappointment	  to	  the	  Clinton	  administration,	  which	  had	  hoped	  to	  
make	  Uganda	  the	  centerpiece	  of	  the	  African	  Crisis	  Response	  Initiative.	  	  
In	  2000,	  Rwandan	  and	  Ugandan	  troops	  exchanged	  fire	  on	  three	  occasions	  in	  
the	  Congolese	  city	  of	  Kisangani,	  leading	  to	  tensions	  and	  deterioration	  in	  the	  
relationship	  between	  Kagame	  and	  Museveni.	  The	  Ugandan	  government	  has	  also	  
been	  criticized	  for	  aggravating	  the	  Ituri	  conflict,	  a	  sub-­‐conflict	  of	  the	  Second	  
Congo	  War.	  	  
In	  December	  2005,	  the	  International	  Court	  of	  Justice	  ruled	  that	  Uganda	  
must	  pay	  compensation	  to	  the	  Democratic	  Republic	  of	  the	  Congo	  for	  human	  rights	  
violations	  during	  the	  Second	  Congo	  War.	  
In	  the	  north,	  Uganda	  had	  supported	  Sudan	  People's	  Liberation	  Army	  
(SPLA)	  in	  the	  Second	  Sudanese	  Civil	  War	  against	  the	  Government	  in	  Khartoum	  
even	  before	  Museveni's	  rise.	  The	  continued	  support	  for	  the	  SPLA,	  led	  by	  
Museveni's	  old	  acquaintance,	  John	  Garang,	  led	  Sudan	  to	  support	  the	  Lord's	  
Resistance	  Army	  (LRA)	  and	  other	  anti-­‐Museveni	  rebel	  groups	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1990s.	  	  
The	  resulting	  insecurity	  and	  conflicts	  have	  caused	  widespread	  human	  
displacement,	  death	  and	  destruction	  in	  southern	  Sudan	  and	  northern	  Uganda.	  
Subsequent	  warming	  of	  relations	  with	  Sudan	  led	  to	  a	  pledge	  to	  stop	  supporting	  
hostile	  proxy	  forces	  (from	  both	  sides)	  and	  the	  granting	  of	  approval	  to	  the	  UPDF	  to	  
attack	  the	  LRA	  within	  Sudan	  itself.	  
	   167	  
While	  each	  of	  the	  conflicts	  in	  the	  East	  African	  region	  is	  influenced	  by	  
history	  and	  a	  number	  of	  other	  factors,	  Museveni’s	  role	  in	  them	  looms	  large.	  Over	  
the	  past	  25	  years,	  Museveni	  seems	  to	  have	  designed	  the	  most	  aggressive	  foreign	  
military	  policy	  for	  the	  region	  of	  any	  of	  his	  predecessors	  and	  any	  other	  leaders	  in	  
the	  history	  of	  the	  region.180	  Museveni’s	  approach	  discounts	  the	  use	  of	  political	  
options	  of	  resolution	  of	  crises.	  An	  inordinate	  amount	  of	  emphasis	  has	  been	  placed	  
on	  the	  use	  of	  force	  to	  end	  conflicts.	  This	  is	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  Ugandan	  
interventions	  in	  Kenya,	  Rwanda,	  the	  DRC,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  Sudan.	  	  
The	  Relationship	  with	  the	  Judiciary	  
	  
With	  reference	  to	  the	  legal	  situation	  in	  Uganda,	  right	  from	  the	  outset,	  there	  
have	  been	  tensions	  between	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  executive.	  The	  judiciary	  has	  
consistently	  resisted	  Government	  meddling	  in	  its	  affairs	  and	  attempts	  to	  limit	  its	  
authority.	  Museveni	  and	  the	  NRM	  elite	  made	  concerted	  efforts	  to	  rein	  in	  the	  
judiciary	  ever	  since	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  1995	  Constitution,	  which	  expanded	  judicial	  
powers	  and	  protections,	  but	  also	  dramatically	  increased	  executive	  privilege.	  	  
The	  courts	  ruled	  against	  the	  Government	  in	  several	  notable	  cases.	  This	  led	  
to	  Government	  threats	  to	  dismiss	  the	  judges	  involved.	  The	  Government	  accused	  
these	  judges	  of	  being	  corrupt,	  sectarian,	  partisan	  and	  political.181	  Ever	  since,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180	  See	  Joseph	  Oloka-­‐Onyango,	  “New-­‐Breed	  Leadership,	  Conflict,	  and	  Reconstruction	  in	  the	  Great	  Lakes	  Region	  of	  Africa:	  A	  
Sociopolitical	  Biography	  of	  Uganda's	  Yoweri	  Kaguta	  Museveni”,	  Africa	  Today	  -­‐	  Volume	  50,	  Number	  3,	  Spring	  2004,	  Pp.	  29-­‐
52.	  
181	  See	  Aili	  Mari	  Tripp,	  Museveni’s	  Uganda:	  Paradoxes	  of	  Power	  in	  a	  Hybrid	  Regime,	  (Boulder,	  CO:	  Lynne	  Rienner	  Publishers,	  
2010),	  86-­‐89.	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Government	  and	  the	  judiciary	  have	  locked	  horns	  on	  several	  other	  issues,	  but	  the	  
judiciary	  has	  managed	  to	  maintain	  its	  independence.	  	  
Analysis:	  Museveni	  as	  the	  Change	  Agent	  
In	  the	  mid-­‐1990s,	  Museveni	  was	  seen	  to	  exemplify	  a	  new	  breed	  of	  African	  
leadership,	  the	  antithesis	  of	  the	  "big	  men"	  who	  had	  dominated	  politics	  in	  the	  
Continent	  since	  independence.	  The	  international	  community	  is	  now	  not	  so	  sure	  
about	  Museveni’s	  commitment	  to	  democratic	  institutions	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  
The	  philosophy	  underlying	  Yoweri	  Museveni’s	  approach	  to	  Ugandan	  
politics	  and	  reform	  seems	  to	  distrust	  the	  ability	  of	  civil	  society	  to	  lead	  Uganda	  
forward.	  Museveni	  saw	  that	  Ugandan	  society	  was	  still	  parochially	  divided	  along	  
ethnic	  and	  religious	  lines.	  Basing	  his	  argument	  on	  the	  experience	  of	  politics	  during	  
the	  first	  two	  decades	  of	  independence,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  Museveni	  initially	  
considered	  that	  pluralist	  politics	  would	  only	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  reinforcing	  these	  
divisions.	  He	  saw	  multi-­‐party	  democracy	  moving	  Uganda	  backwards	  rather	  than	  
forward.	  	  
Museveni’s	  position	  has	  been	  that	  above	  all,	  the	  economy	  needs	  to	  be	  
developed	  so	  that	  social	  and	  economic	  issues	  become	  the	  foundation	  on	  which	  
future	  politics	  rest.	  It	  is	  clear	  that	  it	  is	  for	  this	  same	  reason	  that	  he	  embraces	  
structural	  adjustment	  policies.	  Museveni	  was	  also	  in	  no	  hurry	  to	  bring	  back	  multi-­‐
party	  politics	  to	  the	  fore.	  As	  president,	  Museveni	  has	  attached	  more	  importance	  to	  
the	  role	  of	  social	  structures.	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The	  suffering	  in	  Uganda	  had	  been	  so	  widespread	  and	  deep	  that	  Museveni	  
easily	  gained	  the	  support	  for	  his	  claim	  to	  start	  a	  new	  chapter	  in	  the	  history	  of	  
Uganda’s	  history.	  In	  the	  political	  sphere,	  the	  Movement	  sought	  to	  create	  an	  
inclusive,	  national	  political	  community,	  in	  direct	  contrast	  to	  the	  elitist,	  partisan	  
states	  under	  Obote	  and	  Amin.	  In	  the	  areas	  under	  the	  NRM’s	  control,	  local	  
chieftains	  were	  replaced	  by	  Resistance	  Councils.	  These	  Resistance	  Councils	  
explicitly	  sought	  popular	  support	  and	  promoted	  the	  participation	  of	  previously	  
excluded	  ethnic	  groups,	  women,	  and	  youth.	  	  
Museveni	  also	  called	  for	  respect	  for	  human	  rights	  and	  the	  investigation	  of	  
past	  abuses.	  The	  establishment	  of	  a	  Constitutional	  Commission	  was	  viewed	  as	  
another	  move	  that	  would	  take	  the	  country	  to	  a	  new	  level	  of	  governance,	  where	  
individual	  freedom	  would	  be	  respected,	  and	  peace	  among	  Ugandans	  secured	  more	  
firmly.	  	  
Uganda	  has	  seen	  over	  20	  years	  of	  uninterrupted	  economic	  growth,	  a	  huge	  
achievement	  for	  a	  landlocked	  African	  country.	  The	  recovery	  owes	  much	  to	  the	  
return	  of	  political	  stability	  in	  most	  of	  the	  country	  under	  the	  NRM	  Government.	  
GDP	  growth	  has	  averaged	  over	  five	  percent	  a	  year	  in	  real	  terms.	  In	  terms	  of	  
inclusiveness,	  however,	  the	  benefits	  of	  development	  have	  been	  skewed	  in	  favor	  of	  
Museveni’s	  traditional	  supporters	  from	  the	  South	  and	  Southwest.	  There	  are	  parts	  
of	  the	  North	  and	  East	  that	  have	  continued	  to	  be	  mired	  in	  poverty.	  	  
Looking	  back	  at	  the	  past	  twenty-­‐five	  years	  of	  Ugandan	  politics,	  it	  is	  clear	  
that	  one	  of	  the	  ironies	  of	  the	  NRM	  victory	  is	  that	  it	  raised	  the	  level	  of	  expectations	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among	  Ugandans	  so	  high	  that	  many	  people	  now	  see	  what	  has	  come	  out	  of	  the	  
constitution-­‐making	  process	  as	  a	  disappointment.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  the	  NRM	  
has	  considerably	  changed	  the	  quality	  of	  politics	  and	  economics	  in	  Uganda.	  These	  
changes	  are	  evident	  in	  the	  positions	  taken	  by	  the	  opposition,	  which,	  by	  and	  large	  
feed,	  on	  the	  same	  ethnic	  and	  religious	  divisions	  that	  structured	  Ugandan	  politics	  
before	  1986.	  	  
Traces	  of	  the	  past	  are	  also	  to	  be	  found	  in	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  NRM.	  The	  
notion	  of	  politics	  as	  a	  ‘zero-­‐sum	  game’,	  in	  which	  the	  winner	  takes	  all,	  is	  evident	  in	  
the	  approach	  that	  the	  NRM	  has	  traditionally	  taken	  toward	  government.	  Patronage	  
continues	  to	  be	  part	  of	  the	  way	  of	  governing.	  But	  Ugandan	  governance	  has	  been	  
transformed	  in	  many	  important	  respects,	  notably	  in	  terms	  of	  popular	  involvement,	  
deregulation,	  and	  decentralization.	  	  
Museveni	  has	  won	  praise	  from	  Western	  governments	  for	  his	  adherence	  to	  
structural	  adjustment	  programs.	  A	  proponent	  of	  African	  self-­‐reliance,	  Museveni	  
was	  elected	  chairperson	  of	  the	  Organization	  of	  African	  Unity	  (OAU)	  in	  1991	  and	  
1992.	  Within	  Uganda,	  he	  permitted	  a	  free	  atmosphere	  within	  which	  the	  news	  
media	  could	  operate.	  Private	  FM	  radio	  stations	  flourished	  during	  the	  late	  1990s.	  	  
There	  are	  other	  areas,	  however,	  where	  changes	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  coming	  
immediately	  and	  where	  practice	  actually	  diverges	  from	  promise.	  These	  areas	  
include	  inter-­‐group	  relations	  and	  civil	  and	  political	  liberties,	  both	  of	  which	  
continue	  to	  be	  threatened	  by	  civil	  violence,	  involving	  rebels,	  as	  well	  as	  units	  of	  the	  
National	  Resistance	  Army	  or	  the	  Local	  Defense	  Units.	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As	  to	  whether	  the	  change	  brought	  about	  by	  the	  reforms	  process	  is	  
sustainable,	  the	  full	  possibilities	  of	  civil	  society	  are	  yet	  to	  be	  seen,	  but	  it	  remains	  a	  
fragile	  development.	  The	  political	  transition	  post-­‐Museveni	  is	  going	  to	  be	  difficult,	  
and	  the	  result	  of	  this	  transition	  will	  undoubtedly	  have	  an	  important	  role	  to	  play	  in	  
the	  future	  reform	  and	  development	  of	  Uganda.	  A	  major	  concern	  is	  that	  the	  
Movement	  System	  has	  failed	  to	  institutionalize	  mechanisms	  of	  governance	  distinct	  
from	  the	  personality	  of	  Museveni.	  	  
The	  Movement	  System	  was	  initially	  seen	  as	  a	  temporary	  measure	  to	  
bringing	  together	  a	  divided	  society.	  During	  its	  evolution	  as	  a	  permanent	  feature	  of	  
Ugandan	  politics,	  the	  Movement	  has	  abandoned	  its	  broad-­‐based	  nature	  and	  the	  
notion	  of	  meritocracy.	  It	  has	  become	  a	  system	  that	  seeks	  to	  stifle	  any	  pluralist	  
competition	  and	  oppresses	  civil	  liberties.	  The	  Movement	  has	  become	  whatever	  
Museveni	  decides	  for	  it	  to	  be.	  Any	  opposition	  in	  the	  ranks	  is	  not	  tolerated,	  as	  the	  
experience	  of	  Ssemogerere	  and	  Besigye	  indicate.	  	  	  
Museveni	  has	  not	  performed	  well	  when	  tested	  by	  the	  challenge	  of	  electoral	  
politics.	  In	  1996,	  opposition	  candidate	  Paulo	  Ssemogerere	  did	  not	  pose	  a	  serious	  
challenge	  to	  Museveni,	  but	  the	  level	  of	  violence,	  open	  intimidation	  by	  the	  security	  
forces,	  and	  the	  manipulation	  of	  the	  elections	  show	  the	  level	  of	  insecurity	  felt	  by	  
Museveni.	  	  
In	  the	  2001	  elections,	  the	  challenge	  to	  Museveni	  came	  from	  a	  close	  friend	  
and	  former	  ally,	  Kizza	  Besigye.	  Museveni’s	  response	  to	  this	  was	  extremely	  hostile.	  
Besigye	  was	  branded	  a	  traitor,	  as	  one	  who	  had	  HIV/AIDS,	  and	  many	  attempts	  were	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made	  to	  block	  his	  candidacy.	  Over	  the	  next	  two	  elections,	  in	  2006	  and	  2011,	  
Museveni	  harnessed	  the	  State	  machinery	  to	  discredit,	  dissuade,	  threaten,	  torture,	  
and	  intimidate	  the	  opposition.	  The	  level	  of	  violence	  used	  is	  reminiscent	  of	  Milton	  
Obote	  and	  Idi	  Amin.	  Scholars	  have	  argued	  that	  Besigye’s	  candidature	  touched	  a	  
raw	  nerve	  because	  it	  finally	  demonstrated	  that	  the	  Movement	  system	  was	  an	  
artificial	  edifice	  erected	  for	  the	  accommodation	  of	  Museveni’s	  continued	  retention	  
of	  power.	  182	  
As	  a	  result,	  major	  doubts	  about	  sustainability	  remain.	  Uganda	  appears	  to	  be	  
going	  down	  that	  all	  too	  familiar	  path	  of	  a	  leader	  reluctant	  to	  give	  up	  his	  power.	  
Museveni’s	  controversial	  decision	  to	  remove	  term-­‐limits	  from	  the	  presidency	  has	  
strengthened	  the	  argument	  that	  he	  intends	  to	  hold	  onto	  power	  indefinitely.	  	  
Uganda	  today	  recalls	  the	  images	  of	  the	  early	  days	  of	  African	  independence,	  
when	  the	  "founding	  fathers,"	  such	  as	  Kwame	  Nkrumah,	  Julius	  Nyerere,	  and	  Jomo	  
Kenyatta,	  enjoyed	  a	  legitimacy	  derived	  from	  their	  participation	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  
liberation	  from	  colonial	  hegemony.	  These	  leaders	  were	  unable	  to	  envision	  a	  system	  
independent	  of	  their	  own	  participation	  in	  and	  domination	  over	  it.	  Thus	  came	  the	  
subsequent	  disintegration	  into	  single-­‐party	  regimes	  and	  life	  presidencies.	  	  
The	  success	  of	  the	  Ugandan	  experiment	  will	  be	  sealed	  only	  if	  it	  can	  extricate	  
itself	  from	  reliance	  on	  a	  single	  individual	  and	  escape	  the	  travails	  of	  all	  systems	  that	  
have	  disintegrated	  into	  single-­‐person	  hegemony.	  To	  achieve	  enduring	  change,	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  Leadership,	  Conflict,	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  Reconstruction	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  Region	  of	  Africa:	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Sociopolitical	  Biography	  of	  Uganda's	  Yoweri	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  Africa	  Today	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  29–52.	  
	   173	  
Uganda	  must	  reignite	  the	  spirit	  of	  “Fundamental	  Change,”	  which	  Museveni	  
promised	  when	  he	  first	  took	  power	  in	  January	  1986.	  	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  
Museveni	  started	  out	  pretty	  well,	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  a	  broad-­‐based	  coalition.	  
During	  his	  time	  in	  power,	  however,	  Museveni	  favored	  his	  supporters	  from	  the	  
South	  and	  used	  violent	  means	  to	  continue	  in	  power.	  To	  his	  credit,	  however,	  the	  
National	  Resistance	  Movement	  brought	  power	  to	  the	  people	  and	  gave	  them	  
increased	  control	  of	  their	  own	  economic	  destinies.	  Uganda	  today	  seems	  to	  be	  in	  
relatively	  good	  economic	  shape,	  despite	  his	  less	  than	  stellar	  form	  of	  leadership.	  A	  
lot	  of	  this	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  the	  peace	  and	  stability	  that	  Uganda	  has	  been	  able	  to	  
attain	  under	  the	  NRM	  Government.	  Sustaining	  this	  economic	  growth	  and	  stability	  
in	  the	  future,	  however,	  seems	  questionable	  given	  Museveni’s	  reluctance	  to	  step	  
down.	  As	  a	  result,	  Uganda’s	  durable	  exit	  from	  fragility	  is	  still	  uncertain.	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Paul	  Kagame’s	  Rwanda	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐11:	  Map	  of	  Rwanda183	  
The	  Structural	  Context	  of	  Kagame’s	  Rise	  
In	  the	  nineteenth	  century,	  King	  Rwabugiri,	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Rwanda,	  
conducted	  a	  decades-­‐long	  process	  of	  military	  conquest	  and	  administrative	  
consolidation	  that	  resulted	  in	  the	  kingdom	  coming	  to	  control	  most	  of	  what	  is	  now	  
Rwanda.	  	  
Germany,	  the	  colonial	  power	  at	  the	  time,	  allied	  with	  the	  Rwandan	  King	  and	  
allowed	  him	  to	  conquer	  the	  remaining	  autonomous	  kingdoms	  along	  its	  borders.	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Following	  Germany’s	  defeat	  in	  World	  War	  I,	  Belgium	  assumed	  control	  over	  the	  
territory.	  	  
In	  1926,	  Belgium	  carried	  out	  local	  government	  reforms	  and	  merged	  the	  
separate	  land,	  cattle,	  and	  army	  chieftaincies	  into	  one	  post.	  The	  colonial	  practice	  of	  
treating	  different	  ethnicities	  preferentially	  greatly	  increased	  Tutsi	  political	  control	  
and	  contributed	  to	  Hutu	  resentment	  at	  the	  local	  level.	  This	  also	  led	  to	  the	  
racialization	  of	  the	  system	  of	  minority	  Tutsi	  dominance	  created	  under	  King	  
Rwabugiri.	  	  
A	  convergence	  of	  anti-­‐colonial	  and	  anti-­‐Tutsi	  sentiment	  resulted	  in	  Belgium	  
granting	  national	  independence	  in	  1961.	  Prior	  to	  independence	  and	  in	  the	  
following	  years,	  ethnic	  tensions	  between	  the	  Hutus	  and	  Tutsis	  led	  to	  tens	  of	  
thousands	  of	  mostly	  Tutsi	  deaths,	  with	  many	  more	  fleeing	  the	  country	  (see	  Figure	  
4-­‐12	  for	  a	  brief	  summary	  of	  the	  Hutu-­‐Tutsi	  conflict).	  	  
The	  Rwanda	  of	  the	  1960s	  and	  70s	  had	  hardly	  any	  allies	  in	  the	  region.	  
Rwanda	  had	  been	  artificially	  created,	  like	  most	  other	  African	  states,	  by	  the	  
Germans	  and	  the	  Belgians.	  It	  depended	  heavily	  on	  the	  former	  colonial	  powers	  for	  
sponsorship	  and	  support.	  As	  a	  result,	  there	  was	  no	  scope	  for	  joining	  in	  the	  socialist	  
or	  anti-­‐colonialist	  movements	  that	  were	  blossoming	  in	  neighboring	  countries	  like	  
Tanzania.	  Burundi	  had	  turned	  into	  an	  apartheid	  state	  where	  the	  Tutsi	  minority	  
government	  maintained	  control	  over	  the	  Hutu	  majority	  through	  the	  use	  of	  force.	  
Uganda	  was	  embroiled	  in	  its	  own	  tribal	  and	  ethnic	  conflicts.	  The	  region	  was	  mired	  
in	  conflict	  and	  transitional	  chaos.	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Figure	  4-­‐12:	  Understanding	  the	  Hutu-­‐Tutsi	  Divide184	  
In	  this	  context,	  Rwanda’s	  first	  president	  George	  Kayibanda,	  a	  Hutu,	  took	  
over	  from	  Belgium	  in	  1962.	  He	  exacerbated	  the	  deep	  divisions	  in	  society	  through	  
massacres	  and	  systematic	  purges	  of	  Tutsis	  from	  public	  office.	  The	  violence	  against	  
the	  Tutsis	  led	  to	  a	  mass	  exodus	  to	  neighboring	  countries,	  including	  Uganda	  and	  
Tanzania.	  	  
After	  a	  decade	  in	  office,	  Kayibanda	  began	  to	  lose	  his	  hold	  on	  power.	  In	  1972-­‐
73,	  he	  attempted	  to	  shore	  up	  support	  by	  conducting	  another	  round	  of	  Tutsi	  
persecutions.	  Even	  after	  eliminating	  the	  last	  few	  Tutsis	  who	  held	  high	  positions	  in	  
government,	  Kayibanda	  did	  not	  succeed	  in	  winning	  back	  the	  support	  of	  the	  
majority.	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  The	  Economist	  Intelligence	  Unit,	  Rwanda	  EIU	  Country	  Profile	  2008,	  (London,	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  Unit	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Rwandans	  are	  divided	  over	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  origins	  of	  the	  terms	  Hutu	  and	  Tutsi	  lie	  in	  
class	  or	  ethnicity.	  This	  division	  has	  deeply	  inﬂuenced	  regional	  politics	  for	  the	  past	  40	  years.	  
Colonial	  rule	  shaped	  the	  meanings	  of	  Hutu	  and	  Tutsi,	  partly	  because	  of	  the	  speculative	  and	  
inaccurate	  theory	  of	  the	  Tutsis’	  supposed	  racial	  superiority.	  	  
The	  colonial	  authorities	  invoked	  physical	  diﬀerences	  to	  perpetuate	  these	  distinctions.	  As	  a	  
result,	  the	  tallest	  and	  lightest-­‐skinned	  persons	  were	  cast	  as	  Tutsis,	  while	  the	  shortest,	  
stockiest	  and	  darkest-­‐skinned	  were	  classiﬁed	  as	  Hutus.	  The	  changing	  economy,	  including	  
increased	  coﬀee	  cultivation,	  further	  transformed	  Rwandan	  social	  relations.	  To	  the	  wage	  
laborers	  working	  on	  the	  plantations,	  Tutsi	  came	  to	  imply	  boss,	  while	  owners	  increasingly	  
equated	  Hutus	  with	  laborers.	  The	  atrocities	  perpetrated	  in	  Rwanda	  since	  Independence	  gave	  
the	  terms	  "Hutu"	  and	  "Tutsi"	  new,	  polarized	  meanings.	  	  
Being	  a	  Tutsi	  today	  is	  to	  belong	  to	  a	  community	  that	  has	  survived	  massacres	  in	  1959,	  1973	  and	  
1994.	  To	  be	  a	  Hutu	  is	  to	  belong	  to	  the	  ethnic	  group	  that	  has	  survived	  massacres	  in	  Burundi	  in	  
1972,	  1988,	  1990,	  and	  1991,	  in	  northern	  Rwanda	  in	  1990-­‐94,	  and	  subsequently	  in	  eastern	  Zaïre	  
and	  Congo.	  Today,	  the	  Rwandan	  Constitution	  forbids	  discussion	  of	  ethnicity	  as	  "divisive,"	  
and	  ethnic	  monitoring	  is	  illegal.	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In	  July	  1973,	  the	  Army	  chief-­‐of-­‐staff,	  Major-­‐General	  Juvénal	  Habyarimana,	  
staged	  a	  successful	  coup	  d’état,	  claiming	  that	  such	  a	  course	  of	  action	  was	  necessary	  
to	  restore	  order.	  When	  he	  first	  came	  to	  power,	  Habyarimana	  promised	  that	  the	  
Tutsis	  would	  not	  be	  harmed	  and	  that	  their	  security	  would	  be	  guaranteed	  in	  the	  
country.	  	  
For	  many	  years,	  this	  promise	  was	  upheld.	  The	  role	  that	  Tutsis	  played	  in	  
public	  life,	  however,	  continued	  to	  decline.	  By	  1980,	  there	  was	  only	  one	  Tutsi	  
minister	  in	  the	  34-­‐member	  cabinet,	  and	  two	  out	  of	  eighty	  parliamentarians	  were	  
Tutsi.	  There	  were	  no	  Tutsi	  prefects	  in	  local	  governments	  throughout	  the	  1970s	  and	  
80s.	  Tutsis	  were	  essentially	  treated	  as	  second-­‐class	  citizens,	  whose	  only	  real	  option	  
for	  social	  and	  economic	  advancement	  was	  in	  the	  private	  sector	  in	  Rwanda	  or	  
through	  immigration	  to	  other	  countries.	  	  
Suffering	  from	  similar	  treatment	  as	  second-­‐class	  citizens	  in	  neighboring	  
Uganda,	  the	  Tutsi	  exiles	  formed	  the	  Rwandese	  Refugee	  Welfare	  Foundation	  
(RRWF)	  in	  1979,	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  help	  for	  Tutsis	  in	  Uganda	  and	  Rwanda.	  
Initially,	  the	  RRWF	  was	  focused	  on	  humanitarian	  assistance,	  but	  soon	  it	  became	  
more	  politically	  ambitious	  and	  was	  reborn	  as	  the	  Rwandese	  Alliance	  for	  National	  
Unity	  (RANU).	  RANU	  stood	  for	  an	  end	  to	  the	  politics	  of	  division	  and	  persecution	  
based	  on	  ethnicity	  in	  Rwanda.	  This	  philosophy	  remained	  the	  guiding	  principle	  for	  
RANU	  and	  the	  Rwandan	  Patriotic	  Front	  (RPF)	  for	  the	  next	  two	  decades.185	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  Colin	  Waugh,	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  and	  Rwanda:	  Power,	  Genocide,	  and	  the	  Rwandan	  Patriotic	  Front,	  (Jefferson,	  NC:	  
McFarland	  &	  Company,	  2004),	  10-­‐16.	  	  
	   178	  
Kagame’s	  Early	  Life	  
Paul	  Kagame	  was	  born	  in	  1959	  to	  Tutsi	  parents	  in	  the	  Gitarama	  Prefecture,	  
about	  40	  miles	  west	  of	  Rwanda’s	  capital,	  Kigali.	  When	  he	  was	  only	  three	  years	  old,	  
his	  family	  fled	  across	  the	  border	  to	  Uganda	  to	  avoid	  sectarian	  persecution.	  His	  
family	  was	  not	  alone.	  There	  were	  approximately	  150,000	  Rwandan	  refugees	  in	  
camps	  in	  Uganda,	  by	  1966.	  	  
Kagame	  attended	  primary	  school	  in	  Toro	  District	  and	  learned	  English.	  At	  
the	  age	  of	  nine,	  he	  then	  moved	  to	  a	  Ugandan	  State	  school	  in	  Ntare.	  He	  proved	  to	  
be	  a	  good	  student,	  placing	  among	  the	  top	  three	  performers	  in	  the	  school,	  which	  
qualified	  him	  for	  a	  scholarship	  to	  secondary	  school.	  He	  was	  not	  given	  the	  
scholarship,	  however,	  due	  to	  his	  status	  as	  a	  refugee	  in	  Uganda.	  Kagame,	  
nonetheless,	  managed	  to	  secure	  a	  scholarship	  and	  completed	  his	  schooling	  in	  
Uganda.	  	  
There	  was	  growing	  ill	  will	  and	  bitterness	  towards	  the	  Rwandan	  refugees	  
from	  the	  locals	  due	  their	  above-­‐average	  achievements.	  Children	  from	  the	  local	  
Banyankole	  Ugandan	  group	  harassed	  the	  Rwandan	  children	  and	  often	  reminded	  
them	  of	  their	  outsider	  status.	  For	  many	  refugees,	  this	  feeling	  of	  alienation	  would	  
carry	  even	  into	  their	  adult	  life.	  The	  1972	  coup	  d’état	  in	  Uganda	  by	  General	  Idi	  Amin	  
made	  matters	  worse	  for	  the	  refugees	  and	  further	  led	  to	  their	  isolation	  and	  
challenges.	  Thus,	  Kagame	  grew	  up	  in	  a	  very	  challenging	  environment,	  with	  
obstacles	  at	  every	  step	  of	  the	  way.	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Throughout	  his	  childhood,	  Kagame	  had	  not	  been	  able	  to	  enter	  Rwanda.	  As	  
he	  approached	  adulthood,	  the	  professional	  and	  social	  consequences	  of	  being	  a	  
refugee	  became	  clear	  to	  him,	  and	  this	  awareness	  pushed	  him	  to	  learn	  more	  about	  
his	  homeland.	  He	  spent	  two	  months	  in	  Rwanda	  in	  1977	  and	  then	  again	  in	  1978,	  
where	  he	  learned	  about	  life	  in	  Rwanda	  firsthand.	  	  
Habyarimana’s	  regime	  had	  been	  primarily	  focused	  on	  economic	  
development,	  and	  had	  not	  provided	  any	  space	  for	  democratic	  dissent	  or	  political	  
debate.	  Though	  civilian	  rule,	  under	  one-­‐party	  government,	  was	  introduced	  in	  1978,	  
and	  a	  legislature,	  the	  Conseil	  National	  du	  Développement,	  was	  established	  in	  1981,	  
the	  real	  power	  remained	  with	  President	  Habyarimana.	  
Kagame	  and	  the	  National	  Resistance	  Movement	  
	  	  
By	  the	  time	  Kagame	  returned	  to	  Uganda	  in	  1978,	  an	  armed	  struggle	  against	  
Idi	  Amin	  had	  begun,	  and	  a	  new	  phase	  in	  the	  persecution	  of	  Rwandans	  in	  Uganda	  
was	  about	  to	  start.	  The	  Government	  that	  took	  power	  under	  Milton	  Obote	  in	  1980	  
(Obote	  II)	  characterized	  the	  Rwandan	  refugees	  as	  “foreigners”	  and	  removed	  any	  
refugees	  from	  Government	  posts.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Government	  forces	  began	  
systematically	  to	  harass	  the	  refugees	  through	  expulsions	  and	  theft	  of	  cattle	  and	  
property.	  	  
The	  opposition	  groups	  rejected	  the	  1980	  Uganda	  elections	  as	  fraudulent,	  
and	  by	  early	  1981,	  Museveni	  went	  back	  to	  the	  Ugandan	  bush	  to	  fight	  against	  the	  
second	  Obote	  regime.	  It	  was	  here	  that	  he	  launched	  the	  National	  Resistance	  Army	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(NRA).	  Paul	  Kagame	  and	  Fred	  Rwigyema	  were	  two	  Rwandans	  who	  would	  play	  an	  
important	  role	  in	  Museveni’s	  efforts	  to	  oust	  the	  Obote	  regime.	  	  
Kagame	  had	  joined	  Museveni’s	  Front	  for	  National	  Salvation	  (FRONASA)	  in	  
1978,	  and	  remained	  loyal	  to	  him	  throughout	  the	  duration	  of	  the	  struggle.	  
FRONASA	  aimed	  to	  oust	  Idi	  Amin	  and	  fought	  alongside	  the	  Tanzanians	  during	  
1979.	  Museveni’s	  inclusive	  approach	  appealed	  to	  Kagame.	  Kagame	  had	  seen	  his	  
people	  used	  as	  political	  pawns	  by	  both	  Obote	  and	  Amin.	  Both	  these	  regimes	  had	  
also	  persecuted	  and	  discriminated	  against	  the	  refugees.	  Museveni,	  on	  the	  other	  
hand,	  sought	  to	  bring	  about	  an	  end	  to	  the	  politics	  of	  differences.	  In	  Kagame’s	  
mind,	  the	  Rwandan	  refugees	  were	  essentially	  faced	  with	  an	  existential	  choice:	  
either	  fight	  with	  the	  NRA	  or	  flee	  from	  Uganda,	  as	  well.	  	  
Kagame	  spent	  several	  years	  as	  an	  intelligence	  officer	  in	  the	  Ugandan	  	  
countryside.	  Museveni’s	  guerilla	  army	  needed	  reliable	  information	  in	  order	  to	  
succeed	  against	  its	  more	  powerful	  opponents.	  From	  being	  a	  specialist	  in	  
intelligence	  matters	  for	  six	  years	  in	  the	  NRA,	  Kagame	  rose	  to	  become	  the	  head	  of	  
military	  intelligence	  in	  Musveni’s	  army,	  following	  Milton	  Obote’s	  overthrow,	  in	  
1986.	  	  
During	  the	  struggle	  against	  the	  Obote	  regime,	  Museveni	  accepted	  
assistance	  and	  training	  from	  a	  wide	  number	  of	  supporters	  –	  socialists,	  capitalists,	  
Marxists,	  Maoists,	  or	  otherwise.	  He	  remained	  at	  the	  head	  of	  the	  National	  
Resistance	  Movement	  (NRM),	  which	  was	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  influence	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grassroots	  change	  and	  political	  awareness	  in	  Uganda,	  than	  most	  other	  political	  
parties.	  	  
Museveni	  charted	  his	  own	  revolutionary	  path,	  and	  did	  not	  follow	  in	  the	  
Marxist	  ideology	  that	  others,	  like	  Robert	  Mugabe,	  adopted	  during	  the	  previous	  
decade.	  Museveni	  worked	  hard	  not	  to	  fall	  into	  the	  trap	  of	  becoming	  a	  proxy	  for	  
either	  side	  in	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Due	  to	  the	  wide	  range	  of	  supporters	  that	  he	  gained,	  
Museveni	  sent	  his	  lieutenants	  and	  officers	  for	  training	  across	  the	  world.	  	  
In	  an	  interview	  with	  Colin	  Waugh,	  Kagame	  recollects,	  	  
	  
“When	  the	  war	  ended	  in	  Uganda,	  Museveni	  was	  trying	  to	  build	  
institutions,	  the	  army,	  the	  police	  and	  other	  institutions	  and	  he	  was	  
seeking	  help	  and	  he	  asked	  different	  countries…	  such	  as	  Libya	  and	  some	  
other	  African	  countries	  to	  help	  to	  train	  people.	  So	  it	  happened	  that	  
after	  the	  way	  in	  Uganda	  they	  were	  selecting	  people,	  they	  took	  about	  70	  
people	  just	  out	  of	  the	  bush…	  I	  was	  picked	  and	  I	  went	  for	  nine	  months	  
to	  Cuba,	  but	  there	  was	  no	  special	  connection…	  Some	  were	  trained	  by	  
North	  Korea,	  China	  or	  other	  countries	  that	  offered	  the	  further	  training	  
that	  they	  needed.”186	  
	  
Museveni	  believed	  that	  the	  overseas	  training	  of	  these	  officers	  would	  help	  
rebuild	  Uganda,	  which	  had	  been	  suffering	  from	  decades	  of	  conflict	  and	  
mismanagement.	  His	  template	  for	  development	  and	  armed	  resistance	  greatly	  
inspired	  Paul	  Kagame.	  	  
Since	  its	  inception,	  Museveni’s	  National	  Resistance	  Army	  was	  a	  different	  
kind	  of	  rebel	  army.	  It	  was	  comprised	  of	  different	  persecuted	  groups	  and	  exiles.	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Museveni	  sought	  to	  avoid	  creating	  an	  army	  that	  represented	  only	  one	  particular	  
ethnic	  group,	  which	  would	  seek	  to	  take	  power	  and	  then	  become	  the	  oppressor.	  He	  
wanted	  to	  break	  the	  cycle	  of	  resentment	  and	  counter-­‐resistance.	  	  
The	  NRA	  was	  not	  a	  front	  for	  any	  colonial	  power.	  Museveni	  sought	  to	  heal	  
the	  societal	  cleavages	  and	  bring	  development	  to	  the	  impoverished	  people	  of	  
Uganda.	  The	  movement	  was	  pragmatic	  and	  was	  not	  cast	  in	  a	  Marxist-­‐Leninist	  or	  
anti-­‐colonial	  ideology.	  Museveni,	  himself,	  rejected	  the	  idea	  of	  imposing	  a	  western-­‐
style	  democracy	  in	  Africa	  and	  insisted	  that	  Africa	  needed	  an	  indigenously-­‐
developed	  form	  of	  popular	  rule.187	  	  
The	  Rise	  of	  the	  Rwandan	  Patriotic	  Front	  
	  
During	  the	  first	  half	  of	  the	  1980s,	  RANU	  evolved	  and	  matured	  into	  a	  broad-­‐
based	  organization	  that	  was	  focused	  on	  the	  common	  aims	  of	  all	  Rwandans,	  not	  as	  
socialists,	  monarchists,	  or	  any	  particular	  ideological	  adherents.	  From	  1983-­‐86,	  
RANU’s	  leadership	  was	  primarily	  focused	  on	  mass	  mobilization	  and	  gaining	  
representation	  in	  the	  NRA.	  When	  Museveni	  came	  to	  power	  in	  1986,	  the	  14,000	  
strong	  National	  Resistance	  Army	  included	  more	  than	  4,000	  Rwandan	  fighters.	  	  
Paul	  Kagame	  and	  Fred	  Rwigyema	  were	  part	  of	  the	  RANU	  leadership.	  At	  the	  
1987	  RANU	  Congress,	  leadership	  adopted	  the	  Eight	  Point	  Plan	  which	  called	  for	  the	  
achievement	  of	  “national	  unity,	  democracy,	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  self-­‐sustaining	  
economy,	  an	  end	  to	  the	  abuse	  of	  public	  office,	  establishment	  of	  social	  services,	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democratization	  of	  the	  security	  forces,	  a	  progressive	  foreign	  policy,	  and	  an	  end	  to	  the	  
state-­‐induced	  creation	  of	  refugees.”	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  Plan,	  RANU	  also	  adopted	  operational	  guidelines	  that	  
would	  determine	  the	  conduct	  of	  the	  movement’s	  activities,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  personal	  
code	  of	  conduct	  for	  its	  members.	  These	  actions	  sought	  to	  underline	  RANU’s	  
commitment	  to	  principled	  behavior	  and	  self-­‐discipline	  among	  its	  membership.	  It	  
was	  at	  this	  forum	  that	  RANU	  changed	  its	  name	  to	  the	  Rwandan	  Patriotic	  Front	  
(RPF)	  to	  reflect	  its	  focus	  on	  militancy	  and	  mobilization	  against	  the	  oppressive	  
Rwandan	  regime.	  Many	  of	  the	  RPF’s	  ideas	  were	  modeled	  on	  those	  of	  Museveni	  and	  
the	  NRA.	  	  
As	  Museveni	  consolidated	  his	  hold	  over	  power,	  Fred	  Rwigyema	  and	  Paul	  
Kagame	  became	  the	  highest-­‐ranking	  Rwandans	  in	  Uganda.	  Kagame	  became	  acting	  
head	  of	  the	  NRA’s	  military	  intelligence	  and	  Rwigyema	  rose	  to	  the	  rank	  of	  Major	  
General	  in	  the	  NRA	  and	  Army	  Chief	  of	  Staff,	  and	  later	  Deputy	  Minister	  of	  Defense.	  	  
By	  1988,	  however,	  Museveni	  found	  himself	  in	  a	  difficult	  situation:	  some	  of	  
the	  best	  and	  brightest	  officers	  in	  his	  administration	  were	  Rwandans,	  but	  their	  
continued	  presence	  in	  the	  high	  positions	  and	  their	  prominent	  role	  in	  the	  economy	  
led	  to	  increasing	  tensions	  among	  the	  Ugandans	  and	  posed	  a	  political	  liability.	  
Museveni	  knew	  that	  the	  Rwandans	  in	  his	  army	  had	  additional	  plans	  as	  well	  beyond	  
the	  support	  for	  the	  NRM.	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The	  anti-­‐Rwandan	  lobby	  was	  also	  gaining	  momentum	  in	  the	  Ugandan	  
parliament,	  and	  some	  parliamentarians	  sought	  to	  prevent	  Rwandans	  from	  buying	  
land	  and	  also	  remove	  them	  from	  the	  Ugandan	  armed	  forces.	  	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  growing	  internal	  opposition,	  Museveni	  was	  forced	  to	  
remove	  General	  Rwigyema	  from	  his	  position	  as	  Army	  Chief	  of	  Staff	  in	  November	  
1989.	  Kagame	  was	  also	  relieved	  of	  his	  duties	  as	  head	  of	  military	  intelligence	  and	  
sent	  to	  the	  USA	  for	  training	  at	  Fort	  Leavenworth	  in	  Kansas.	  Both	  of	  these	  moves	  
were	  part	  of	  Museveni’s	  efforts	  to	  sideline	  his	  two	  influential	  Rwandan	  lieutenants.	  
Museveni	  suspected	  that	  Rwigyema	  and	  Kagame	  were	  planning	  to	  make	  a	  move	  
against	  the	  Rwandan	  Government	  from	  inside	  Ugandan	  territory.	  	  
These	  developments	  contributed	  to	  the	  sense	  of	  urgency	  that	  the	  RPF	  
leadership	  already	  felt.	  The	  removal	  of	  prominent	  Rwandan	  leaders	  from	  the	  NRM	  
Government	  escalated	  the	  sense	  of	  anxiety	  that	  Rwandans	  refugees	  felt	  and	  dashed	  
any	  hopes	  of	  their	  achieving	  a	  life	  of	  normalcy	  in	  Uganda.	  The	  Rwandan	  refugees	  
had	  to	  attempt	  to	  return	  to	  their	  homeland.	  The	  RPF’s	  military	  experience	  would	  
prominently	  figure	  in	  this	  effort.	  	  	  
President	  Habyarimana	  in	  Rwanda	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  RPF’s	  growing	  strength	  
and	  intentions.	  In	  1989,	  he	  agreed	  to	  address	  the	  plight	  of	  the	  Tutsi	  refugees	  and	  
participated	  in	  UNHCR-­‐brokered	  talks	  with	  neighbors	  Zaire	  and	  Uganda	  to	  begin	  
the	  process	  of	  selective	  repatriation	  of	  refugees.	  	  
Political	  and	  economic	  setbacks	  in	  Rwanda,	  however,	  reduced	  
Habyarimana’s	  political	  influence.	  The	  economy	  had	  taken	  a	  downward	  dip	  with	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the	  collapse	  of	  coffee	  prices	  and	  there	  was	  the	  recurring	  threat	  of	  famine	  due	  to	  
drought	  and	  crop	  failures.	  There	  was	  social	  unrest	  and	  increased	  infighting	  
between	  political	  and	  ethnic	  groups.	  	  
Habyarimana’s	  one	  party	  state	  was	  also	  showing	  signs	  of	  being	  under	  the	  
influence	  of	  extremists.	  Internally,	  the	  ruling	  party’s	  hardliners	  opposed	  any	  move	  
towards	  multi-­‐party	  democracy,	  while	  external	  donors	  continued	  calling	  for	  multi-­‐
party	  democracy.	  Habyarimana’s	  Government	  denied	  the	  reports	  of	  increasing	  
state-­‐tolerated	  violence	  and	  discrimination	  against	  the	  Tutsi	  minority.	  	  
The	  RPF	  was	  increasingly	  skeptical	  about	  the	  Rwandan	  Government’s	  
promises	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  real	  change	  in	  the	  situation.	  The	  selective	  repatriation	  
process	  that	  Habyarimana’s	  Government	  proposed	  allowed	  for	  the	  return	  of	  a	  
select	  number	  of	  refugees	  only.	  The	  plan	  intended	  for	  others	  to	  be	  “absorbed”	  by	  
the	  host	  country.	  This	  was	  unacceptable	  to	  the	  RPF.	  	  
In	  a	  final	  effort	  to	  prevent	  hostilities,	  presidents	  Museveni,	  Habyarimana,	  
and	  Mobutu	  Sese	  Seko	  of	  Zaire	  met	  in	  September	  1990,	  in	  Kampala,	  but	  they	  failed	  
to	  establish	  common	  ground	  for	  a	  solution.	  These	  developments	  emboldened	  the	  
RPF	  to	  use	  military	  force.	  
Kagame	  saw	  these	  talks	  as	  irrelevant	  as	  they	  did	  not	  involve	  the	  refugees’	  
representatives.	  	  
“It	  wasn’t	  going	  to	  work	  because	  it	  wasn’t	  involving	  the	  people	  
who	  actually	  had	  the	  problem.	  I	  didn’t	  see	  how	  Habyarimana	  and	  
Mobutu	  were	  just	  going	  to	  sit	  down	  with	  each	  other	  and	  decide	  how	  to	  
deal	  with	  it	  their	  own	  way…Maybe	  they	  would	  come	  out	  and	  say	  these	  
ones	  will	  go	  and	  these	  ones	  will	  stay	  and	  be	  absorbed…and	  they	  can	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just	  shut	  up…so	  I	  might	  be	  told	  to	  stay	  without	  my	  own	  consent…and	  
then	  I	  would	  have	  to	  stay	  but	  without	  my	  full	  rights…then	  the	  
Ugandans	  would	  just	  say	  that	  he	  is	  one	  of	  the	  ones	  who	  has	  been	  
absorbed…	  but	  I	  would	  be	  there	  as	  a	  second-­‐class	  citizen	  and	  a	  
foreigner.”188	  
Kagame	  and	  the	  RPF’s	  Armed	  Struggle	  	  
	  
On	  October	  1,	  1990,	  Fred	  Rwigyema	  assumed	  command	  of	  the	  4000	  
Rwandan	  soldiers	  in	  the	  Ugandan	  National	  Army	  and	  launched	  a	  surprise	  attack	  
on	  Rwanda.	  The	  RPF	  began	  to	  make	  rapid	  progress	  towards	  the	  South.	  The	  RPF	  
was	  initially	  able	  to	  take	  over	  several	  towns	  on	  the	  way,	  but	  soon	  found	  itself	  
overstretched.	  The	  RPF	  was	  cutoff	  from	  supply	  lines	  and	  contact	  with	  potential	  
reinforcements	  from	  the	  Ugandan	  side.	  The	  Rwandan	  Government	  forces	  were	  
more	  numerous	  and	  received	  support	  from	  France	  and	  Belgium.	  	  
In	  a	  major	  setback	  to	  the	  RPF,	  General	  Rwigyema	  was	  killed	  on	  the	  second	  
day	  of	  the	  military	  campaign	  by	  his	  senior	  officers.	  Mutual	  disagreement	  on	  the	  
invasion	  strategy	  was	  the	  cause	  of	  his	  death.	  After	  Rwigyema’s	  death,	  the	  RPF’s	  
luck	  began	  to	  run	  out	  and	  it	  soon	  found	  itself	  besieged	  on	  all	  sides	  by	  Government	  
forces.	  It	  was	  clear	  that	  Kagame	  had	  to	  return	  to	  Rwanda	  from	  the	  United	  States,	  
where	  he	  had	  been	  for	  over	  three	  months	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  attack.	  	  
Though	  Kagame	  did	  not	  directly	  participate	  in	  the	  preparations	  for	  the	  
attack,	  he	  had	  been	  in	  regular	  touch	  with	  General	  Rwigyema.	  Upon	  Rwigyema’s	  
death,	  Kagame	  returned	  to	  Kampala	  by	  late	  October	  and	  was	  taken	  straight	  to	  the	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  Colin	  Waugh,	  Paul	  Kagame	  and	  Rwanda:	  Power,	  Genocide,	  and	  the	  Rwandan	  Patriotic	  Front,	  (Jefferson,	  NC:	  
McFarland	  &	  Company,	  2004),	  44.	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border	  by	  RPF	  officers	  still	  operating	  inside	  Uganda.	  There	  was	  no	  effort	  on	  the	  
part	  of	  the	  Ugandan	  Government	  to	  prevent	  the	  defection	  of	  one	  of	  their	  elite	  
officers	  to	  the	  front	  in	  the	  region’s	  latest	  civil	  war.	  
The	  RPF	  military	  offensive	  was	  in	  total	  disarray	  at	  the	  time	  of	  Kagame’s	  
return	  from	  the	  United	  States.	  The	  military	  offensive	  had	  made	  the	  situation	  worse	  
for	  Tutsis	  in	  Rwanda.	  President	  Habyarimana	  called	  for	  rounding	  them	  up	  to	  
prevent	  more	  conflict,	  and	  used	  the	  opportunity	  to	  perpetrate	  more	  violence	  on	  
them.	  	  	  
Habyarimana	  was	  a	  close	  personal	  friend	  of	  French	  President	  Francois	  
Mitterrand.	  He	  had	  ensured	  that	  the	  French	  Government	  would	  support	  him	  in	  
this	  struggle.189	  In	  addition,	  Zairian	  president	  Mobutu	  also	  provided	  military	  
support	  for	  the	  Habyarimana	  regime.	  The	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  had	  made	  
Mobutu’s	  Zaire	  strategically	  redundant	  in	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  West.	  The	  Zairean	  
dictator	  was	  looking	  for	  a	  role	  to	  make	  his	  strategic	  importance	  felt.	  However,	  the	  
1,000	  so-­‐called	  ‘elite’	  soldiers	  from	  the	  Zairian	  Presidential	  Guard	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  
ill	  disciplined	  in	  their	  conduct	  and	  terrorized	  the	  local	  population.	  They	  quickly	  
became	  an	  embarrassment	  to	  the	  Habyarimana	  regime.	  Both	  Hutus	  and	  Tutsis	  
suffered	  the	  brunt	  of	  this	  violence.	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  Colin	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  the	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McFarland	  &	  Company,	  2004).	  France’s	  obsession	  with	  Rwanda	  stemmed	  from	  a	  need	  to	  maintain	  the	  self-­‐image	  of	  a	  neo-­‐
colonial	  France,	  which	  was	  still	  in	  a	  position	  to	  influence	  developments	  in	  Francophone	  Africa.	  Official	  French	  military	  
support	  for	  the	  Habyarimana	  regime	  reached	  $8	  million	  per	  annum,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  weaponry	  and	  funds	  already	  being	  
provided	  from	  1990	  to	  93.	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After	  the	  defeat	  of	  the	  RPF	  in	  1990,	  Kagame	  (by	  now	  a	  Major-­‐General	  in	  the	  
RPF)	  set	  about	  the	  process	  of	  reorganizing,	  retraining,	  and	  reinforcing	  the	  army.	  
Kagame	  relied	  on	  his	  extensive	  personal	  contacts	  across	  North	  America,	  Europe,	  
and	  Africa	  to	  re-­‐engineer	  the	  army	  and	  raise	  funds	  for	  the	  cause.	  From	  1990	  to	  
1994,	  the	  RPF’s	  political	  arm	  also	  evolved.	  Paul	  Kagame	  became	  the	  figurehead	  of	  
the	  RPF	  –	  both	  politically	  and	  militarily.	  Under	  his	  leadership,	  the	  army	  grew	  
significantly	  under	  his	  leadership	  from	  its	  initial	  size	  of	  4,000	  men,	  into	  a	  20,000	  
strong	  fighting	  force.	  	  
The	  RPF	  received	  support	  in	  the	  form	  of	  military	  supplies	  from	  neighboring	  
Uganda,	  and	  as	  well	  as	  the	  states	  of	  the	  former	  Soviet	  Union.	  These	  newly	  formed	  
states	  were	  cash-­‐strapped,	  and	  often	  resorted	  to	  raising	  money	  by	  selling	  the	  
Soviet-­‐era	  arsenals	  to	  buyers	  in	  Africa	  and	  elsewhere.	  	  
The	  RPF’s	  actions	  had	  led	  to	  increased	  harassment	  of	  Tutsis	  in	  Rwanda	  as	  
well	  as	  reprisals	  and	  massacres	  of	  Tutsi	  communities	  by	  the	  government	  forces.	  In	  
1991,	  the	  RPF’s	  advance	  on	  the	  capital,	  Kigali,	  was	  blocked	  by	  French	  armed	  forces.	  
Donor	  pressure	  and	  the	  growing	  threat	  posed	  by	  the	  RPF	  finally	  led	  Habyarimana	  
to	  sanction	  multiparty	  politics.	  He	  called	  for	  a	  truce	  to	  begin	  negotiations	  with	  the	  
RPF.	  	  
The	  negotiations	  between	  the	  new	  Government	  and	  the	  RPF	  in	  Arusha,	  
Tanzania,	  resulted	  in	  a	  settlement	  called	  the	  Arusha	  Accord	  in	  August	  1993.	  The	  
Accord	  stipulated	  that	  the	  RPF	  would	  to	  join	  the	  Government.	  However,	  the	  
Accord	  was	  unacceptable	  to	  members	  of	  the	  ruling	  elite,	  some	  of	  whom	  covertly	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formed	  the	  Hutu	  supremacist	  Coalition	  pour	  la	  Défense	  de	  la	  République	  (CDR)	  to	  
resist	  it.	  The	  CDR,	  senior	  army	  officers	  and	  others	  opposed	  to	  the	  Arusha	  Accord	  
then	  began	  to	  arm	  and	  train	  radical	  Hutu	  militias.	  In	  1993-­‐94,	  Habyarimana	  also	  
tried	  to	  orchestrate	  splits	  in	  the	  opposition,	  thus	  delaying	  the	  implementation	  of	  
the	  Arusha	  Accords.	  
The	  Rwandan	  Genocide	  
	  
On	  April	  6,	  1994	  unknown	  assassins	  shot	  down	  Habyarimana’s	  plane	  over	  
Kigali.190	  Following	  Habyarimana’s	  death,	  an	  elite	  faction	  of	  his	  administration	  
installed	  a	  new	  Government	  and	  started	  eliminating	  its	  political	  opponents,	  
including	  moderate	  Hutus,	  and	  all	  Tutsis.	  The	  main	  perpetrators	  of	  this	  genocide	  
were	  the	  youth	  militias	  known	  as	  the	  Interahamwe,	  with	  the	  army	  also	  heavily	  
involved.	  In	  addition,	  hundreds	  of	  thousands	  of	  civilians	  took	  part	  voluntarily	  or	  
through	  coercion	  by	  the	  government.	  	  
The	  United	  Nations	  Security	  Council	  had	  been	  told	  months	  earlier	  about	  
plans	  to	  implement	  the	  genocide	  against	  the	  Tutsis.	  When	  the	  killings	  began,	  the	  
Security	  Council	  members	  misread	  this	  information	  as	  continuing	  instances	  of	  
tribal	  warfare.	  The	  killing	  of	  Belgian	  soldiers	  by	  the	  Interahamwe	  led	  to	  the	  prompt	  
withdrawal	  by	  the	  United	  Nations	  of	  all	  but	  270	  of	  its	  troops.	  The	  genocide	  
intensified	  after	  the	  departure	  of	  the	  United	  Nations	  troops,	  and	  an	  estimated	  
800,000	  –	  one	  million	  people	  were	  killed	  over	  a	  period	  of	  100	  days.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190	  Debate	  continues	  to	  this	  day	  over	  whether	  the	  RPF	  or	  Habyarimana’s	  own	  supporters	  fired	  the	  missile	  and	  this	  remains	  
a	  significant	  dispute	  between	  the	  current	  Rwandan	  government	  and	  France.	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The	  reasons	  for	  the	  outburst	  of	  violence	  were	  easy	  to	  see.	  The	  high	  youth	  
unemployment	  factor,	  coupled	  with	  historic	  enmity	  between	  the	  Hutus	  and	  Tutsis	  
provided	  for	  an	  explosive	  situation.	  The	  economics	  of	  discrimination	  was	  very	  
much	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  what	  was	  otherwise	  a	  caste-­‐based	  conflict.	  The	  role	  that	  
Belgium	  played	  as	  a	  colonial	  power	  in	  its	  ethnically	  based	  patronage	  and	  deliberate	  
polarization	  of	  Rwandan	  society	  cannot	  be	  overemphasized.	  Scholars	  have	  also	  
argued	  that	  another	  factor	  contributing	  to	  the	  genocide	  in	  Rwanda	  was	  the	  
totalitarian	  nature	  of	  the	  state,	  which	  was	  able	  to	  direct	  its	  subjects	  (specifically	  
the	  Hutus)	  to	  obey	  its	  orders,	  even	  it	  if	  meant	  killing	  people.191	  	  	  
The	  RPF	  renewed	  its	  offensive	  when	  the	  killing	  started	  and	  was	  able	  to	  
capture	  Kigali	  on	  July	  19,	  1994.	  The	  RPF’s	  victory	  ended	  the	  genocide	  but	  it	  
triggered	  a	  mass	  Hutu	  exodus	  of	  nearly	  two	  million	  people	  to	  the	  Democratic	  
Republic	  of	  Congo	  (DRC),	  Tanzania,	  and	  Burundi.	  The	  Hutu	  refugees	  gathered	  in	  
huge	  camps	  in	  these	  countries.	  Hutu	  militias	  later	  used	  these	  camps	  as	  bases	  to	  
launch	  raids	  into	  Rwanda	  well	  after	  the	  genocide	  had	  been	  stopped.	  	  
The	  Approach	  to	  Political	  Participation	  and	  Inclusion	  
The	  victorious	  RPF	  sought	  to	  try	  and	  heal	  the	  decades	  of	  ethnic	  rivalry	  by	  
announcing	  a	  national	  unity	  Government	  in	  which	  Pasteur	  Bizimungu,	  a	  Hutu,	  
would	  be	  president.	  Paul	  Kagame,	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  RPF,	  was	  made	  vice-­‐president	  
and	  Defense	  Minister.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191	  See	  Gerard	  Prunier,	  The	  Rwanda	  Crisis:	  History	  of	  a	  Genocide,	  (London,	  UK:	  Hurst	  Publishers,	  1997).	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Though	  Kagame	  was	  the	  real	  power	  behind	  the	  presidency,	  the	  RPF	  
leadership	  sought	  to	  send	  the	  message	  to	  the	  majority	  Hutu	  community	  that	  they	  
would	  be	  strongly	  represented	  in	  the	  national	  government.	  Hutu	  community	  
leaders	  were	  drawn	  into	  local	  government	  structures	  to	  promote	  reconciliation	  
efforts.	  This	  strategic	  move	  by	  Kagame	  and	  the	  RPF	  leadership	  helped	  to	  ensure	  
the	  neutrality,	  if	  not	  loyalty,	  of	  the	  Hutu	  militias.	  	  
Following	  the	  Rwandan	  Genocide,	  the	  new	  Rwandan	  Government	  felt	  
threatened	  by	  the	  presence	  of	  former	  Rwandan	  soldiers	  and	  members	  of	  the	  
previous	  regime	  across	  the	  Congo	  River	  in	  the	  DRC.	  These	  Hutu	  militias	  were	  
being	  supported	  by	  the	  DRC’s	  President,	  Mobutu	  Sese	  Seko,	  and	  often	  engaged	  in	  
sporadic	  attacks	  against	  Rwanda.	  The	  provocation	  by	  these	  Hutu	  militias	  caused	  
Kagame	  and	  Museveni	  to	  join	  forces	  with	  Laurent	  Kabila's	  rebels	  in	  1996	  to	  
overthrow	  Mobutu.	  Even	  though	  Laurent	  Kabila	  took	  power	  in	  the	  Congo,	  he	  was	  
ineffective	  in	  being	  able	  to	  stop	  the	  cross-­‐border	  attacks	  against	  Rwandans.	  	  
In	  August	  1998,	  Rwanda	  and	  Uganda	  undertook	  to	  invade	  Congo	  again,	  this	  
time	  to	  overthrow	  Museveni	  and	  Kagame's	  former	  ally,	  Laurent	  Kabila.	  Both	  
Rwandan	  and	  Ugandan	  troops	  were	  accused	  to	  widespread	  looting	  and	  plunder	  of	  
the	  DRC’s	  rich	  natural	  resources,	  and	  the	  campaign	  met	  with	  international	  
condemnation.	  	  
By	  1999,	  however,	  the	  security	  situation	  had	  significantly	  improved	  inside	  
Rwanda,	  and	  the	  RPF	  had	  been	  able	  to	  defeat	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Interahamwe	  
youth	  militias	  and	  the	  former	  Government	  forces	  who	  had	  fled	  into	  Zaire.	  Sporadic	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cross	  border	  raids	  from	  the	  DRC	  continued,	  but	  were	  no	  longer	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  
serious	  threat	  to	  the	  government.	  
Even	  though	  Bizimungu	  was	  the	  President,	  many	  believed	  that	  Kagame	  had	  
true	  control	  of	  the	  government.	  Bizimungu	  eventually	  came	  into	  conflict	  with	  
Kagame,	  amid	  growing	  differences	  over	  Government	  policies	  and	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  
an	  unwarranted	  crackdown	  on	  dissent.	  	  
Between	  October	  1999	  and	  March	  2000,	  political	  scandals	  and	  allegations	  of	  
corruption	  led	  to	  an	  extensive	  Government	  shake-­‐up.	  Hardline	  Tutsi	  leaders	  in	  the	  
RPF	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  Kagame’s	  approach	  of	  reconciliation	  and	  incorporation	  of	  
Hutus	  in	  the	  Government	  structure.	  Many	  Tutsi	  political	  groups	  abroad	  felt	  that	  
they	  had	  been	  passed	  over	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  reconstruction	  efforts.	  Many	  of	  the	  
dissenters	  even	  supported	  the	  re-­‐establishment	  of	  the	  Monarchy,	  which	  had	  ruled	  
Rwanda	  into	  the	  late	  1950s.	  	  
The	  RPF,	  which	  had	  been	  a	  non-­‐ethnically	  based	  movement,	  began	  to	  show	  
cracks.	  The	  1993	  Arusha	  Accords	  from	  which	  a	  majority	  of	  Rwanda’s	  Constitution	  
was	  derived,	  provided	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  a	  multi-­‐party	  democracy,	  with	  a	  
cabinet	  composed	  of	  a	  balanced	  membership	  from	  all	  the	  major	  parties.	  	  
Initially,	  the	  transitional	  administration	  had	  adhered	  to	  this	  and	  allocated	  a	  
number	  of	  posts	  to	  Hutu	  members	  of	  parliament.	  But	  the	  façade	  of	  multi-­‐ethnicity	  
faded	  very	  quickly,	  and	  Kagame	  found	  himself	  in	  a	  position	  he	  wanted	  to	  avoid:	  
that	  of	  a	  military	  leader	  who	  maintained	  power	  by	  force,	  and	  represented	  the	  
interests	  of	  an	  elite	  few.	  There	  were	  also	  growing	  instances	  of	  atrocities	  being	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committed	  by	  the	  armed	  forces	  against	  civilians	  and	  the	  illegal	  exploitation	  of	  
minerals	  in	  the	  DRC.	  Kagame	  initially	  denied	  all	  these	  allegations.	  	  
The	  president,	  Pasteur	  Bizimungu,	  a	  Hutu,	  resigned	  in	  March	  2000	  citing	  
the	  increasing	  intolerance	  and	  attacks	  against	  Hutu	  parliamentarians	  by	  members	  
of	  his	  own	  party	  –	  the	  RPF.	  One	  could	  say	  that	  the	  multi-­‐ethnic	  façade	  of	  the	  
Government	  came	  to	  an	  end.	  Kagame	  succeeded	  Bizimungu	  as	  the	  President	  of	  
Rwanda.	  	  	  
Strengthening	  State	  Institutions	  
	  
In	  post-­‐genocide	  Rwanda,	  there	  was	  significant	  opposition	  to	  the	  RPF-­‐
dominated	  Government.	  The	  constituencies	  opposed	  to	  Kagame	  became	  broader	  
and	  more	  organized	  as	  Rwanda’s	  political	  transition	  proceeded.	  Kagame’s	  
approach	  was	  similar	  to	  Museveni’s	  approach	  to	  political	  participation.	  Following	  
in	  Museveni’s	  footsteps,	  Kagame	  avoided	  any	  early	  attempts	  to	  hold	  multiparty	  
democratic	  elections	  and	  chose	  to	  strengthen	  the	  state	  and	  its	  institutions.	  Like	  
Museveni,	  Kagame	  also	  chose	  to	  focus	  on	  economic	  development,	  with	  a	  strategy	  
of	  pro-­‐western	  market	  economics	  and	  privatization.	  	  
Given	  Rwanda’s	  divided	  society	  and	  the	  recent	  experience	  with	  
Habyarimana’s	  regime,	  the	  country	  was	  not	  in	  a	  position	  to	  return	  to	  multi-­‐party	  
politics	  right	  away.	  Kagame	  and	  the	  RPF	  emphasized	  the	  need	  for	  consensus-­‐based	  
Government	  as	  enshrined	  in	  the	  Arusha	  Accords.	  However,	  the	  focus	  was	  on	  
political	  education	  and	  creating	  awareness	  among	  the	  general	  population	  as	  a	  
precursor	  to	  developing	  a	  new	  Constitution.	  Given	  the	  large	  percentage	  of	  illiterate	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people	  in	  Rwanda,	  Kagame	  and	  the	  RPF	  elite	  saw	  this	  as	  a	  logical	  first	  step	  towards	  
participatory	  democracy.	  It	  would	  also	  help	  heal	  the	  divisions	  that	  had	  been	  
created	  due	  to	  propaganda	  and	  colonial	  motivations.	  	  
Kagame	  contended	  that	  the	  country	  was	  not	  yet	  ready	  for	  all	  the	  rights	  and	  
freedoms	  associated	  with	  western	  liberal	  democracies.	  The	  experiment	  with	  multi-­‐
party	  democracy	  under	  Habyarimana	  between	  1990-­‐94	  had	  failed.	  In	  an	  interview	  
with	  Colin	  Waugh	  in	  2003,	  Kagame	  said,	  	  
“…If	  you	  try	  to	  organize	  elections,	  to	  authorize	  parties	  to	  grown	  
like	  mushrooms	  and	  allow	  competition,	  you	  create	  an	  even	  bigger	  
problem	  for	  yourself	  than	  you	  already	  have:	  dividing	  people	  who	  are	  
already	  divided.	  	  
What	  does	  the	  multi-­‐party	  system	  mean	  in	  our	  African	  
societies?	  That	  I	  will	  use	  every	  tactic	  to	  distinguish	  myself	  from	  my	  
neighbor	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  winning	  more	  votes	  than	  he	  wins…	  We	  will	  
never	  have	  democracy:	  people	  will	  prey	  on	  each	  other.	  One	  party	  would	  
emerge	  to	  defend	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  genocide,	  while	  another	  would	  
emerge	  to	  say	  that	  the	  perpetrators	  should	  be	  tried.	  We	  would	  end	  up	  
with	  a	  great	  war…”192	  
	  
In	  this	  way,	  Kagame	  warned	  of	  the	  potential	  dangers	  and	  summarized	  the	  
RPF’s	  philosophy	  that	  would	  guide	  the	  political,	  social,	  and	  economic	  
reconstruction	  of	  Rwanda	  emerging	  from	  the	  genocide.	  During	  the	  process	  of	  
launching	  the	  new	  Constitutional	  Commission	  in	  2000,	  Kagame	  stressed	  cohesion,	  
political	  education	  and	  accountability	  as	  prerequisites	  for	  the	  restoration	  of	  
political	  rights.	  The	  crucial	  emphasis	  at	  the	  center	  of	  this	  process	  was	  the	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  See	  Colin	  Waugh,	  Paul	  Kagame	  and	  Rwanda:	  Power,	  Genocide,	  and	  the	  Rwandan	  Patriotic	  Front,	  (Jefferson,	  NC:	  
McFarland	  &	  Company,	  2004),	  160-­‐163.	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prioritization	  of	  economic	  and	  social	  rights,	  over	  some	  civil	  rights.	  The	  process	  
culminated	  in	  a	  popular	  vote	  to	  approve	  the	  new	  Constitution	  in	  2003.	  	  
Kagame	  made	  a	  major	  concession	  to	  his	  political	  opponents	  by	  confirming	  
that	  the	  forthcoming	  presidential	  and	  legislative	  elections	  would	  be	  conducted	  by	  
universal	  suffrage	  against	  the	  advice	  of	  some	  of	  his	  closest	  advisors,	  particularly	  in	  
the	  military.	  This	  was	  a	  gamble	  for	  Kagame,	  who	  would	  need	  to	  win	  a	  substantial	  
percentage	  of	  Hutu	  votes	  to	  remain	  in	  power.	  	  
Kagame	  contested	  the	  presidential	  elections	  in	  2003,	  and	  ran	  against	  two	  
other	  candidates	  from	  the	  majority	  Hutu	  community.	  The	  RPF’s	  incumbency	  in	  
power,	  and	  the	  policy	  and	  strategy	  to	  denounce	  “divisionism”	  became	  a	  valuable	  
and	  frequently	  used	  pretext	  of	  removing	  opposition	  candidates	  from	  the	  election	  
arena.	  Kagame	  was,	  however,	  accused	  of	  strong-­‐arming	  and	  using	  scare-­‐tactics	  to	  
eliminate	  and	  expel	  any	  challengers.	  	  
In	  the	  elections	  that	  followed	  in	  August,	  Kagame	  won	  the	  elections	  with	  
95.1	  percent	  of	  the	  vote	  (see	  Table	  4-­‐11).	  The	  results	  were	  largely	  seen	  as	  “free	  and	  
fair.”	  Observers	  deemed	  that	  the	  elections	  were	  conducted	  in	  an	  atmosphere	  of	  
calm	  and	  without	  violent	  incident.	  Some	  observers,	  however,	  reported	  instances	  of	  
ballot	  stuffing,	  irregular	  handling	  of	  ballot	  boxes,	  misuse	  of	  Government	  vehicles	  
and	  buildings	  by	  the	  RPF,	  a	  lack	  of	  transparency,	  and	  even	  buying	  votes	  with	  gifts.	  	  
	   196	  
	  
Table	  4-­‐11:	  2003	  Rwanda	  Presidential	  Election	  Results193	  
Candidates	  -­‐	  Parties	   Votes	   %	  
Paul	  Kagame	  	   3,544,777	   95.1	  
Faustin	  Twagiramungu	   134,865	   3.6	  
Jean-­‐Népomuscène	  Nayinzira	   49,634	   1.3	  
Total	  valid	  votes	   3,729,276	   100.0	  
Total	  votes	  (turnout	  96.6%)	   3,812,567	   	  
Registered	  voters	   3,948,749	   	  
	  
The	  2010	  Rwandan	  presidential	  election	  campaign	  began	  publicly	  in	  January	  
2010,	  when	  Victoire	  Ingabire,	  a	  Hutu	  who	  had	  been	  living	  abroad	  for	  some	  years,	  
returned	  to	  Rwanda	  and	  announced	  her	  candidacy	  for	  the	  presidency.	  Ingabire	  
caused	  controversy	  in	  Rwanda	  following	  her	  arrival,	  with	  comments	  relating	  to	  the	  
genocide,	  which	  were	  construed	  as	  minimizing	  or	  denying	  that	  the	  horrific	  event	  
ever	  happened.	  The	  Government	  accused	  her	  of	  breaking	  the	  country's	  strict	  laws	  
regarding	  Genocide	  denial,	  and	  she	  was	  arrested	  in	  April	  2010.	  She	  was	  released	  on	  
bail,	  but	  was	  prohibited	  from	  running	  in	  the	  election.	  
In	  May	  2010,	  President	  Kagame	  was	  officially	  endorsed	  as	  the	  RPF's	  
candidate	  for	  the	  election,	  at	  the	  party's	  national	  congress.	  He	  ran	  against	  three	  
other	  presidential	  candidates,	  who	  had	  previously	  supported	  him	  in	  the	  2003	  
election.	  The	  opposition	  described	  Kagame’s	  challengers	  as	  the	  RPF's	  "political	  
satellites,"	  a	  token	  opposition	  used	  to	  maintain	  the	  façade	  of	  pluralism.	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Intimidating	  the	  Opposition	  
	  
The	  run-­‐up	  to	  the	  election	  was	  plagued	  with	  the	  killings	  of	  several	  
opposition	  leaders,	  including	  the	  unsolved	  murder	  of	  the	  vice-­‐president	  of	  the	  
Democratic	  Green	  Party,	  André	  Kagwa	  Rwisereka.	  The	  murder	  of	  journalist	  Jean-­‐
Léonard	  Rugambage,	  sparked	  concern,	  and	  prompted	  the	  United	  Nations	  to	  
demand	  an	  investigation.	  The	  BBC	  described	  the	  electoral	  campaign	  as	  “marred	  by	  
violence	  and	  intimidation	  against	  opposition	  politicians.”194	  	  
Amnesty	  International	  also	  condemned	  the	  attacks	  and	  called	  on	  the	  
government	  to	  ensure	  an	  atmosphere	  for	  Rwandans	  to	  "freely	  express	  their	  views."	  	  
“In	  recent	  months,	  killings,	  arrests	  and	  the	  closure	  of	  
newspapers	  and	  broadcasters	  have	  reinforced	  a	  climate	  of	  fear.	  The	  
Rwandan	  Government	  must	  ensure	  that	  investigations	  into	  the	  killings	  
are	  thorough	  and	  reinstate	  closed	  media	  outlets.”195	  
	  
South	  Africa	  also	  recalled	  its	  ambassador	  to	  Rwanda	  to	  discuss	  the	  situation	  
in	  the	  country	  the	  week	  before	  the	  elections.	  This	  came	  about	  two	  months	  after	  a	  
dissident	  Rwandan	  general	  survived	  an	  assassination	  attempt	  in	  Johannesburg.	  
General	  Faustin	  Kayumba	  Nyamwasa,	  a	  critic	  of	  Kagame,	  alleged	  that	  it	  was	  an	  
assassination	  attempt	  by	  Rwandan	  intelligence,	  a	  charge	  the	  Rwandan	  government	  
denied.	  Days	  later,	  a	  journalist	  who	  claimed	  to	  have	  uncovered	  the	  regime's	  
responsibility	  in	  the	  attempted	  murder	  was	  shot	  dead.	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  See	  Paul	  Kagame:	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  to	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  See	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  International	  Condemns	  Rwanda	  pre-­‐election	  Attacks:	  
http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/466/50840.html	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Opposition	  parties	  said	  more	  than	  30	  newspapers	  had	  been	  banned.	  
Amnesty	  International	  declared	  that	  opposition	  party	  figures	  had	  been	  
intimidated,	  journalists	  had	  been	  targeted	  and	  killed,	  and	  several	  senior	  officers	  
critical	  of	  the	  ruling	  party	  attacked	  and	  arrested.	  The	  head	  of	  the	  African	  Union	  
election	  monitoring	  delegation	  supported	  the	  Government	  by	  saying	  that	  they	  had	  
not	  received	  any	  evidence	  of	  intimidation.	  Kagame	  also	  refuted	  opposition	  claims	  
and	  said	  the	  vote	  was	  “very	  democratic.	  The	  people	  of	  Rwanda	  were	  free	  to	  stand	  for	  
election,	  those	  who	  wanted	  to,	  and	  to	  qualify,	  so	  I	  see	  no	  problem.	  Some	  sections	  of	  
the	  media	  seem	  to	  be	  reading	  from	  a	  different	  page."196	  
	  
Table	  4-­‐12:	  2010	  Rwanda	  Presidential	  Election	  Results197	  
Candidates	  –	  Parties	   Votes	   %	  
Paul	  Kagame	  –	  Rwandan	  Patriotic	  Front	   4,638,560	   93.08	  
Jean	  Damascene	  Ntawukuriryayo	  –	  Social	  Democratic	  Party	   256,488	   5.15	  
Prosper	  Higiro	  –	  Liberal	  Party	   68,235	   1.37	  
Alvera	  Mukabaramba	  –	  Party	  for	  Progress	  and	  Concord	   20,107	   0.40	  
Total	  valid	  votes	   4,983,390	   100.0	  
Registered	  voters	   5,178,492	   	  
	  
Kagame	  was	  declared	  the	  winner	  of	  the	  election,	  according	  to	  results	  
released	  by	  the	  National	  Electoral	  Commission	  on	  August	  11,	  2010	  (See	  Table	  4-­‐12).	  
Opposition	  and	  human	  rights	  groups	  said	  the	  election	  was	  tainted	  by	  repression,	  
murder	  and	  lack	  of	  credible	  competition.	  Kagame	  responded	  saying,	  “I	  see	  no	  
problems,	  but	  there	  are	  some	  people	  who	  choose	  to	  see	  problems	  where	  there	  are	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  Election:	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none.”198	  International	  observers	  also	  criticized	  the	  election	  because	  the	  campaign	  
was	  devoid	  of	  truly	  critical	  opposition	  voices	  as	  the	  three	  other	  presidential	  
challengers	  were	  linked	  to	  Kagame's	  party.	  
The	  Approach	  to	  Economic	  Growth	  and	  Inclusion	  
In	  the	  1960s	  and	  1970s,	  Rwanda's	  prudent	  financial	  policies,	  coupled	  with	  
generous	  external	  aid	  and	  relatively	  favorable	  terms	  of	  trade,	  resulted	  in	  sustained	  
growth	  in	  per	  capita	  income	  and	  low	  inflation	  rates.	  However,	  when	  world	  coffee	  
prices	  fell	  sharply	  in	  the	  1980s,	  growth	  became	  erratic.	  Compared	  to	  an	  annual	  
GDP	  growth	  rate	  of	  6.5	  percent	  from	  1973	  to	  1980,	  growth	  slowed	  to	  an	  average	  of	  
2.9	  percent	  a	  year	  from	  1980	  through	  1985	  and	  was	  stagnant	  from	  1986	  to	  1990.	  	  
The	  crisis	  peaked	  in	  1990	  when	  the	  first	  measures	  of	  an	  IMF	  structural	  
adjustment	  program	  were	  carried	  out.	  While	  the	  program	  was	  not	  fully	  
implemented	  before	  the	  war	  broke	  out,	  key	  measures	  such	  as	  two	  large	  
devaluations	  of	  the	  currency	  and	  the	  removal	  of	  official	  prices	  were	  enacted.	  The	  
consequences	  on	  salaries	  and	  purchasing	  power	  of	  citizens	  were	  rapid	  and	  
dramatic.	  This	  crisis	  particularly	  affected	  the	  educated	  elite,	  most	  of	  whom	  were	  
employed	  in	  the	  civil	  service	  or	  in	  state-­‐owned	  enterprises.	  	  
During	  the	  five	  years	  of	  civil	  war	  that	  culminated	  in	  the	  1994	  genocide,	  the	  
GDP	  shrank	  in	  three	  out	  of	  five	  years,	  posting	  a	  dramatic	  decline	  at	  more	  than	  40	  
percent	  in	  1994,	  the	  year	  of	  the	  genocide.	  Rwanda	  was	  indeed	  in	  dire	  straits.	  	  
	   The	  post-­‐conflict	  Government	  inherited	  two	  sets	  of	  problems:	  the	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  See	  Rwanda’s	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  Set	  for	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consequences	  of	  the	  1994	  genocide	  and	  the	  structural	  problems	  of	  Rwanda’s	  
economy.	  As	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  genocide,	  the	  country	  lost	  not	  only	  one	  million	  
people,	  including	  highly	  skilled	  professionals	  and	  workers,	  but	  most	  of	  the	  
economic	  infrastructure,	  such	  as	  roads,	  bridges,	  warehouses,	  airports	  and	  train	  
stations	  had	  been	  destroyed.	  	  
	   The	  genocide	  also	  had	  strong	  social	  repercussions,	  including	  losses	  at	  
different	  levels	  of	  society	  and	  increased	  poverty,	  leading	  to	  higher	  Government	  
expenditures	  in	  the	  form	  of	  social	  security	  payments.	  The	  Government	  sought	  to	  
address	  these	  problems	  through	  the	  introduction	  of	  macroeconomic	  and	  structural	  
reforms.	  Among	  others,	  the	  Government	  embarked	  on	  reforms	  in	  the	  following	  
areas:	  the	  central	  bank	  was	  made	  independent	  in	  an	  effort	  to	  control	  inflation	  and	  
achieve	  macroeconomic	  stabilization.199	  	  
	   The	  Government	  also	  embarked	  on	  tax	  system	  reforms	  and	  created	  an	  
independent	  tax	  collection	  agency,	  the	  Rwanda	  Revenue	  Authority	  and	  introduced	  
the	  value-­‐added	  tax	  (VAT).	  The	  RWANDA	  Revenue	  Authority	  was	  able	  to	  
efficiently	  allocate	  Government	  revenues	  to	  finance	  public	  investment	  budgets.	  In	  
addition,	  state	  enterprises	  were	  privatized;	  the	  tariff	  structure	  and	  labor	  market	  
laws	  were	  reformed.	  Trade	  was	  liberalized	  through	  the	  removal	  of	  price	  controls.	  	  
	   Other	  specialized	  programs	  and	  socioeconomic	  initiatives	  to	  support	  youth	  
and	  women	  were	  put	  in	  place	  to	  ensure	  inclusion	  of	  traditionally	  weaker	  sections	  
of	  society.	  Kagame’s	  Government	  also	  established	  institutions	  to	  deal	  with	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corruption	  in	  Rwanda.	  The	  Ombudsman’s	  office	  was	  established	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  
National	  leader’s	  property	  (personal	  wealth);	  the	  General	  Auditor’s	  Office	  to	  check	  
the	  management	  of	  public	  institutions;	  and,	  the	  National	  Tender	  Board	  to	  manage	  
public	  procurement.	  
President	  Kagame’s	  approach	  to	  economic	  development	  is	  one	  of	  optimism,	  
hard	  work,	  inclusion	  and	  community	  empowerment.	  The	  core	  of	  this	  approach	  is	  
summarized	  in	  the	  Eight	  Point	  plan,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  strong	  social	  and	  economic	  
development.200	  It	  states	  that	  the	  key	  to	  the	  country’s	  development	  is	  “within	  the	  
Rwandans’	  hands,”	  and	  nowhere	  else.	  This	  has	  helped	  build	  national	  self-­‐
confidence	  and	  a	  sense	  of	  ownership	  for	  Rwandan	  citizens	  about	  the	  possibilities	  
for	  the	  future.	  In	  effect,	  the	  process	  of	  policy	  making	  in	  Rwanda	  is	  a	  dynamic	  and	  
interactive	  game	  that	  involves	  multiple	  stakeholders.	  It	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  singularly	  
hinge	  on	  President	  Kagame.	  	  
The	  Government	  of	  Rwanda	  also	  adopted	  a	  national	  decentralization	  policy	  
in	  May	  2000	  to	  achieve	  three	  main	  goals:	  good	  governance,	  pro-­‐poor	  service	  
delivery,	  and	  sustainable	  socioeconomic	  development.	  This	  policy	  was	  developed	  
through	  a	  nationwide	  consultative	  process	  aimed	  at	  determining	  the	  causes	  of	  
genocide	  and	  outlining	  lasting	  solutions.	  In	  this	  context,	  decentralization	  is	  seen	  
as	  an	  instrument	  for	  political	  empowerment,	  reconciliation,	  and	  social	  integration.	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The	  ubudehe	  process	  was	  established	  to	  reinforce	  decentralization	  and	  local	  
development	  efforts.	  The	  ubudehe	  process	  is	  a	  unique	  policy	  of	  promoting	  citizens’	  
collective	  action	  in	  partnership	  with	  a	  government	  committed	  to	  decentralization.	  
The	  policy	  was	  designed	  to	  aid	  an	  improvement	  in	  the	  level	  of	  institutional	  
problem-­‐solving	  capacity	  at	  the	  local	  level	  by	  citizens	  and	  local	  governments.	  	  
The	  ubudehe	  process	  has	  been	  able	  to	  increase	  citizens’	  participation	  
through	  local	  collective	  action.	  Kagame’s	  government	  has	  sought	  to	  increase	  
accountability	  and	  make	  the	  decentralization	  policy	  more	  effective	  by	  signing	  
performance	  contracts	  with	  local	  governments.	  These	  contracts	  include	  details	  on	  
the	  programs	  that	  are	  achievable	  within	  one	  year.	  Evaluations	  are	  performed	  every	  
three	  months,	  which	  allows	  local	  institutions	  to	  plan	  their	  activities	  and	  establish	  
quantifiable	  indicators	  for	  evaluation.	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Figure	  4-­‐13:	  Economic	  Performance	  Under	  Kagame201	  
	   Figure	  4-­‐13	  illustrates	  the	  year	  on	  year	  increase	  in	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  under	  
Kagame’s	  leadership.	  Over	  the	  years,	  Rwanda	  attained	  a	  reasonable	  level	  of	  
macroeconomic	  stability	  and	  fiscal	  discipline.	  This	  was	  achieved	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  
ongoing	  heavy	  reliance	  on	  foreign	  savings	  to	  compensate	  for	  insufficient	  domestic	  
savings.	  	  
In	  2005,	  Rwanda’s	  economic	  reforms	  were	  advanced	  enough	  to	  qualify	  for	  
the	  highly	  indebted	  poor	  countries	  (HIPC)	  debt	  cancellation.	  Under	  the	  enhanced	  
HIPC,	  Rwanda	  gained	  an	  estimated	  $1.4	  billion	  out	  of	  $1.5	  billion	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  
adoption	  of	  strict	  measures	  in	  public	  debt	  management.	  These	  reforms	  and	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different	  economic	  policies	  explain	  important	  economic	  achievements	  in	  Rwanda	  
during	  the	  last	  five	  years.	  From	  2004	  to	  2008,	  the	  economic	  growth	  in	  Rwanda	  was	  
around	  8	  percent	  on	  average	  against	  −1.8	  percent	  from	  1990	  to	  1993.	  The	  real	  GDP	  
per	  capita,	  which	  grew	  on	  average	  0.1	  percent	  from	  1980	  to	  1989,	  rose	  by	  5	  percent	  
per	  year	  from	  1995	  to	  2003,	  and	  by	  14.9	  percent	  per	  year	  on	  average	  from	  2003	  to	  
2007.202	  	  
The	  Approach	  to	  Security	  and	  Justice	  
Since	  1994,	  President	  Kagame	  and	  the	  Rwanda	  Patriotic	  Front	  (RPF)	  leaders	  
have	  worked	  to	  reestablish	  social	  harmony	  and	  promote	  sustainable	  economic	  
development.	  The	  results	  include	  the	  reestablishment	  of	  security,	  economic	  and	  
social	  revival,	  and	  promotion	  of	  the	  private	  sector	  and	  civil	  society.	  
One	  of	  Kagame’s	  key	  security	  decisions	  to	  was	  to	  follow	  the	  Hutu	  militias	  
into	  the	  DRC	  to	  bring	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  genocide	  to	  justice.	  Kagame	  was	  able	  
to	  obtain	  Museveni’s	  assistance.	  They	  jointly	  carried	  out	  a	  military	  campaign	  to	  
oust	  President	  Mobutu	  of	  the	  DRC,	  and	  helped	  install	  Laurent	  Kabila	  as	  president.	  
The	  RPF	  and	  its	  allies	  forcibly	  broke	  up	  the	  Hutu	  camps	  in	  Zaire	  and	  more	  than	  a	  
million	  Hutu	  refugees	  returned	  to	  Rwanda	  between	  November	  1996	  and	  January	  
1997.	  	  
Through	  this	  approach,	  Kagame	  has	  been	  able	  to	  eliminate	  most	  armed	  
militias	  based	  out	  of	  the	  DRC.	  His	  regime	  is	  much	  less	  prone	  to	  removal	  through	  
violence	  as	  a	  result.	  The	  society	  and	  economy	  have	  been	  able	  to	  reap	  the	  dividends	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of	  peace.	  	  
Involving	  citizens	  in	  governance	  and	  making	  them	  responsible	  for	  their	  
own	  destiny	  are	  essential	  elements	  of	  legitimacy	  and	  consensus.	  Led	  by	  Kagame	  
and	  the	  RPF,	  Rwanda	  embarked	  on	  a	  program	  of	  decentralization	  of	  public	  
administration	  to	  improve	  the	  delivery	  of	  services	  and	  empower	  people	  to	  
participate	  in	  their	  own	  development	  programs.	  Important	  efforts	  were	  made	  to	  
build	  peace,	  security,	  and	  reconciliation.	  
President	  Kagame	  seems	  to	  have	  realized	  that	  a	  post-­‐conflict	  country	  such	  
as	  Rwanda	  could	  not	  experience	  meaningful	  economic	  growth	  separately	  from	  
conflict	  resolution	  and	  building	  peace	  and	  security.	  Peace	  is	  a	  precondition	  for	  
security,	  stability,	  and	  development.	  Like	  Museveni,	  Kagame’s	  government	  
understands	  that	  it	  needs	  political	  stability	  to	  attract	  domestic	  and	  foreign	  
investors,	  and	  it	  needs	  peace	  to	  implement	  development	  plans	  and	  growth.
	   However,	  in	  contrast	  to	  Museveni’s	  approach,	  President	  Kagame’s	  office	  
took	  the	  initiative	  to	  organize	  consultative	  discussions	  about	  the	  future	  of	  Rwanda	  
in	  1997-­‐98.	  The	  discussions	  led	  to	  development	  of	  the	  Vision	  2020	  project	  as	  a	  
high-­‐level	  vision	  for	  the	  Rwanda’s	  future.	  One	  of	  the	  key	  ingredients	  of	  this	  vision	  
was	  building	  peace	  and	  security	  to	  facilitate	  productive	  initiatives.	  This	  would	  then	  
help	  realize	  the	  main	  goal	  of	  the	  vision:	  to	  transform	  Rwanda	  into	  a	  modern,	  
strong,	  and	  united	  nation,	  proud	  of	  its	  fundamental	  values,	  politically	  stable,	  and	  
without	  discrimination	  among	  its	  citizens.	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In	  most	  post-­‐conflict	  situations,	  disarmament	  and	  demobilization	  programs	  
have	  often	  left	  a	  power	  vacuum.	  There	  is	  a	  tendency	  to	  reduce	  the	  numbers	  of	  the	  
police	  and	  the	  military	  without	  paying	  much	  attention	  to	  the	  challenges	  that	  lie	  
ahead	  for	  the	  already	  weakened	  institutions	  to	  maintain	  order	  and	  security.	  	  
Many	  of	  these	  newly	  unemployed	  security	  personnel	  often	  tend	  to	  coalesce	  
together	  into	  rebel	  movements,	  or	  become	  nuisances	  in	  the	  maintenance	  of	  law	  
and	  order.	  With	  this	  in	  mind,	  Kagame	  and	  the	  RPF	  elite	  established	  the	  National	  
Commission	  for	  Demobilization	  has	  developed	  a	  program	  for	  reintegration	  of	  
former	  soldiers	  and	  police	  into	  civil	  life.	  The	  Commission	  does	  this	  by	  providing	  
training	  and	  financial	  support	  in	  the	  implementation	  of	  small	  projects	  that	  
generate	  income	  for	  demobilized	  soldiers.	  
In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  1994	  genocide,	  Rwandans	  have	  been	  able	  to	  share	  
the	  vision	  of	  peace	  and	  to	  work	  together	  without	  fear	  of	  civil	  crises.	  	  The	  
environment	  of	  peace	  has	  promoted	  the	  involvement	  of	  Rwandans	  in	  productive	  
activities	  such	  as	  agriculture	  and	  entrepreneurship.	  This	  involvement	  in	  
productive	  sectors	  is	  an	  important	  factor	  of	  growth.	  	  After	  the	  genocide,	  national	  
reconciliation	  has	  been	  and	  continues	  to	  be	  promoted	  as	  an	  official	  policy,	  
understood	  as	  a	  prerequisite	  to	  economic	  development.	  	  
Rwanda’s	  Government	  has	  been	  able	  to	  maintain	  law	  and	  order.	  There	  has	  
been	  an	  emphasis	  on	  mutual	  support	  and	  complementarity	  among	  different	  
institutions	  as	  essential	  preconditions	  for	  the	  attainment	  of	  stability	  and	  security	  
in	  the	  country.	  The	  Government	  has	  invested	  in	  good	  governance	  efforts	  and	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undertaken	  administrative	  reforms	  based	  on	  decentralization.	  Presently,	  
administrative	  services	  are	  decentralized	  to	  the	  low	  levels	  of	  sectors,	  so-­‐called	  
umurenge.	  	  This	  has	  greatly	  facilitated	  easy	  and	  quick	  access	  to	  public	  services	  for	  
all	  Rwandans,	  especially	  those	  living	  in	  rural	  areas.	  Easy	  availability	  of	  public	  
services	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  be	  less	  costly	  in	  terms	  of	  money	  and	  time.	  	  	  
Numerous	  institutions	  have	  been	  established	  to	  contribute	  to	  the	  process	  of	  
national	  reconciliation	  and	  socioeconomic	  growth.	  The	  National	  Commission	  for	  
Reconciliation	  trains	  Rwandans	  to	  participate	  in	  personal	  exchanges,	  business	  
transactions,	  and	  other	  socioeconomic	  activity	  without	  discrimination.	  	  
Analysis:	  Kagame	  as	  Change	  Agent	  
The	  decision	  to	  prioritize	  security,	  social	  cohesion	  and	  political	  awareness	  
over	  free	  expression	  and	  broad	  civil	  rights	  has	  a	  number	  of	  parallels	  in	  other	  
societies	  that	  have	  been	  thought	  of	  as	  successful	  models.	  Singapore,	  Malaysia,	  
Taiwan,	  South	  Korea,	  and	  Uganda	  are	  some	  examples.	  This	  decision	  brought	  
considerable	  criticism	  to	  Kagame	  –	  both	  within	  Rwanda	  and	  abroad.	  Over	  time,	  
Kagame’s	  government	  muzzled	  both	  political	  opponents	  and	  media,	  or	  expelled	  
them	  from	  the	  political	  scene.	  	  
It	  appears	  that	  it	  was	  clear	  to	  Kagame	  that	  political	  opponents	  from	  the	  
Hutu	  majority	  would	  always	  clamor	  for	  more	  democracy,	  not	  only	  because	  of	  the	  
support	  they	  would	  receive	  from	  the	  West,	  but	  also	  because	  it	  would	  make	  the	  
possibility	  of	  majority	  rule	  more	  likely	  –	  much	  like	  the	  regimes	  that	  ruled	  Rwanda	  
from	  1960	  onwards.	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In	  addition	  to	  addressing	  the	  economic	  and	  security	  challenges,	  Kagame’s	  
efforts	  from	  2003-­‐2009,	  were	  towards	  reconciliation	  in	  the	  deeply	  divided	  society.	  
The	  Government	  had	  to	  work	  on	  resettling	  and	  reconciling	  the	  Hutus	  and	  Tutsis	  
in	  a	  challenging	  environment,	  which	  included	  a	  devastated	  economy	  and	  threats	  
of	  violence	  from	  across	  the	  border.	  	  
In	  the	  aftermath	  of	  the	  genocide	  and	  the	  mass	  exodus	  of	  Hutus	  across	  the	  
border	  to	  the	  DRC,	  Kagame	  declared	  that	  the	  Government	  would	  make	  efforts	  to	  
repatriate	  the	  refugees	  and	  that	  justice	  would	  have	  to	  be	  done.	  The	  perpetrators	  of	  
the	  genocide	  would	  have	  to	  be	  disarmed	  either	  inside	  or	  outside	  Rwanda’s	  borders	  
and	  brought	  to	  justice.	  The	  RPF	  proceeded	  on	  these	  lines	  and	  arrested	  100,000	  
citizens	  and	  sent	  them	  to	  prison	  for	  crimes	  committed	  during	  the	  genocide.	  
Kagame’s	  stance	  also	  meant	  that	  he	  had	  to	  invade	  the	  DRC	  to	  find	  those	  who	  
perpetrated	  the	  genocide	  and	  were	  trying	  to	  hide	  from	  justice.	  	  
	   The	  1994	  genocide	  against	  the	  Tutsis	  devastated	  both	  the	  Rwandan	  
economy	  as	  well	  as	  its	  societal	  fabric.	  The	  gross	  domestic	  product	  (GDP)	  was	  
halved	  in	  a	  single	  year,	  80	  percent	  of	  the	  population	  plunged	  into	  poverty,	  and	  vast	  
tracts	  of	  farmland	  were	  destroyed.	  The	  genocide	  exacerbated	  societal	  divides	  and	  
other	  constraints	  on	  development	  that	  existed	  well	  before	  1994.	  The	  basic	  
infrastructure	  of	  the	  state	  was	  completely	  destroyed;	  this	  included	  institutions	  as	  
well	  as	  physical	  infrastructure	  like	  buildings	  and	  roads.	  	  
	   Since	  2000,	  Rwanda	  has	  envisaged	  a	  set	  of	  policies	  with	  the	  goal	  of	  
transforming	  the	  agrarian	  subsistence	  economy	  into	  a	  sophisticated	  knowledge-­‐
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based	  society.	  The	  policies	  envisioned	  by	  President	  Kagame	  and	  his	  team	  became	  
the	  Vision	  2020	  framework.	  The	  main	  socioeconomic	  objectives	  of	  Vision	  2020	  
include	  transforming	  Rwanda	  into	  a	  middle-­‐income	  country	  by	  2020.203	  	  
Since	  1994	  Rwanda	  has	  attained	  impressive	  achievements	  following	  the	  
turbulent	  war	  and	  genocide	  and	  since	  that	  time	  has	  been	  on	  a	  path	  of	  economic	  
development	  and	  poverty	  reduction	  of	  its	  citizens.	  Recently	  attained	  economic	  
performance	  and	  social	  and	  political	  achievements	  are	  strongly	  linked	  to	  Kagame’s	  
leadership	  that	  invests	  in	  the	  inclusive	  development	  of	  all	  Rwandans.	  	  
The	  violent	  stifling	  of	  opposition	  and	  the	  recent	  killings	  of	  dissidents	  are	  
worrisome	  developments.	  Kagame	  should	  realize	  that	  he	  is	  well	  positioned	  to	  
direct	  a	  calibrated	  opening-­‐up	  of	  the	  political	  system.	  He	  continues	  to	  dominate	  
the	  political	  scene,	  and	  still	  has	  absolute	  control	  over	  the	  military.	  Even	  though	  he	  
seems	  to	  believe	  that	  true	  multi-­‐party	  politics	  could	  drive	  Rwanda	  back	  towards	  
conflict,	  Kagame	  should	  make	  efforts	  to	  democratize	  the	  RPF	  and	  broaden	  the	  
base	  of	  his	  government.	  Otherwise,	  at	  some	  point	  there	  will	  be	  conflict;	  it	  will	  
most	  likely	  be	  violent	  and	  radical.	  And,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  Kagame	  will	  emerge	  as	  
the	  victor.	  	  
One	  of	  Kagame’s	  favorite	  themes	  is	  the	  development	  of	  strong	  institutions	  
in	  Rwanda.	  When	  such	  institutions	  emerge,	  they	  will	  challenge	  his	  absolute	  hold	  
on	  power.	  Though	  the	  institutions	  in	  Rwanda	  are	  getting	  stronger,	  they	  still	  have	  a	  
way	  to	  go	  before	  they	  are	  capable	  of	  challenging	  Kagame’s	  hold.	  Government	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203	  See	  Rwanda	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  and	  Economic	  Planning,	  Rwanda	  Vision	  2020,	  (Kigali,	  2000).	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officials	  at	  all	  levels	  continue	  to	  tremble	  at	  the	  prospect	  of	  Kagame’s	  wrath	  –	  this	  is	  
perhaps	  because	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  Rwandan	  society	  which	  is	  very	  structured	  and	  
discipline	  oriented,	  and	  also	  because	  of	  Kagame’s	  demanding	  personality.204	  	  
Rwandan	  leaders	  have	  sought	  to	  develop	  a	  system	  that	  meets	  their	  
country’s	  unique	  needs	  and	  address	  the	  danger	  of	  conflagration	  between	  the	  
different	  ethnicities.	  Under	  Kagame’s	  leadership,	  the	  Government	  stabilized	  
Rwandan	  society	  and	  set	  it	  on	  the	  path	  towards	  modernization.	  Though	  he	  has	  
many	  critics,	  Kagame	  has	  been	  able	  to	  accomplish	  remarkable	  things	  in	  the	  time	  
since	  the	  genocide.	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  
Kagame’s	  initial	  approach	  seemed	  more	  democratic	  and	  he	  sought	  to	  public	  
reconciliation	  between	  the	  Tutsis	  and	  the	  Hutus.	  His	  government	  has	  done	  much	  
to	  bring	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  crime	  to	  justice	  and	  has	  tried	  to	  heal	  the	  deep-­‐seated	  
divisions	  in	  society.	  Kagame’s	  administration	  has	  focused	  on	  economic	  
development	  in	  Rwanda	  and	  has	  been	  able	  to	  nearly	  triple	  the	  GDP	  per	  capita	  
from	  around	  $200	  when	  he	  became	  president	  in	  2000	  to	  $530	  in	  2011.205	  Kagame’s	  
stellar	  record,	  however,	  has	  been	  tarnished	  by	  his	  suppression	  of	  political	  
opponents	  and	  the	  use	  of	  violence	  to	  stay	  in	  power.	  	  
Rwanda	  today	  is	  in	  a	  much	  better	  place	  than	  anyone	  could	  have	  hoped	  for	  it	  
to	  be.	  But	  the	  country	  faces	  two	  important	  challenges.	  It	  still	  faces	  threats	  from	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204	  See	  Stephen	  Kinzer,	  A	  Thousand	  Hills:	  Rwanda’s	  Rebirth	  and	  the	  Man	  Who	  Dreamed	  It,	  (Hoboken,	  NJ:	  John	  Wiley	  &	  
Sons,	  2008),	  332-­‐338.	  
205	  See	  World	  Development	  Indicators	  available	  at	  http://data.worldbank.org/indicator	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across	  the	  border	  in	  the	  DRC,	  by	  the	  remnants	  of	  the	  Hutu	  militias	  and	  the	  
Interahamwe,	  who	  would	  seek	  to	  unleash	  another	  round	  of	  ethnicity-­‐based	  
violence	  in	  Rwanda.	  	  
In	  such	  a	  situation,	  Kagame	  and	  other	  RPF	  leaders	  argue	  that	  opening	  up	  
the	  political	  space	  to	  multi-­‐party	  democracy	  would	  lead	  to	  another	  genocide.	  But	  
how	  long	  this	  special	  situation	  of	  limited	  political	  freedoms	  will	  last,	  no	  one	  can	  
tell.	  The	  other	  problem	  is	  that	  of	  human	  nature,	  and	  has	  to	  do	  with	  Kagame	  
himself.	  	  Under	  his	  leadership,	  Rwanda	  has	  been	  called	  Africa’s	  “biggest	  success	  
story.”206	  Kagame	  has	  become	  a	  public	  advocate	  of	  new	  models	  for	  foreign	  aid	  
designed	  to	  help	  recipients	  become	  self-­‐reliant.	  Will	  Rwanda	  be	  Africa’s	  
Singapore?	  Only	  time	  will	  tell.	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  See	  Fareed	  Zakaria	  in	  CNN,	  “Rwanda:	  Africa’s	  Biggest	  Success	  Story,”	  (July	  17,	  2009).	  
http://edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/07/17/zakaria.rwanda/	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Nelson	  Mandela’s	  South	  Africa	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐14:	  Map	  of	  South	  Africa207	  
The	  Structural	  Context	  for	  Mandela’s	  Rise	  
Though	  South	  Africa	  was	  not	  a	  fragile	  state	  in	  the	  truest	  sense	  of	  the	  term,	  
the	  Apartheid	  regime	  had	  brought	  the	  nation	  to	  its	  knees.	  The	  racially	  
segregationist	  approach	  of	  the	  National	  Party	  regime	  deeply	  divided	  South	  African	  
society	  by	  race	  and	  ethnicity.	  South	  Africa	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s	  was	  becoming	  
increasingly	  ‘fragile’	  with	  violence	  regularly	  spilling	  onto	  the	  streets	  and	  paralyzing	  
normal	  life.	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In	  this	  context,	  Nelson	  Mandela	  played	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  South	  Africa’s	  
peaceful	  transition	  to	  democracy.	  His	  efforts	  brought	  about	  a	  sense	  of	  
reconciliation	  between	  the	  different	  ethnic	  factions	  and	  helped	  transform	  South	  
Africa	  into	  a	  truly	  democratic	  country.	  	  
Mandela’s	  Early	  Life	  
	  
Nelson	  Mandela,	  the	  eldest	  son	  of	  a	  Xhosa	  chief,208	  was	  born	  in	  1918.	  He	  was	  
born	  into	  the	  family	  of	  the	  Thembu	  chieftaincy	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  ‘left-­‐hand	  
house’209	  of	  King	  Ngubencuka,	  who	  presided	  over	  a	  united	  Thembu	  community	  in	  
the	  1830s.	  Mandela	  today	  prefers	  to	  be	  called	  “Madiba,”	  as	  his	  father	  belonged	  to	  
the	  Madiba	  clan,	  named	  after	  an	  eighteenth-­‐century	  Thembu	  chief.	  	  
The	  Thembu	  were	  one	  of	  twelve	  isiXhosa-­‐speaking	  chieftaincies	  that	  
inhabited	  the	  Transkei,	  the	  largest	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  African	  peasant	  reserves	  
located	  on	  the	  eastern	  seaboard.210	  The	  Thembu	  left-­‐hand	  house	  descendants	  
served	  as	  advisers	  to	  the	  royal	  household.	  Tom	  Lodge	  in	  Mandela:	  A	  Critical	  Life	  
notes	  that	  Mandela’s	  genealogy	  has	  served	  as	  an	  important	  source	  of	  charismatic	  
power	  for	  him	  throughout	  his	  life.	  Accounts	  of	  Mandela’s	  birth	  and	  young	  age,	  
prepared	  by	  the	  African	  National	  Congress	  (ANC)	  in	  the	  early	  1960s,	  emphasize	  his	  
social	  status	  and	  royal	  connections.	  	  
At	  the	  age	  of	  nine,	  Mandela’s	  father	  died,	  and	  Jongintaba,	  the	  Regent	  of	  the	  
Transkei	  became	  his	  caretaker.	  As	  a	  boy,	  Mandela	  learned	  about	  the	  tradition	  of	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  The	  Xhosas	  are	  the	  second	  biggest	  tribe	  in	  South	  Africa	  after	  the	  Zulus.	  
209	  Children	  born	  to	  the	  third	  wife	  of	  the	  King	  were	  referred	  to	  as	  children	  of	  the	  left-­‐hand	  house.	  	  
210	  See	  Tom	  Lodge,	  Mandela:	  A	  Critical	  Life,	  (Oxford,	  UK:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  1.	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African	  people	  and	  of	  their	  conflicts	  with	  colonial	  powers.	  This	  knowledge	  
reinforced	  his	  awareness	  of	  African	  proto-­‐nationalism.	  	  
Standard	  British	  textbooks	  also	  played	  an	  important	  role	  in	  shaping	  
Mandela’s	  thinking.	  He	  was	  disappointed	  with	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  the	  textbooks	  
and	  teachers	  recognized	  White	  leaders,	  while	  Black	  leaders	  were	  described	  as	  
savages	  and	  thieves.	  	  Mandela’s	  formal	  education,	  through	  primary	  school	  at	  
Clarkebury	  and	  high	  school	  at	  Healdtown,	  left	  a	  deep	  impression	  upon	  his	  
thinking,	  as	  well	  as	  his	  values	  and	  etiquette.	  	  
With	  the	  intention	  of	  earning	  qualifications	  to	  become	  a	  court	  interpreter	  
that	  would	  enable	  him	  to	  pursue	  a	  career	  in	  rural	  civil	  service,	  Mandela	  took	  his	  
high	  school	  exams	  a	  year	  early	  and	  went	  to	  Fort	  Hare	  University	  in	  1939.	  He	  
understood	  that	  court	  interpreters	  were	  indispensible	  in	  the	  South	  African	  legal	  
system,	  as	  most	  Africans	  would	  have	  been	  unable	  to	  follow	  the	  court	  proceedings	  
in	  English	  or	  Afrikaans.	  	  
While	  at	  Fort	  Hare,	  Mandela	  formed	  a	  close	  friendship	  with	  Kaiser	  
Matanzima,	  his	  kinsman	  (Jongintaba’s	  son),	  who	  would	  later	  become	  the	  ruler	  of	  
the	  Transkei	  and,	  as	  a	  Bantustan	  leader,	  a	  fierce	  opponent	  of	  the	  ANC.	  Mandela	  
also	  became	  friends	  with	  Oliver	  Tambo,	  who	  would	  be	  his	  predecessor	  as	  president	  
of	  the	  ANC.	  	  
Although	  Mandela	  supported	  student-­‐led	  demonstrations	  against	  British	  
rule,	  during	  his	  time	  at	  Fort	  Hare	  he	  was	  not	  wholly	  committed	  to	  African	  
nationalistic	  politics.	  Lodge	  notes	  that	  Mandela’s	  participation	  in	  a	  student	  protest	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that	  led	  to	  his	  expulsion	  from	  Fort	  Hare	  is	  often	  wrongly	  perceived	  as	  the	  reason	  
for	  his	  progress	  towards	  political	  militancy.	  	  
Lodge	  argues	  that	  other	  accounts	  conflate	  or	  confuse	  two	  separate	  events.	  	  
One	  event	  was	  the	  boycott	  of	  the	  Student	  Representative	  Council	  (SRC)	  elections	  
in	  1940	  due	  to	  complaints	  about	  the	  quality	  of	  food	  served	  in	  the	  dining	  hall,	  and	  
the	  second	  more	  serious	  event	  was	  the	  protest	  against	  the	  SRC	  in	  1941	  when	  
students	  went	  on	  strike	  after	  a	  White	  teacher	  slapped	  a	  Black	  canteen	  worker.	  
Lodge	  notes	  that	  Mandela	  became	  involved	  in	  the	  SRC	  electoral	  boycott	  because	  
he	  had	  been	  nominated	  before	  the	  elections	  and	  was	  in	  fact	  elected	  by	  a	  small	  
minority	  who	  chose	  to	  vote.	  Mandela	  felt	  a	  sense	  of	  obligation	  to	  the	  students,	  
however,	  and	  refused	  to	  take	  up	  his	  position	  in	  the	  SRC.	  This	  was	  despite	  a	  
warning	  from	  the	  Principal,	  Alexander	  Kerr,	  to	  do	  so	  or	  face	  expulsion.	  Oliver	  
Tambo	  contends	  that	  Mandela’s	  sense	  of	  dignity	  and	  sensitivity	  against	  insult	  or	  
patronage	  also	  might	  have	  contributed	  to	  his	  decision.211	  	  
After	  the	  expulsion	  from	  Fort	  Hare,	  Jongintaba	  announced	  that	  he	  had	  
arranged	  marriages	  for	  Matanzima	  and	  Mandela.	  Displeased	  with	  this	  
development,	  the	  young	  men	  moved	  to	  Johannesburg	  and	  found	  jobs	  at	  the	  gold	  
mines.	  Mandela	  worked	  as	  a	  guard,	  but	  his	  employment	  was	  terminated	  when	  the	  
employer	  discovered	  that	  he	  was	  the	  Regent’s	  runaway	  ward.	  	  
At	  this	  point,	  Mandela	  went	  to	  stay	  with	  his	  cousin,	  Garlick	  Mbekeni	  in	  
George	  Goch	  Township.	  Upon	  learning	  of	  Mandela’s	  interest	  in	  the	  legal	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  See	  Mary	  Benson,	  Nelson	  Mandela:	  The	  Man	  and	  the	  Movement,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  WW	  Norton	  &	  Co,	  1986),	  20.	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profession,	  Mbekeni	  introduced	  him	  to	  his	  friend	  Walter	  Sisulu	  who	  was	  well	  
connected	  in	  Johannesburg.	  	  
As	  Mandela’s	  friend	  and	  mentor,	  realtor	  Walter	  Sisulu	  helped	  him	  secure	  a	  
job	  as	  a	  law	  clerk	  at	  Johannesburg	  law	  firm	  Witkin,	  Sidelsky	  and	  Edelman.	  While	  
working	  for	  the	  law	  firm,	  Mandela	  completed	  his	  B.A.	  degree	  at	  the	  University	  of	  
South	  Africa	  via	  correspondence.	  He	  then	  began	  law	  studies	  at	  the	  University	  of	  
Witwatersrand	  where	  he	  befriended	  fellow	  students	  and	  future	  anti-­‐apartheid	  
political	  activists	  Joe	  Slovo,	  Harry	  Schwarz	  and	  Ruth	  First.212	  During	  this	  time,	  
Mandela	  lived	  in	  Alexandra	  Township,	  North	  of	  Johannesburg.	  	  
Mandela	  moved	  from	  Alexandra	  in	  1942,	  after	  accepting	  a	  clansman’s	  offer	  to	  move	  
into	  the	  headman’s	  quarters	  in	  Witwatersrand	  Native	  Labor	  Compound.	  In	  late	  
1943,	  he	  met	  Sisulu’s	  first	  cousin,	  Evelyn	  Mase,	  whom	  he	  soon	  married	  and	  in	  1946,	  
they	  moved	  into	  their	  own	  home	  in	  Orlando	  Township	  in	  Soweto,	  a	  lower-­‐class	  
populated	  urban	  area	  of	  the	  city	  of	  Johannesburg.	  
Mandela’s	  Involvement	  in	  Political	  Activism	  
	  
During	  the	  1940s,	  Mandela	  began	  attending	  gatherings	  of	  the	  Youth	  League	  
of	  the	  ANC,	  a	  forum	  for	  young	  intellectuals.	  The	  Forum	  was	  led	  by	  Dr.	  Alfred	  
Xuma,	  the	  president	  of	  the	  ANC.	  Other	  prominent	  Youth	  Leaguers	  included	  
Walter	  Sisulu	  and	  Oliver	  Tambo.	  The	  young	  men	  discussed	  the	  growing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212	  Slovo	  would	  eventually	  become	  Mandela's	  Minister	  of	  Housing,	  while	  Schwarz	  would	  become	  his	  Ambassador	  to	  
Washington.	  
	   217	  
oppression	  of	  Black	  and	  Colored	  people	  in	  South	  Africa,	  and	  possible	  ways	  of	  
remedying	  the	  situation.	  	  
Since	  its	  formation	  in	  1912	  and	  until	  the	  early	  1940s,	  the	  ANC	  had	  been	  a	  
symbolic	  body,	  meeting	  in	  conference	  every	  year,	  but	  otherwise	  undertaking	  little	  
activity.	  Xuma’s	  ascension	  to	  the	  presidency	  of	  the	  ANC	  changed	  all	  this,	  and	  he	  
instituted	  a	  branch	  of	  the	  ANC	  to	  work	  with	  the	  Communist	  Party	  of	  South	  Africa	  
to	  establish	  a	  following	  among	  the	  rapidly	  growing	  urban	  workforce.	  Mandela	  was	  
persuaded	  by	  his	  ANC	  colleagues	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  Alexandra	  bus	  boycott	  in	  
1943.	  Mandela	  recollects	  finding	  this	  experience	  exhilarating	  and	  impressive.213	  	  
Over	  the	  course	  of	  the	  next	  few	  years,	  Mandela	  came	  in	  contact	  with	  many	  
Communist	  intellectuals	  who	  sought	  to	  establish	  more	  rights	  for	  Blacks,	  Colored	  
people	  and	  Indians	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  
Mandela’s	  growing	  involvement	  in	  politics	  ran	  parallel	  with	  the	  rise	  of	  
Afrikaner214	  nationalism	  in	  South	  Africa	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  National	  Party.	  The	  
Afrikaner	  ideology	  of	  apartheid	  (apartness)	  and	  a	  more	  rigid	  and	  codified	  racial	  
segregation	  developed	  in	  response	  to	  the	  acceleration	  of	  African	  urbanization	  that	  
accompanied	  industrialization	  and	  the	  government’s	  slight	  loosening	  of	  racial	  
restrictions	  during	  World	  War	  II.	  The	  rise	  of	  the	  National	  Party	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  
threat	  by	  Black	  and	  Indian	  intellectuals.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
213	  See	  Tom	  Lodge,	  Mandela:	  A	  Critical	  Life,	  (Oxford,	  UK:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  30-­‐32.	  
214	  Afrikaner	  nationalism	  is	  a	  political	  ideology	  that	  was	  born	  in	  the	  late	  19th	  century	  around	  the	  idea	  that	  Afrikaners	  in	  
South	  Africa	  were	  a	  "chosen	  people";	  it	  was	  also	  strongly	  influenced	  by	  anti-­‐British	  sentiments	  that	  grew	  strong	  among	  the	  
Afrikaners,	  especially	  because	  of	  the	  Boer	  Wars.	  Afrikaner	  nationalism	  emphasized	  the	  unity	  of	  all	  Afrikaans	  speaking	  white	  
people,	  the	  Volk	  (nation),	  against	  such	  "foreign"	  elements	  as	  Blacks,	  Jews	  and	  English-­‐speaking	  South	  Africans.	  See	  
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afrikaner_nationalism	  (Accessed	  February	  23,	  2012).	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Apartheid	  politics	  called	  for	  a	  halt	  to	  permanent	  African	  urbanization	  as	  
well	  as	  greater	  restrictions	  on	  Blacks,	  Indians	  and	  Colored	  people.	  This	  was	  
appealing	  to	  White	  factory	  workers	  who	  feared	  the	  loss	  of	  their	  livelihoods	  and	  
were	  eager	  to	  keep	  Indian	  businessmen	  out	  of	  main	  street	  commerce.	  The	  National	  
Party	  also	  received	  support	  from	  White	  farmers	  who	  were	  finding	  it	  increasingly	  
difficult	  to	  recruit	  labor	  –	  as	  most	  of	  the	  young	  Black	  men	  went	  to	  cities	  in	  search	  
of	  higher	  paying	  factory	  jobs.	  	  
Mandela	  began	  actively	  participating	  in	  politics	  after	  the	  1948	  elections,	  
which	  brought	  the	  Afrikaner-­‐dominated	  National	  Party	  to	  power.	  His	  initial	  
reaction	  to	  the	  National	  Party	  victory	  was	  one	  of	  dismay	  and	  concern.	  For	  others	  in	  
the	  Youth	  League	  of	  the	  ANC,	  this	  victory	  meant	  that	  they	  had	  to	  work	  towards	  a	  
program	  of	  action	  that	  would	  commit	  the	  ANC	  to	  militant	  tactics,	  strikes,	  
boycotts,	  and	  civil	  disobedience.215	  	  
In	  November	  1949,	  Mandela	  met	  with	  Xuma	  and	  argued	  that	  the	  ANC	  
should	  derive	  inspiration	  from	  the	  work	  of	  Mahatma	  Gandhi	  and	  Jawaharlal	  Nehru	  
during	  India’s	  freedom	  struggle	  against	  British	  Imperialism.	  He	  wanted	  the	  ANC	  to	  
launch	  its	  own	  program	  of	  action	  through	  non-­‐violent	  resistance	  and	  civil	  
disobedience.	  Xuma	  however	  did	  not	  concur	  with	  this	  proposal.	  He	  contended	  
that	  the	  ANC’s	  supporters	  were	  not	  ready	  for	  such	  an	  approach.	  He	  was	  worried	  
that	  the	  government	  would	  suppress	  the	  ANC’s	  activities	  further	  if	  such	  actions	  
were	  undertaken.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215	  See	  Tom	  Lodge,	  Mandela:	  A	  Critical	  Life,	  (Oxford,	  UK:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  43-­‐46.	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When	  Xuma	  could	  not	  be	  convinced,	  the	  Youth	  Leaguers	  voted	  against	  him	  
and	  installed,	  James	  Moroka,	  a	  Free-­‐State	  medical	  practitioner	  as	  ANC	  president.	  
In	  February	  1950,	  Mandela	  was	  co-­‐opted	  to	  the	  National	  Executive	  to	  fill	  the	  
position	  created	  by	  Xuma’s	  exit.	  	  
During	  the	  early	  part	  of	  his	  political	  career,	  Mandela	  had	  been	  ambivalent	  
towards	  working	  with	  other	  Colored	  and	  Indian	  organizations	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  
equal	  rights.	  He	  was	  also	  concerned	  that	  the	  Communists	  might	  hijack	  the	  ANC	  
agenda,	  and	  avoided	  any	  collaboration	  with	  them.	  His	  ambivalence	  to	  work	  with	  
the	  Indian	  organizations	  and	  the	  Communist	  Party	  continued	  until	  the	  end	  of	  1951.	  	  
By	  this	  time,	  Mandela	  had	  begun	  to	  see	  the	  value	  of	  working	  together	  with	  
these	  different	  organizations	  for	  the	  cause	  of	  democracy	  and	  equal	  rights	  for	  all	  
South	  African	  people.	  More	  generally,	  within	  the	  ANC	  the	  ideas	  of	  Karl	  Marx	  and	  
Lenin	  became	  widely	  diffused	  during	  the	  early	  1950s	  as	  is	  evident	  from	  the	  
educational	  materials	  provided	  to	  the	  ANC	  members	  at	  the	  time.	  	  
The	  Gandhian	  influence	  also	  dominated	  freedom	  struggles	  on	  the	  African	  
continent	  right	  up	  to	  the	  1960s	  because	  of	  the	  power	  it	  generated	  and	  the	  unity	  it	  
forged	  among	  the	  powerless.	  Nonviolence	  was	  the	  official	  stance	  of	  all	  major	  
African	  coalitions,	  and	  the	  South	  African	  ANC	  remained	  opposed	  to	  violence	  for	  
most	  of	  its	  existence.	  
Increasingly,	  the	  ‘exclusivist’	  African	  sentiment	  expressed	  by	  other	  Youth	  
Leaguers	  was	  at	  odds	  with	  Mandela’s	  own	  beliefs	  and	  personal	  experiences.	  Many	  
Youth	  Leaguers	  generally	  condemned	  any	  relationship	  with	  Indians	  or	  Whites,	  but	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interestingly,	  the	  friendships	  that	  Mandela	  recalls	  most	  vividly	  and	  affectionately	  
are	  those	  with	  Indians	  involved	  in	  the	  struggle	  against	  apartheid	  during	  that	  
time.216	  	  
Lodge	  notes	  that	  most	  African	  contemporaries	  from	  this	  period	  in	  their	  
recollections	  often	  emphasize	  those	  qualities	  in	  Mandela	  that	  set	  him	  apart	  –	  his	  
gentlemanliness,	  his	  openness	  to	  working	  with	  other	  races,	  and	  a	  lack	  of	  bitterness	  
towards	  White	  people.	  Mrs.	  Tambo	  remembers	  that	  Mandela	  was	  quite	  a	  
gentleman,	  with	  perfect	  etiquette	  and	  an	  eye	  for	  dressing	  well.	  	  
Another	  distinction	  in	  Mandela’s	  attitude	  had	  to	  do	  with	  where	  he	  came	  
from.	  Mandela	  came	  from	  the	  Transkei,	  and	  as	  a	  cultural	  consequence,	  he	  
expected	  younger	  people	  to	  defer	  to	  him.	  But,	  over	  time,	  as	  he	  interacted	  with	  
Indians	  and	  Whites,	  his	  patriarchal	  status	  among	  Africans	  became	  less	  important	  
for	  him	  and	  less	  inhibiting.	  What	  scholars	  find	  striking	  about	  Mandela	  was	  his	  
ability	  to	  shift	  from	  one	  kind	  of	  social	  etiquette	  to	  another,	  an	  ability	  that	  shows	  
his	  social	  awareness,	  the	  capacity	  to	  understand	  where	  his	  adversaries	  and	  friends	  
stood,	  and	  a	  keen	  sense	  of	  empathy.	  	  
Growing	  up,	  his	  contact	  with	  Whites	  was	  limited	  to	  those	  who	  had	  treated	  
him	  with	  consideration.	  In	  his	  autobiography,	  Mandela	  confesses	  	  
“to	  being	  something	  of	  an	  anglophile…	  In	  so	  many	  ways,	  the	  
model	  of	  a	  gentleman	  for	  me	  was	  an	  Englishman…	  While	  I	  abhorred	  
British	  imperialism,	  I	  never	  rejected	  the	  trappings	  of	  British	  style	  and	  
manners.”	  217	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216	  See	  Tom	  Lodge,	  Mandela:	  A	  Critical	  Life,	  (Oxford,	  UK:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  48-­‐49.	  
217	  See	  Tom	  Lodge,	  Mandela:	  A	  Critical	  Life,	  (Oxford,	  UK:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  6.	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Consequently,	  Mandela	  paid	  special	  attention	  to	  the	  way	  he	  dressed	  and	  
presented	  himself	  in	  public.	  Ellen	  Khuzwayo,	  a	  schoolteacher	  in	  Pimville,	  who	  
joined	  the	  Youth	  League	  in	  the	  mid-­‐1940s	  notes:	  	  
“I	  remember	  the	  glamorous	  Nelson	  Mandela	  of	  those	  years.	  The	  
beautiful	  white	  silk	  scarf	  he	  wore	  stands	  out	  in	  my	  mind	  to	  this	  day.	  
Walter	  Max	  Sisulu,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  was	  a	  hardy	  down	  to	  earth	  man	  
with	  practical	  clothing	  –	  typically	  a	  heavy	  coat	  and	  stout	  boots.	  
Looking	  back	  the	  third	  member	  of	  their	  trio,	  Oliver	  Tambo,	  acted	  as	  
something	  of	  a	  balance,	  with	  his	  middle-­‐of-­‐the-­‐road	  clothes!”218	  
	  
The	  Defiance	  Campaign	  
	  
Mandela	  was	  the	  prominent	  leader	  in	  the	  ANC's	  1952	  Defiance	  Campaign,219	  
which	  demanded	  the	  repeal	  of	  unjust	  laws	  including	  the	  Bantu	  Authorities	  Act,220	  
the	  Group	  Areas	  Act,221	  the	  Voters	  Representation	  Act,222	  the	  Suppression	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218	  Ellen	  Khuzwayo,	  Call	  Me	  Woman,	  (Johannesburg,	  South	  Africa:	  Ravan	  Press,	  1985),	  139.	  
219	  The	  Defiance	  Campaign	  against	  Unjust	  Laws	  was	  presented	  by	  the	  African	  National	  Congress	  (ANC)	  at	  a	  conference	  held	  
in	  Bloemfontein,	  South	  Africa	  in	  December	  1951.	  The	  ANC	  decided	  to	  implement	  a	  national	  action	  the	  following	  year	  based	  
on	  non-­‐cooperation	  with	  certain	  laws	  considered	  unjust	  and	  discriminatory.	  Demonstrations	  in	  support	  of	  the	  Defiance	  
Principles	  were	  organized	  for	  April	  6,	  1952,	  the	  300th	  anniversary	  of	  white	  settlement	  in	  the	  Cape	  of	  Southern	  Africa.	  Of	  
approximately	  10,000	  people	  who	  protested	  the	  unjust	  apartheid	  laws,	  around	  8,500	  of	  them	  were	  imprisoned,	  including	  
Nelson	  Mandela.	  See	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defiance_Campaign	  (Accessed	  November	  2,	  2011).	  
220	  The	  Bantu	  Authorities	  Act,	  1951	  (Act	  No.	  68	  of	  1951;	  subsequently	  renamed	  the	  Black	  Authorities	  Act,	  1951)	  was	  one	  of	  
the	  pillars	  of	  apartheid	  in	  South	  Africa	  during	  the	  apartheid	  era.	  This	  legislation,	  succeeding	  the	  Native	  Affairs	  Act	  (Act	  No.	  
23	  of	  1920),	  created	  the	  legal	  basis	  for	  the	  deportation	  of	  blacks	  into	  designated	  homeland	  reserve	  areas	  and	  established	  
tribal,	  regional	  and	  territorial	  authorities.	  This	  Act	  was	  augmented	  by	  the	  Bantu	  Homelands	  Citizens	  Act	  of	  1970.	  After	  the	  
end	  of	  apartheid,	  with	  the	  introduction	  of	  democratic	  local	  government	  and	  a	  new	  framework	  for	  traditional	  leadership,	  the	  
act	  became	  obsolete,	  and	  it	  was	  formally	  repealed	  in	  2010.	  See	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bantu_Authorities_Act,_1951	  
(Accessed	  November	  2,	  2011).	  
221	  The	  Group	  Areas	  Act	  of	  1950	  forced	  physical	  separation	  between	  races	  by	  creating	  different	  residential	  areas	  for	  different	  
races.	  Led	  to	  forced	  removals	  of	  people	  living	  in	  "wrong"	  areas,	  for	  example	  Coloreds	  living	  in	  District	  Six	  in	  Cape	  Town.	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Communism	  Act,223	  Pass	  Laws,224	  stock	  limitation	  controls,	  and	  other	  apartheid	  
regulations.	  ANC	  leaders	  hoped	  that	  this	  campaign	  would	  build	  activist	  
membership	  for	  the	  organization	  and	  signal	  the	  move	  towards	  more	  activism	  and	  
militancy.	  	  The	  conference	  in	  the	  course	  of	  a	  lengthy	  public	  statement	  on	  this	  
historic	  decision	  stated:	  
“All	  people,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  national	  group	  they	  belong	  to	  
and	  irrespective	  of	  the	  color	  of	  their	  skin,	  who	  have	  made	  South	  Africa	  
their	  home,	  are	  entitled	  to	  live	  a	  full	  and	  free	  life.	  
Full	  democratic	  rights	  with	  direct	  say	  in	  the	  affairs	  of	  the	  
government	  are	  the	  inalienable	  right	  of	  every	  South	  African	  -­‐	  a	  right	  
which	  must	  be	  realized	  now	  if	  South	  Africa	  is	  to	  be	  saved	  from	  social	  
chaos	  and	  tyranny	  and	  from	  the	  evils	  arising	  out	  of	  the	  existing	  denial	  
of	  the	  franchise	  of	  vast	  masses	  of	  the	  population	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  
race	  and	  color.	  
The	  struggle	  which	  the	  national	  organizations	  of	  the	  non-­‐
European	  people	  are	  conducting	  is	  not	  directed	  against	  any	  race	  or	  
national	  group.	  It	  is	  against	  the	  unjust	  laws,	  which	  keep	  in	  perpetual	  
subjection	  and	  misery	  vast	  sections	  of	  the	  population.	  It	  is	  for	  the	  
creation	  of	  conditions	  which	  will	  restore	  human	  dignity,	  equality	  and	  
freedom	  to	  every	  South	  African.”225	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
222	  The	  Separate	  Representation	  of	  Voters	  Act	  of	  1951	  together	  with	  the	  1956	  amendment,	  led	  to	  the	  removal	  of	  Coloreds	  
from	  the	  common	  voters'	  roll.	  
223	  The	  Suppression	  of	  Communism	  Act	  of	  1950	  outlawed	  communism	  and	  the	  Communist	  Party	  in	  South	  Africa.	  
Communism	  was	  defined	  so	  broadly	  that	  it	  covered	  any	  call	  for	  radical	  change.	  Communists	  could	  be	  banned	  from	  
participating	  in	  a	  political	  organization	  and	  restricted	  to	  a	  particular	  area.	  
224	  The	  Natives	  (Abolition	  of	  Passes	  and	  Co-­‐ordination	  of	  Documents)	  Act	  of	  1952	  was	  commonly	  known	  as	  the	  Pass	  Laws.	  
This	  ironically	  named	  act	  forced	  black	  people	  to	  carry	  identification	  with	  them	  at	  all	  times.	  A	  pass	  included	  a	  photograph,	  
details	  of	  place	  of	  origin,	  employment	  record,	  tax	  payments,	  and	  encounters	  with	  the	  police.	  It	  was	  a	  criminal	  offence	  to	  be	  
unable	  to	  produce	  a	  pass	  when	  required	  to	  do	  so	  by	  the	  police.	  No	  Black	  person	  could	  leave	  a	  rural	  area	  for	  an	  urban	  one	  
without	  a	  permit	  from	  the	  local	  authorities.	  On	  arrival	  in	  an	  urban	  area	  a	  permit	  to	  seek	  work	  had	  to	  be	  obtained	  within	  72	  
hours.	  
225	  See	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Defiance_Campaign	  (Accessed	  November	  2,	  2011).	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Mandela	  and	  the	  other	  ANC	  leaders	  selected	  these	  laws	  in	  order	  to	  build	  a	  
broad	  base	  of	  support	  across	  racial	  groups	  against	  apartheid.	  Through	  this	  effort,	  
he	  was	  able	  to	  galvanize	  the	  support	  of	  Indian	  businessmen	  who	  donated	  large	  
sums	  of	  money	  to	  the	  ANC	  for	  its	  activities,	  something	  that	  the	  Youth	  Leaguers	  
remained	  wary	  of	  well	  into	  the	  campaign.	  	  
Ten	  thousand	  volunteers	  were	  to	  be	  prepared	  by	  June	  26,	  1952,	  for	  
disciplined	  civil	  disobedience	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Defiance	  Campaign.	  The	  organizers	  
envisaged	  a	  two	  step	  process	  where	  small	  groups	  of	  individuals	  would	  break	  laws	  
in	  main	  cities,	  followed	  by	  a	  more	  generalized	  and	  more	  dispersed	  participation	  in	  
the	  disobedience	  campaign	  across	  the	  country.	  	  
In	  Mandela’s	  strategic	  understanding,	  the	  campaign	  would	  lead	  to	  a	  
situation	  where	  the	  government	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  administer	  certain	  laws.	  
Mandela	  addressed	  a	  10,000	  person	  strong	  crowd	  in	  Durban	  (half	  of	  those	  
assembled	  were	  Indians)	  and	  suggested	  to	  them	  that	  if	  Defiance	  became	  a	  popular	  
movement,	  the	  government	  might	  be	  compelled	  to	  remove	  discrimination	  or	  even	  
concede	  mass	  suffrage	  or	  that	  White	  voters	  might	  choose	  to	  vote	  it	  out	  of	  power.	  
Fewer	  than	  200	  people	  participated	  in	  the	  Defiance	  Campaign	  in	  Durban	  after	  his	  
speech.	  This	  was	  partly	  due	  to	  the	  inter-­‐communal	  riots	  in	  1949,	  after	  which	  ANC	  
leaders	  had	  remained	  nervous	  about	  engaging	  with	  Indian	  leaders.	  	  
Another	  challenge	  for	  Mandela	  was	  to	  be	  able	  to	  convert	  the	  large	  
audiences	  he	  had	  in	  public	  meetings	  into	  sustained	  activism	  that	  would	  help	  
further	  the	  aims	  of	  the	  ANC.	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Building	  the	  ANC	  	  
	  
Mandela’s	  role	  was	  crucial	  in	  helping	  create	  a	  national	  organization	  for	  the	  
ANC	  that	  was	  able	  to	  operate	  in	  a	  coordinated	  and	  coherent	  manner.	  His	  extensive	  
travels	  in	  the	  early	  1950s	  and	  his	  meetings	  with	  local	  organizers,	  helped	  mobilize	  
people	  across	  the	  nation.	  Mandela	  explained	  to	  organizers	  about	  the	  purpose	  of	  
the	  campaign	  and	  helped	  remove	  any	  misunderstandings.	  	  
Significantly,	  the	  Defiance	  Campaign	  was	  the	  first	  public	  movement	  in	  
South	  Africa	  to	  be	  led	  by	  a	  Black	  person.	  The	  Campaign	  received	  considerable	  
media	  attention	  and	  support	  across	  different	  racial	  and	  ethnic	  groups.	  	  
During	  this	  period,	  Mandela	  and	  fellow	  lawyer	  Oliver	  Tambo	  also	  operated	  
the	  law	  firm	  of	  Mandela	  and	  Tambo,	  providing	  free	  or	  low-­‐cost	  legal	  counsel	  to	  
many	  blacks	  who	  lacked	  attorney	  representation.	  
Mandela	  was	  arrested	  twice	  in	  1952,	  once	  for	  breaking	  curfew	  and	  then	  
again	  under	  the	  Suppression	  of	  Communism	  act.	  He	  was	  put	  on	  trial	  with	  20	  other	  
ANC	  officials	  in	  November	  1952.	  All	  the	  accused	  received	  a	  20-­‐month	  prison	  
sentence,	  which	  was	  suspended	  for	  nine	  months,	  something	  that	  Mandela	  
retrospectively	  viewed	  as	  fair	  and	  reasonable,	  given	  the	  judge’s	  acceptance	  that	  the	  
ANC	  leaders	  had	  insisted	  on	  following	  a	  peaceful	  approach.226	  	  	  
During	  the	  trial,	  ANC	  President	  James	  Moroka	  obtained	  separate	  legal	  
representation	  and	  argued	  that	  he	  was	  hostile	  to	  Communism,	  and	  cited	  his	  close	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
226	  See	  Tom	  Lodge,	  Mandela:	  A	  Critical	  Life,	  (Oxford,	  UK:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  54.	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connections	  within	  the	  White	  Afrikaner	  community	  as	  well.	  This	  defection	  cost	  
him	  the	  ANC	  presidency.	  	  
Following	  the	  trial,	  the	  National	  Party	  led	  government	  began	  to	  actively	  
curb	  Mandela’s	  efforts	  at	  revolution.	  In	  December	  1952,	  Mandela	  and	  52	  ANC	  
leaders	  were	  restricted	  from	  leaving	  Johannesburg	  without	  permission	  or	  meeting	  
with	  more	  than	  one	  person	  at	  a	  time.	  More	  than	  8,000	  volunteers	  were	  convicted	  
during	  the	  Defiance	  Campaign,	  which	  ended	  in	  March	  1953.	  	  
From	  Mandela’s	  perspective,	  the	  Campaign	  had	  indeed	  been	  a	  success.	  It	  
was	  able	  to	  help	  the	  ANC	  gain	  over	  100,000	  supporters,	  the	  national	  organizational	  
capacity	  of	  the	  ANC	  had	  expanded,	  and	  8,000	  of	  its	  activists	  had	  stood	  against	  
unjust	  laws	  and	  had	  braved	  the	  police,	  the	  courts,	  and	  the	  jails.	  	  
Towards	  the	  end	  of	  1954,	  the	  ANC	  also	  began	  planning	  for	  protests	  against	  
the	  Bantu	  Education	  Act227,	  which	  gave	  the	  government	  control	  over	  mission	  
schools	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  dictate	  the	  syllabus	  for	  the	  African	  children.	  Mandela	  
was	  also	  involved	  in	  the	  preparations	  for	  the	  1955	  Congress	  of	  the	  People,	  an	  
assembly	  of	  more	  than	  3,000	  delegates	  mainly	  drawn	  from	  ANC	  branches.	  The	  
Congress’	  adoption	  of	  the	  Freedom	  Charter	  provided	  the	  ANC	  a	  fundamental	  basis	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
227	  The	  Bantu	  Education	  Act	  of	  1953	  established	  a	  Black	  Education	  Department	  in	  the	  Department	  of	  Native	  Affairs,	  which	  
would	  compile	  a	  curriculum	  that	  suited	  the	  "nature	  and	  requirements	  of	  the	  black	  people".	  The	  author	  of	  the	  legislation,	  Dr.	  
Hendrik	  Verwoerd	  (then	  Minister	  of	  Native	  Affairs,	  later	  Prime	  Minister),	  stated	  that	  its	  aim	  was	  to	  prevent	  Africans	  
receiving	  an	  education	  that	  would	  lead	  them	  to	  aspire	  to	  positions	  they	  wouldn't	  be	  allowed	  to	  hold	  in	  society.	  Instead	  
Africans	  were	  to	  receive	  an	  education	  designed	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  skills	  to	  serve	  their	  own	  people	  in	  the	  homelands	  or	  to	  
work	  in	  laboring	  jobs	  under	  whites.	  See	  http://africanhistory.about.com/library/bl/blsalaws.htm	  (Accessed	  November	  2,	  
2011).	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for	  the	  anti-­‐apartheid	  struggle.228	  A	  multi-­‐racial	  Federation	  of	  South	  African	  
Women	  began	  organizing	  protests	  against	  the	  extension	  of	  the	  Pass	  Laws	  to	  
African	  women	  in	  1956.	  	  
Mandela	  was	  by	  now	  the	  deputy	  president	  of	  the	  ANC.	  He	  played	  a	  central	  
role	  in	  the	  organization’s	  activities.	  He	  is	  known	  to	  have	  been	  the	  architect	  of	  the	  
ANC’s	  new	  organizational	  scheme,	  in	  which	  the	  base	  units	  of	  the	  ANC	  would	  be	  
‘cells’,	  one	  for	  every	  street	  of	  a	  township.	  These	  ‘cells’	  were	  themselves	  divided	  into	  
‘blocks’	  of	  seven	  households	  each.	  Seven	  cells	  would	  constitute	  a	  ‘zone’	  and	  four	  
zones	  would	  constitute	  a	  ‘ward’	  led	  by	  ‘prime	  stewards.’	  The	  stewards	  together	  
would	  embody	  a	  branch	  secretariat.	  Mandela	  envisioned	  that	  this	  new	  structure	  
would	  enable	  the	  ANC	  to	  work	  in	  close	  contact	  with	  common	  folk	  and	  hence	  make	  
it	  more	  representative	  of	  their	  sentiments	  and	  wishes	  (See	  Figure	  4-­‐15).	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  See	  Congress	  of	  the	  People,	  1955,	  
http://web.archive.org/web/20080622053030/http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/campaigns/cop/index.html	  (Accessed	  
October	  28,	  2011).	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Figure	  4-­‐15:	  The	  ANC's	  New	  Organization	  Structure	  as	  envisaged	  by	  Mandela	  in	  the	  1950s.	  
The	  ANC	  leaders,	  including	  Mandela,	  during	  the	  1950s	  believed	  that	  racial	  
reconciliation	  was	  possible	  and	  tried	  to	  work	  towards	  such	  a	  settlement.	  Mandela	  
and	  his	  associates	  had	  received	  help	  from	  White	  farmers	  and	  Afrikaners	  in	  
unexpected	  circumstances,	  and	  these	  experiences	  had	  reinforced	  the	  hope	  that	  the	  
White	  minority	  could	  be	  reasoned	  with	  in	  South	  Africa.	  	  
Within	  the	  ANC,	  however,	  the	  Youth	  Leaguers	  found	  the	  idea	  of	  
incorporation	  of	  racial	  minorities	  into	  a	  broad	  notion	  of	  South	  African	  citizenship	  
unacceptable.	  Many	  members	  would	  break	  away	  from	  the	  ANC	  and	  form	  the	  rival	  
Pan	  Africanist	  Congress	  (PAC)	  in	  1959.	  This	  was	  the	  culmination	  of	  developments	  
over	  a	  seven-­‐year	  period	  from	  1952–1959.	  	  
During	  this	  time,	  a	  new	  class	  of	  Black	  activists	  known	  as	  the	  Africanists	  
disrupted	  ANC	  activities	  in	  the	  townships,	  demanding	  more	  drastic	  steps	  against	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Tambo	  and	  Walter	  Sisulu	  felt	  not	  only	  that	  the	  Africanists	  were	  moving	  too	  fast	  
but	  also	  that	  they	  challenged	  their	  leadership.	  	  
The	  ANC	  leadership	  consequently	  bolstered	  their	  position	  through	  alliances	  
with	  small	  White,	  Colored,	  and	  Indian	  political	  parties	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  give	  the	  
appearance	  of	  wider	  appeal	  than	  the	  Africanists.	  This	  led	  to	  further	  differences	  
between	  the	  ANC	  leadership	  and	  the	  Youth	  Leaguers.	  	  
The	  Africanists	  criticized	  the	  1955	  Freedom	  Charter	  at	  the	  Kliptown	  
Conference	  for	  the	  concession	  of	  the	  100,000-­‐strong	  ANC	  to	  just	  a	  single	  vote	  in	  a	  
Congressional	  alliance.	  In	  1959,	  the	  ANC	  lost	  its	  militant	  support	  when	  most	  of	  the	  
Africanists	  (Youth	  Leaguers),	  with	  financial	  support	  from	  Ghana	  and	  significant	  
political	  support	  from	  the	  Transvaal-­‐based	  Basotho,	  broke	  away	  to	  form	  the	  Pan	  
Africanist	  Congress	  (PAC)	  under	  the	  direction	  of	  Robert	  Sobukwe	  and	  Potlako	  
Leballo.229	  
Mandela	  confessed	  to	  harboring	  thoughts	  of	  an	  exclusivist	  African	  
government	  in	  the	  1940s,	  and	  entertaining	  doubts	  about	  the	  merits	  of	  multi-­‐racial	  
mobilization.	  But	  by	  1955,	  his	  thinking	  had	  considerably	  changed	  and	  he	  
campaigned	  for	  mass	  revolution	  at	  the	  widest	  scale	  possible	  in	  order	  to	  completely	  
transform	  the	  current	  social,	  economic	  and	  political	  situation	  in	  South	  Africa.	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  For	  more	  information	  on	  the	  Pan	  Africanist	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  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pan_Africanist_Congress	  
(Accessed	  November	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  2011).	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The	  Freedom	  Charter	  
	  
In	  1956,	  Mandela	  wrote	  an	  exposition	  of	  the	  1955	  Freedom	  Charter	  of	  the	  
Congress	  of	  the	  People	  for	  a	  left-­‐wing	  journal,	  Liberation.	  He	  explained	  that	  the	  
Charter	  was	  not	  merely	  a	  list	  of	  demands	  for	  democratic	  reform.	  It	  was	  not	  a	  
blueprint	  for	  a	  Socialist	  state	  either.	  He	  argued	  that	  the	  Charter	  proposed	  a	  
“transfer	  of	  power	  to	  the	  people,	  not	  a	  single	  class,	  but	  all	  the	  people…	  be	  they	  
workers,	  peasants,	  professional	  men,	  or	  petty	  bourgeoisie.”230	  	  
Mandela	  emphasized	  that	  the	  Charter’s	  implementation	  would	  essentially	  
dismantle	  the	  White	  monopoly	  over	  the	  gold	  mines,	  the	  farms,	  and	  the	  financial	  
sector.	  This	  would	  allow	  for	  the	  development	  of	  an	  African	  middle	  class,	  which	  
could	  for	  the	  first	  time	  look	  forward	  to	  land	  ownership	  and	  property	  rights.	  He	  
foresaw	  that	  this	  would	  allow	  for	  the	  growth	  and	  spread	  of	  private	  enterprise	  in	  
South	  Africa.	  	  
Mandela	  had	  several	  detractors	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  ANC	  in	  this	  
interpretation	  of	  the	  Charter.	  The	  Communists	  wanted	  workers’	  committees	  to	  
manage	  the	  mines	  and	  other	  big	  industries.	  Mandela	  was	  not	  so	  sure	  about	  this	  
approach.	  He	  was	  more	  focused	  on	  creating	  institutions	  that	  would	  help	  sustain	  
democracy	  and	  ensure	  economic	  opportunities	  for	  all	  Africans.	  	  
Lodge	  points	  out	  that	  on	  one	  hand	  Mandela	  found	  the	  moral	  absolutism	  of	  
the	  ‘professional	  revolutionary’	  quite	  appealing.	  Mandela	  kept	  pictures	  of	  Lenin	  
and	  Stalin	  on	  his	  office	  wall	  throughout	  the	  1950s.	  He	  saw	  the	  ANC’s	  struggle	  as	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  See	  Tom	  Lodge,	  Mandela:	  A	  Critical	  Life,	  (Oxford,	  UK:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  66-­‐67.	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one	  against	  a	  fascist	  state,	  which	  sought	  to	  enrich	  a	  minority,	  while	  oppressing	  a	  
large	  majority.	  	  
Mandela	  also	  believed,	  however,	  that	  there	  were	  significant	  numbers	  of	  
White	  South	  Africans	  who	  might	  be	  willing	  to	  compromise	  and	  work	  with	  the	  
ANC.	  Mandela	  took	  care	  to	  ensure	  that	  he	  represent	  himself	  and	  the	  ANC	  
leadership	  as	  “professional	  revolutionaries”	  who	  merely	  represented	  the	  will	  of	  the	  
people.	  They	  were	  not	  leading	  for	  any	  personal	  glorification,	  but	  were	  following	  
the	  wishes	  of	  the	  people.	  	  	  
Though	  he	  believed	  in	  non-­‐violent	  resistance	  and	  civil-­‐obedience,	  Mandela	  
also	  entertained	  the	  notion	  of	  violent	  insurgent	  politics	  in	  the	  1950s.	  Towards	  the	  
end	  of	  1956,	  156	  ANC	  leaders,	  including	  Mandela	  were	  charged	  with	  treason	  and	  
sent	  to	  a	  trial	  that	  would	  last	  for	  nearly	  five	  years.	  The	  marathon	  Treason	  Trial	  of	  
1956–1961	  followed,	  with	  all	  defendants	  receiving	  acquittals.231	  	  
The	  ANC	  and	  Violent	  Resistance	  
	  
After	  police	  killed	  69	  unarmed	  black	  protesters	  at	  Sharpeville	  in	  1960,	  
Mandela	  and	  other	  Congress	  leaders	  increasingly	  abandoned	  their	  hopes	  for	  
peaceful	  change.	  Mandela	  writes,	  	  
“Gandhi	  remained	  committed	  to	  nonviolence;	  I	  followed	  the	  
Gandhian	  strategy	  for	  as	  long	  as	  I	  could,	  but	  then	  there	  came	  a	  point	  
in	  our	  struggle	  when	  the	  brute	  force	  of	  the	  oppressor	  could	  no	  longer	  
be	  countered	  through	  passive	  resistance	  alone.	  We	  founded	  Umkhonto	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  See	  "Nelson	  Mandela's	  Testimony	  at	  the	  Treason	  Trial	  1956–60"	  African	  National	  Congress.	  
http://web.archive.org/web/20080802140822/http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1960s/treason.html	  
(Accessed	  October	  28,	  2011).	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we	  Sizwe	  and	  added	  a	  military	  dimension	  to	  our	  struggle.	  Even	  then,	  
we	  chose	  sabotage	  because	  it	  did	  not	  involve	  the	  loss	  of	  life,	  and	  it	  
offered	  the	  best	  hope	  for	  future	  race	  relations.	  Militant	  action	  became	  
part	  of	  the	  African	  agenda	  officially	  supported	  by	  the	  Organization	  of	  
African	  Unity	  (OAU)	  following	  my	  address	  to	  the	  Pan-­‐African	  
Freedom	  Movement	  of	  East	  and	  Central	  Africa	  (PAFMECA)	  in	  1962,	  in	  
which	  I	  stated,	  "Force	  is	  the	  only	  language	  the	  imperialists	  can	  hear,	  
and	  no	  country	  became	  free	  without	  some	  sort	  of	  violence."”232	  
	  
In	  1961,	  Mandela	  and	  his	  peers	  formed	  the	  ANC’s	  military	  wing,	  Umkhonto	  
we	  Sizwe	  (The	  Spear	  of	  the	  Nation).233	  The	  following	  year,	  Mandela	  left	  the	  country	  
for	  military	  training	  in	  Algeria	  and	  to	  arrange	  training	  for	  the	  other	  members.	  On	  
his	  return	  he	  was	  arrested	  for	  leaving	  the	  country	  illegally	  and	  for	  incitement	  to	  
strike.	  	  
Mandela	  conducted	  his	  own	  defense,	  but	  was	  convicted	  and	  jailed	  for	  five	  
years	  in	  November	  1962.	  While	  serving	  his	  sentence	  he	  was	  also	  charged	  in	  the	  
Rivonia	  trial	  with	  sabotage	  and	  sentenced	  to	  life	  imprisonment	  on	  Robben	  Island	  
Prison.	  His	  statement	  during	  his	  defense	  at	  the	  Rivonia	  Trial	  in	  1964	  described	  how	  
the	  ANC	  had	  used	  peaceful	  means	  to	  resist	  apartheid	  for	  years	  until	  the	  Sharpeville	  
Massacre.	  	  
The	  shift	  to	  violent	  resistance	  had	  several	  factors.	  The	  massacre	  at	  
Sharpeville,	  the	  banning	  of	  the	  ANC,	  the	  referendum	  establishing	  the	  Republic	  of	  
South	  Africa,	  and	  the	  declaration	  of	  a	  state	  of	  emergency	  were	  all	  factors	  that	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  See	  the	  section	  on	  Gandhi	  at	  http://www.sa-­‐venues.com/nelson_mandela.htm	  	  
233	  See	  Manifesto	  of	  Umkhonto	  we	  Sizwe	  
http://web.archive.org/web/20080521064728/http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/manifesto-­‐mk.html	  (Accessed	  
November	  2,	  2011).	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contributed	  to	  this	  decision.	  All	  these	  made	  it	  clear	  to	  Mandela	  and	  his	  colleagues	  
that	  their	  only	  choice	  was	  to	  resist	  through	  acts	  of	  sabotage	  and	  that	  doing	  
otherwise	  would	  have	  been	  equivalent	  to	  unconditional	  surrender.	  	  
In	  his	  closing	  remarks	  to	  the	  judge	  Mandela	  remarked,	  	  
“I	  have	  fought	  against	  white	  domination,	  and	  I	  have	  fought	  
against	  black	  domination.	  I	  have	  cherished	  the	  ideal	  of	  a	  democratic	  
and	  free	  society	  in	  which	  all	  persons	  live	  together	  in	  harmony	  and	  with	  
equal	  opportunities.	  It	  is	  an	  ideal	  which	  I	  hope	  to	  live	  for	  and	  to	  
achieve.	  But	  if	  needs	  be,	  it	  is	  an	  ideal	  for	  which	  I	  am	  prepared	  to	  
die.”234	  	  
Mandela’s	  Time	  in	  Prison	  
	  
Nelson	  Mandela	  spent	  the	  next	  27	  and	  half	  years	  of	  his	  life	  as	  a	  prisoner	  
from	  August	  1962.	  He	  initially	  spent	  18	  years	  at	  Robben	  Island	  prison	  where	  he	  was	  
held	  in	  Section	  B	  of	  a	  specially	  built	  one-­‐level	  block,	  enclosing	  a	  courtyard,	  for	  
political	  prisoners.	  	  
Robben	  Island	  Prison	  held	  African,	  Indian	  and	  Colored	  political	  prisoners	  
between	  1962	  and	  1991.	  From	  the	  mid	  to	  late	  1960s,	  there	  were	  more	  than	  1000	  PAC	  
and	  ANC	  activists	  on	  the	  Island.	  The	  prison	  warders	  were	  exclusively	  White	  
Afrikaners.	  Mandela	  was	  put	  into	  a	  single	  cell	  prison,	  and	  was	  kept	  in	  solitary	  
confinement	  for	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  time.	  He	  was	  given	  a	  mat	  and	  three	  blankets,	  
and	  slept	  on	  the	  floor	  until	  the	  mid	  1970s	  when	  the	  International	  Red	  Cross	  
persuaded	  the	  authorities	  to	  provide	  beds	  for	  the	  prisoners.	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  Nelson	  Mandela's	  statement	  from	  the	  dock	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  the	  Rivonia	  Trial	  ended	  with	  these	  words.	  See	  http://www.sa-­‐
venues.com/nelson_mandela.htm	  for	  more	  details	  (Accessed	  November	  2,	  2011).	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During	  this	  period,	  Mandela’s	  life	  was	  solitary	  and	  introspective	  and	  he	  was	  
treated	  mostly	  in	  the	  same	  manner	  as	  many	  other	  prisoners	  on	  the	  Island.	  The	  
authorities,	  however,	  allowed	  him	  to	  continue	  his	  University	  of	  London	  Bachelor	  
of	  Law	  course.	  This	  might	  have	  been	  due	  to	  his	  Transkeien	  royal	  connection	  or	  the	  
international	  attention	  that	  the	  Rivonia	  trial	  received.235	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  his	  pursuit	  of	  law	  degree,	  Mandela	  also	  made	  an	  effort	  to	  
learn	  Afrikaans	  and	  was	  seen	  as	  civil	  and	  respectable	  by	  the	  warders.	  Lodge	  notes	  
that	  Mandela	  especially	  liked	  reading	  and	  was	  fond	  of	  quoting	  William	  Henley’s	  
‘Invictus’:	  	   	  
‘It	  matters	  not	  how	  straight	  the	  gate,	  
How	  charged	  with	  punishments	  the	  scroll,	  
I	  am	  the	  master	  of	  my	  fate,	  
I	  am	  the	  Captain	  of	  my	  soul.’	  236	  
	  
When	  allowed	  to	  meet,	  the	  inmates	  would	  engage	  in	  political	  discussions	  
and	  philosophical	  debates	  with	  fellow	  ANC	  leaders,	  as	  well	  as	  leaders	  of	  other	  
groups.	  It	  was	  clear	  that	  Mandela	  exerted	  an	  intellectual	  and	  ideological	  influence	  
on	  the	  other	  prisoners	  on	  Robben	  Island.	  His	  presence	  on	  the	  Island	  helped	  to	  
create	  a	  groundswell	  of	  support	  for	  the	  ANC	  across	  South	  Africa,	  as	  well	  as	  
strengthened	  the	  organization.	  	  
Soon,	  the	  Government	  had	  no	  choice	  but	  to	  take	  some	  action	  to	  try	  and	  
curb	  his	  growing	  influence.	  In	  March	  1982	  Mandela	  was	  transferred	  from	  Robben	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  See	  http://observer.gm/africa/gambia/article/2008/7/25/the-­‐big-­‐read-­‐nelson-­‐mandela-­‐a-­‐living-­‐legend-­‐1	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  See	  Tom	  Lodge,	  Mandela:	  A	  Critical	  Life,	  (Oxford,	  UK:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  140.	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Island	  to	  Pollsmoor	  Prison	  along	  with	  other	  senior	  ANC	  leaders	  Walter	  Sisulu,	  
Andrew	  Mlangeni,	  Ahmed	  Kathrada	  and	  Raymond	  Mhlaba.237	  The	  Government	  
made	  this	  move	  in	  order	  to	  remove	  the	  influence	  of	  these	  senior	  ANC	  leaders	  on	  
the	  new	  generation	  of	  young	  Black	  activists	  imprisoned	  on	  Robben	  Island,	  the	  so-­‐
called	  "Mandela	  University".238	  	  
Minister	  Hendrik	  Coetsee	  however,	  claimed	  that	  the	  move	  was	  to	  enable	  
discreet	  contact	  between	  the	  senior	  ANC	  leaders	  and	  the	  South	  African	  
Government	  to	  move	  towards	  a	  political	  settlement.239	  One	  of	  the	  other	  reasons	  
for	  the	  transfer	  was	  that	  the	  older	  prisoners	  needed	  medical	  attention	  more	  
frequently,	  and	  Pollsmoor	  Prison	  was	  closer	  to	  a	  hospital.	  	  
Mandela	  believed	  that	  the	  move	  was	  to	  decapitate	  the	  ANC’s	  leadership	  
structure	  on	  the	  Island.	  More	  generally,	  in	  the	  1970s	  the	  government	  began	  to	  
disperse	  the	  political	  prisoners	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  reducing	  their	  organizational	  
capacity	  as	  well	  the	  prison’s	  symbolic	  significance	  for	  anti-­‐apartheid	  
campaigners.240	  	  	  
In	  1976,	  nationwide	  protests	  by	  school	  children	  put	  South	  Africa’s	  
government	  on	  the	  defensive.	  Adding	  to	  the	  strain	  on	  the	  Government	  was	  the	  
contraction	  in	  GDP	  growth	  rates	  as	  production	  for	  local	  markets	  reached	  its	  limits	  
in	  a	  low-­‐wage	  economy.	  A	  decade	  of	  African	  experience	  with	  semi-­‐skilled	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  See	  Tom	  Lodge,	  Mandela:	  A	  Critical	  Life,	  (Oxford,	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  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	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238	  See	  Anders	  Hallengren,	  “Nelson	  Mandela	  and	  the	  Rainbow	  of	  Culture,”	  The	  Nobel	  Foundation,	  2001.	  
http://web.archive.org/web/20080822063757/http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/articles/mandela/index.html	  	  
239	  See	  Allister	  Sparks,	  Tomorrow	  is	  Another	  Country:	  The	  Inside	  Story	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  Road	  to	  Change,	  (Chicago,	  IL:	  
University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	  1996).	  	  
240	  See	  Tom	  Lodge,	  Mandela:	  A	  Critical	  Life,	  (Oxford,	  UK:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  149.	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manufacturing	  work	  gave	  the	  Black	  Africans	  added	  leverage	  against	  their	  White	  
employers	  and	  laid	  the	  foundations	  for	  strong	  labor	  unions.	  	  
Increased	  literacy	  due	  to	  the	  expansion	  in	  secondary	  and	  high	  school	  
enrolments	  of	  Africans	  combined	  with	  the	  growing	  vibrancy	  of	  local	  media	  
fostered	  the	  formation	  of	  new	  political	  organizations.	  International	  developments	  
like	  the	  Civil	  Rights	  movement	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  the	  collapse	  of	  colonial	  
power	  in	  most	  of	  Africa	  inspired	  Black	  activists	  to	  continue	  and	  scale-­‐up	  their	  
struggle	  against	  the	  Apartheid	  regime.	  	  
The	  growing	  desperation	  of	  the	  regime	  was	  evident	  in	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  
Police	  fired	  upon	  a	  crowd	  of	  15,000	  school	  children,	  killing	  two,	  in	  1976.	  This	  
incident	  led	  to	  large-­‐scale	  riots	  across	  50	  Transvaal	  centers	  before	  spreading	  to	  the	  
main	  economic	  centers	  in	  the	  eastern	  and	  western	  Cape.	  The	  situation	  worsened	  
over	  the	  next	  year,	  with	  more	  street	  battles,	  strikes	  and	  classroom	  boycotts,	  and	  
more	  than	  500	  protesters	  died.	  	  
As	  a	  prisoner,	  Mandela	  remained	  true	  to	  the	  cause	  of	  the	  people.	  In	  1976,	  
Mandela	  refused	  the	  offer	  of	  a	  remission	  of	  sentence	  if	  he	  recognized	  Transkei,	  an	  
area	  set-­‐aside	  for	  members	  of	  a	  specific	  ethnicity	  and	  a	  nominal	  parliamentary	  
democracy	  in	  the	  southeastern	  region	  of	  South	  Africa,	  and	  settled	  there.	  His	  
struggle	  was	  against	  apartheid	  in	  South	  Africa.	  He	  would	  not	  compromise	  his	  
principles	  and	  the	  faith	  that	  his	  peers	  and	  followers	  had	  placed	  in	  him.	  	  
In	  February	  1985,	  President	  P.W.	  Botha	  offered	  Mandela	  his	  freedom	  on	  the	  
condition	  that	  he	  unconditionally	  rejected	  violence	  as	  a	  political	  weapon.	  Minister	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Coetsee	  and	  others	  in	  the	  cabinet	  had	  advised	  Botha	  against	  this,	  saying	  that	  
Mandela	  would	  never	  commit	  his	  organization	  to	  giving	  up	  the	  armed	  struggle	  in	  
exchange	  for	  personal	  freedom.	  	  
Mandela	  spurned	  the	  offer	  and	  released	  a	  statement	  via	  his	  daughter	  Zindzi	  
saying,	  	  
"I	  am	  a	  member	  of	  the	  African	  National	  Congress.	  I	  have	  
always	  been	  a	  member	  of	  the	  African	  National	  Congress	  and	  I	  will	  
remain	  a	  member	  of	  the	  African	  National	  Congress	  until	  the	  day	  I	  die.	  
Oliver	  Tambo	  is	  much	  more	  than	  a	  brother	  to	  me.	  He	  is	  my	  greatest	  
friend	  and	  comrade	  for	  nearly	  fifty	  years.	  If	  there	  is	  any	  one	  amongst	  
you	  who	  cherishes	  my	  freedom,	  Oliver	  Tambo	  cherishes	  it	  more,	  and	  I	  
know	  that	  he	  would	  give	  his	  life	  to	  see	  me	  free.	  There	  is	  no	  difference	  
between	  his	  views	  and	  mine.	  
I	  am	  surprised	  at	  the	  conditions	  that	  the	  government	  wants	  to	  
impose	  on	  me.	  I	  am	  not	  a	  violent	  man.	  My	  colleagues	  and	  I	  wrote	  in	  
1952	  to	  Malan	  asking	  for	  a	  round	  table	  conference	  to	  find	  a	  solution	  to	  
the	  problems	  of	  our	  country,	  but	  that	  was	  ignored.	  When	  Strijdom	  was	  
in	  power,	  we	  made	  the	  same	  offer.	  Again	  it	  was	  ignored.	  When	  
Verwoerd	  was	  in	  power	  we	  asked	  for	  a	  national	  convention	  for	  all	  the	  
people	  in	  South	  Africa	  to	  decide	  on	  their	  future.	  This,	  too,	  was	  in	  vain.	  
It	  was	  only	  then,	  when	  all	  other	  forms	  of	  resistance	  were	  no	  
longer	  open	  to	  us	  that	  we	  turned	  to	  armed	  struggle.	  Let	  Botha	  show	  
that	  he	  is	  different	  to	  Malan,	  Strijdom	  and	  Verwoerd.	  Let	  him	  
renounce	  violence.	  Let	  him	  say	  that	  he	  will	  dismantle	  apartheid.	  Let	  
him	  unban	  the	  people's	  organization,	  the	  African	  National	  Congress.	  
Let	  him	  free	  all	  who	  have	  been	  imprisoned,	  banished	  or	  exiled	  for	  their	  
opposition	  to	  apartheid.	  Let	  him	  guarantee	  free	  political	  activity	  so	  
that	  people	  may	  decide	  who	  will	  govern	  them.	  
I	  cherish	  my	  own	  freedom	  dearly,	  but	  I	  care	  even	  more	  for	  your	  
freedom.	  Too	  many	  have	  died	  since	  I	  went	  to	  prison.	  Too	  many	  have	  
suffered	  for	  the	  love	  of	  freedom.	  I	  owe	  it	  to	  their	  widows,	  to	  their	  
orphans,	  to	  their	  mothers	  and	  to	  their	  fathers	  who	  have	  grieved	  and	  
wept	  for	  them.	  Not	  only	  I	  have	  suffered	  during	  these	  long,	  lonely,	  
wasted	  years.	  I	  am	  not	  less	  life	  loving	  than	  you	  are.	  But	  I	  cannot	  sell	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my	  birthright,	  nor	  am	  I	  prepared	  to	  sell	  the	  birthright	  of	  the	  people	  to	  
be	  free.	  I	  am	  in	  prison	  as	  the	  representative	  of	  the	  people	  and	  of	  your	  
organization,	  the	  African	  National	  Congress,	  which	  was	  banned.	  
What	  freedom	  am	  I	  being	  offered	  while	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  
people	  remains	  banned?	  What	  freedom	  am	  I	  being	  offered	  when	  I	  may	  
be	  arrested	  on	  a	  pass	  offence?	  What	  freedom	  am	  I	  being	  offered	  to	  live	  
my	  life	  as	  a	  family	  with	  my	  dear	  wife	  who	  remains	  in	  banishment	  in	  
Brandfort?	  What	  freedom	  am	  I	  being	  offered	  when	  I	  must	  ask	  for	  
permission	  to	  live	  in	  an	  urban	  area?	  What	  freedom	  am	  I	  being	  offered	  
when	  I	  need	  a	  stamp	  in	  my	  pass	  to	  seek	  work?	  What	  freedom	  am	  I	  
being	  offered	  when	  my	  very	  South	  African	  citizenship	  is	  not	  respected?	  
Only	  free	  men	  can	  negotiate.	  Prisoners	  cannot	  enter	  into	  
contracts.	  Herman	  Toivo	  ja	  Toivo,	  when	  freed,	  never	  gave	  any	  
undertaking,	  nor	  was	  he	  called	  upon	  to	  do	  so.	  
I	  cannot	  and	  will	  not	  give	  any	  undertaking	  at	  a	  time	  when	  I	  and	  
you,	  the	  people,	  are	  not	  free.	  
Your	  freedom	  and	  mine	  cannot	  be	  separated.	  I	  will	  return."	  241	  
	  
The	  first	  meeting	  between	  Mandela	  and	  the	  National	  Party	  government	  
came	  in	  November	  1985	  when	  Hendrik	  Coetsee	  met	  Mandela	  in	  Volks	  Hospital	  in	  
Cape	  Town	  where	  Mandela	  was	  recovering	  from	  prostate	  surgery.	  In	  mid-­‐1985,	  
Mandela	  wrote	  to	  Minister	  Coetsee	  and	  requested	  a	  meeting,	  representing	  a	  
decisive	  break	  from	  the	  accepted	  convention	  that	  ‘as	  isolated	  prisoners,	  we	  would	  
do	  nothing	  that	  could	  be	  construed	  as	  policy	  making.’242	  Mandela	  later	  explained	  
in	  1994	  that	  he	  knew	  that	  his	  colleagues	  would	  condemn	  his	  proposal	  and	  that	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  See	  “I	  am	  not	  prepared	  to	  sell	  the	  birthright	  of	  my	  people	  in	  order	  to	  be	  free”,	  
http://web.archive.org/web/20080622004124/http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/64-­‐90/jabulani.html	  
(Accessed	  October	  29,	  2011).	  	  
242	  See	  Tom	  Lodge,	  Mandela:	  A	  Critical	  Life,	  (Oxford,	  UK:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  157.	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would	  kill	  his	  initiative,	  but	  at	  times	  a	  leader	  must	  move	  out	  ahead	  of	  his	  flock	  and	  
go	  in	  a	  new	  direction.243	  	  
The	  South	  African	  government	  saw	  Mandela	  as	  an	  exceptional	  individual	  
who	  could	  be	  reasoned	  and	  negotiated	  with.	  He	  was	  not	  seen	  to	  be	  racially	  
embittered	  like	  many	  other	  ANC	  leaders.	  He	  was	  philosophically	  pragmatic,	  
intellectually	  creative,	  and	  believed	  in	  the	  cause	  he	  was	  fighting	  for.	  A	  1981	  prison	  
report	  on	  Mandela	  noted	  that	  he	  commanded	  all	  the	  qualities	  to	  be	  the	  Number	  
One	  Black	  leader	  in	  South	  Africa.	  Imprisonment	  had	  actually	  served	  to	  increase	  his	  
‘psycho-­‐political	  posture’	  and	  had	  provided	  him	  with	  an	  added	  charisma.244	  	  
In	  addition	  to	  Mandela’s	  personality	  and	  charm,	  the	  Government	  of	  Prime	  
Minister	  P.W.	  Botha	  in	  the	  early	  1980s	  had	  to	  take	  into	  consideration	  the	  
increasing	  international	  pressures	  as	  well	  as	  internal	  developments.	  During	  a	  
private	  meeting	  with	  Botha,	  British	  Prime	  Minister,	  Margaret	  Thatcher,	  advised	  
him	  to	  release	  Mandela.	  	  
Over	  the	  next	  four	  years,	  a	  series	  of	  tentative	  meetings	  took	  place,	  laying	  
the	  groundwork	  for	  further	  contact	  and	  future	  negotiations,	  but	  little	  real	  progress	  
was	  made.245	  Throughout	  Mandela's	  imprisonment,	  local	  and	  international	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  Tom	  Lodge,	  Mandela:	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  Life,	  (Oxford,	  UK:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  157-­‐158.	  	  
244	  See	  Anthony	  Sampson,	  Mandela:	  The	  authorized	  biography,	  (London,	  UK:	  Harper	  Collins,	  1999),	  300.	  
245	  See	  Allister	  Sparks,	  Tomorrow	  is	  Another	  Country:	  The	  Inside	  Story	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  Road	  to	  Change,	  (Chicago,	  IL:	  
University	  of	  Chicago	  Press,	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pressure	  mounted	  on	  the	  South	  African	  government	  to	  release	  him,	  under	  the	  
resounding	  slogan	  Free	  Nelson	  Mandela!246	  	  
In	  1980,	  the	  editor	  of	  the	  Johannesburg	  daily	  tabloid,	  The	  World,	  launched	  
the	  Free	  Mandela	  Campaign.	  The	  Campaign	  received	  widespread	  international	  
support,	  and	  was	  symbolized	  by	  Winnie	  Mandela’s	  efforts	  within	  South	  Africa.	  A	  
petition	  sponsored	  by	  Sunday	  Post	  soon	  received	  over	  86,000	  signatures	  and	  was	  
supported	  by	  many	  organizations	  and	  community	  leaders.247	  
In	  the	  years	  after	  Mandela	  was	  moved	  to	  Pollsmoor	  Prison,	  the	  Government	  
undertook	  further	  reforms	  and	  conceded	  executive	  authority	  to	  previously	  
advisory	  African	  municipal	  assemblies.	  The	  Government	  also	  lifted	  restrictions	  on	  
private	  sector	  investment	  in	  black	  townships	  and	  in	  1986,	  it	  repealed	  the	  system	  of	  
Pass	  Laws	  and	  influx	  control.	  	  
In	  the	  more	  liberal	  political	  climate	  of	  the	  1980s,	  some	  South	  African	  
activists	  formed	  the	  United	  Democratic	  Front	  (UDF)	  in	  1983,	  and	  proclaimed	  their	  
loyalty	  to	  the	  ‘non-­‐racial’	  ideology	  of	  the	  ANC.	  The	  ANC’s	  revival	  as	  a	  political	  
force	  inside	  South	  Africa	  was	  also	  due	  to	  the	  resumption	  of	  the	  military	  operations	  
of	  the	  Umkhonto	  we	  Sizwe,	  through	  infiltration	  from	  Botswana	  and	  Mozambique.	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  Political	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  Africa,	  available	  at:	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  (Accessed	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  2011).	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  See	  Free	  Nelson	  Mandela:	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  Account	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  (Accessed	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  2011).	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The	  UDF	  campaigned	  for	  boycotts	  of	  the	  tri-­‐cameral	  parliament	  election,	  
which	  was	  instituted	  by	  the	  government	  in	  1984	  and	  would	  include	  Indian	  and	  
colored	  chambers	  of	  parliament	  alongside	  the	  white	  chamber	  of	  parliament.	  
Members	  of	  all	  three	  chambers	  would	  join	  a	  multi-­‐racial	  cabinet.	  UDF	  activists	  
were	  prominent	  in	  the	  riots	  and	  violence	  that	  occurred	  across	  townships	  in	  South	  
Africa.	  This	  was	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  bloodiest	  phase	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  political	  
history	  after	  the	  Anglo-­‐Boer	  War.	  In	  the	  decade	  between	  1984	  and	  1994,	  more	  than	  
25,000	  political	  motivated	  killings	  occurred	  in	  South	  Africa.248	  	  
In	  1988,	  Mandela	  was	  moved	  to	  Victor	  Verster	  Prison	  and	  would	  remain	  
there	  until	  his	  release.	  In	  1989,	  South	  Africa	  was	  at	  crossroads	  when	  President	  
Botha	  suffered	  a	  stroke	  and	  was	  replaced	  as	  state	  president	  by	  Frederik	  Willem	  de	  
Klerk.	  	  	  
Mandela	  and	  de	  Klerk	  
	  
F.W.	  de	  Klerk	  was	  not	  considered	  a	  reformer	  or	  a	  member	  of	  the	  National	  
Party’s	  liberal	  wing.	  Like	  Mandela,	  de	  Klerk	  was	  notable	  in	  the	  Afrikaner	  
community.	  He	  was	  the	  son	  of	  a	  former	  cabinet	  minister	  and	  related	  to	  the	  second	  
Prime	  Minister	  of	  the	  Apartheid	  era,	  Hans	  Strydom.	  He	  remained	  convinced	  that	  
the	  people	  who	  created	  the	  Apartheid	  ideology	  were	  not	  ‘evil	  people’	  and	  that	  in	  
its	  idealistic	  form,	  Apartheid	  was	  a	  program	  to	  bring	  political	  rights	  to	  all	  South	  
Africans	  via	  nation	  states.	  However,	  he	  later	  conceded	  that	  the	  Apartheid	  system	  
had	  failed	  and	  had	  just	  resulted	  in	  racial	  discrimination	  and	  minority	  domination.	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The	  resulting	  moral	  and	  practical	  crisis	  represented	  a	  matter	  of	  conscience	  he	  
agreed.249	  	  
The	  fall	  of	  the	  White	  regime	  in	  neighboring	  Rhodesia	  (now	  Zimbabwe)	  in	  
1980	  and	  the	  regular	  briefings	  about	  the	  growing	  unrest	  in	  the	  country	  might	  have	  
persuaded	  the	  new	  President	  to	  seize	  the	  initiative	  for	  negotiations	  with	  Mandela	  
and	  the	  ANC.	  Scholars	  have	  acknowledged	  de	  Klerk’s	  courage	  and	  moral	  
conviction	  to	  the	  negotiations,	  and	  his	  willingness	  to	  take	  risks,	  which	  proved	  a	  
decisive	  factor	  in	  South	  Africa’s	  achievement	  of	  democracy.	  	  
By	  the	  time	  Botha	  stepped	  down,	  Mandela	  had	  established	  regular	  contact	  
with	  Oliver	  Tambo,	  who	  was	  now	  the	  ANC	  President	  in	  exile	  in	  Harare,	  through	  
Mac	  Maharaj,	  another	  longstanding	  ANC	  associate.	  He	  was	  able	  to	  review	  a	  
document	  that	  Tambo	  had	  prepared	  as	  the	  ANC’s	  Harare	  Declaration.	  The	  
Declaration	  suggested	  that	  the	  ANC’s	  military	  operations	  could	  be	  suspended	  in	  
exchange	  for	  release	  of	  prisoners,	  lifting	  the	  ban	  on	  the	  ANC,	  and	  the	  withdrawal	  
of	  South	  African	  Defense	  Force	  soldiers	  from	  black	  townships.	  	  
In	  October	  1989,	  Mandela	  suggested	  to	  Coetsee	  that	  de	  Klerk	  should	  release	  
ten	  prominent	  prisoners	  including	  Ahmed	  Kathrada,	  Walter	  Sisulu	  and	  he	  assured	  
the	  minister	  that	  their	  behavior	  would	  be	  low	  key.	  Mandela	  also	  spelled	  out	  the	  
fundamental	  requirements	  for	  a	  political	  settlement	  with	  the	  Government.	  He	  
wanted	  a	  unified	  South	  Africa	  with	  no	  artificial	  homelands;	  black	  representation	  in	  
the	  central	  parliament;	  and	  a	  ‘one-­‐man,	  one-­‐vote	  on	  a	  common	  roll’	  policy.	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The	  government	  was	  willing	  to	  negotiate	  regarding	  these	  terms.	  Mandela	  
met	  with	  President	  F.W.	  de	  Klerk	  on	  December	  13,	  1989.	  It	  was	  a	  positive	  meeting,	  
and	  both	  men	  found	  each	  other	  to	  be	  a	  good	  listener.	  To	  Mandela,	  de	  Klerk	  
appeared	  willing	  to	  at	  least	  consider	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  National	  Party’s	  
commitment	  to	  ‘Afrikaner	  rights’	  was	  negotiable.	  De	  Klerk	  saw	  Mandela	  as	  a	  
politician	  to	  be	  reckoned	  with.	  	  
On	  2	  February	  1990,	  President	  F.W.	  de	  Klerk	  reversed	  the	  ban	  on	  the	  ANC	  
and	  other	  anti-­‐apartheid	  organizations,	  and	  announced	  that	  Mandela	  would	  
shortly	  be	  released	  from	  prison.	  Mandela	  was	  released	  from	  Victor	  Verster	  Prison	  
in	  Paarl	  on	  February	  11,	  1990.	  The	  event	  was	  broadcast	  live	  all	  over	  the	  world.	  
On	  the	  day	  of	  his	  release,	  Mandela	  made	  a	  speech	  to	  South	  Africa.	  He	  
publicly	  declared	  his	  commitment	  to	  peace	  and	  reconciliation	  with	  the	  country's	  
white	  minority,	  but	  made	  it	  clear	  that	  the	  ANC's	  armed	  struggle	  was	  not	  yet	  over:	  	  
"Our	  resort	  to	  the	  armed	  struggle	  in	  1960	  with	  the	  formation	  of	  
the	  military	  wing	  of	  the	  ANC	  (Umkhonto	  we	  Sizwe)	  was	  a	  purely	  
defensive	  action	  against	  the	  violence	  of	  apartheid.	  The	  factors	  which	  
necessitated	  the	  armed	  struggle	  still	  exist	  today.	  We	  have	  no	  option	  
but	  to	  continue.	  We	  express	  the	  hope	  that	  a	  climate	  conducive	  to	  a	  
negotiated	  settlement	  would	  be	  created	  soon,	  so	  that	  there	  may	  no	  
longer	  be	  the	  need	  for	  the	  armed	  struggle."250	  
	  
Mandela	  maintained	  that	  his	  main	  focus	  was	  to	  bring	  peace	  to	  the	  Black	  
majority	  and	  give	  them	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  in	  both	  national	  and	  local	  elections.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250	  Tom	  Lodge,	  Mandela:	  A	  Critical	  Life,	  (Oxford,	  UK:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	  164-­‐165.	  
	   243	  
Many	  international	  leaders	  were	  disappointed	  with	  Mandela’s	  speech,	  and	  
felt	  that	  it	  was	  not	  inspiring	  and	  lacked	  warmth,	  vision,	  and	  humanity.	  However,	  
Mandela’s	  focus	  was	  his	  African	  constituents.	  He	  wanted	  to	  reassure	  them	  that	  he	  
continued	  to	  remain	  loyal	  to	  their	  cause,	  and	  that	  he	  could	  be	  relied	  upon	  to	  
represent	  their	  aspirations.	  It	  was	  a	  speech	  that	  was	  focused	  on	  collective	  
requirements	  of	  South	  Africans,	  and	  not	  on	  his	  personal	  experiences	  in	  prison.	  	  
Even	  though	  it	  seemed	  simple	  enough,	  Mandela’s	  walk	  out	  of	  the	  prison	  
with	  Winnie	  was	  carefully	  planned.	  UDF	  leaders	  and	  trade	  unionists	  had	  put	  a	  
National	  Reception	  Committee	  together.	  Cyril	  Ramaphosa,	  the	  secretary-­‐general	  
of	  the	  National	  Union	  of	  Mineworkers,	  headed	  the	  Committee.	  Ramaphosa	  met	  
with	  Mandela	  the	  day	  before	  his	  release	  to	  help	  him	  draft	  his	  speech.	  He	  
maintained	  that	  Mandela’s	  position	  was	  similar	  to	  other	  ANC	  leaders	  and	  that	  he	  
would	  take	  his	  place	  in	  the	  movement	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  ANC.	  	  	  
Negotiating	  with	  the	  “enemy”	  
	  
The	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  meant	  that	  Soviet	  support	  for	  the	  ANC’s	  armed	  
insurgency	  no	  longer	  existed.	  De	  Klerk	  knew	  that	  the	  ANC’s	  armed	  forces	  were	  
under	  increasing	  pressure	  to	  settle	  with	  the	  Government.	  He	  also	  believed	  that	  the	  
ANC	  was	  a	  much	  weaker	  opponent	  without	  international	  support.	  He	  was	  aware,	  
however,	  of	  the	  domestic	  challenges	  facing	  his	  Government	  and	  was	  willing	  to	  
accept	  Mandela’s	  offer	  of	  ‘talking	  about	  talks.’251	  	  Such	  a	  gesture	  of	  accommodation	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on	  his	  part	  won	  de	  Klerk	  support	  from	  the	  conservative	  administrations	  in	  London	  
and	  Washington.	  	  
Negotiated	  or	  ‘pacted’	  transitions	  require	  strong	  adversaries	  and	  popular	  
moral	  authority.	  Lodge	  notes	  that	  it	  was	  clear	  by	  1989	  that	  the	  South	  African	  
regime	  needed	  to	  negotiate	  with	  their	  most	  famous	  prisoner	  in	  order	  to	  render	  any	  
settlement	  legitimate.	  This	  was	  also	  due	  to	  Mandela’s	  diplomacy	  and	  willingness	  to	  
‘talk	  with	  the	  enemy.’	  In	  doing	  so,	  he	  had	  become	  more	  than	  the	  master	  of	  his	  own	  
fate,	  and	  could	  effectively	  influence	  the	  political	  destiny	  of	  his	  compatriots	  and	  his	  
opponents	  as	  well.252	  	  
Mandela	  returned	  to	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  ANC	  and,	  between	  1990	  and	  
1994,	  led	  the	  party	  in	  the	  multi-­‐party	  negotiations	  that	  led	  to	  the	  country's	  first	  
multi-­‐racial	  elections.	  This	  period	  saw	  increasing	  tensions	  between	  the	  UDF/ANC	  
and	  the	  Inkatha	  Freedom	  Party	  headed	  by	  Chief	  Mangosuthu	  Buthelezi.	  The	  
Inkatha	  Freedom	  Party’s	  aims	  were	  increasingly	  at	  odds	  with	  those	  of	  the	  ANC	  and	  
other	  Black	  activists.	  	  
The	  Inkatha	  sought	  to	  maintain	  the	  Zulu	  monarchy	  and	  a	  federal	  political	  
system	  in	  which	  the	  regional	  governments	  would	  enjoy	  virtual	  autonomy.	  Aware	  of	  
the	  growing	  rift	  between	  the	  ANC	  and	  Inkatha,	  the	  South	  African	  government	  
began	  channeling	  money	  towards	  funding	  Inkatha	  from	  1990.	  	  
Mandela	  missed	  an	  important	  opportunity	  to	  make	  an	  early	  peace	  with	  
Chief	  Buthelezi,	  when	  he	  withdrew	  from	  a	  previously	  arranged	  meeting	  at	  the	  last	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minute	  in	  March	  1990.	  Jacob	  Zuma	  reckons	  that	  much	  of	  the	  violence	  between	  the	  
ANC	  and	  Inkatha	  could	  have	  been	  avoided	  had	  the	  two	  men	  met	  in	  1990.253	  	  
In	  1991,	  the	  ANC	  held	  its	  first	  national	  conference	  in	  South	  Africa	  after	  the	  
lifting	  of	  the	  ban.	  In	  the	  conference,	  the	  ANC	  members	  elected	  Nelson	  Mandela	  as	  
President	  of	  the	  organization.	  His	  old	  friend	  and	  colleague	  Oliver	  Tambo,	  who	  had	  
led	  the	  organization	  in	  exile	  during	  Mandela's	  imprisonment,	  became	  National	  
Chairperson.	  	  
During	  the	  conference,	  Mandela	  received	  criticism	  from	  fellow	  Robben	  
islander,	  Terror	  Lekota.	  Lekota	  accused	  him	  of	  being	  dictatorial	  and	  of	  imposing	  
his	  will	  on	  other	  ANC	  members.	  Mandela	  acknowledged	  that	  leaders	  should	  grasp	  
the	  principle	  that	  they	  were	  servants	  of	  the	  people,	  but	  also	  rebuked	  the	  audience	  
for	  their	  failure	  to	  express	  any	  praise	  for	  the	  leadership.	  Those	  who	  believed	  that	  
one	  could	  negotiate	  without	  secrecy	  did	  not	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  negotiation.	  
He	  argued	  that	  before	  any	  Constitutional	  negotiations	  could	  begin,	  there	  needed	  
to	  be	  agreement	  on	  who	  should	  take	  part,	  and	  how	  the	  talks	  with	  the	  Government	  
would	  be	  organized.	  	  
Mandela	  brokered	  a	  compromise	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  1991	  and	  the	  talks	  
began	  with	  an	  all-­‐party	  meeting	  that	  would	  decide	  on	  an	  Interim	  Constitution,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  more	  permanent	  principles	  that	  would	  be	  incorporated	  into	  a	  final	  
Constitution	  after	  the	  election	  of	  a	  Constituent	  Assembly.	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Mandela's	  leadership	  through	  the	  negotiations	  as	  well	  as	  his	  relationship	  
with	  President	  F.	  W.	  de	  Klerk	  was	  recognized	  when	  they	  were	  jointly	  awarded	  the	  
Nobel	  Peace	  Prize	  in	  1993.	  The	  relationship	  between	  to	  the	  two	  leaders	  was	  at	  
times	  tense	  and	  strained.	  In	  a	  particularly	  sharp	  exchange	  in	  1991,	  Mandela	  
furiously	  referred	  to	  De	  Klerk	  as	  the	  head	  of	  “an	  illegitimate,	  discredited,	  minority	  
regime.”	  	  
The	  negotiations	  broke	  down	  following	  the	  Boipatong	  massacre	  in	  June	  
1992,	  when	  heavily	  armed	  Inkatha	  Freedom	  Party	  members	  stormed	  into	  
Boipatong	  Township	  and	  killed	  46	  people.	  This	  incident	  caused	  Mandela	  to	  take	  
the	  ANC	  out	  of	  the	  negotiations,	  accusing	  De	  Klerk's	  government	  of	  complicity	  in	  
the	  killings.254	  	  
However,	  talks	  resumed	  following	  the	  Bisho	  massacre,	  where	  Ciskei	  
Defense	  Forces	  killed	  28	  ANC	  members	  in	  September	  1992.	  The	  specter	  of	  violent	  
confrontation	  made	  it	  clear	  to	  Mandela	  that	  negotiations	  were	  the	  only	  way	  
forward.255	  	  
Economically,	  the	  situation	  was	  getting	  to	  a	  tipping-­‐point.	  The	  ongoing	  
violence	  had	  scared	  the	  White	  minority-­‐owned	  businesses.	  The	  ANC’s	  head	  of	  
economic	  policy,	  Trevor	  Manuel	  warned	  Mandela	  about	  the	  ongoing	  degeneration	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  The	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  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  Mandela	  and	  de	  Klerk.	  Revelations	  
about	  the	  secret	  activities	  of	  the	  police	  and	  the	  other	  intelligence	  units’	  role	  in	  the	  ongoing	  violence	  shook	  Mandela’s	  faith	  in	  
de	  Klerk’s	  integrity	  and	  commitment	  to	  the	  settlement	  process.	  See	  ANC	  Statement	  on	  the	  Boipatong	  Massacre,	  
http://web.archive.org/web/20080306075135/http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/pr/1992/pr0618.html	  (Accessed	  October	  30,	  
2011).	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  See	  Nelson	  Mandela,	  Long	  Walk	  to	  Freedom,	  (New	  York,	  NY:	  Little,	  Brown	  and	  Company,	  1994).	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of	  the	  economy	  since	  1990.	  He	  cautioned	  that	  the	  economy	  would	  be	  so	  destroyed	  
by	  the	  conflict	  that	  when	  a	  democratic	  government	  came	  to	  power,	  it	  would	  not	  be	  
able	  to	  survive.	  Mandela	  reasoned	  that	  the	  deadlock	  must	  end.	  	  
It	  was	  not	  easy	  however,	  and	  insurgent	  politics	  was	  keeping	  any	  possibility	  
of	  settlement	  at	  bay.	  While	  arriving	  to	  address	  a	  meeting	  of	  supporters	  in	  
Johannesburg,	  one	  of	  the	  battlegrounds	  between	  the	  ANC	  and	  Inkatha,	  he	  found	  a	  
note	  awaiting	  him	  at	  the	  speaker’s	  table.	  ‘No	  peace,	  do	  not	  talk	  to	  us	  about	  peace.	  
We’ve	  had	  enough.	  Please,	  Mr.	  Mandela,	  no	  peace.	  Give	  us	  weapons.	  No	  Peace.’	  	  
Mandela	  departed	  from	  his	  prepared	  speech	  and	  gave	  an	  impassioned	  plea	  
to	  those	  assembled	  stating:	  
“There	  are	  times	  when	  our	  people	  participate	  in	  the	  killing	  of	  
innocent	  people.	  It	  is	  difficult	  for	  us	  to	  say	  when	  people	  are	  angry	  that	  
they	  must	  be	  non-­‐violent.	  But	  the	  solution	  is	  peace,	  it	  is	  reconciliation,	  
it	  is	  political	  tolerance.	  We	  must	  accept	  that	  blacks	  are	  fighting	  each	  
other	  in	  the	  townships…	  we	  must	  accept	  that	  responsibility	  for	  ending	  
the	  violence	  is	  not	  just	  the	  government’s,	  the	  police’s,	  the	  army’s.	  It	  is	  
also	  our	  responsibility.	  We	  must	  put	  our	  house	  in	  order.	  If	  you	  have	  no	  
discipline	  you	  are	  not	  a	  freedom	  fighter.	  If	  you	  are	  going	  to	  kill	  
innocent	  people,	  you	  don’t	  belong	  to	  the	  ANC.	  Your	  task	  is	  
reconciliation.	  Listen	  to	  me.	  Listen	  to	  me.	  I	  am	  your	  leader.	  I	  am	  going	  
to	  give	  leadership.	  Do	  you	  want	  me	  to	  remain	  your	  leader?	  Yes?	  Well,	  
as	  long	  as	  I	  am	  your	  leader,	  I	  will	  tell	  you	  always,	  when	  you	  are	  
wrong.”256	  
	  
The	  assassination	  of	  ANC	  leader	  Chris	  Hani	  in	  April	  1993,	  led	  to	  renewed	  
fears	  that	  the	  country	  would	  erupt	  in	  violence.	  Mandela	  addressed	  the	  nation	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  Tom	  Lodge,	  Mandela:	  A	  Critical	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  (Oxford,	  UK:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006),	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appealing	  for	  calm	  in	  a	  speech	  regarded	  as	  'presidential'	  even	  though	  he	  was	  not	  
yet	  president	  of	  the	  country	  at	  that	  time.	  	  
Mandela	  said,	  	  
“Tonight,	  I	  am	  reaching	  out	  to	  every	  single	  South	  African,	  Black	  
and	  White,	  from	  the	  very	  depths	  of	  my	  being.	  A	  White	  man,	  full	  of	  
prejudice	  and	  hate,	  came	  to	  our	  country	  and	  committed	  a	  deed	  so	  foul	  
that	  our	  whole	  nation	  now	  teeters	  on	  the	  brink	  of	  disaster.	  A	  White	  
woman,	  of	  Afrikaner	  origin,	  risked	  her	  life	  so	  that	  we	  may	  know,	  and	  
bring	  to	  justice,	  this	  assassin.	  The	  cold-­‐blooded	  murder	  of	  Chris	  Hani	  
has	  sent	  shock	  waves	  throughout	  the	  country	  and	  the	  world.	  ...Now	  is	  
the	  time	  for	  all	  South	  Africans	  to	  stand	  together	  against	  those	  who,	  
from	  any	  quarter,	  wish	  to	  destroy	  what	  Chris	  Hani	  gave	  his	  life	  for	  –	  
the	  freedom	  of	  all	  of	  us.”257	  
	  
There	  were	  several	  factors	  that	  contributed	  to	  a	  consensus	  between	  the	  
ANC	  and	  the	  Government	  during	  the	  Multi-­‐Party	  Negotiation	  Forum.	  These	  
factors	  include:	  the	  ANC’s	  willingness	  to	  embrace	  transitional	  constitutional	  
arrangements;	  the	  breakdown	  of	  any	  prospect	  of	  alliance	  between	  the	  Inkatha	  
Freedom	  Party	  and	  the	  National	  Party;	  and	  Mandela’s	  assumption	  of	  the	  role	  of	  
national	  conciliator	  in	  the	  crisis	  that	  followed	  Hani’s	  assassination.	  	  	  
The	  Multi-­‐party	  Negotiation	  Forum	  agreed	  that	  democratic	  elections	  
should	  take	  place	  on	  April	  27,	  1994,	  just	  over	  a	  year	  after	  Chris	  Hani's	  
assassination.	  For	  five	  years	  from	  the	  1994	  elections,	  South	  Africa	  would	  be	  ruled	  
by	  a	  coalition	  administration,	  in	  which,	  seats	  were	  shared	  in	  a	  proportional	  
manner	  based	  on	  the	  electoral	  support	  for	  parties	  with	  more	  than	  five	  percent	  of	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  See	  Nelson	  Mandela’s	  statement	  on	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  of	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  http://www.anc.org.za/show.php?id=4083	  
(Accessed	  November	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the	  vote.	  The	  elections	  themselves	  would	  be	  held	  under	  the	  system	  of	  proportional	  
representation.	  The	  electorate	  would	  be	  voting	  for	  a	  National	  Assembly	  and	  nine	  
regional	  Governments.	  The	  regional	  Governments	  demarcated	  by	  borders	  would	  
allow	  at	  least	  one	  of	  the	  old	  homeland	  parties,	  the	  Inkatha	  Freedom	  Party,	  a	  
reasonable	  prospect	  of	  securing	  executive	  authority.	  	  
The	  House	  of	  Assembly,	  along	  with	  the	  Senate,	  would	  sit	  as	  a	  Constituent	  
Assembly	  and	  decide	  on	  a	  final	  Constitution.	  The	  Constitution	  would	  have	  to	  
incorporate	  key	  features	  of	  the	  interim	  constitution	  negotiated	  at	  the	  Multi-­‐Party	  
Negotiation	  Forum,	  including	  an	  extensive	  Bill	  of	  Rights.	  Bureaucrats,	  soldiers,	  and	  
policemen	  had	  their	  jobs	  guaranteed	  and	  amnesty	  would	  be	  offered	  to	  those	  guilty	  
of	  politically	  motivated	  killings.	  	  
Mandela’s	  political	  authority	  was	  crucial	  in	  securing	  legitimacy	  for	  
constitutional	  arrangements	  that	  fell	  well	  short	  of	  political	  expectations	  among	  the	  
ANC’s	  support	  base.	  An	  interim	  Government	  of	  national	  unity	  was	  not	  ‘power-­‐
sharing’	  he	  insisted.258	  	  
Lodge	  contends	  that	  Mandela’s	  preoccupation	  with	  reconciliation	  may	  have	  
been	  only	  one	  facet	  of	  a	  deeper	  preoccupation	  with	  unity.	  At	  one	  extreme,	  the	  
politics	  of	  maintaining	  unity	  can	  be	  authoritarian.	  It	  is	  in	  such	  a	  situation	  that	  
Mandela’s	  adherence	  to	  the	  tenets	  of	  liberal	  democracy	  is	  admirable.	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Approach	  to	  Political	  Participation	  and	  Inclusion	  
Table	  4-­‐13:	  1994	  South	  Africa	  Election	  Results	  
Party	  
Percentage	  
of	  Votes	   Seats	  Won	  
African	  National	  Congress	   62.65	   252	  
National	  Party	   20.39	   82	  
Inkatha	  Freedom	  Party	   10.54	   43	  
Freedom	  Front	   2.17	   9	  
Democratic	  Party	   1.73	   7	  
Pan	  Africanist	  Congress	   1.25	   5	  
African	  Christian	  Democratic	  Party	   0.45	   2	  
Africa	  Muslim	  Party	   0.18	   0	  
African	  Moderates	  Congress	  Party	   0.14	   0	  
Dikwankwetla	  Party	   0.1	   0	  
Federal	  Party	   0.09	   0	  
Minority	  Front	   0.07	   0	  
Sport	  Organization	  for	  Collective	  Contributions	  
and	  Equal	  Rights	  
0.05	   0	  
African	  Democratic	  Movement	   0.05	   0	  
Women's	  Rights	  Peace	  Party	   0.03	   0	  
Ximoko	  Progressive	  Party	   0.03	   0	  
Keep	  It	  Straight	  and	  Simple	  Party	   0.03	   0	  
Workers'	  List	  Party	   0.02	   0	  
Luso-­‐South	  African	  Party	   0.02	   0	  
Total	   100	   400	  
	  
After	  the	  1994	  general	  elections,	  the	  ANC	  and	  its	  allies	  fell	  short	  of	  the	  two-­‐
thirds	  majority	  required	  to	  form	  a	  government	  (See	  Table	  4-­‐13).	  In	  accordance	  with	  
the	  Interim	  Constitution,	  the	  ANC	  formed	  a	  Government	  of	  National	  Unity	  along	  
with	  the	  National	  Party	  and	  the	  Inkatha	  Freedom	  Party.	  	  
Mandela’s	  experience	  as	  national	  executive	  was	  brief.	  He	  presided	  over	  the	  
coalition	  government	  from	  1994	  through	  1999.	  	  
	   251	  
Halfway	  through	  the	  Government’s	  tenure,	  de	  Klerk	  and	  his	  colleagues	  
from	  the	  National	  Party	  left	  and	  joined	  the	  opposition	  benches.	  They	  were	  
disappointed	  with	  their	  lack	  of	  influence	  in	  the	  cabinet.	  The	  National	  Party	  was	  
also	  unhappy	  with	  its	  inability	  to	  get	  the	  ANC	  to	  agree	  to	  entrench	  power	  sharing	  
as	  a	  permanent	  feature	  of	  the	  constitution.	  	  
Though	  the	  Coalition	  Government	  worked	  well	  at	  the	  beginning,	  de	  Klerk	  
was	  surprised	  by	  Mandela’s	  lack	  of	  consultation	  in	  allocating	  cabinet	  positions.	  
This	  had	  been	  something	  that	  was	  required	  by	  the	  interim	  Constitution.	  On	  
several	  other	  occasions	  as	  well,	  Mandela’s	  humiliating	  treatment	  of	  de	  Klerk	  went	  
against	  his	  own	  ethical	  code,	  though	  such	  treatment	  had	  beneficial	  effects	  in	  terms	  
of	  Mandela’s	  standing	  with	  his	  ANC	  colleagues.	  	  
During	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  administration,	  Mandela	  used	  his	  powers	  of	  
public	  appointment	  to	  send	  reassuring	  signals	  to	  former	  or	  potential	  adversaries.	  
He	  also	  took	  care	  to	  bring	  about	  a	  racial	  balance	  in	  his	  cabinet.	  Mandela’s	  
sensitivity	  to	  business	  leaders’	  confidence	  explained	  the	  reappointment	  of	  Finance	  
Minister	  Derek	  Keys.	  Keys	  had	  been	  part	  of	  de	  Klerk’s	  cabinet	  previously.	  	  
Mandela’s	  appointment	  of	  the	  conservative	  economist,	  Chris	  Stals	  as	  the	  
governor	  of	  the	  Reserve	  Bank	  led	  to	  criticism	  from	  Bulelani	  Ngcuka,	  the	  ANC’s	  
chief	  whip	  in	  the	  House	  of	  the	  Assembly.	  He	  suggested	  that	  Mandela	  might	  be	  
leaning	  too	  much	  towards	  the	  other	  side	  in	  attempting	  to	  reassure	  former	  
adversaries.	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Mandela’s	  predisposition	  towards	  inclusiveness	  motivated	  a	  series	  of	  
invitations,	  in	  1997,	  to	  smaller	  parties	  to	  join	  his	  government,	  a	  ‘consensual’	  
practice	  maintained	  by	  his	  successor,	  Thabo	  Mbeki,	  to	  the	  detriment	  of	  vigorous	  
opposition	  politics.	  	  
Mandela’s	  inclusive	  ‘social	  nationalism’	  in	  which	  all	  people	  could	  join	  the	  
nation	  if	  they	  shared	  its	  values	  is	  evident	  in	  his	  many	  public	  speeches.	  Through	  his	  
public	  speeches,	  Mandela	  was	  able	  tell	  a	  story	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  was	  able	  to	  invite	  
his	  listeners	  to	  share	  emotions	  and	  experiences.	  	  
However,	  consensual	  politics	  often	  has	  authoritarian	  dimensions.	  At	  times,	  
Mandela	  could	  sound	  as	  impatient	  as	  his	  predecessors	  with	  media	  critics.	  In	  1997,	  
he	  accused	  newspapers	  of	  conspiring	  with	  counterrevolutionary	  forces	  to	  
undermine	  democracy.	  Only	  a	  year	  earlier,	  Mandela	  had	  said	  that	  the	  mass	  media	  
had	  set	  itself	  up	  to	  oppose	  the	  ANC.	  However,	  Mandela’s	  administration	  
dismantled	  press	  censorship,	  and	  he	  resisted	  any	  restrictions	  to	  media	  freedoms,	  
even	  when	  suggested	  by	  his	  colleagues.	  	  
Though	  he	  remained	  assertive	  in	  the	  ANC,	  he	  was	  unable	  to	  influence	  the	  
choice	  of	  Cyril	  Ramaphosa	  as	  his	  successor.	  Mandela	  believed	  that	  Thabo	  Mbeki	  
was	  intolerant	  of	  criticism	  and	  inflexible	  and	  hence,	  not	  fit	  to	  lead	  the	  ANC	  and	  
the	  country.	  	  
Mandela	  was	  willing	  to	  stand	  against	  the	  ANC	  when	  it	  was	  necessary	  to	  
protect	  the	  National	  interest.	  For	  instance,	  the	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  
Commission	  report	  initially	  received	  a	  hostile	  response	  from	  the	  ANC	  and	  its	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youth	  wing.	  Thabo	  Mbeki	  tried	  to	  delay	  the	  release	  of	  the	  report	  because	  of	  its	  
‘wrong	  and	  misguided’	  conclusions.	  ANC	  leaders	  were	  unhappy	  with	  the	  report’s	  
equation	  of	  their	  organization’s	  abuses	  of	  human	  rights	  with	  the	  crimes	  of	  the	  
Apartheid	  regime.	  Mandela	  endorsed	  the	  report	  however,	  and	  later	  explained	  that	  
“I	  am	  the	  president	  of	  the	  country…	  I	  have	  set	  up	  the	  TRC	  and	  they	  have	  done	  not	  a	  
perfect	  but	  a	  remarkable	  job	  and	  I	  approve	  of	  everything	  they	  did.”259	  
Another	  example	  of	  Mandela’s	  efforts	  towards	  reconciliation	  was	  his	  
insistence	  that	  Afrikaans	  be	  included	  as	  an	  official	  language,	  when	  the	  ANC	  
insisted	  that	  the	  army	  adopt	  English	  as	  its	  only	  language.	  Mandela	  said	  that	  ANC’s	  
proposal	  could	  undo	  all	  the	  work	  that	  he	  had	  undertaken	  to	  promote	  
reconciliation	  with	  Afrikaners.	  	  
Incorporating	  Whites,	  Blacks,	  Indians,	  and	  Colored	  people	  into	  a	  
multiracial	  community	  of	  citizens	  was	  Mandela’s	  imperative.	  He	  observed	  that	  if	  
there	  was	  no	  genuine	  attempt	  at	  reconciliation,	  the	  majority	  of	  the	  Whites	  in	  
South	  Africa	  would	  flee	  abroad.	  Mandela	  was	  aware	  of	  the	  chaos	  that	  such	  an	  
exodus	  could	  cause.	  Mandela’s	  genuineness	  and	  sincerity	  towards	  reconciliation	  
was	  understood	  and	  appreciated	  by	  Afrikaners,	  and	  it	  helped	  the	  South	  African	  
leadership	  to	  win	  friends	  internationally.	  	  
The	  Approach	  to	  Economic	  Growth	  and	  Inclusion	  
During	  the	  1960s	  and	  70s,	  the	  South	  African	  economy	  grew	  by	  virtue	  of	  
inflows	  of	  foreign	  capital	  and	  public	  investment	  in	  strategic	  industries	  like	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armaments	  and	  synthetic	  petrol.	  These	  investments	  were	  in	  response	  to	  a	  United	  
Nations	  embargo	  on	  petroleum	  and	  arms	  sales	  to	  South	  Africa	  in	  1965.	  	  
In	  1965,	  the	  contribution	  of	  the	  manufacturing	  sector	  to	  the	  GDP	  was	  equal	  
to	  that	  of	  the	  mining	  and	  agricultural	  sectors.	  However,	  by	  1988,	  the	  
manufacturing	  sector	  contributed	  to	  22	  percent	  of	  GDP.	  Although	  South	  African	  
factories	  were	  less	  sophisticated	  and	  produced	  much	  smaller	  proportions	  of	  capital	  
goods	  of	  export	  quality260	  the	  level	  of	  industrial	  development	  was	  comparable	  to	  
Mexico	  or	  India.	  	  
South	  Africa’s	  economy	  evolved	  and	  took	  on	  different	  characteristics	  along	  
with	  the	  societal	  changes	  that	  occurred	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s.	  By	  the	  mid-­‐
1970s,	  the	  social	  interests	  shaping	  Afrikaner-­‐nationalism	  had	  changed.	  More	  than	  
65	  percent	  of	  Afrikaners	  were	  white-­‐collar	  workers	  due	  to	  the	  preferential	  
recruitment	  policy	  of	  the	  public	  and	  private	  sectors.	  Within	  the	  business	  sector,	  
Afrikaner	  firms	  were	  among	  the	  most	  advanced	  manufacturers	  and	  their	  
executives	  were	  increasingly	  inconvenienced	  by	  the	  restrictions	  on	  African	  labor	  
mobility.	  	  
In	  1979,	  African	  unions	  were	  able	  to	  obtain	  collective	  bargaining	  rights,	  with	  
support	  from	  White	  Afrikaners.	  These	  reforms	  were	  reflective	  of	  changing	  
attitudes	  among	  Afrikaners,	  and	  increasing	  internal	  and	  international	  pressures.	  
Between	  1959	  and	  1994,	  the	  sanctions	  against	  the	  Apartheid	  regime	  represented	  
the	  most	  widely	  supported	  single-­‐issue	  protest	  in	  the	  world.	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The	  ANC	  had	  to	  compromise	  on	  its	  commitment	  to	  nationalizing	  key	  
industries,	  as	  it	  would	  lead	  to	  capital	  flight	  from	  an	  already	  fragile	  economy.	  	  
Mandela	  played	  a	  key	  role	  in	  the	  realignment	  of	  ANC	  policy	  regarding	  the	  
nationalization	  of	  industries	  and	  other	  socialist	  policies	  that	  ANC	  leaders	  wished	  
to	  implement.	  	  
After	  the	  first	  two	  years	  as	  President,	  when	  he	  paid	  close	  attention	  to	  every	  
policy	  detail,	  Mandela	  increasingly	  shifted	  the	  task	  of	  decision	  making	  to	  Thabo	  
Mbeki,	  his	  deputy.	  Mbeki	  oversaw	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  GEAR	  (Growth,	  
Employment	  and	  Redistribution)	  plan,	  a	  macro-­‐financial	  liberalization	  program.	  
Mandela	  saw	  the	  first	  draft	  of	  the	  program	  and	  supported	  its	  monetarist	  
implications	  and	  endorsed	  a	  new	  commitment	  to	  privatizing	  parastatal	  companies.	  	  
Mandela	  was	  deeply	  influenced	  by	  the	  Malaysian	  experience	  of	  the	  
preferential	  opening	  up	  of	  the	  public	  sector	  to	  Malay	  bumiputra	  entrepreneurs	  
(sons	  of	  the	  soil),	  and	  sought	  to	  include	  such	  elements	  in	  the	  GEAR	  plan.	  	  
Mandela’s	  administration	  oversaw	  a	  period	  of	  mixed	  economic	  outcomes	  –	  
the	  GDP	  per	  Capita	  actually	  reduced	  during	  his	  term,	  but	  the	  Government’s	  
emphasis	  was	  on	  helping	  lift	  millions	  of	  Black	  South	  Africans	  out	  of	  poverty	  (See	  
Figure	  4-­‐16).	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Figure	  4-­‐16:	  Economic	  Performance	  Under	  Mandela261	  
On	  assuming	  office,	  Mandela	  announced	  a	  series	  of	  ‘presidential	  initiatives’	  
(See	  Figure	  4-­‐17)	  including	  free	  health	  care	  for	  mothers	  and	  children	  as	  well	  as	  a	  
primary	  school	  feeding	  scheme.	  The	  Mandela	  administration’s	  achievements	  
included	  impressively	  disciplined	  management	  of	  public	  finances	  in	  which	  tight	  
controls	  on	  public	  expenditure	  eliminated	  a	  public	  debt	  of	  250	  billion	  Rand,	  while	  
simultaneously	  redirecting	  resources	  from	  richer	  communities	  to	  poorer	  ones.	  	  
In	  1999,	  the	  government	  could	  make	  valid	  claims	  that	  it	  had	  undertaken	  
serious	  efforts	  to	  alleviate	  poverty.	  It	  had	  financed	  the	  construction	  of	  nearly	  a	  
million	  low-­‐cost	  homes,	  extended	  clean	  water	  supply	  to	  millions	  of	  people	  in	  the	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rural	  areas,	  expanded	  the	  provision	  of	  health	  care	  in	  the	  countryside,	  and	  spent	  
money	  on	  building	  schools	  in	  Black	  neighborhoods.	  	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐17:	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Reforms	  Enacted	  by	  the	  Mandela	  
Administration262	  
These	  investments,	  however,	  failed	  to	  reduce	  poverty	  significantly.	  Better	  
housing	  and	  improved	  public	  facilities	  could	  not	  compensate	  for	  rising	  
unemployment.	  Left-­‐wing	  critics	  of	  the	  Government	  argued	  that	  the	  liberalization	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• The	  introduction	  of	  free	  healthcare	  (1994)	  for	  all	  children	  under	  the	  age	  of	  six	  together	  with	  
pregnant	  and	  breastfeeding	  women	  making	  use	  of	  public	  sector	  health	  facilities	  (a	  provision	  
extended	  to	  all	  those	  using	  primary	  level	  public	  sector	  health	  care	  services	  in	  1996).	  
• The	  launching	  of	  the	  Reconstruction	  and	  Development	  Program,	  which	  invested	  in	  essential	  
social	  services	  such	  as	  housing	  and	  health	  care.	  
• Increases	  in	  welfare	  spending,	  with	  public	  spending	  on	  welfare	  and	  social	  grants	  increased	  by	  
13%	  in	  1996/97,	  13%	  in	  1997/98,	  and	  7%	  in	  1998/99.”	  
• The	  introduction	  of	  parity	  in	  grants	  for	  communities	  which	  were	  previously,	  including	  disability	  
grants,	  child	  maintenance	  grants,	  and	  old-­‐age	  pensions,	  which	  had	  previously	  been	  set	  at	  
diﬀerent	  levels	  for	  South	  Africa’s	  diﬀerent	  racial	  groups.	  
• The	  extension	  of	  the	  application	  of	  the	  child	  maintenance	  grant	  to	  blacks	  in	  rural	  areas,	  who	  had	  
been	  previously	  excluded	  from	  the	  system.	  
• A	  signiﬁcant	  increase	  in	  public	  spending	  on	  education,	  with	  expenditure	  raised	  by	  25%	  in	  
1996/97,	  7%	  in	  1997/98	  and	  4%	  in	  1998/99.	  
• The	  introduction	  of	  child	  support	  grants	  (1998)	  to	  alleviate	  child	  poverty.	  
• The	  Skills	  Development	  Act	  (1998)which	  provided	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  mechanisms	  to	  
ﬁnance	  and	  promote	  skills	  development	  at	  the	  workplace.	  
• The	  Labour	  Relations	  Act	  (1995),	  which	  promoted	  workplace	  democracy,	  orderly	  collective	  
bargaining,	  and	  the	  eﬀective	  resolution	  of	  labor	  disputes.	  
• The	  Basic	  Conditions	  of	  Employment	  Act	  (1997),	  which	  Improved	  enforcement	  mechanisms	  
while	  extending	  an	  improved	  “ﬂoor”	  of	  rights	  to	  all	  workers.	  
• The	  passage	  of	  the	  Employment	  Equity	  Act	  (1998)	  to	  put	  an	  end	  to	  unfair	  discrimination	  and	  
ensure	  the	  implementation	  of	  aﬃrmative	  action	  in	  the	  workplace.	  
• The	  Welfare	  Laws	  Amendment	  Act	  (1997),	  which	  amended	  the	  Social	  Assistance	  Act	  of	  1992	  to	  
provide	  for	  equality	  of	  access,	  uniformity	  and	  eﬀective	  regulation	  of	  social	  assistance	  throughout	  
South	  Africa.	  
• Amendments	  to	  the	  Aged	  Persons	  Act	  (1998),	  which	  provided	  for	  the	  establishment	  of	  
management	  committees	  for	  homes	  for	  the	  elderly,	  to	  require	  reporting	  on	  the	  abuse	  of	  elderly	  
persons,	  and	  to	  regulate	  the	  prevention	  of	  the	  abuse	  of	  elderly	  people.	  
• The	  establishment	  of	  a	  National	  Development	  Agency	  (1998),	  which	  was	  mandated	  to	  provide	  
funds	  to	  civil	  society	  organizations	  to	  meet	  the	  developmental	  needs	  of	  poor	  communities.	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of	  foreign-­‐trade	  and	  Mandela’s	  ministers’	  reluctance	  to	  borrow	  on	  the	  
international	  capital	  market	  were	  partly	  to	  blame	  for	  the	  economy’s	  failure	  to	  
generate	  jobs.	  In	  the	  meantime,	  business	  lobbies	  argued	  that	  social	  reforms	  were	  
mainly	  to	  blame	  for	  unemployment	  and	  cited	  the	  new	  industrial	  relations	  
legislation	  and	  affirmative	  action	  programs.	  	  
The	  Approach	  to	  Security	  and	  Justice	  
In	  the	  two	  decades	  or	  so	  that	  Mandela	  had	  spent	  in	  prison,	  the	  ANC	  and	  
other	  African	  liberation	  movements	  had	  reorganized	  themselves	  in	  exile	  and	  were	  
getting	  ready	  to	  take	  on	  the	  government	  forces	  through	  guerilla	  warfare.	  	  
Successive	  National	  Party	  Governments	  under	  Hendrik	  Verwoerd	  and	  John	  
Vorster	  had	  embarked	  on	  an	  ambitious	  program	  of	  racial	  segregation	  and	  the	  
establishment	  of	  ethnically	  constituted	  administrations	  in	  all	  the	  historic	  ‘native’	  
reserves.	  This	  would	  ensure	  that	  the	  Black	  Africans	  would	  remain	  migrants	  to	  the	  
urban	  areas,	  and	  need	  valid	  contracts	  and	  passes	  in	  order	  to	  visit	  or	  work	  in	  cities.	  
Those	  without	  valid	  passes	  would	  be	  deported	  to	  their	  respective	  native	  
homelands.	  	  
In	  the	  1970s,	  restrictions	  were	  placed	  on	  Africans,	  Indians,	  and	  Colored	  
enrollment	  in	  major	  universities	  and	  segregated	  colleges	  were	  established	  to	  train	  
future	  generations	  of	  ethnic	  administrators.	  A	  succession	  of	  fierce	  anti-­‐terrorist	  
laws	  institutionalized	  detention	  without	  trial	  and	  facilitated	  the	  torture	  of	  
prisoners.	  These	  repressive	  restrictions	  were	  removed	  upon	  Mandela’s	  ascent	  to	  
the	  presidency.	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Mandela	  undertook	  a	  series	  of	  policy	  reviews	  to	  redefine	  the	  government’s	  
priorities.	  Among	  the	  key	  Government	  commitments	  were,	  support	  for	  human	  
rights,	  multilateral	  initiatives	  to	  assert	  South	  Africa’s	  role	  in	  the	  African	  continent,	  
and	  an	  expansion	  of	  South	  African	  armed	  forces	  through	  the	  procurement	  of	  
military	  equipment.	  	  
	  
Figure	  4-­‐18:	  Level	  of	  Conflict	  under	  Mandela263	  
Mandela’s	  government	  could	  claim	  success	  in	  the	  area	  of	  social	  
reconciliation	  and	  in	  beginning	  the	  process	  of	  healing	  the	  divisions	  in	  the	  society.	  
The	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  represented	  an	  especially	  ambitious	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263	  The	  measure	  for	  level	  of	  conflict	  was	  developed	  using	  the	  Internal	  and	  External	  conflict	  indicators	  from	  the	  
International	  Conflict	  Risk	  Group	  (ICRG)	  Database.	  These	  indicators	  have	  also	  been	  used	  in	  the	  panel	  data	  analysis	  in	  
chapter	  3.	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venture,	  which	  as	  well	  as	  administering	  amnesty	  through	  its	  televised	  public	  
hearing	  supplied	  a	  forum	  for	  the	  stories	  of	  victims	  of	  human	  rights	  violations.	  The	  
Commission’s	  six-­‐volume	  report	  offered	  a	  morally	  complicated	  public	  history,	  
which	  despite	  angering	  politicians	  on	  all	  sides	  generally	  accorded	  with	  public	  
perceptions.	  A	  definitive	  Constitution	  was	  enacted	  in	  1996	  that	  entrenched	  and	  
extended	  the	  human	  rights	  provisions	  of	  the	  1993	  interim	  constitution.	  A	  
Constitutional	  Court	  rapidly	  established	  its	  credentials	  as	  an	  independent	  and	  
politically	  neutral	  authority.	  	  
A	  sharp	  decline	  in	  politically	  motivated	  violence	  in	  Kwa-­‐Zulu	  Natal	  was	  
partly	  an	  effect	  of	  localized	  peace	  making	  by	  ANC	  and	  Inkatha	  leaders	  before	  and	  
after	  the	  1994	  elections.	  Other	  reasons	  were	  the	  inclusion	  of	  Inkatha	  
representatives	  in	  national	  administration	  and	  its	  predominance	  in	  Kwa-­‐Zulu	  
Natal	  regional	  government,	  and	  also	  as	  a	  result	  of	  politically	  neutral	  public	  
resource	  allocation.	  	  
In	  April	  1995,	  Mandela	  warned	  that	  he	  might	  cut	  off	  funds	  to	  Kwa-­‐Zulu	  
Natal	  because	  of	  continuing	  Inkatha	  opposition	  to	  the	  province’s	  constitutional	  
status.	  It	  was	  an	  unwise	  and	  illegal	  threat	  for	  him	  to	  make	  and	  provincial	  revenue	  
allocation	  in	  fact	  remained	  equitable.	  The	  main	  credit	  for	  peace	  making	  in	  the	  
province	  belonged	  to	  Thabo	  Mbeki	  and	  Jacob	  Zuma,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  second	  echelon	  
Inkatha	  leadership.	  Relations	  between	  Mandela	  and	  Chief	  Mangosuthu	  Buthelezi	  
remained	  fractious	  as	  Mandela	  reneged	  on	  his	  pre-­‐election	  promise	  to	  invite	  
foreign	  mediators	  over	  constitutional	  issues	  pertaining	  to	  the	  status	  of	  Kwa-­‐Zulu	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Natal.264	  As	  a	  result	  of	  these	  differences	  with	  the	  Inkatha	  party	  and	  continuing	  
high	  youth	  unemployment,	  there	  was	  an	  increase	  in	  conflict	  towards	  the	  end	  of	  his	  
presidency	  (as	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  4-­‐18).	  	  
Analysis:	  Mandela	  as	  the	  Change	  Agent	  
Nelson	  Mandela	  is	  an	  individual	  of	  immense	  stature.	  His	  story	  is	  one	  of	  
outstanding	  moral	  courage	  against	  seemingly	  impossible	  odds,	  determination	  to	  
destroy	  apartheid,	  and	  above	  all	  –	  tireless	  efforts	  to	  bring	  about	  reconciliation	  in	  
his	  homeland.	  	  
As	  an	  individual,	  Mandela	  led	  a	  simple	  lifestyle.	  Unlike	  his	  colleagues	  who	  
tended	  to	  live	  ostentatiously,	  Mandela	  lived	  in	  a	  comfortable	  suburban	  home	  in	  
Johannesburg.	  He	  donated	  one-­‐third	  of	  his	  salary	  and	  his	  Nobel	  Prize	  earnings	  to	  
the	  charitable	  foundation	  he	  had	  established.	  He	  made	  his	  own	  bed	  and	  folded	  his	  
own	  clothes.	  Mandela	  had	  no	  privileged	  circle	  or	  presidential	  cronies.	  	  
Mandela	  made	  conscious	  efforts	  to	  democratize	  and	  demystify	  his	  larger	  
than	  life	  personality.	  In	  his	  autobiography	  he	  insists	  on	  his	  status	  as	  ‘an	  ordinary	  
man	  who	  became	  a	  leader	  because	  of	  extraordinary	  circumstances.’	  In	  this	  spirit,	  
the	  ANC’s	  electoral	  campaign	  borrowed	  from	  American	  politics	  the	  device	  of	  a	  
people’s	  forum	  or	  town	  hall	  in	  which	  members	  of	  the	  audience	  would	  pose	  
questions	  to	  Mandela.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
264	  KwaZulu	  was	  a	  bantustan	  in	  South	  Africa,	  intended	  by	  the	  apartheid	  government	  as	  a	  semi-­‐independent	  homeland	  for	  
the	  Zulu	  people.	  The	  capital,	  formerly	  at	  Nongoma,	  was	  moved	  in	  1980	  to	  Ulundi.	  It	  was	  led	  by	  Chief	  Mangosuthu	  Buthelezi	  
of	  the	  Zulu	  tribe	  and	  head	  of	  the	  Inkatha	  Freedom	  Party	  until	  its	  abolition	  in	  1994.	  It	  was	  then	  merged	  with	  the	  surrounding	  
South	  African	  province	  of	  Natal	  to	  form	  the	  new	  province	  of	  KwaZulu-­‐Natal.	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British	  political	  scientist	  John	  Kane	  contends	  that	  charismatic	  leaders	  like	  
Mandela	  rely	  on	  absolute	  trust	  and	  their	  authority	  is	  partly	  magical,	  not	  entirely	  
legal	  or	  rational.	  Leaders	  who	  command	  moral	  authority	  achieve	  their	  position	  
through	  action	  and	  behavior,	  by	  appearing	  constantly	  committed	  to	  a	  widely	  
shared	  cause,	  through	  undertaking	  actions	  that	  are	  similarly	  perceived	  to	  advance	  
their	  cause,	  through	  exemplifying	  the	  values	  they	  represent	  in	  their	  behavior,	  and	  
finally	  by	  the	  use	  of	  language	  and	  symbols	  that	  animate	  their	  followers	  and	  reach	  
across	  political	  boundaries.	  	  
Leaders	  who	  mobilize	  support	  through	  the	  deployment	  of	  this	  ‘moral	  
capital’	  need	  not	  be	  philosophical	  visionaries	  or	  grand	  strategists.	  They	  lead	  by	  
example,	  through	  scripting	  and	  acting	  out	  a	  narrative	  that	  embodies	  the	  passions	  
and	  aspirations	  of	  those	  whom	  they	  seek	  to	  attract	  as	  followers.	  They	  may	  create	  
and	  draw	  upon	  their	  moral	  prestige	  self-­‐consciously,	  as	  Mandela	  certainly	  did	  at	  
different	  stages	  of	  his	  life,	  so	  as	  to	  bring	  coherence	  to	  previously	  disparate	  social	  
forces	  and	  in	  doing	  so	  extending	  exemplary	  influence	  across	  a	  range	  of	  political	  
constituencies.265	  
Kane	  argues	  that	  Mandela	  accumulated	  his	  moral	  capital	  through	  his	  
skilled,	  dignified,	  and	  powerful	  theatrical	  performances	  in	  the	  service	  of	  the	  ANC	  
through	  the	  1950s	  and	  his	  redemptive	  leadership,	  and	  in	  his	  legal	  defense	  of	  the	  
armed	  rebellion.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
265	  John	  Kane,	  The	  Politics	  of	  Moral	  Capital,	  (Cambridge,	  UK:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  126.	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Mandela’s	  moral	  capital	  was	  further	  enhanced	  by	  his	  colleagues	  and	  his	  
family	  through	  their	  evocation	  of	  his	  mythical	  personality	  during	  his	  years	  in	  
prison.	  Upon	  his	  release,	  this	  intensely	  self-­‐controlled	  personality	  directed	  his	  
emotions,	  both	  anger	  and	  forgiveness,	  in	  ways	  that	  extended	  his	  appeal	  well	  
beyond	  the	  followers	  of	  his	  cause,	  particularly	  during	  points	  of	  crisis	  in	  the	  
transition	  to	  democracy.	  	  
As	  a	  leader	  in	  government,	  Mandela	  remained	  intensely	  conscious	  of	  the	  
symbolic	  function	  of	  his	  role	  in	  creating	  a	  focus	  for	  new	  ideas	  about	  citizenship,	  
simultaneously	  exploiting	  his	  moral	  power,	  insisting	  upon	  his	  ordinariness	  and	  
admitting	  to	  his	  mistakes.	  	  
Neither	  before	  nor	  during	  his	  presidency	  did	  Mandela	  demand	  or	  receive	  
entirely	  unconditional	  devotion.	  While	  in	  power,	  he	  expected	  his	  compatriots	  to	  
behave	  as	  assertive	  citizens,	  not	  as	  genuflecting	  disciples.	  	  
In	  a	  2003	  article	  for	  TIME	  magazine	  that	  celebrated	  the	  People	  of	  the	  
Century,	  Mandela	  wrote	  “Gandhi	  dared	  to	  exhort	  nonviolence	  in	  a	  time	  when	  the	  
violence	  of	  Hiroshima	  and	  Nagasaki	  had	  exploded	  on	  us;	  he	  exhorted	  morality	  when	  
science,	  technology	  and	  the	  capitalist	  order	  had	  made	  it	  redundant;	  he	  replaced	  self-­‐
interest	  with	  group	  interest	  without	  minimizing	  the	  importance	  of	  self.”266	  These	  
were	  ideals	  that	  Mandela	  tried	  to	  mirror	  in	  his	  actions	  as	  the	  leader	  of	  the	  ANC’s	  
non-­‐violent	  campaigns	  against	  apartheid	  during	  the	  1950s.	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  See	  Nelson	  Mandela,	  “The	  Sacred	  Warrior,	  Nelson	  Mandela	  on	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  Time,	  (January	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  2000).	  	  
	   264	  
Conclusion	  
	  
In	  general,	  Mandela	  strengthened	  the	  institutional	  bases	  of	  power	  with	  
which	  he	  associated	  himself,	  rather	  than	  substituting	  his	  authority	  for	  organized	  
politics.	  This	  is	  probably	  his	  strongest	  achievement.	  Mandela’s	  political	  style	  
engendered	  public	  participation	  and	  democratic	  deliberation.267	  	  
Mandela	  followed	  a	  largely	  participatory	  approach	  when	  it	  came	  to	  political	  
institutions,	  security	  and	  justice	  and	  economic	  growth.	  He	  was	  able	  to	  keep	  the	  
country	  together	  and	  prevented	  it	  from	  sliding	  into	  civil	  war.	  Mandela’s	  
administration	  had	  mixed	  success	  in	  reforming	  the	  economy.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  
that	  South	  Africa	  at	  the	  time	  was	  already	  a	  middle-­‐income	  country	  and	  Mandela’s	  
focus	  was	  more	  on	  political	  and	  social	  reconciliation.	  Peace	  and	  stability	  were	  
crucial	  to	  prevent	  South	  African	  from	  sliding	  into	  fragility,	  and	  this	  is	  exactly	  what	  
Mandela	  and	  his	  administration	  strove	  to	  do.	  	  
Nelson	  Mandela	  is	  an	  example	  of	  an	  exemplary	  leader,	  who	  did	  what	  he	  
could	  during	  his	  limited,	  legal	  tenure	  and	  left	  with	  dignity.	  Mandela	  played	  a	  key	  
role	  in	  ensuring	  South	  Africa’s	  path	  towards	  a	  stable	  democracy.	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  Keith	  Grint,	  The	  Arts	  of	  Leadership,	  (Oxford,	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  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2000),	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5. Comparison	  Across	  Cases	  
Different	  Strokes:	  A	  Comparison	  of	  Leadership	  Strategies	  
At	  the	  outset,	  this	  dissertation	  sought	  to	  study	  the	  different	  leadership	  
strategies	  that	  led	  to	  different	  outcomes	  in	  terms	  of	  exit	  from	  fragility.	  The	  cases	  
examined	  in	  this	  dissertation	  offer	  interesting	  insights	  into	  the	  different	  
approaches	  taken	  by	  the	  national	  executives	  of	  Zimbabwe,	  Uganda,	  Rwanda,	  and	  
South	  Africa.	  More	  specifically,	  the	  dissertation	  examined	  the	  extent	  of	  political	  
inclusion,	  economic	  inclusive	  growth,	  and	  the	  approach	  to	  security	  and	  justice,	  as	  
pillars	  of	  a	  leadership	  strategy	  of	  each	  national	  executive.	  	  
There	  are	  two	  particularly	  important	  insights	  that	  emerge	  from	  the	  in-­‐
depth	  analysis	  of	  the	  country	  case	  studies.	  The	  first	  insight	  is	  related	  to	  the	  
sustainability	  of	  the	  exit	  from	  fragility	  based	  on	  the	  strategy	  adopted	  by	  the	  change	  
agent	  and	  the	  interaction	  of	  the	  agent	  with	  the	  structural	  aspects	  of	  development.	  
The	  other	  insight	  has	  more	  to	  do	  with	  the	  personal	  agency	  aspect	  of	  the	  leader	  and	  
is	  specifically	  related	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  leader	  exit	  or	  how	  the	  leaders	  give	  up	  power.	  
This	  issue	  becomes	  significant	  given	  that	  disorderly	  or	  violent	  leadership	  exits	  can	  
lead	  to	  a	  relapse	  into	  fragility.	  	  
Mugabe’s	  Leadership	  Strategy	  
	  
In	  Zimbabwe,	  Robert	  Mugabe	  oversaw	  the	  transition	  from	  what	  was	  a	  
hopeful	  democracy	  to	  political,	  social	  and	  economic	  collapse.	  Mugabe’s	  strategy	  at	  
the	  outset	  was	  to	  strengthen	  the	  state	  institutions	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  control	  and	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power.	  Though	  he	  initially	  called	  for	  reconciliation	  between	  the	  White	  minority	  
and	  the	  Black	  majority,	  he	  did	  not	  follow	  this	  up	  with	  concrete	  actions	  to	  heal	  the	  
divisions	  in	  society.	  	  
Instead,	  Mugabe	  directed	  Government	  resources	  and	  established	  a	  network	  
of	  patronage	  and	  corruption	  to	  bolster	  support	  for	  his	  rule.	  For	  example,	  Mugabe	  
disbursed	  gratuities	  to	  party	  elites,	  rural	  peasants,	  war	  veterans	  and	  the	  military	  in	  
order	  to	  strengthen	  his	  ruling	  coalition.	  To	  deflect	  criticism	  of	  his	  failed	  policies,	  
he	  used	  angry	  rhetoric	  to	  frame	  the	  threat	  to	  black	  Zimbabweans	  as	  one	  from	  
white	  neo-­‐colonialists	  and	  former	  colonial	  powers,	  and	  resorted	  to	  white	  farm	  
invasions.	  His	  intentions	  regarding	  reconciliation	  became	  quite	  clear,	  and	  it	  was	  
also	  clear	  that	  he	  would	  stop	  at	  nothing	  to	  maintain	  power,	  even	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  
economic	  ruin.	  	  
Mugabe’s	  approach	  to	  political	  participation	  was	  not	  inclusive	  of	  the	  White	  
minority	  and	  the	  non-­‐Shona	  speaking	  people	  in	  Zimbabwe.	  Mugabe	  and	  the	  
ZANU-­‐PF	  elite	  followed	  reckless	  fiscal	  policies	  and	  ran-­‐up	  big	  budget	  deficits.	  The	  
focus	  was	  not	  so	  much	  on	  creation	  of	  jobs	  or	  a	  sustainable	  economic	  system,	  but	  
rather	  on	  the	  strategic	  disbursement	  of	  economic	  goods	  to	  a	  narrow	  coalition	  that	  
was	  responsible	  for	  keeping	  Mugabe	  and	  his	  corrupt	  elites	  in	  power.	  	  
Dissent	  of	  any	  form	  was	  not	  tolerated,	  and	  the	  government	  routinely	  
resorted	  to	  using	  the	  state	  apparatus	  to	  perpetrate	  violence	  against	  any	  opposition	  
leaders,	  in	  addition	  to	  the	  White	  minority.	  The	  White	  minority	  was	  often	  singled	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out	  and	  targeted	  for	  state	  supported	  violence	  in	  order	  to	  detract	  attention	  from	  the	  
Government’s	  failed	  economic	  and	  political	  policies.	  	  
Mugabe	  thus	  sought	  to	  strengthen	  the	  coercive	  apparatus	  of	  Government	  
and	  avoided	  the	  installation	  of	  any	  checks-­‐and-­‐balances	  institutions	  that	  would	  
pose	  any	  challenge	  or	  threat	  to	  his	  authority.	  His	  strategy	  has	  been	  limited	  to	  
maintaining	  power,	  and	  focused	  on	  the	  plunder	  of	  state	  resources	  to	  maintain	  his	  
narrow	  coalition	  of	  elites,	  through	  whom	  he	  ruled	  Zimbabwe	  for	  nearly	  thirty	  
years.	  	  
As	  a	  result	  of	  his	  economic	  policies	  the	  Zimbabwean	  dollar,	  which	  had	  
parity	  with	  the	  US	  dollar,	  is	  now	  nearly	  worthless.	  The	  country’s	  GDP	  shrunk	  by	  
more	  than	  half	  over	  the	  last	  decade	  and	  the	  country’s	  economy	  deteriorated	  from	  
being	  one	  of	  the	  World’s	  strongest	  to	  the	  World’s	  weakest.	  Mugabe	  and	  his	  elite	  
coalition	  have	  followed	  an	  authoritarian-­‐exclusive	  approach	  to	  leadership	  and	  are	  
responsible	  for	  Zimbabwe’s	  sorry	  state	  of	  affairs	  today.	  	  
As	  a	  leader,	  it	  appears	  as	  though	  Mugabe	  did	  not	  have	  an	  exit	  strategy,	  and	  
sought	  to	  rule	  over	  Zimbabwe	  for	  life.	  Even	  when	  he	  was	  voted	  out	  in	  2008,	  
Mugabe	  and	  his	  elite	  did	  not	  cede	  power	  to	  the	  MDC,	  and	  resorted	  to	  violence	  to	  
keep	  the	  power.	  They	  eventually	  had	  to	  agree	  to	  a	  power-­‐sharing	  agreement	  that	  
continues	  till	  date.	  However,	  Mugabe	  has	  continually	  resorted	  to	  violence	  to	  
intimidate	  and	  keep	  his	  hold	  on	  power.	  	  
Figure	  5-­‐1	  below	  is	  a	  heuristic	  depiction	  of	  Mugabe’s	  non-­‐inclusive	  
leadership	  strategy,	  which	  led	  to	  an	  exacerbation	  of	  fragility.	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Figure	  5-­‐1:	  Robert	  Mugabe's	  Leadership	  Strategy	  
Note:	  In	  this	  heuristic	  depiction	  of	  the	  leadership	  strategy	  of	  national	  executives	  and	  their	  
coalitions,	  I	  use	  three	  values	  –	  low	  (0.33),	  medium	  (0.67)	  and	  high	  (1.00)	  to	  indicate	  exacerbating	  
fragility,	  neutral,	  and	  alleviating	  fragility	  outcomes.	  	  
Museveni’s	  Leadership	  Strategy	  
	  
In	  Uganda,	  Yoweri	  Museveni	  sought	  to	  exit	  from	  fragility	  by	  reducing	  
conflict	  through	  the	  use	  of	  force	  and	  strengthening	  the	  government	  apparatus.	  
Museveni	  argued	  that	  multi-­‐party	  politics	  would	  only	  exacerbate	  an	  already	  fragile	  
society.	  This	  made	  sense	  in	  Uganda,	  given	  its	  violent	  history	  of	  fractious,	  ethnicity-­‐
based	  politics.	  The	  suffering	  in	  Uganda	  had	  been	  so	  widespread	  and	  deep-­‐rooted	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A	  majority	  of	  Ugandans	  appreciated	  Museveni’s	  call	  for	  respect	  for	  human	  
rights	  and	  the	  investigation	  of	  past	  abuses.	  He	  sought	  to	  promote	  popular	  
participation	  in	  Government	  through	  the	  system	  of	  Resistance	  Councils.	  	  
Uganda	  has	  had	  over	  20	  years	  of	  uninterrupted	  economic	  growth,	  a	  huge	  
achievement	  for	  a	  landlocked	  African	  country.	  The	  recovery	  owes	  much	  to	  the	  
return	  of	  political	  stability	  and	  peace	  in	  most	  of	  the	  country	  under	  the	  government	  
of	  Museveni.	  The	  benefits	  of	  development,	  however,	  have	  been	  skewed	  in	  favor	  of	  
Museveni’s	  traditional	  supporters	  from	  the	  South	  and	  Southwest.	  The	  North	  and	  
Eastern	  parts	  of	  the	  country	  continue	  to	  be	  mired	  in	  poverty.	  	  
Museveni	  has	  resisted	  strengthening	  checks-­‐and-­‐balance	  institutions	  and	  in	  
fact	  regressed	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  media	  and	  political	  freedoms.	  
The	  state	  is	  still	  very	  much	  in	  charge,	  and	  unfortunately	  for	  Uganda,	  it	  seems	  
wedded	  to	  Museveni’s	  own	  ambitions.	  It	  is	  unclear	  as	  to	  what	  will	  be	  the	  fate	  of	  a	  
post-­‐Museveni	  Uganda.	  	  
It	  appears	  that	  Museveni,	  also,	  does	  not	  have	  a	  clear	  exit	  strategy.	  During	  
the	  early	  days	  of	  his	  presidency,	  Museveni	  had	  criticized	  African	  leaders	  who	  
sought	  to	  cling	  onto	  power	  for	  more	  than	  15	  years.	  Now,	  Museveni	  has	  been	  in	  
power	  for	  25	  years,	  and	  has	  resorted	  to	  undemocratic	  means	  like	  vote	  rigging,	  
intimidation	  of	  opposition	  leaders,	  and	  manipulation	  of	  the	  constitution,	  to	  ensure	  
his	  continued	  hold	  on	  power.	  There	  is	  concern	  among	  scholars	  that	  Uganda	  may	  
be	  another	  Zimbabwe	  in	  the	  making.	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Uganda	  risks	  losing	  the	  valuable	  progress	  it	  has	  made	  since	  1986,	  due	  to	  
Museveni’s	  personal	  ambition	  and	  inability	  to	  exit	  office	  gracefully.	  See	  Figure	  5-­‐2	  
for	  a	  heuristic	  depiction	  of	  Museveni’s	  leadership	  strategy.	  	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐2:	  Yoweri	  Museveni's	  Leadership	  Strategy	  
Kagame’s	  Leadership	  Strategy	  
	  
In	  Rwanda,	  Paul	  Kagame	  faced	  a	  divided	  society	  with	  a	  horrific	  genocide	  
fresh	  in	  public	  memory.	  Like	  Museveni,	  Kagame	  moved	  to	  first	  strengthen	  
Government	  institutions	  and	  the	  army	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  peace	  would	  
hold	  in	  the	  aftermath	  of	  years	  of	  violence.	  He	  brought	  individuals	  from	  both	  Hutu	  
and	  Tutsi	  backgrounds	  in	  the	  reconstitution	  of	  the	  Government.	  	  
After	  ensuring	  that	  there	  was	  a	  degree	  of	  stability,	  the	  Government	  focused	  
on	  economic	  issues	  and	  poverty	  reduction.	  With	  the	  stated	  aim	  of	  making	  Rwanda	  
a	  middle-­‐income	  country	  by	  2020,	  Kagame	  and	  his	  team	  sought	  to	  establish	  an	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the	  establishment	  of	  Government	  agencies	  focused	  on	  education	  and	  job	  growth.	  	  
Kagame	  and	  the	  RPF	  Government	  outlawed	  ethnicity	  based	  discrimination,	  
and	  instituted	  the	  Truth	  and	  Reconciliation	  Commission	  to	  address	  the	  divisions	  
in	  society.	  There	  was	  a	  focus	  on	  ensuring	  that	  the	  perpetrators	  of	  the	  genocide	  
were	  brought	  to	  justice.	  	  
In	  the	  political	  realm,	  Kagame’s	  Government	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  able	  to	  shape	  
an	  inclusive	  political	  system	  in	  a	  country	  used	  to	  exclusionary	  politics.	  The	  Tutsis	  
are	  still	  very	  much	  in	  control.	  To	  his	  credit,	  however,	  Kagame	  took	  the	  initiative	  to	  
organize	  consultative	  discussions	  about	  the	  future	  of	  Rwanda	  in	  1997-­‐98,	  unlike	  
Museveni’s	  more	  centralized	  approach.	  	  
The	  Vision	  2020	  project	  was	  developed	  collaboratively	  and	  has	  become	  a	  
high-­‐level	  vision	  for	  Rwanda’s	  future.	  One	  of	  the	  key	  ingredients	  of	  this	  vision	  was	  
building	  peace	  and	  security	  to	  facilitate	  productive	  initiatives.	  This	  would	  help	  
realize	  the	  main	  goal	  of	  the	  vision:	  to	  transform	  Rwanda	  into	  a	  modern,	  strong,	  
and	  united	  nation,	  proud	  of	  its	  fundamental	  values,	  politically	  stable,	  and	  without	  
discrimination	  among	  its	  citizens.	  	  
Rwanda	  faces	  two	  daunting	  challenges	  in	  the	  years	  ahead.	  One	  of	  these	  
challenges	  has	  to	  do	  with	  the	  nature	  of	  post-­‐genocide	  Rwanda.	  Numerous	  
genocide	  perpetrators	  fled	  across	  the	  border	  into	  the	  DRC.	  These	  Hutu	  militias	  
continue	  to	  wait	  for	  an	  opportunity	  to	  strike	  back	  at	  the	  Kagame’s	  Government.268	  
The	  other	  challenge	  is	  that	  of	  Kagame	  himself.	  It	  is	  unclear	  as	  to	  whether	  Kagame	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
268	  Gérard	  Prunier,	  From	  Genocide	  to	  Continental	  War:	  The	  "Congolese"	  Conflict	  and	  the	  Crisis	  of	  Contemporary	  Africa,	  
(London,	  UK:	  C.	  Hurst	  &	  Co,	  2009),	  193.	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can	  institute	  a	  system	  that	  ensures	  an	  orderly	  transfer	  of	  power	  to	  the	  next	  elected	  
leader.	  If	  Kagame	  continues	  to	  cling	  onto	  power	  like	  others	  before	  him,	  it	  could	  
lead	  to	  a	  continuation	  of	  the	  vicious	  cycle	  of	  violent	  revolution.	  	  
Kagame’s	  exit	  strategy	  is	  unclear	  as	  well,	  though	  he	  has	  stated	  that	  he	  
would	  respect	  the	  two-­‐term	  limit	  for	  presidents	  in	  Rwanda.	  Recent	  efforts	  by	  his	  
Government	  to	  limit	  political	  opposition	  through	  intimidation	  and	  targeted	  killing	  
are	  contrary	  to	  the	  official	  rhetoric	  of	  political	  inclusion	  and	  reconciliation.	  See	  
Figure	  5-­‐3	  for	  a	  heuristic	  depiction	  of	  Kagame’s	  leadership	  strategy.	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐3:	  Paul	  Kagame's	  Leadership	  Strategy	  
Mandela’s	  Leadership	  Strategy	  
	  
In	  South	  Africa,	  Nelson	  Mandela	  was	  part	  of	  the	  struggle	  for	  equal	  rights	  for	  
Africans,	  and	  became	  the	  symbol	  of	  the	  ANC’s	  struggle	  against	  Apartheid.	  	  In	  
general,	  Mandela	  strengthened	  the	  institutional	  bases	  of	  power	  with	  which	  he	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This	  is	  probably	  his	  strongest	  achievement.	  Incorporating	  different	  races	  and	  
ethnicities	  into	  a	  community	  of	  South	  African	  citizens	  was	  Mandela’s	  imperative.	  
Without	  genuine	  attempts	  at	  reconciliation,	  Mandela	  knew	  that	  most	  White	  South	  
Africans	  would	  flee	  abroad,	  causing	  economic	  chaos	  in	  South	  Africa.	  Though	  he	  
faced	  considerable	  opposition	  from	  his	  ANC	  colleagues,	  Mandela	  stood	  firm	  in	  his	  
commitment	  to	  a	  sincere	  process	  of	  reconciliation.	  	  
Mandela’s	  genuineness	  and	  sincerity	  towards	  reconciliation	  was	  understood	  
and	  appreciated	  by	  Afrikaners.	  His	  speeches	  and	  conduct	  after	  the	  1994	  election	  
results	  went	  a	  long	  way	  in	  helping	  calm	  nerves	  and	  even	  helped	  the	  South	  African	  
leadership	  win	  friends	  internationally.	  Mandela	  undertook	  a	  series	  of	  policy	  
reviews	  to	  redefine	  the	  government’s	  priorities,	  including	  government	  support	  for	  
human	  rights.	  	  
Mandela	  supported	  multilateral	  initiatives	  to	  assert	  South	  Africa’s	  role	  in	  
the	  African	  continent.	  He	  advocated	  an	  expansion	  of	  South	  Africa’s	  military	  and	  
sought	  to	  promote	  South	  Africa’s	  role	  in	  Africa	  as	  the	  continent’s	  regional	  power.	  
Mandela	  ensured	  that	  there	  would	  be	  no	  restriction	  on	  free	  speech.	  	  His	  
administration	  allowed	  complete	  freedom	  of	  the	  press,	  even	  though	  it	  meant	  that	  
the	  media	  could	  come	  down	  against	  him	  and	  the	  ANC.	  	  
Mandela	  and	  his	  administration	  instituted	  broad-­‐based	  economic	  policies	  
but	  were	  only	  moderately	  successful	  in	  their	  efforts.	  South	  Africa	  still	  has	  
unemployment	  rates	  in	  the	  range	  of	  25	  percent	  and	  faces	  growing	  income	  
inequality.	  To	  Mandela’s	  credit,	  however,	  he	  was	  able	  to	  ensure	  the	  transition	  of	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South	  Africa	  from	  being	  a	  racial	  autocracy	  into	  a	  multi-­‐racial	  democracy	  full	  of	  
hope	  for	  the	  future.	  	  
Mandela	  stepped	  down	  after	  serving	  one	  term	  as	  South	  Africa’s	  president.	  
His	  graceful	  exit	  serves	  as	  an	  example	  for	  other	  national	  executives	  who	  seem	  to	  
yield	  to	  the	  temptation	  of	  staying	  on	  in	  power	  even	  after	  they	  complete	  their	  
terms.	  	  See	  Figure	  5-­‐4	  for	  a	  heuristic	  depiction	  of	  Mandela’s	  leadership	  strategy.	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐4:	  Nelson	  Mandela's	  Leadership	  Strategy	  
Comparison	  of	  Leadership	  Strategies	  
	  
In	  terms	  of	  comparing	  the	  leadership	  strategies,	  Table	  5-­‐1	  provides	  a	  more	  
detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  approach	  of	  each	  of	  the	  leaders	  to	  political	  participation	  
and	  inclusion,	  economic	  growth	  and	  inclusion,	  and	  security	  and	  justice.	  This	  
comparison	  is	  based	  on	  the	  framework	  for	  analyzing	  leadership	  strategy	  related	  to	  
fragility	  developed	  in	  Chapter	  4	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  	  















	   275	  
Table	  5-­‐1:	  Comparison	  of	  Leadership	  Strategies	  
Leadership	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Sequencing	  and	  Prioritizing	  Reform	  
The	  comparison	  of	  leadership	  strategies	  employed	  by	  the	  different	  leaders	  
reveals	  differences	  in	  the	  sequencing	  of	  governance	  strategies.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  
see	  that	  Yoweri	  Museveni	  of	  Uganda	  and	  Paul	  Kagame	  of	  Rwanda	  have	  employed	  
similar	  strategies	  in	  helping	  alleviate	  fragility	  in	  their	  countries,	  while	  Robert	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Mugabe	  of	  Zimbabwe	  and	  Nelson	  Mandela	  of	  South	  Africa	  have	  followed	  strategies	  
that	  are	  poles	  apart.	  	  
Research	  at	  the	  World	  Bank	  has	  shown	  that	  countries	  follow	  different	  
strategies	  while	  pursuing	  governance	  reform.	  In	  terms	  of	  sequencing	  of	  strategies,	  
the	  trajectories	  of	  progress	  differ	  from	  country	  to	  country	  by	  virtue	  of	  their	  unique	  
structural	  factors,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  leadership	  strategy.	  	  
In	  a	  2007	  World	  Bank	  report	  on	  governance	  reform,	  Brian	  Levy	  notes	  that	  
individual	  countries	  show	  a	  strikingly	  uneven	  mix	  of	  strengths	  and	  weaknesses	  
across	  different	  institutions	  and	  governance	  outcomes.269	  
	  
Figure	  5-­‐5:	  Sequencing	  Governance	  Reform270	  
In	  the	  first	  trajectory,	  the	  political	  leadership	  takes	  power	  and	  focuses	  
primarily	  on	  liberalizing	  the	  economy	  and	  strengthening	  the	  performance	  of	  the	  
public	  sector	  –	  and	  considers	  checks-­‐and-­‐balance	  institutions	  a	  lower	  priority.	  
Museveni	  in	  Uganda	  and	  Kagame	  in	  Rwanda	  have	  adopted	  this	  approach.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
269	  See	  Brian	  Levy,	  Governance	  Reform:	  Bridging	  Monitoring	  and	  Action,	  (Washington	  DC:	  The	  World	  Bank,	  2007).	  	  
270	  See	  The	  World	  Bank,	  Global	  Monitoring	  Report,	  (Washington	  DC:	  The	  World	  Bank,	  2006).	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Economic	  growth	  can	  be	  rapid	  in	  this	  scenario,	  but	  if	  the	  country	  leadership	  and	  
reformers	  wait	  too	  long	  to	  put	  the	  challenge	  of	  strengthening	  checks	  and	  balances	  
on	  the	  agenda,	  the	  consequence	  (as	  in	  Indonesia	  during	  the	  later	  Suharto	  years)	  
can	  be	  rising	  corruption,	  financial	  crisis,	  a	  difficult	  process	  of	  political	  succession	  
and	  a	  reversal	  of	  earlier	  gains.	  Mugabe’s	  approach	  would	  be	  one	  of	  trying	  to	  
strengthen	  government,	  without	  addressing	  the	  strength	  of	  checks	  and	  balance	  
institutions.	  
In	  the	  second	  trajectory,	  a	  country	  moves	  towards	  political	  pluralism.	  
Albania	  in	  the	  early	  1990s	  and	  Indonesia	  more	  recently	  are	  examples	  of	  this	  
approach.	  Only	  sometimes	  does	  this	  political	  openness	  translate	  into	  stronger	  
Government	  capacity.	  Such	  a	  trajectory	  could	  also	  cause	  a	  country	  to	  be	  trapped	  in	  
a	  cycle	  of	  what	  Thomas	  Carothers	  calls	  “feckless	  pluralism,”	  with	  short-­‐lived	  
Governments	  repeatedly	  voted	  out	  of	  power.	  These	  Governments	  do	  not	  have	  the	  
sufficient	  support	  or	  time	  to	  build	  the	  basis	  of	  institutional	  capacity	  on	  which	  
effectiveness	  and	  legitimacy	  will	  eventually	  be	  restored.271	  Museveni	  and	  Kagame	  
were	  fearful	  of	  this	  outcome	  and	  hence,	  chose	  to	  prioritize	  the	  stability	  and	  
strength	  of	  the	  Government	  versus	  opening	  up	  the	  country	  to	  multi-­‐party	  
democracy,	  and	  provision	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  that	  come	  along	  with	  such	  a	  
transition.	  	  
In	  the	  third	  trajectory,	  following	  regime	  collapse,	  international	  intervention	  
or	  support	  helps	  to	  provide	  an	  umbrella	  of	  security	  under	  which	  both	  the	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  Thomas	  Carrothers,	  “The	  End	  of	  the	  Transition	  Paradigm,”	  Journal	  of	  Democracy,	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  1,	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government	  and	  checks-­‐and-­‐balances	  institutions	  are	  strengthened	  side-­‐by-­‐side.	  
Mozambique	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  country	  that	  appears	  to	  have	  followed	  a	  balanced	  
trajectory.	  	  
It	  is	  arguable	  that	  South	  Africa,	  post-­‐Apartheid,	  was	  in	  a	  fragile	  situation.	  
There	  had	  been	  widespread	  riots	  and	  violence,	  and	  the	  economy	  was	  teetering	  on	  
collapse.	  In	  such	  a	  situation,	  Mandela	  sought	  to	  steady	  the	  ship	  by	  continuing	  on	  a	  
path	  of	  reconciliation,	  coupled	  with	  institutional	  strengthening,	  as	  well	  as	  
ensuring	  the	  efficacy	  of	  checks-­‐and-­‐balances	  institutions.	  	  	  
Thus,	  a	  comparison	  of	  the	  leadership	  approaches	  of	  the	  four	  cases	  presents	  
an	  interesting	  picture	  of	  different	  leadership	  strategies.	  The	  national	  executives	  
studied	  in	  the	  dissertation	  utilized	  different	  strategies	  to	  address	  their	  own	  unique	  
contexts,	  but	  they	  had	  to	  address	  the	  common	  issues	  of	  political	  fragmentation,	  
security,	  and	  economic	  growth.	  	  
Mugabe’s	  approach	  was	  more	  authoritarian	  in	  nature,	  and	  the	  veneer	  of	  
consultative	  and	  consensus	  based	  politics	  evaporated	  in	  the	  first	  few	  years	  of	  the	  
regime.	  Mugabe	  only	  focused	  on	  strengthening	  the	  coercive	  apparatus	  to	  help	  
maintain	  control	  and	  as	  a	  result	  was	  able	  to	  reap	  the	  dividends	  of	  the	  peace	  effect	  
for	  the	  first	  ten	  years	  of	  his	  regime.	  Without	  a	  clear	  exit	  strategy,	  Mugabe	  fell	  prey	  
to	  the	  disease	  of	  “life-­‐long	  rulership,”	  that	  seems	  to	  afflict	  many	  rulers	  in	  Africa	  and	  
the	  Middle	  East.	  	  
Kagame	  and	  Museveni	  used	  more	  broad	  based	  strategies	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  
establishing	  security	  and	  economic	  growth,	  but	  did	  not	  fully	  open	  up	  to	  political	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consultation.	  Though	  they	  sought	  to	  establish	  a	  stronger	  government	  apparatus	  to	  
ensure	  security	  and	  stability	  at	  first,	  they	  have	  succumbed	  to	  allowing	  this	  power	  
to	  be	  used	  against	  any	  opposition	  to	  their	  regime.	  Museveni	  in	  particular	  has	  not	  
indicated	  what	  is	  his	  leadership	  exit	  strategy	  and	  as	  a	  result,	  the	  durability	  of	  
Uganda’s	  exit	  from	  fragility	  is	  still	  unclear.	  Kagame	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  has	  declared	  
that	  he	  will	  step	  down	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  second	  term	  as	  president	  in	  2016.	  Whether	  
he	  is	  able	  to	  strengthen	  Rwanda’s	  institutions	  in	  the	  next	  five	  years,	  so	  that	  they	  
can	  endure	  and	  evolve	  beyond	  his	  exit	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  	  
In	  South	  Africa,	  Mandela	  followed	  a	  largely	  inclusive,	  broad-­‐based	  
leadership	  strategy,	  and	  handled	  the	  issue	  of	  leaving	  office	  in	  a	  graceful	  manner.	  
Though	  his	  economic	  record	  is	  mixed,	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  his	  administration’s	  
focus	  was	  on	  political	  and	  social	  reconciliation.	  Mandela	  paved	  the	  way	  for	  the	  
institution	  of	  leadership	  to	  take	  root	  in	  the	  fledgling	  democracy.	  	  
When	  interpreted	  together	  with	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  data	  analysis,	  it	  appears	  
that	  an	  inclusive	  leadership	  strategy,	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  political,	  economic	  and	  
security	  aspects,	  helps	  sustain	  an	  exit	  from	  fragility.	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6. Insights	  and	  Implications	  
Politics	  is	  at	  the	  core	  of	  development.	  Though	  natural	  and	  human	  resources	  
are	  important,	  what	  seems	  to	  matter	  most	  is	  how	  governments	  manage	  those	  
resources.	  The	  role	  of	  governance	  is	  critical	  to	  whether	  a	  country	  makes	  economic	  
and	  social	  progress	  or	  not.	  	  
Development,	  however	  it	  is	  defined,	  involves	  economic,	  social	  and	  political	  
changes	  in	  society.	  	  Such	  change	  is	  shaped	  by	  ideas,	  engages	  interests	  and	  
proceeds	  within	  rules	  and	  norms	  set	  by	  political	  institutions.	  Since	  the	  structure	  of	  
political	  institutions	  is	  influenced	  by	  human	  agency,	  leadership	  becomes	  a	  critical	  
factor	  that	  merits	  its	  own	  research	  agenda.	  	  
This	  chapter	  seeks	  to	  draw	  together	  the	  insights	  obtained	  during	  the	  course	  
of	  the	  study	  and	  outlines	  some	  of	  the	  implications	  for	  policies	  of	  development	  
assistance.	  	  
Insights	  
Insight	  1:	  The	  Important	  Role	  of	  Leadership	  in	  Establishing	  Institutions	  for	  
Development	  
Leaders	  and	  their	  elite	  coalitions	  are	  crucial	  agents	  in	  establishing	  the	  basis	  
for	  political	  and	  economic	  institutional	  foundations	  of	  effective	  states.	  The	  process	  
of	  establishment	  of	  these	  institutions	  in	  fragile	  and	  post-­‐conflict	  states	  often	  
requires	  societal	  reconciliation	  and	  security	  for	  citizens.	  These	  are	  both	  bottom-­‐up	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and	  top-­‐down	  processes	  in	  which	  the	  role	  of	  leaders	  and	  coalitions	  across	  multiple	  
levels	  is	  fundamental.	  	  
From	  the	  data	  analysis	  and	  the	  country	  case	  studies	  in	  the	  preceding	  
chapters,	  it	  is	  evident	  that	  agency	  plays	  a	  clear	  role	  in	  determining	  the	  
development	  trajectory	  of	  fragile	  states	  post-­‐transition.	  	  
The	  ‘structure-­‐agency’	  debate	  has	  been	  going	  on	  for	  many	  decades	  in	  the	  
social	  sciences.272	  The	  structure-­‐agency	  problem	  is	  about	  the	  key	  issue	  of	  how	  to	  
explain	  socio-­‐economic	  and	  political	  behavior.	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  there	  are	  
explanations	  that	  give	  emphasis	  to	  structural	  and	  institutional	  factors	  that	  shape	  
and	  govern	  behavior;	  and	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  there	  are	  explanations	  that	  place	  
greater	  emphasis	  on	  the	  autonomy	  of	  agents	  and	  agency.	  Both	  structure	  and	  
agency	  are	  important.	  	  	  
Leadership	  as	  an	  institution	  is	  paramount	  because	  it	  provides	  a	  
transitioning	  society	  with	  the	  means	  to	  solve	  problems,	  make	  decisions,	  and	  craft	  
policies.	  Leaders	  can	  help	  shape	  institutions	  that	  reduce	  uncertainty.273	  
There	  is	  widespread	  agreement	  in	  the	  international	  community	  and	  among	  
researchers	  that	  institutions	  matter	  for	  stable	  and	  secure	  states,	  economic	  growth,	  
political	  democracy	  and	  inclusive	  social	  development.	  Policy	  makers	  and	  
international	  financial	  institutions	  have	  been	  insisting	  on	  the	  adoption	  of	  
‘appropriate’	  political,	  economic	  and	  social	  institutions	  in	  the	  belief	  that	  these	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  Anthony	  Giddens,	  Central	  Problems	  in	  Social	  Theory:	  Action,	  Structure,	  and	  Contradiction	  in	  Social	  Analysis,	  (London,	  
UK:	  Macmillan,	  1979).	  
273	  See	  Douglass	  C.	  North,	  Institutions,	  Institutional	  Change	  and	  Economic	  Performance,	  (Cambridge,	  UK:	  Cambridge	  
University	  Press,	  1990).	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would	  promote	  economic	  growth,	  accountability	  and	  responsiveness	  through	  good	  
economic	  governance	  and	  political	  democracy.274	  It	  takes	  effective	  leadership	  to	  
achieve	  this.	  	  
The	  cross-­‐country	  panel	  data	  analysis	  in	  this	  dissertation	  supports	  the	  
hypothesis	  that	  leadership	  change	  and	  fragility	  are	  related.	  The	  cases	  analyzed	  in	  
this	  dissertation	  lend	  support	  to	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  leadership	  is	  crucial	  in	  
establishing	  policies	  and	  institutions	  that	  in	  turn	  determine	  the	  development	  
trajectories	  of	  nations.	  	  
Insight	  2:	  Differentiated	  Leadership	  Strategies	  –	  Key	  role	  of	  sequencing	  
political	  participation	  of	  inclusion	  
While	  Mugabe’s	  strategy	  seems	  to	  have	  led	  to	  all-­‐round	  deleterious	  
outcomes,	  and	  Mandela	  managed	  a	  very	  effective	  transition,	  the	  more	  nuanced	  
implications	  and	  issues	  arise	  from	  the	  intermediate	  cases	  of	  Museveni’s	  Uganda	  
and	  Kagame’s	  Rwanda.	  Both	  achieved	  a	  measure	  of	  security,	  and	  strong	  economic	  
outcomes,	  but	  felt	  it	  essential	  to	  allow	  hesitant,	  limited	  or	  even	  retreating	  political	  
participation.	  	  This	  raises	  a	  key	  issue	  of	  what	  is	  the	  appropriate	  sequencing	  of	  
political	  participation;	  while	  limiting	  political	  participation	  can	  lead	  to	  short-­‐term	  
gains	  in	  the	  consolidation	  of	  power,	  when	  does	  that	  prove	  to	  be	  unsustainable.	  	  	  
Fragile	  states	  are	  characterized	  by	  weak	  governance	  institutions,	  debilitated	  
economies,	  and	  prolonged	  vulnerability	  to	  conflict.	  In	  such	  situations,	  the	  new	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  See	  Adrian	  Leftwich	  and	  Steve	  Hogg,	  “Leadership	  for	  Development:	  The	  Role	  of	  Leaders,	  Elites,	  and	  Coalitions,”	  
Research	  and	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  Program	  2008-­‐2009,	  Global	  Integrity	  Alliance,	  (Canberra:	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government	  leadership	  must	  seek	  to	  restore	  security	  and	  stability	  as	  a	  priority.	  
Restoring	  confidence	  and	  legitimacy	  through	  inclusion	  and	  early,	  visible	  results	  at	  
local	  levels	  is	  important	  before	  embarking	  on	  wider	  institutional	  reform.	  	  
The	  leadership	  case	  studies	  in	  this	  dissertation	  demonstrated	  the	  
importance	  of	  trying	  to	  build	  inclusive	  coalitions	  in	  order	  to	  realize	  a	  transition	  
away	  from	  fragility.	  The	  2011	  World	  Development	  Report	  on	  Conflict,	  Security,	  and	  
Development	  emphasizes	  that	  coalition-­‐building	  efforts	  will	  only	  be	  successful	  if	  
they	  can	  address	  the	  underlying	  weaknesses	  that	  increase	  the	  risks	  of	  repeated	  
cycles	  of	  violence	  –	  deficits	  in	  security,	  justice,	  and	  job-­‐creation.	  	  
The	  World	  Development	  Report	  also	  outlines	  four	  key	  principles	  that	  can	  
help	  national	  leadership	  galvanize	  and	  sustain	  a	  virtuous	  cycle	  to	  address	  the	  
challenges	  of	  weak	  institutional	  capacity	  and	  repeated	  violence:	  
• Inclusion	  is	  important	  to	  restore	  confidence,	  but	  coalitions	  need	  not	  be	  “all-­‐
inclusive.”	  Inclusive-­‐enough	  coalitions	  work	  to	  build	  national	  support	  for	  
change	  and	  bring	  in	  relevant	  international	  stakeholders	  whose	  support	  is	  
required.	  At	  the	  local	  level,	  the	  coalitions	  can	  work	  with	  community	  leaders	  
and	  structures	  to	  identify	  priorities	  and	  deliver	  programs.	  Inclusive-­‐enough	  
coalitions	  help	  address	  violence	  through	  collaboration	  with	  community	  
leaders,	  parliaments,	  civil	  society,	  private	  sector,	  and	  with	  regional	  neighbors,	  
and	  donors.	  
• Some	  quick	  wins	  are	  required	  to	  build	  confidence	  of	  citizens	  and	  create	  
momentum	  for	  longer-­‐term	  institutional	  transformation.	  When	  trust	  is	  low,	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people	  do	  not	  believe	  in	  big	  reform	  plans.	  Some	  early	  results	  can	  help	  build	  
trust,	  restore	  confidence,	  and	  build	  momentum	  for	  reform.	  Sustained	  
economic	  growth	  and	  socio-­‐political	  development	  require	  complex	  structural	  
and	  institutional	  transformations	  that	  can	  take	  a	  generation.	  	  
• It	  makes	  sense	  to	  establish	  first	  the	  basic	  institutional	  functions	  that	  provide	  
citizen	  security,	  justice,	  and	  jobs,	  and	  ensure	  that	  the	  new	  initiatives	  do	  not	  
lose	  credibility	  due	  to	  corruption.	  Progress	  in	  these	  areas	  helps	  lay	  the	  
foundation	  for	  broader	  change	  that	  will	  require	  addressing	  the	  longer-­‐term	  
issues	  of	  social	  attitudes	  to	  marginalized	  groups,	  political	  reform,	  deeper	  
economic	  reform,	  and	  decentralization.	  
• Embrace	  pragmatic	  options	  to	  address	  immediate	  challenges.	  In	  post-­‐conflict	  
situations,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  be	  realistic	  and	  pragmatic	  in	  dealing	  with	  
challenges,	  and	  not	  wait	  for	  a	  perfect	  solution	  based	  on	  a	  single	  ideology.	  	  
This	  is	  also	  where	  the	  leaders	  studied	  in	  this	  dissertation	  diverged	  in	  their	  
approaches.	  A	  key	  insight	  emerging	  from	  the	  case	  studies	  is	  that	  inclusive-­‐enough	  
coalitions	  need	  to	  be	  managed	  dynamically;	  a	  coalition	  that	  is	  inclusive	  enough	  at	  
one	  point	  may	  not	  be	  sufficient	  or	  sustainable	  as	  the	  regime	  matures	  and	  pressures	  
build	  for	  strengthening	  political	  participation	  and	  inclusion.	  	  
Mugabe,	  Museveni,	  Kagame,	  and	  Mandela	  are	  from	  different	  backgrounds	  
and	  operated	  in	  different	  geo-­‐political	  and	  ethno-­‐historical	  contexts.	  They	  were	  
successful	  (or	  unsuccessful)	  to	  different	  extents	  in	  terms	  of	  managing	  the	  exits	  
from	  fragility	  and	  addressing	  the	  underlying	  issues	  of	  political	  fragmentation,	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security	  and	  justice,	  and	  economic	  growth.	  These	  divergent	  leadership	  strategies	  
involved	  addressing	  complex	  issues	  related	  to	  political	  participation	  and	  inclusion,	  
economic	  growth	  and	  inclusion,	  and	  security	  and	  justice.	  From	  the	  data	  analysis,	  
and	  the	  case	  studies,	  it	  appears	  as	  though	  an	  inclusive	  leadership	  strategy	  helps	  
put	  a	  country	  on	  the	  path	  out	  of	  fragility.	  	  
Insight	  3:	  Importance	  of	  Exit	  as	  Key	  Aspect	  of	  Effective	  Leadership	  Strategy	  
The	  issue	  of	  leadership	  exit	  or	  how	  leaders	  leave	  office	  is	  also	  worth	  more	  
systematic	  study.	  Leaders	  who	  leave	  at	  the	  end	  of	  their	  terms	  generally	  seem	  to	  
respect	  the	  institutional	  setup	  that	  has	  been	  put	  in	  place.	  This	  gives	  the	  
institutions	  an	  opportunity	  to	  take	  hold.	  	  
On	  the	  other	  hand,	  leaders	  who	  refuse	  to	  exit	  in	  accordance	  with	  
institutional	  and	  legal	  constraints,	  endanger	  the	  country’s	  exit	  from	  fragility.	  For	  
instance,	  Nelson	  Mandela’s	  exit	  at	  the	  end	  of	  his	  term	  cemented	  South	  Africa’s	  
transition	  to	  a	  multi-­‐party	  democracy.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Museveni’s	  
manipulation	  of	  institutions	  in	  order	  to	  continue	  as	  president	  of	  Uganda	  is	  putting	  
the	  country	  at	  risk	  of	  regressing	  into	  another	  violent	  struggle	  for	  power	  when	  
Museveni	  exits,	  and	  hence	  a	  regression	  back	  into	  fragility.	  The	  same	  challenge	  is	  
relevant	  to	  Kagame	  in	  Rwanda,	  whose	  future	  seems	  to	  be	  quite	  intertwined	  with	  
the	  president’s	  political	  fortunes.	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Insight	  4:	  The	  Need	  for	  Additional	  Rigorous	  Research	  on	  Leadership	  	  
Another	  implication	  is	  that	  the	  field	  of	  leadership	  for	  development	  needs	  
more	  analytical	  research	  that	  lends	  itself	  to	  empirical	  investigation.	  Since	  
leadership	  is	  an	  elusive	  construct	  riddled	  with	  so	  much	  ambiguity,	  it	  can	  be	  hard	  
even	  to	  define	  it,	  let	  alone	  study	  it	  systematically.	  However,	  the	  demand	  for	  
insights	  into	  leadership	  has	  only	  increased	  over	  time.	  	  
A	  majority	  of	  the	  leadership	  literature	  is	  focused	  on	  the	  corporate	  sector	  
and	  business	  organizations	  in	  the	  developed	  world.	  There	  has	  also	  not	  been	  a	  
systematic	  approach	  to	  studying	  the	  role	  of	  leadership	  in	  influencing	  development	  
outcomes.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  understand	  systematically	  the	  specific	  structural	  and	  
leadership	  contexts	  that	  influence	  development	  outcomes.	  Based	  on	  this	  
understanding,	  national	  leaders	  and	  international	  donor	  agencies	  could	  then	  make	  
more	  focused	  policies	  that	  address	  the	  specific	  contextual	  challenges.	  	  
The	  methodology	  developed	  in	  this	  dissertation	  could	  be	  significantly	  
improved	  upon	  to	  provide	  more	  convincing	  results	  and	  address	  more	  specific	  
questions	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  leadership	  that	  can	  promote	  a	  durable	  exit	  from	  
fragility.	  Additional	  research	  could	  be	  done	  to	  develop	  empirically	  measurable	  
indicators	  for	  the	  variables	  identified	  in	  the	  framework	  and	  panel	  data	  analysis	  of	  
these	  variables	  could	  be	  carried	  out	  as	  a	  later	  research	  project.	  	  
Conclusion	  
	  
	   This	  dissertation	  establishes	  the	  importance	  of	  leadership	  in	  determining	  
development	  outcomes	  in	  fragile	  states	  using	  a	  rigorous	  combination	  of	  both	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quantitative	  and	  qualitative	  methods.	  The	  dissertation	  conducted	  a	  panel	  data	  
analysis	  to	  determine	  whether	  there	  was	  a	  robust	  association	  between	  changes	  in	  
leadership	  and	  levels	  of	  fragility.	  Having	  found	  a	  strong	  association,	  the	  
dissertation	  then	  delved	  into	  in-­‐depth	  case	  studies.	  	  
The	  country	  case	  studies	  examined	  the	  role	  that	  agency	  plays	  in	  
determining	  development	  outcomes.	  The	  case	  studies	  provide	  support	  for	  the	  
hypothesis	  advanced	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  this	  dissertation.	  The	  nature	  of	  the	  
leadership	  strategy	  clearly	  impacts	  fragility	  outcomes	  and	  consequently	  the	  
sustainability	  of	  the	  transition	  away	  from	  fragility.	  	  
The	  dissertation	  provided	  the	  basis	  for	  a	  framework	  that	  could	  be	  further	  
developed	  to	  measure	  how	  specific	  leadership	  actions	  and	  policies	  impact	  fragility	  
outcomes.	  	  
This	  dissertation	  contributes	  to	  the	  scholarship	  on	  the	  role	  of	  leadership	  in	  
development.	  It	  also	  sets	  the	  stage	  for	  further,	  more	  refined	  research	  linking	  
elements	  of	  leadership	  to	  development	  outcomes.	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